Husserls Theorie der Intersubjektivitat ist alles andere als ein abgeschlossenes, endgultiges System. Sie ist vielmehr eine riesige begriffliche Baustelle, bei der die Baugeruste verschiedenartiger phanomenologischer Versuche und Ansatze uberall zu sehen sind. Die Grundabsicht der vorliegenden Arbeit ist es daher, die Perspektive auf die Problemkonstellation der Intersubjektivitat so weit wie moglich zu erweitern, um sowohl Husserls erste Versuche, dieses Problemfeld zu umgrenzen, als auch seinen spaten Entwurf einer transzendentalen Intersubjektivitatstheorie ins Auge zu fassen und als Etappen eines einheitlichen Bemuhens zu (...) sehen. Dabei wird auch der Schlusselcharakter des Intersubjektivitatsthemas deutlich, das eine Transformation der Husserlschen Transzendentalphilosophie veranlasst und vorangetrieben hat. (shrink)

"Empathy – Interpretation – (Interpreting) Apperception. Attempts to Explain Husserl’s First Steps Towards a Theory of Intersubjectivity. The aim of this paper is to investigate Husserl’s first steps towards a theory of intersubjectivity and his early attempts to solve the intricate questions pertaining to the constitution of alter ego. The starting point of this investigation is Husserl’s critical examination of the concept of empathy theorized by Th. Lipps and his contention that empathy cannot be a passive and rather quasi-instinctive activity (...) of the ego, but must be grounded in a kind of analogy between my own body and that of the other. This first attempt to explain in phenomenological terms how an ego can be aware of and perceive other thigs as egos is marred by difficulties that force Husserl to constantly rethink the question of the constitution of the alter ego and propose new ways of conceiving the special kind of apperception that opens up the possibility of perceiving the others as alter egos. Keywords: pure ego, alter ego, empathy, embodiment, interpretation, apperception. ". (shrink)

This collects some of the remarks made at the 2016 Pacific APA Memorial session for Patrick Suppes and Jaakko Hintikka. The full list of speakers on behalf of these two philosophers: Dagfinn Follesdal; Dana Scott; Nancy Cartwright; Paul Humphreys; Juliet Floyd; Gabriel Sandu; John Symons.

Luca M. Possati, Jean Grondin, Paul Ricoeur ; Aurore Dumont, François Dosse et Catherine Goldenstein, Paul Ricoeur: penser la mémoire ; Paul-Gabriel Sandu, Gert-Jan van der Heiden, The Truth of Language. Heidegger, Ricoeur and Derrida on Disclosure and Displacement ; Paul Marinescu, Marc-Antoine Vallée, Gadamer et Ricoeur. La conception herméneutiquedu langage ; Witold Płotka, Saulius Geniusas, Th e Origins of the Horizon in Husserl’s Phenomenology ; Delia Popa, Annabelle Dufourcq, La dimension imaginaire du réel (...) dans la philosophie de Husserl ; Maria GyemantDenis Seron, Ce que voir veut dire. Essai sur la perception ; Christian Ferencz-Flatz, Hans Friesen, Christian Lotz, Jakob Meier, Markus Wolf, Ding und Verdinglichung. Technik- und Sozialphilosophie nach Heidegger und der Kritischen Th eorie ; Bogdan MincăLarisa Cercel, John Stanley, Unterwegs zu einer hermeneutischen Übersetzungswissenschaft. Radegundis Stolze zu ihrem 60. Geburtstag ; Denisa Butnaru Johann Michel, Sociologie du soi. Essai d’herméneutique appliquée ; Ovidiu Stanciu, Jan Patočka, Aristote, ses devanciers, ses successeurs. Trad. fr. Erika Abrams ; Mădălina Diaconu, Emmanuel Alloa, Das durchscheinende Bild. Konturen einer medialen, Phänomenologie. (shrink)

Deflationists have argued that truth is an ontologically thin property which has only an expressive function to perform, that is, it makes possible to express semantic generalizations like ‘All the theorems are true’, ‘Everything Peter said is true’, etc. Some of the deflationists have also argued that although truth is ontologically thin, it suffices in conjunctions with other facts not involving truth to explain all the facts about truth. The purpose of this paper is to show that in the case (...) of arithmetic, it is difficult to combine the expressive with the explanatory function of truth if the latter is understood in a deflationist way. We will make our point by investigating several logical systems: first‐order logic, full second‐order logic, and existential second‐order logic. (shrink)

In a recent article in the American Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology, Frank Chervenak et al. argue that home birth is less safe than hospital birth, and that physicians have a dual duty to avoid any collaboration with home birth midwives and to make hospital birth more psychologically and socially supportive to accommodate women who want more choices during labor. The assertion that home birth is significantly less safe than hospital birth has been responded to by Howard Minkoff and Jeffrey (...) Ecker and by a recent large observational study of home birth outcomes in America. Minkoff and Ecker argue that the evidence supports, at most, a minimal increased.. (shrink)

Both Frege's Grundgesetze, and Lagrange's treatises on analytical functions pursue a foundational purpose. Still, the former's program is not only crucially different from the latter's. It also depends on a different idea of what foundation of mathematics should be like . Despite this contrast, the notion of function plays similar roles in their respective programs. The purpose of my paper is emphasising this similarity. In doing it, I hope to contribute to a better understanding of Frege's logicism, especially in relation (...) to its crucial differences with a set-theoretic foundational perspective. This should also spread some light on a question arisen by J. Hintikka and G. Sandu in a widely discussed paper, namely whether Frege should or should not be credited with the notion of arbitrary function underlying our standard interpretation of second-order logic. In section 1, I account for Lagrange's notion of function. In section 2, I advance some remarks on connected historical matters. This will provide an appropriate framework for discussing the role played by the notion of function in Frege's Grundgesetze. Section 3 is devoted to this. Some concluding remarks will close the paper. (shrink)

The volume deals with the history of logic, the question of the nature of logic, the relation of logic and mathematics, modal or alternative logics (many-valued, relevant, paraconsistent logics) and their relations, including translatability, to classical logic in the Fregean and Russellian sense, and, more generally, the aim or aims of philosophy of logic and mathematics. Also explored are several problems concerning the concept of definition, non-designating terms, the interdependence of quantifiers, and the idea of an assertion sign. The contributions (...) concerned with Wittgenstein's investigations into the philosophy of logic and mathematics pursue issues relating to logical necessity, the undeniability of the law of the excluded middle, and the source of self-evidence, often characterized in the literature as the "rule-following considerations". Additionally, they examine Wittgenstein's attitudes towards the very idea of set-theory as a possible foundation for arithmetic. The volume also includes a number of contributions on specific issues concerning Wittgenstein's views on moral and religious judgements. (shrink)

In this paper, we introduce a new approach to independent quantifiers, as originally introduced in Informational independence as a semantic phenomenon by Hintikka and Sandu [9] under the header of independence-friendly languages. Unlike other approaches, which rely heavily on compositional methods, we shall analyze independent quantifiers via equilibriums in strategic games. In this approach, coined equilibrium semantics, the value of an IF sentence on a particular structure is determined by the expected utility of the existential player in any of (...) the game’s equilibriums. This approach was suggested in Henkin quantifiers and complete problems by Blass and Gurevich [2] but has not been taken up before. We prove that each rational number can be realized by an IF sentence. We also give a lower and upper bound on the expressive power of IF logic under equilibrium semantics. (shrink)

Team semantics is a highly general framework for logics which describe dependencies and independencies among variables. Typically, the dependencies considered in this context are properties of sets of configurations or data records. We show how team semantics can be further generalized to support languages for the discussion of interventionist counterfactuals and causal dependencies, such as those that arise in manipulationist theories of causation. We show that the “causal teams” we introduce in the present paper can be used for modelling some (...) classical counterfactual scenarios which are not captured by the usual causal models. We then analyse the basic properties of our counterfactual languages and discuss extensively the differences with respect to the Lewisian tradition. (shrink)

We shall introduce in this paper a language whose formulas will be interpreted by games of imperfect information. Such games will be defined in the same way as the games for first-order formulas except that the players do not have complete information of the earlier course of the game. Some simple logical properties of these games will be stated together with the relation of such games of imperfect information to higher-order logic. Finally, a set of applications will be outlined.

Part I of Frege’s Grundgesetze is devoted to the “exposition [Darlegung]” of his formal system.

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in (...) the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

This book focuses on the game-theoretical semantics and epistemic logic of Jaakko Hintikka. Hintikka was a prodigious and esteemed philosopher and logician, and his death in August 2015 was a huge loss to the philosophical community. This book, whose chapters have been in preparation for several years, is dedicated to the work of Jaako Hintikka, and to his memory. This edited volume consists of 23 contributions from leading logicians and philosophers, who discuss themes that span across the entire range of (...) Hintikka’s career. Semantic Representationalism, Logical Dialogues, Knowledge and Epistemic logic are among some of the topics covered in this book's chapters. The book should appeal to students, scholars and teachers who wish to explore the philosophy of Jaako Hintikka. (shrink)

We introduce several senses of the principle ofcompositionality. We illustrate the difference between them with thehelp of some recent results obtained by Cameron and Hodges oncompositional semantics for languages of imperfect information.

This book presents a collection of studies by Romanian philosophers, addressing foundational issues currently debated in contemporary philosophy of science. It offers a historical survey of the tradition of scientific philosophy in Romania. It examines some problems in the foundations of logic, mathematics, linguistics, the natural and social sciences. Among the more specific topics, it discusses scientific explanation, models, and mechanisms, as well as memory, artifacts, and rules of research. The book is useful to those interested in the philosophy of (...) real science, but also to those interested in Romanian philosophy. (shrink)

In this paper we show that first-order languages extended with partially ordered connectives and partially ordered quantifiers define, under a certain interpretation, their own truth-predicate. The interpretation in question is in terms of games of imperfect information. This result is compared with those of Kripke and Feferman.

Independence‐Friendly logic introduced by Hintikka and Sandu studies patterns of dependence and independence of quantifiers which exceed those found in ordinary first‐order logic. The present survey focuses on the game‐theoretical interpretation of IF‐logic, including connections to solution concepts in classical game theory, but we shall also present its compositional interpretation together with its connections to notions of dependence and dependence between terms.

We show that a coherent theory of partially ordered connectives can be developed along the same line as partially ordered quantification. We estimate the expressive power of various partially ordered connectives and use methods like Ehrenfeucht games and infinitary logic to get various undefinability results.

This chapter begins with a discussion of the three phases of the interaction between logic and linguistics on the nature of universal grammar. It then attempts to reconstruct the dynamics and interactions between these approaches in logic and in linguistic theory, which represent the major landmarks in the quest for the individuation of the universal structure of language.

The so-called New Theory of Reference (Marcus, Kripke etc.) is inspired by the insight that in modal and intensional contexts quantifiers presuppose nondescriptive unanalyzable identity criteria which do not reduce to any descriptive conditions. From this valid insight the New Theorists fallaciously move to the idea that free singular terms can exhibit a built-in direct reference and that there is even a special class of singular terms (proper names) necessarily exhibiting direct reference. This fallacious move has been encouraged by a (...) mistaken belief in the substitutional interpretation of quantifiers, by the myth of thede re reference, and a mistaken assimilation of direct reference to ostensive (perspectival) identification. Thede dicto vs.de re contrast does not involve direct reference, being merely a matter of rule-ordering (scope).The New Theorists' thesis of the necessity of identities of directly referred-to individuals is a consequence of an unmotivated and arbitrary restriction they tacitly impose on the identification of individuals. (shrink)

The paper argues that there are two main kinds of joint action, direct joint bringing about (or performing) something (expressed in terms of a DO-operator) and jointly seeing to it that something is the case (expressed in terms of a Stit-operator). The former kind of joint action contains conjunctive, disjunctive and sequential action and its central subkinds. While joint seeing to it that something is the case is argued to be necessarily intentional, direct joint performance can also be nonintentional. Actions (...) performed by social groups are analyzed in terms of the notions of joint action (basically DO and Stit).A precise semantical analysis of the aforementioned kinds of joint action is given in terms of time-trees. With each participant a tree is connected, and the trees are joined defining joint possible worlds in terms of state-expressing nodes from the trees. Sentences containing DO and Stit are semantically evaluated with respect to such joint possible worlds. Intentional joint actions are characterized in terms of the notion of we-intention (joint intention), characterized formally by means of a special operator. (shrink)

Henkin quantifiers have been introduced in Henkin (1961). Walkoe (1970) studied basic model-theoretical properties of an extension $L_{*}^{1}$ (H) of ordinary first-order languages in which every sentence is a first-order sentence prefixed with a Henkin quantifier. In this paper we consider a generalization of Walkoe's languages: we close $L_{*}^{1}$ (H) with respect to Boolean operations, and obtain the language L¹(H). At the next level, we consider an extension $L_{*}^{2}$ (H) of L¹(H) in which every sentence is an L¹(H)-sentence prefixed with (...) a Henkin quantifier. We repeat this construction to infinity. Using the (un)definability of truth - in - N for these languages, we show that this hierarchy does not collapse. In addition, we compare some of the present results to the ones obtained by Kripke (1975), McGee (1991), and Hintikka (1996). (shrink)

In his article The Foundations of Mathematics (1925) Ramsey was concerned with the nature of the statements of 'pure mathematics' and the way these statements differ from those in empirical sciences. He thought that the answer given to these questions by Hilbert and the formalist school according to which mathematical statements are meaningless formulas, is unsatisfactory for several reasons, which will not be discussed here. He also expressed serious doubts about the intuitionist program developed by Brouwer and Weyl. It is (...) the logicist school of Frege, Russell and Whitehead, which attempted to reduce mathematics to few logical concepts, that came closest to Ramsey’s views, although he was not completely satisfied with it, either. (shrink)

This paper shows that the logic known as Information-friendly logic (IF-logic) introduced by Jaakko Hintikka and Gabriel Sandu defines its own truth-predicate. The result is interesting given that IF logic is a much stronger logic than ordinary first-order logic and has also a well behaved notion of negation which, on its first-order subfragment, behaves like classical, contradictory negation.

This chapter explores logical semantics, that is, the structural meaning of logical expressions like connectives, quantifiers, and modalities. It focuses on truth-theoretical semantics for formalized languages, a tradition emerging from Carnap's and Tarski's work in the first half of the last century that specifies the meaning of these expressions in terms of the truth-conditions of the sentences in which they occur. It considers Tarski-style definitions of the semantics of a given language in a stronger metalanguage, Tarski's impossibility results, and attempts (...) to overcome them in the post-Tarskian tradition. (shrink)

Against some very common views (e.g. Dummett), this paper argues that Frege did not have a standard interpretation of higher-order logic and for this reason his programme in the foundations of mathematics was a nonstarter.

The paper argues that unlike Ramsey, Frege and Russell lacked the idea of an arbitrary function and this had important consequences for their foundational programs.

The paper attempts to give a solution to the Fitch's paradox though the strategy of the reformulation of the paradox in temporal logic, and a notion of knowledge which is a kind of ceteris paribus modality. An analogous solution has been offered in a different context to solve the problem of metaphysical determinism.

We consider two versions of truth as grounded in verification procedures: Dummett's notion of proof as an effective way to establish the truth of a statement and Hintikka's GTS notion of truth as given by the existence of a winning strategy for the game associated with a statement. Hintikka has argued that the two notions should be effective and that one should thus restrict one's attention to recursive winning strategies. In the context of arithmetic, we show that the two notions (...) do not coincide: on the one hand, proofs in PA do not yield recursive winning strategies for the associated game; on the other hand, there is no sound and effective proof procedure that captures recursive GTS truths. We then consider a generalized version of Game Theoretical Semantics by introducing games with backward moves. In this setting, a connection is made between proofs and recursive winning strategies. We then apply this distinction between two kinds of verificationist procedures to a recent debate about how we recognize the truth of Gödelian sentences. (shrink)

Linguistique et philosophie logique du langage: deux traditions de pensee que bien des choses opposent. La premiere est plutot mentaliste, et orientee vers l'etude de la syntaxe; la seconde, plus preoccupee de semantique, cherche volontiers le sens dans les conditions de verite des phrases. Ce portrait n'est pas faux, mais il est incomplet: entre logique et linguistique, les relations n'ont pas ete, ne sont pas que d'opposition. Dans cet ouvrage, les auteurs proposent une sorte d'histoire conceptuelle des interactions fecondes entre (...) les deux disciplines au cours du XXe siecle. La premiere partie, consacree a la notion de categorie semantique et/ou syntaxique, raconte comment les theories a priori de la signification (Husserl, Frege, Russell) ont progressivement donne lieu au programme des grammaires categorielles, d'inspiration plus descriptive et empirique. La deuxieme partie traite d'un autre episode, datant des annees cinquante a soixante-dix, et lie a la naissance des grammaires generatives: celui au cours duquel l'opposition entre la these avancee par Chomsky de l'autonomie de la syntaxe, et l'idee de la priorite conceptuelle de la semantique, soutenue par des logiciens comme Montague, vient au premier plan. Enfin la troisieme partie traite des recherches tout a fait contemporaines concernant l'etude des expressions indefinies et des relations anaphoriques qu'elles soutiennent, theme ou se dessinent des convergences nouvelles entre l'analyse logique et l'analyse linguistique: la comprehension des rapports entre generalite et reference dans les langages naturels y gagnera certainement en finesse et en adequation empirique. (shrink)

This paper is a short survey of different languageswith imperfect information introduced in (Hintikka and Sandu 1989).The imperfect information concerns both quantifiers and connectives.At the end, I will sketch a connection between these languages and linearlogic.

This work presents an overview of four different approaches to the problem of future contingency and determinism in temporal logics. All of them are bivalent, viz. they share the assumption that propositions concerning future contingent facts have a determinate truth-value. We introduce Ockhamism, Peirceanism, Actualism and T × W semantics, the four most relevant bivalent alternatives in this area, and compare them from the point of view of their expressiveness and their underlying metaphysics of time.