We show that if identical members first decide on the sharing technology (stage I) taking into account their subsequent effort supply (stage II) decisions, the resulting contractarian sharing technology (constitution) channels individual self-seeking towards team (Pareto) optimum. Voting with one's feet and open entry can ensure symmetry and majoritarian decision making in the real world teams. The model helps explain the differential performance of the Israeli Kibbutz and the Russian Kolkhoz.

We first show that the Generalized Sharing mechanism which is exhaustive, allows a team of identical members voluntarily supplying the observable effort to attain Pareto efficient production under increasing returns provided team size is allowed to vary. We then show that where true effort is imperfectly observable (moral hazard) Pareto efficient production under nonconstant returns to scale is still attainable by varying team size.

The search for a systems‐level picture of metabolism as a web of molecular interactions provides a paradigmatic example of how the methods used to characterize a system can bias the interpretation of its functional meaning. Metabolic maps have been analyzed using novel techniques from network theory, revealing some non‐trivial, functionally relevant properties. These include a small‐world structure and hierarchical modularity. However, as discussed here, some of these properties might actually result from an inappropriate way of defining network interactions. Starting from (...) the so‐called bipartite organization of metabolism, where the two meaningful subsets (reactions and metabolites) are considered, most current works use only one of the subsets by means of so‐called graph projections. Unfortunately, projected graphs often ignore relevant biological and chemical constraints, thus leading to statistical artifacts. Some of these drawbacks and alternative approaches need to be properly addressed. (shrink)

The European Union Commission’s whitepaper on Artificial Intelligence proposes shaping the emerging AI market so that it better reflects common European values. It is a master plan that builds upon the EU AI High-Level Expert Group guidelines. This article reviews the masterplan, from a culture cycle perspective, to reflect on its potential clashes with current societal, technical, and methodological constraints. We identify two main obstacles in the implementation of this plan: the lack of a coherent EU vision to drive future (...) decision-making processes at state and local levels and the lack of methods to support a sustainable diffusion of AI in our society. The lack of a coherent vision stems from not considering societal differences across the EU member states. We suggest that these differences may lead to a fractured market and an AI crisis in which different members of the EU will adopt nation-centric strategies to exploit AI, thus preventing the development of a frictionless market as envisaged by the EU. Moreover, the Commission aims at changing the AI development culture proposing a human-centred and safety-first perspective that is not supported by methodological advancements, thus taking the risks of unforeseen social and societal impacts of AI. We discuss potential societal, technical, and methodological gaps that should be filled to avoid the risks of developing AI systems at the expense of society. Our analysis results in the recommendation that the EU regulators and policymakers consider how to complement the EC programme with rules and compensatory mechanisms to avoid market fragmentation due to local and global ambitions. Moreover, regulators should go beyond the human-centred approach establishing a research agenda seeking answers to the technical and methodological open questions regarding the development and assessment of human-AI co-action aiming for a sustainable AI diffusion in the society. (shrink)

As Plato’s Phaedrus 246c stipulates, every logos must be structured like a living being, i.e., the relation of all its parts to one another and to the whole must be appropriate. Thus, the present paper argues that Plato’s masterwork has been organized in accord with the ascent/descent movement as presented in the Allegory of the Cave: Book I represents eikasia, Books II–IV.434c exemplify pistis, Book IV.434d–444e illustrates dianoia and Books V–VII express noesis. Having reached the anabasis the philosopher turns to (...) the consideration of the deficient or unjust forms of the souls and the corresponding political regimes. Finally, the discussion comes back to eikasia through the renewed criticism of mimesis and the exposition of the Myth of Er. As is typical of Plato, this is not merely a formal matter, since the structure conveys that as the Good makes the Ideas intelligible, so the Sun, the Line and the Cave images also throw light on the whole dialogue. (shrink)

Aristotle's Definition of a Science of Being qua Being Selected Bibliography on the Meanings of Being in Aristotle The Place of Metaphysics in the Ancient Divisions of Philosophy The Peripatos after Aristotle's and the Origin of the Corpus Aristotelicum Bibliography on the Ancient Catalogues of Aristotle and the Corpus Aristotelicum Ancient Catalogues of Aristotle's Works: English studies Diogenes Laërtius, Lives, V 22-27 Hesychius of Miletus and Ptolemy al-Garib Listes Anciennes des Ouvrages d'Aristote: études en français Diogène Laërce, Vies V, 22-27 (...) Hésychius de Milet et Ptolémée el-Garib The Oblivion of Being After Aristotle: Theophrastus' Metaphysics.. (shrink)

En este trabajo ofreceré argumentos para mantener que el entorno co-textual de una expresión configura su significado y también conforma su referente. Donde el referente es resultado de una actividad metalingüística cuya base se encuentra en las operaciones lingüísticas de condensación, síntesis y reificación, entre otras. Lo anterior implica que se puede mantener una teoría referencial sin la necesidad de asumir compromisos ontológicos tal como lo manifestaron Russell y especialmente W. V. Quine. Me valdré de la construcción nominal “la radiación (...) adaptativa” con el objetivo de responder a qué tipo de entidades se refiere esta expresión. Una respuesta parcial e incompleta a esta interrogante la encontramos en Quine por esta razón intentaré desarrollarla más recurriendo a la lingüística operacional y a la lingüística de texto. In this paper I will offer arguments to show that the co-textual environment of an expression configures its meaning and also conforms its referent. Where reference is a result of a metalinguistic activity which is based on linguistic operations of condensation, synthesis and reification, among others. The above implies that we can maintain a referential theory without the necessity to assume ontological commitments as they manifested especially Russell and WV Quine. I will use the nominal construction “la radiación adaptativa” in order to respond to what kind of entities is covered by this expression. A partial and incomplete answer to this question is found in Quine for this reason I will try to develop appealing to operational linguistics and textual linguistics. (shrink)

"El libro presenta la posibilidad de una filosofía intercultural, que se basaría a su vez en un diálogo intercultural, entendido éste como alternativa histórica para transformar los modos de pensar vigentes"--Handbook of Latin American Studies, v. 58.

This study is based on the Acts of Peter, an apocryphal writing of the New Testament. The book, which is actually a work “pious”, popular and exemplary, recounts numerous episodes of magic. Of special interest to maintain the pulse Simon Peter vs Simon Magus, doing magic and miracles in Rome. The ideological background of the book is is an attack against the figure of the bad Roman emperors, whose model is Nerone, character ridiculed as murderer and persecutor of Christians.

This chapter argues that from a particularly weak recombination principle and plausible assumptions about the nature of parthood and location, it follows that it is possible that the mereological structure of the material world and that of space-time fail to correspond to one another in very radical ways. The chapter suggests, moreover, that rejecting the possibility of such failures of correspondence leaves us with a choice of no less unappealing alternatives. It also discusses a few ways in which their possibility (...) is relevant to various important debates in metaphysics. (shrink)

This reading companion and commentary on Lacan Seminar XXIII provides detailed analyses of Lacan's seminar while maintaining an overall continuity and consistency. This book does not purport to provide an exhaustive and systematic line-by-line reading of a very complex and varied seminar. Rather it selects key themes of Lacanian theory that are found present throughout his work. In addition, the book does not try to simplify Lacan's ambiguous style, leaving the text open to different interpretations, while providing theory, commentary, and (...) lines of analysis into some of Lacan's important insights. Finally, this book is not about Joyce the writer, but more about the use that Lacan makes of Joyce. Its purpose is not to apply psychoanalysis to a literary subject, but rather to use the literary text to illustrate and develop psychoanalytic theory, and Lacanian theory in particular. It is an analysis of topology and language, or a linguisterie, as Lacan called it, for clinicians. The references to neurosis and psychosis are always there. However, a Lacanian clinic can also be of service to those interested in literary theory and/or social studies to develop theory within their own respective fields of studies. (shrink)

Exploring how a Freudian-Lacanian approach to psychoanalysis intersects with social and cultural theory, Lacan, Jouissance and the Social Sciences demonstrates the significance of subjectivity as a concept for the study of leadership, social psychology, culture, and political theory. Raul Moncayo examines Lacan's notion of surplus jouissance in relation to four types of socio-economic value: Productive Value, Exchange Value, Surplus Value and Profit. Also drawing on the work of Slavoj Žižek, Moncayo contends that surplus production cannot be reduced to alienated (...) labor, but rather includes various levels of jouissance-value. In this way, the jouissance that drives capitalization and organization can be theorized as constructive rather than destructive, and encompass satisfaction and prosperity rather than individual suffering. This volume will be of great interest to psychoanalysts both in practice and in training, and to academics and scholars of psychoanalytic studies, Lacanian studies, and the social sciences. (shrink)

We study whether robots can satisfy the conditions of an agent fit to be held morally responsible, with a focus on autonomy and self-control. An analogy between robots and human groups enables us to modify arguments concerning collective responsibility for studying questions of robot responsibility. We employ Mele’s history-sensitive account of autonomy and responsibility to argue that even if robots were to have all the capacities required of moral agency, their history would deprive them from autonomy in a responsibility-undermining way. (...) We will also study whether humans and technological artifacts like robots can form hybrid collective agents that could be morally responsible for their actions and give an argument against such a possibility. (shrink)

I argue that from a very weak recombination principle and plausible assumptions about the nature of parthood and location it follows that it's possible that the mereological structure of the material world and that of spacetime fail to correspond to one another in very radical ways. I defend, moreover, that rejecting the possibility of such failures of correspondence leaves us with a choice of equally radical alternatives. I also discuss a few ways in which their possibility is relevant to various (...) debates in metaphysics. (shrink)

Page 1. Economics and Philosophy, 26 291--320 Copyright C Cambridge University Press doi: 10.1017 / S0266267110000386 TWO KINDS OF WE-REASONING RAUL HAKLI, KAARLO MILLER AND RAIMO TUOMELA University of Helsinki.

I give shape to a neglected debate in metaphysics, the debate over the ontological priority between individuality and collectivity. I distinguish the debate from more familiar ones in the recent literature and articulate what I call ontological collectivism, the view that collectivity is prior to individuality. I defend the in-principle intelligibility of the view from forceful general objections and argue that not only is it coherent but also of significant interest to the literature: it allows for overlooked alternatives on a (...) variety of central discussions. (shrink)

Diversas investigaciones han mostrado que la tematización de la autoconciencia no es un exclusiva de la filosofía moderna. Plotino es tal vez el primero en haber reflexionado sobre las cuestiones fundamentales de una teoría de la autoconciencia y, ello, en confrontación con el escepticismo de Sexto Empírico. La autoconciencia es propia de la hipóstasis del nous como unidad diferenciada de Inteligencia, Inteligible e Intelección que, sin embargo, se constituye a sí misma en su vano intento de aprehender la Unidad absolutamente (...) simple del Uno. El artículo examina una reciente objeción a Plotino según la cual él se limitaría a describir en qué medida se puede reconstruir la Inteligencia como anterior a la relación, pero no resuelve la paradoja sobre la posibilidad de que de una relación resulte una identidad. (shrink)

En base a una confrontación estrictamente racional con la tradición filosófica, Plotino establece un principio transcendente al ser y al pensamiento y que, sin embargo, funge como principio creador, constitutivo y diferenciador de todo lo existente: el Uno o la Unidad absolutamente simple. En sí mismo inaccesible, se manifiesta ya sea por revelación (la cual sólo es una hipótesis para Plotino) o por sus efectos. Por eso, el discurso filosófico sobre el Uno sólo es posible desde la perspectiva de la (...) multiplicidad y, por tanto, tiene un carácter aproximativo. La forma que este discurso asume es necesariamente la de las vías analogiae, eminentiae y negationis. De este modo, la razón misma nos remite por primera vez a un principio que le antecede y que, a la vez la funda, dándose así inicio a una segunda época en la historia de la filosofía. (shrink)

I will study the concept of solidarity by looking at patterns of practical reasoning leading to behaviour that can be taken to exemplify solidarity. By studying which kinds of premisses are necessary for taking the motivation to display solidarity, in contrast to altruistic or moral motivation, I try to find necessary conditions for solidarity. I will argue that practical reasoning leading to solidary behaviour is a form of we-reasoning in which some of the premisses are in first person plural form (...) and attribute actions or attitudes to a collective. If this is correct, solidarity is a group concept, and intentional solidary behaviour presupposes identification with a group where others have shared goals or interests. This distinguishes solidary motivation and behaviour from altruistic or moral motivation and behaviour. (shrink)

Various sources in the literature claim that the deduction theorem does not hold for normal modal or epistemic logic, whereas others present versions of the deduction theorem for several normal modal systems. It is shown here that the apparent problem arises from an objectionable notion of derivability from assumptions in an axiomatic system. When a traditional Hilbert-type system of axiomatic logic is generalized into a system for derivations from assumptions, the necessitation rule has to be modified in a way that (...) restricts its use to cases in which the premiss does not depend on assumptions. This restriction is entirely analogous to the restriction of the rule of universal generalization of first-order logic. A necessitation rule with this restriction permits a proof of the deduction theorem in its usual formulation. Other suggestions presented in the literature to deal with the problem are reviewed, and the present solution is argued to be preferable to the other alternatives. A contraction-and cut-free sequent calculus equivalent to the Hubert system for basic modal logic shows the standard failure argument untenable by proving the underivability of DA from A. (shrink)

El artículo constituye una breve investigación histórica y teórica en torno a los principales nexos entre el pensamiento temprano de William James y el trabajo desplegado por Edmund Husserl en las Investigaciones lógicas. A través de un examen preliminar de las relaciones personales entre ambos autores, pasaremos a un estudio sobre el aparato conceptual desarrollado por James, sobre todo en Principios de psicología, con el objetivo de contrastarlo con el planteado por Husserl, mostrando cómo el primer autor esbozó, entre otros, (...) los conceptos fenomenológicos de intencionalidad y objetividad ideal. (shrink)

El artículo pretende estudiar el problema de la teodicea leibniziana, concretamente el problema del mal, desde una perspectiva crítica. Para ello me dedicaré a examinar las principales tesis del sistema de Leibniz con la finalidad de dar un marco apropiado para la comprensión de cómo este autor concibe dicho problema. La idea es mostrar en qué medida su sistema resulta insuficiente para abordar esta cuestión y examinar si la aproximación posmoderna de un autor como John D. Caputo puede proveernos de (...) mejores herramientas para responder al complejo problema de la existencia del mal en el mundo. (shrink)

The Greek word mētis (μῆτις) traditionally refers to a particular form of wily intelligence associated with the arts of deception (dolos) and the knowledge of tricks (kerdē), subterfuges, and traps. Mētis evokes innovative and ground-breaking solutions, based on the capability to understand, anticipate, and possibly violate the others’ expectations. Most importantly, mētis presupposes practical wisdom, or prudence (phrόnesis), a dispositional quality that underpins all the virtues that deserve to be cultivated by sportspersons and that is pivotal to perfect sportspersons’ moral (...) character. Not only is prudence required to apply mētis profitably for winning a game, but it is also indispensable to perform consistently with the game’s norms—cognizant of sport values. This analysis of mētis is key to illuminate the embodied dimension of tactical and moral reasoning in contemporary sport practice. In this paper, we first argue that the strategic effectiveness of mētis proves that not only sensorimotor control but also higher forms of intelligence, like strategic reasoning, are embodied and inform skilful performance; second, we argue that relying on mētis is necessary not only to interpret the rules of the game in one’s own favor but also to respect the shared values that these rules uphold in the sport practice. (shrink)

Endorsing the idea of group knowledge seems to entail the possibility of group belief as well, because it is usually held that knowledge entails belief. It is here studied whether it would be possible to grant that groups can have knowledge without being committed to the controversial view that groups can have beliefs. The answer is positive on the assumption that knowledge can be based on acceptance as well as belief. The distinction between belief and acceptance can be seen as (...) a refinement of the ordinary language concept of belief, and it may be useful in understanding the nature of epistemic justification and classifying various types of epistemic subjects. (shrink)

Epistemic justification of non-summative group beliefs is studied in this paper. Such group beliefs are understood to be voluntary acceptances, the justification of which differs from that of involuntary beliefs. It is argued that whereas epistemic evaluation of involuntary beliefs can be seen not to require reasons, justification of voluntary acceptance of a proposition as true requires that the agent, a group or an individual, can provide reasons for the accepted view. This basic idea is studied in relation to theories (...) of dialectical justification in which justification is taken to require ability to justify. Since the reasons offered can in principle always be challenged, there is no ultimate end to the dialectical chain of justification. This makes justification of acceptance, and thus group belief, social and, in a way, contextual, but this does not seem to entail strong forms of epistemic relativism. (shrink)