I explore physics implications of the External Reality Hypothesis (ERH) that there exists an external physical reality completely independent of us humans. I argue that with a sufficiently broad definition of mathematics, it implies the Mathematical Universe Hypothesis (MUH) that our physical world is an abstract mathematical structure. I discuss various implications of the ERH and MUH, ranging from standard physics topics like symmetries, irreducible representations, units, free parameters, randomness and initial conditions to broader issues like consciousness, parallel universes and (...) Gödel incompleteness. I hypothesize that only computable and decidable (in Gödel’s sense) structures exist, which alleviates the cosmological measure problem and may help explain why our physical laws appear so simple. I also comment on the intimate relation between mathematical structures, computations, simulations and physical systems. (shrink)

One might think that since life here on Earth has survived for nearly 4 Gyr (Gigayears), such catastrophic events must be extremely rare. Unfortunately, such an argument is flawed, giving us a false sense of security. It fails to take into account the observation selection effect [6, 7] that precludes any observer from observing anything other than that their own species has survived up to the point where they make the observation. Even if the frequency of cosmic catastrophes were very (...) high, we should still expect to find ourselves on a planet that had not yet been destroyed. The fact that we are still alive does not even seem to rule out the hypothesis that the average cosmic neighborhood is typically sterilized by vacuum decay, say, every 10000 years, and that our own planet has just been extremely lucky up until now. (shrink)

We discuss the nature of reality in the ontological context of Penrose’s math-matter-mind triangle. The triangle suggests the circularity of the widespread view that math arises from the mind, the mind arises out of matter, and that matter can be explained in terms of math. Non-physicists should be wary of any claim that modern physics leads us to any particular resolution of this circularity, since even the sample of three theoretical physicists writing this paper hold three divergent views. Some physicists (...) believe that current physics has already found the basic framework for a complete description of reality, and only has to fill in the details. Others suspect that no single framework, from physics or other sources, will ever capture reality. Yet others guess that reality might be approached arbitrarily closely by some form of future physics, but probably based on completely different frameworks. We will designate these three approaches as the fundamentalist, secular and mystic views of the world, as seen by practicing physicists. We present and contrast each of these views, which arguably form broad categories capturing most if not all interpretations of physics. We argue that this diversity in the physics community is more useful than an ontological monoculture, since it motivates physicists to tackle unsolved problems with a wide variety of approaches. (shrink)

The multiverse hypothesis is the leading alternative to the competing fine-tuning hypothesis. The multiverse dispels many aspects of the fine-tuning argument by suggesting that there are different initial conditions in each universe, varying constants of physics, and the laws of nature lose their known arbitrary values; thus, making the previous single-universe argument from fine- tuning incredibly weak. The position that will be advocated will be that a form of multiverse could exist and that any level of Tegmark's multiverse does (...) not circumvent the fine-tuning argument for the existence of a fine-tuner. An argument will be presented suggesting that the multiverse could strengthen the fine-tuning argument by narrowing down the parameters of the data to a more fundamental description needed for the multiverse to function as it does since it may be the case that some physical descriptions are not the same in every universe. That is, the task of explaining how the multiverse mechanism functions cannot be accounted for by the multiverse itself. Fine-tuning by a mind serves as a sufficient and best explanation for the data. (shrink)

Recent developments in quantum physics postulate the existence of some form of multiverse, often considered inimical to theism. We argue that a cosmology of many worlds is not novel either to philosophy or to theism. The multiverse is not a monolithic concept and we refer to and use the four levels of categorization proposed by Max Tegmark. We trace the idea of a multiverse back to the Milesians and Epicureans in order to initially demonstrate its use of a plenitude (...) argument. We then examine the argument for possible compatibility based on a theistic principle of plenitude in three specifically Christian theists: Origen, Thomas Aquinas, and G. W. Leibniz. We conclude that this argument is sustainable so that if any level of the multiverse actually exists then it is harmonious with theism, and we argue that its fit is most successful if a multiverse is considered as a single possible world. We call this view Thomistic modal realism. (shrink)

Physicist Max Tegmark argues that if there are infinite universes or sub-universes, we will encounter our exact duplicates infinite times, the nearest within 10^10^115 m. Tegmark assumes Humean supervenience and a finite number of possible combinations of elementary quantum states. This paper argues on the contrary that Tegmark’s argument fails to hold if possible thoughts, persons, and life histories are all infinite in number. Are there infinite thoughts we could possibly think? This paper will show that there (...) are. If so, then it is not only Tegmark’s specific claim about our duplication that is called into question. We additionally acquire another strong argument against Humean supervenience. (shrink)

Porpora offers an a priori argument for the conclusion that there are infinitely many thoughts that it is physically possible for us to think. That there should be such an a priori argument is astonishing enough. That the argument should be simple enough to teach to a first-year undergraduate class in about 20 min, as Porpora’s is, is more astonishing still. Porpora’s main target is Max Tegmark’s recent argument for the claim that if current physics is right, then there (...) are mental duplicates of us in far flung regions of the Universe. His argument is directed against Tegmark’s assumption that mental facts supervene upon physical facts. So, if Porpora’s argument is sound then not only is Tegmark’s argument unsound, but physicalism is also false. So, Porpora’s argument is powerful indeed. Who would have thought that a simple a priori argument, together with the physical facts, could solve the issue of whether physicalism is true?. Not I. In this paper I take a closer look at Porpora’s argument and show that it is fallacious. I also consider the other reasons Porpora gives for thinking there are infinitely many thinkable thoughts and find them similarly lacking. (shrink)

The Protestant ethic — a moral code stressing hard work, rigorous self-discipline, and the organization of one's life in the service of God — was made famous by sociologist and political economist Max Weber. In this brilliant study (his best-known and most controversial), he opposes the Marxist concept of dialectical materialism and its view that change takes place through "the struggle of opposites." Instead, he relates the rise of a capitalist economy to the Puritan determination to work out anxiety over (...) salvation or damnation by performing good deeds — an effort that ultimately discouraged belief in predestination and encouraged capitalism. Weber's classic study has long been required reading in college and advanced high school social studies classrooms. (shrink)

This book is a defense of the methods of analytic philosophy against a recent empirical challenge to the soundness of those methods. The challenge is raised by practitioners of “experimental philosophy” and concerns the extent to which analytic philosophy relies on intuition—in particular, the extent to which analytic philosophers treat intuitions as evidence in arguing for philosophical conclusions. Experimental philosophers say that analytic philosophers place a great deal of evidential weight on people’s intuitions about hypothetical cases and thought experiments. This (...) book argues that this view of traditional philosophical method is a myth, part of “metaphilosophical folklore.” Analytic philosophy makes regular use of hypothetical examples and thought experiments, but philosophers argue for their claims about what is true or not true in these examples and thought experiments. It is these arguments, not intuitions, that are treated as evidence for the claims. The book discusses xphi and some recent xphi studies; critiques a variety of other metaphilosophical claims; examines such famous arguments as Gettier’s refutation of the JTB theory and Kripke’s Gödel Case argument against descriptivism about proper names, and shows that they rely on reasoning rather than intuition; and finds existing critiques of xphi, the “Multiple Concepts” and “Expertise” replies, to be severely lacking. (shrink)

The book "Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience" is an engaging criticism of cognitive neuroscience from the perspective of a Wittgensteinian philosophy of ordinary language. The authors' main claim is that assertions like "the brain sees" and "the left hemisphere thinks" are integral to cognitive neuroscience but that they are meaningless because they commit the mereological fallacy—ascribing to parts of humans, properties that make sense to predicate only of whole humans. The authors claim that this fallacy is at the heart of Cartesian (...) dualism, implying that current cognitive neuroscientists are Cartesian dualists. Against this claim, we argue that the fallacy cannot be committed within Cartesian dualism either, for this doctrine does not allow for an intelligible way of asserting that a soul is part of a human being. Also, the authors' Aristotelian essentialistic outlook is at odds with their Wittgensteinian stance, and we were unconvinced by their case against explanatory reductionism. Finally, although their Wittgensteinian stance is congenial with radical behaviorism, their separation between philosophy and science seems less so because it is based on a view of philosophy as a priori. The authors' emphasis on the a priori, however, does not necessarily commit them to rationalism if it is restricted to conceptual or analytical truths. (shrink)

Advocates of conceptual engineering as a method of philosophy face a dilemma: either they are ignorant of how conceptual engineering can be implemented, or else it is trivial to implement but of very little value, representing no new or especially fruitful method of philosophizing. Two key distinctions frame this dilemma and explain its two horns. First, the distinction between speaker’s meaning and reference and semantic meaning and reference reveals a severe implementation problem for one construal of conceptual engineering. Second, the (...) distinction between stipulating meanings and conceptually analyzing allows us to see why, on another construal of what conceptual engineering involves, the practice is neither a new nor neglected philosophical methodology. The article also argues that semantic externalism is not the root of the implementation problem for conceptual engineering, and that the usual rationale for adopting the practice, one that ties its value to the amelioration of “conceptual defects”, is unsound. (shrink)

Upon Scheler’ s death in 1928, Martin Heidegger remarked that he was the most important force in philosophy at the time. Jose Ortega y Gasset called Scheler "the first man of the philosophical paradise." The Human Place in the Cosmos, the last of his works Scheler completed, is a pivotal piece in the development of his writing as a whole, marking a peculiar shift in his approach and thought. He had been asked to provide an initial sketch of his much (...) larger works on philosophical anthropology and metaphysics--works he was not able to complete because of his early demise. Frings' new translation of this key work allows us to read and understand Scheler's thought within current philosophical debates and interests. The book addresses two main questions: What is the human being? And what is the place of the human being in the universe? Scheler responds to these questions within contexts of said two projected much larger works but not without reference to scientific research. He covers various levels of being: inorganic reality, organic reality (including plant life and psychological life), all the way up to practical intelligence and the spiritual dimension of human beings, and touching upon the holy. Negotiating two intertwined levels of being, life-energy ("impulsion") and "spirit," this work marks not only a critical moment in the development of his own philosophy but also a significant contribution to the current discussions of continental and analytic philosophers on the nature of the person. (shrink)

Max Schelers Magnum Opus aus dem Jahr 1913/16 kann als der gründlichste und umfassendste Entwurf einer am Personenbegriff orientierten und auf die Objektivität von Werten setzenden Ethik angesehen werden. Vor dem Hintergrund der Phänomenologie Husserls und in kritisch distanzierender Würdigung der Kantischen Philosophie entwickelt Scheler die Grundlagen der Praktischen Philosophie, indem er die Fülle der menschlichen Wirklichkeit in all ihren Facetten ernst nimmt, um sie zugleich vor dem Hintergrund eines materialen Wertaprioris verständlich zu machen. Die Kritik an formalen Ethikentwürfen und (...) die Zurückweisung von utilitaristischen Ansätzen entwickelt sich vor dem Hintergrund einer subtilen Diskussion des Wertbegriffs, einer höchst differenzierten Analyse der Rangordnung von Werten und einer Phänomenologie der Person, die bis heute einschlägig und wirksam ist. Neben dem Gesamtentwurf besticht die Schelersche Schrift durch feingliedrige phänomenologische Analysen zu einzelnen Fragestellungen, die auch nach einem Jahrhundert nicht an Brisanz verloren haben. Hierzu zählen u.a. die Ausführungen zur Leiblichkeit, die Diskussion der Gefühle oder die Konzeption des Liebesbegriffs. Hundert Jahre nach der Erstveröffentlichung 1913/1916 erscheint Schelers Hauptwerk in einer kritischen Fassung als Ausgabe letzter Hand. Der Text wird durch eine Einleitung und einen editorischen Bericht sowie Begriffs-, Personen- und Literaturregister erschlossen. Zudem werden nachträglich eingefügte Änderungen am Text ausgewiesen sowie unvollständige Angaben ergänzt bzw. Verweise und Anspielungen durch Herausgeberanmerkungen kommentiert. (shrink)

To be able to produce and understand metaphorical statements is nothing much to boast about: these familiar skills, which children seem to acquire as they learn to talk, are perhaps no more remarkable than our ability to tell and to understand jokes. How odd then that it remains difficult to explain what we do in grasping metaphorical statements. In a provocative paper, "What Metaphors Mean,"1 Donald Davidson has recently charged many students of metaphor, ancient and modern, with having committed a (...) "central mistake." According to him, there is "error and confusion" in claiming "that a metaphor has, in addition to its literal sense or meaning, another sense or meaning." The guilty include "literary critics like Richards, Empson, and Winters; philosophers from Aristotle to Max Black; psychologists from Freud and earlier to Skinner and later; and linguists from Plato to Uriel Weinreich and George Lakoff." Good company, if somewhat mixed. The error to be extirpated is the "idea that a metaphor has a special meaning" . If Davidson is right, much that has been written about metaphor might well be consigned to the flames. Even if he proves to be wrong, his animadversions should provoke further consideration of the still problematic modus operandi of metaphor. · 1. In "What Metaphors Mean," Critical Inquiry 5 : 31-47. All further references in text. Max Black is Susan Linn Sage professor of philosophy and humane letters emeritus at Cornell University and senior member of the Cornell program on science, technology, and society. His many influential works include Models and Metaphors, A Companion to Wittgenstein's Tractatus, and, most recently, Caveats and Critiques. During the fall of 1978 he was Tarner Lecturer at Cambridge University and is currently preparing a book on rationality based on those lectures. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Recent Relativism Standard Semantics and Ordinary Truth Relativist Semantics and Ordinary Truth Issues of Commensurability References.

The trouble with business schools -- The great, but delicate experiment -- A hippocratic oath for business -- Six more arguments for the MBA oath -- The purpose of a manager -- Ethics and integrity -- No man is an island : stakeholders -- Ambition and good faith -- The letter and the spirit : law -- The sunlight of responsibility : transparency -- Personal and professional growth -- Sustainable prosperity : a partnership for living well -- Accountability.

There seem to be topics on which people can disagree without fault. For example, you and I might disagree on whether Picasso was a better artist than Matisse, without either of us being at fault. Is this a genuine possibility or just apparent? In this paper I pursue two aims: I want to provide a systematic map of available responses to this question. Simultaneously, I want to assess these responses. I start by introducing and defining the notion of a faultless (...) disagreement. Then I present a simple argument to the conclusion that faultless disagreement is not possible. Those who accept the argument have to explain away apparent cases of faultless disagreement. Those who want to maintain the possibility of faultless disagreement must deny one of the argument's premisses. The position I want to promote belongs to the latter category and is a form of genuine relativism. (shrink)

Heidegger, M. Andenken an Max Scheler.--Gadamer, H.-G. Max Scheler, der Verschwender.--Plessner, H. Erinnerungen an Max Scheler.--Kuhn, H. Max Scheler als Faust.--Dempf, A. Schelers System christlicher Geistphilosophie als Grundlage einer religiösen Erneuerung.--Scheler, M. Neun Briefe an Karl Muth.--Rombach, H. Die Erfahrung der Freiheit.--Landgrebe, L. Geschichtsphilosophische Perspektiven bei Scheler und Husserl.--Theunissen, M. Wettersturm und Stille.--Good, P. Anschauung und Sprache.--Welsch, W. Mit Scheler.--Avé-Lallement, E. Die phänomenologische Reduktion in der Philosophie Max Schelers.--Gehlen, A. Rückblick auf die Anthropologie Max Schelers.--Schoeps, H. J. Die Stellung des (...) Menschen im Kosmos.--Ströker, E. Der Tod im Denken Max Schelers.--Wyss, D. und Huppmann, G. Die Bedeutung Max Schelers für die Medizinische Anthropologie.--Lieber, H.-J. Bemerkungen zur Wissenssoziologie Max Schelers.--Fetscher, I. Max Schelers Auffassung von Krieg und Frieden.--Bochenski, J. M. Ist die Sprache Schelers in eine analytische übersetzbar? (shrink)

Das Buchbeinhaltet Max Webers vollständige Schriften zu wissenschaftlichen und politischen Berufen: „Wissenschaft als Beruf”, die Artikel zu Hochschulen, und „Politik als Beruf”. Die Einleitung des Herausgebers verbindet beide Berufe konzeptionell und in der Person Max Webers. Die Verwendung von C. G. Jungs psychologischer Typentheorie, die durch den Myers-Briggs Typindikator (MBTI) weiterentwickelt wurde, wird ein Verständnis seines Persönlichkeitstypus ermöglicht. Das Buch ist die überarbeitete und aktualisierte Auflage der englischen Ausgabe „Max Weber’s Complete Writings on Academic and Political Vocations”. In der zweiten (...) Auflage des Bandes wurde die Einleitung um einige Analysen von Webers Schriften erweitert. Außerdem wurden zwei weitere Artikel aufgenommen und die Bibliographie um einige bedeutsame Werke ergänzt. Einleitung und englische Kommentare wurden einheitlich neu übersetzt. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain (...) in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Utilitarians think that what matters in ethics is making the world a better place. In that case, it might seem that we each rationally ought to do our best—perform the actions, out of those open to each of us, with the best expected outcomes. In other words, we should follow act-utilitarian reasons. But often the result of many altruistic agents following such individualistic reasons is worse than the result of them following collectivist ‘team-reasons’. So utilitarians should reject act utilitarianism, and (...) accept a dualist view according to which both individualistic and team reasons are fundamental. In order to align these distinct kinds of reason, utilitarians must focus centrally on questions of political and social reform—as did their historical forebears. (shrink)

In diesem Band der Max Weber-Gesamtausgabe werden Webers Texte zum asketischen Protestantismus aus den Jahren 1904 bis 1906 in ihrer überarbeiteten Fassung, wie er sie 1919/20 zum Druck gab, zusammen mit der »Vorbemerkung« in historisch-kritischer Bearbeitung präsentiert. Diese »Vorbemerkung« stellte er an den Beginn seiner Sammlung religionssoziologischer Aufsätze, die vier Bände umfassen sollte, und legte darin den Zweck dieser Sammlung dar.

Many environmentalists believe that religion has been a major contributor to our ecological crisis, for Judeo-Christians have been taught that they have dominion over the earth and so do not consider themselves part of a biotic community. In this book a philosopher of environmental ethics acknowledges that religion may contribute to environmental problems but argues that religion can also play an important role in solving these problems―that religion can provide an ethical context that will help people to become sensitive to (...) the environment and to elect leaders who are genuinely responsive to the ecological crisis. Examining a broad range of Western religious traditions―from conservative Christianity and orthodox Judaism to Goddess feminism and nature religion―Max Oelschlaeger provides a sociolinguistic analysis of their creation stories and finds environmentally positive aspects in each of them. He asserts that religious discourse in the public arena can offer a way for such environmental issues as biodiversity, pollution, and population to be addressed outside the realm of special-interest politics. And he urges local churches to make "caring for creation" a theme for worship in their services; the majority of Americans, says Oelschlaeger, will discover an environmental ethic only through their religious faith. (shrink)

Produced in 1961 using film shot by official war photographers provided by the Australian War Memorial in Canberra, this 26 part series covers every major ...

Bayesianism is the predominant philosophy of science in North-America, the most important school of statistics world-wide, and the general version of the rational-choice approach in the social sciences. Although often rejected as a theory of actual behavior, it is still the benchmark case of perfect rationality. The paper reviews the development of Bayesianism in philosophy, statistics and decision making and questions its status as an account of perfect rationality. Bayesians, who otherwise are squarely in the empiricist camp, invoke a priori (...) reasoning when they recommend Bayesian methods - a recommendation that is not justified by their own standards. (shrink)

This paper considers critical rationalism under an institutional perspective. It argues that a methodology must be incentive compatible in order to prevail in scientific competition. As shown by a formal game-theoretic model of scientific competition, incentive compatibility requires quality standards that are hereditary: using high-quality research as an input must increase a researcher’s chances to produce high-quality output. Critical rationalism is incentive compatible because of the way it deals with the Duhem-Quine problem. An example from experimental economics illustrates the relevance (...) of the arguments. (shrink)

Addressing six primary philosophical concerns - the self, reality, epistemology, ethics, politics and religion, this text contains not only many readings from the Western canon, but essential readings from many cultural perspectives not typically included in introductory philosophy classes as well.

Achieving judgment -- In sensible judgment -- Sentencing -- Dissenting -- Making judgments -- Judging as right -- Living on the premises -- Inferring, judging, arguing -- Questioning critique -- Sting of reason -- Critique's mystique -- Enigma absolute -- Moving establishment -- Being nomadic -- Chasing after modernity -- When to forget.

Oui, sous le rayon d'un soleil dilué de nuages roses, j'ai rédigé la plupart de ces textes Rue du Poète. Il convient de ne point nous méprendre à penser que le poète se complaît dans une indolente béatitude. Poiêsis, c'est l'action, l'expression même des mouvements et des relations qui déterminent notre univers, nos lieux d'échange, au présent, le plus souvent insaisissable, de ce que l'on prend pour le réel et cet imaginaire vers lequel l'homme projette sa mémoire, son " récit (...) ", son désir, son attente afin de " se " créer du devenir. La mort veille toujours en coulisse mais l'existence lui ravit la vedette et la tentation de vivre édifie le monde tel que l'autre l'induit en nous jour après jour, au coeur d'une cité partagée. Fragiles, " labiles ", métaphoriques, leurrés par l'illusion de se reconnaître, les êtres et leur vie, les être et leur ville... En parler? Pourquoi non? (shrink)

An in-depth look at the theory of solidarity of German philosopher Jürgen Habermas, serving also as a comprehensive introduction to his work.

"...wenn wir etwas näher zusehen und den Aufbau der exakten Wissenschaft einer genaueren Prüfung unterziehen, dann werden wir sehr bald gewahr, daß das Gebäude eine gefährlich schwache Stelle besitzt, und diese Stelle ist das Fundament. Dem Bau fehlt eine von vornherein nach allen Richtungen hin gesicherte, von äußeren Stürmen nicht zu erschütternde Grundlage, oder mit anderen Worten: es gibt für exakte Wissenschaft kein Prinzip von so allgemeiner Gültigkeit und zugleich von so bedeutsamem Inhalt, daß es ihr als ausreichende Unterlage dienen (...) kann. Wohl rechnet sie allenthalben mit Maß und Zahl und trägt daher mit vollem Recht ihren stolzen Namen; denn die Gesetze der Logik und der Mathematik müssen wir ohne Zweifel als zuverlässig betrachten. Aber auch die schärfste Logik und die genaueste mathematische Rechnung können kein einziges fruchtbares Ergebnis zeitigen, wenn es an einer sicher zutreffenden Voraussetzung fehlt. Aus nichts läßt sich nichts folgern." (Max Planck, S. 5 f. in diesem Buch) Der deutsche Physiker Max Planck (* 23. April 1858 in Kiel, † 4. Oktober 1947 in Göttingen) gilt als Begründer der Quantenphysik. Im Jahr 1919 wurde ihm der Nobelpreis für Physik für das Jahr 1918 verliehen. 1941 hielt Planck einen vielbeachteten Vortrag über das Fundament der "exakten" Wissenschaften, zu denen auch die Pysik gezählt wird. Lange vergriffen liegt sein Vortrag "Sinn und Grenzen der exakten Wissenschaft" nun in einer ungekürzten Neuausgabe, ergänzt um einen illustrierten Anhang, wieder als Einzelpublikation vor. Max Planck. Sinn und Grenzen der exakten Wissenschaft. Vortrag gehalten im November 1941. Erstdruck: Johann Ambrosius Barth – Verlag, Leipzig 1942. Durchgesehener Neusatz, der Text dieser Ausgabe folgt der siebenten Auflage, Johann Ambrosius Barth – Verlag, Leipzig 1965. Für die Neuausgabe 2021 mit sieben Illustrationen versehen. Gebundene Ausgabe - Hardcover - mit Lesebändchen. Neuausgabe, LIWI Verlag, Göttingen 2021. LIWI Literatur- und Wissenschaftsverlag. (shrink)