If cultures are always in the making, this book catches one kind of culture on the make. Academics will be familiar with audit in the form of research and teaching assessments - they may not be aware how pervasive practices of 'accountability' are or of the diversity of political regimes under which they flourish. Twelve social anthropologists from across Europe and the Commonwealth chart an influential and controversial cultural phenomenon.

This article exploits the “binary license” offered by the title of the symposium in which it appears (“Comparative Relativism”) as a kind of promise of connection. The author suggests, however tentatively, that in the challenge of heterogeneity, fractality, perspective/-alism, and multiplicities lies the power of the forking pathway: the moment a relation is created through divergence. If we are invited—in the same breath—to consider forms of comparison and forms of relativism (dropping difference and similarity), we are also offered two paths, (...) one based on a world of singularities and multiplicities, and the other on a world of not-quite repetitions. The article asks if the binary is not essential to the epistemic work that Western (Euro-American) scholars might want to do, since we forever reinvent the divide between the modern and the post-/pre-modern. Strathern assumes the anthropologist's license to talk about concepts through persons, and begins by asking how Papua New Guineans who come together in a city compare themselves, and in contrast to ethnic comparisons elsewhere (e.g., contra Sarah Green's Balkan interactions). In talking about persons through concepts, it is worth asking what is entailed in relativizing one scholar's work through that of another. The author says that her “hunch” is that in both cases the analyst might wish to have the liberty of discerning—in the same breath—the multiplicities of what John Law and Annemarie Mol call perspectivalism (their very general alternative to comparison) and Eduardo Viveiros de Castro's radically divergent perspectivism (a self-contained, recursive and above all socially specific relativism). (shrink)

Abstract:In this forum, Marilyn Strathern and Jade S. Sasser review Adele Clarke and Donna Haraway's edited volume Making Kin, Not Population: Reconceiving Generations (Prickly Paradigm Press, 2018). Responses from multiple authors featured in the book follow.

The authors of Re-Thinking Science argue theneed for a socially robust science. In this essay, an anthropologist asks what it takes to render a description of `society' robust. Two empirical cases – concerning bioethics in the field of reproductive technology, and compensation claims for environmental pollution – show society in different guises.

How do we inhabit technology? This theme for a conference on the way in which technology at once surrounds us and becomes part of our very bodies prompts reflections from Melanesia. If the concept of technology inhabits anything, it most emphatically inhabits our ways of speaking about ourselves, reifying many different projects as the extensions of one - an enchantment with creativity. The same language imagines `nature' existing apart from human creations. It is clear that the life of these old (...) Euro-American divisions is not over yet. Intellectual property protocols, notably patenting, foster the divide between `technology' and `nature' while presaging its collapse. This article points to some alternatives, incidentally offering a candidate for `habitation' that has nothing to do with community or locality. (shrink)

The Nuffield Council on Bioethics' recent report on the ethics of the donation of bodily material for treatment and research (Human Bodies: Donation for Medicine and Research. www.nuffieldbioethics.org/human-bodies) brings to the fore the much-debated question of how far society should go in trying to encourage people to donate their bodily material. Based on conclusions reached by the Working Party with respect to the duties of the stewardship state, the role of altruism and of solidarity, public interest in health-related research, the (...) welfare of the donor and the importance of ‘professional values’ such as trust and respect, the report presents an ‘Intervention Ladder’ that sets out the ethical acceptability of various ways of encouraging people to donate. Policy recommendations are made in a number of areas including organ donation, gamete donation, volunteering for clinical trials and the use of donated tissue in research. (shrink)

This piece answers responses by Bruce Kapferer, Annemarie Mol, and Morten Pedersen to the author's article “Binary License,” appearing in the Common Knowledge symposium on “comparative relativism.” She emphasizes that, whatever contributions to theory may be attributed to her (for example, the concept of the “partible person”), her work is mainly descriptive and centered on Melanesia. She makes no objection to discussing generally applicable principles, or to finding unity in diversity—saying only that she is somewhat wary of them and, instead, (...) mainly reports her findings about particular cultures in detail. Her conclusion is that, when theoretical expectations are in tension with observed particulars, though a “bifurcation” may well come to light, “bifurcation is nothing to be ashamed of.”. (shrink)

This introduction to the Common Knowledge symposium titled “Comparative Relativism” outlines a variety of intellectual contexts where placing the unlikely companion terms comparison and relativism in conjunction offers analytical purchase. If comparison, in the most general sense, involves the investigation of discrete contexts in order to elucidate their similarities and differences, then relativism, as a tendency, stance, or working method, usually involves the assumption that contexts exhibit, or may exhibit, radically different, incomparable, or incommensurable traits. Comparative studies are required to (...) treat their objects as alike, at least in some crucial respects; relativism indicates the limits of this practice. Jensen argues that this seeming paradox is productive, as he moves across contexts, from Lévi-Strauss's analysis of comparison as an anthropological method to Peter Galison's history of physics, and on to the anthropological, philosophical, and historical examples offered in symposium contributions by Barbara Herrnstein Smith, Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, Marilyn Strathern, and Isabelle Stengers. Comparative relativism is understood by some to imply that relativism comes in various kinds and that these have multiple uses, functions, and effects, varying widely in different personal, historical, and institutional contexts that can be compared and contrasted. Comparative relativism is taken by others to encourage a “comparison of comparisons,” in order to relativize what different peoples—say, Western academics and Amerindian shamans—compare things “for.” Jensen concludes that what is compared and relativized in this symposium are the methods of comparison and relativization themselves. He ventures that the contributors all hope that treating these terms in juxtaposition may allow for new configurations of inquiry. (shrink)

It is tempting to interpret Marilyn Strathern as saying that the concept of nature is a social construction, because in her essay “No Nature, No Culture: the Hagen Case” she tells us that the Hagen people do not describe the world using this concept. However, I point out an obstacle to interpreting her in this way, an obstacle which leads me to reject this interpretation. Interpreting her in this way makes her inconsistent. The inconsistency is owing to a (...) commitment that she shares with previous British anthropologists, a commitment which points to an incompatibility between two intellectual traditions. (shrink)

The interview was conducted in September 1996 in Cambridge. Marilyn Strathern and Janet Carsten had been colleagues at the University of Manchester’s Department of Social Anthropology until September 1993, when Marilyn Strathern left to take up the William Wyse Professorship at the University of Cambridge, where she remained until retirement in 2008. Janet Carsten joined Edinburgh in October of the same year, where she is presently Professor of Social and Cultural Anthropology.

Marilyn Strathern has produced a remarkable body of work that not only demonstrates range and tenacity but also has produced a host of inspirations that have made their way into the world. This Afterword to the special issue ‘Social Theory After Strathern’ dwells on the subject of the modesty of what Strathern is proposing and how it relates to space, noting that her work enables us to forge new practico-theoretical combinations and works of diplomacy between incompatibles (...) which show up the limitations of each party even as they forge new understandings – an approach that chimes with a move towards a more spatial view of knowledge. Theory, to echo Strathern’s gardening metaphor, needs to leave room not just to prune but to grow, the two being inter-related, as she points out. This Afterword also proposes that the extraordinary ability of anthropology to be inside and outside at once might serve as a model for what the social sciences need to become if they are to stay relevant in a world which cannot be reduced to a cipher for theory but still needs to learn from theory – theory which is precarious but spreadable, theory which establishes a rapport, but a rapport with friction built into it. (shrink)

Economics uses rational actor models, but what about anthropology? I present an interpretation of the influential anthropologist Marilyn Strathern according to which she engages in a kind of rational actor modelling, but a kind that is different from economic modelling.

Marilyn Strathern argues against the possibility of feminist research bringing about a paradigm shift in social anthropology. In an earlier paper, my interpretation of Strathern’s argument, or one of them, is similar to Janaki Nair’s response in broad outline. But it is different in detail and I also object to Strathern’s argument, whereas Nair endorses the argument she extracts. Here I identify differences and I object to the Nair-Strathern argument as well.

Regarding the argument by Marilyn Strathern which Victoria Loblay focuses on, I present two differences between my response and Loblay’s response. Also I raise a concern about Loblay’s response.

Patricia Uberoi extracts an argument from Marilyn Strathern: that feminist research cannot bring about a paradigm shift in social anthropology, because any feminist framework can be easily contained. I contrast Uberoi’s interpretation of Strathern with my own, and then draw attention to two possibilities that this containment argument overlooks.

I respond to the charge that one of my objections to Marilyn Strathern’s rejection of feminist anthropology is the same as an objection made by Kamala Visweswaran. They may seem very similar to begin with, but I argue that there is both a difference in focus - in which premises we are concentrating on - and in method.

This paper presents an attempted pastiche of the writing and thinking style of the distinguished anthropologist Marilyn Strathern. The claim about the consequence of avoiding the charge of exoticism resembles the paradox of analysis.

This piece addresses Marilyn Strathern's article, “Binary License,” and the important contribution she makes to the development of an anthropology that is truly comparative and that aims to escape some important disadvantages of an earlier relativism. This comment places her in the context of the related effort of Louis Dumont, which involved a sustained critique of Eurocentricism, in which he saw anthropological comparativism as hitherto being bound. A question is raised concerning the extent to which Strathern has (...) escaped the kind of criticism that Dumont developed. Additionally, Strathern's Hagen materials are considered in relation to the earlier Zambian studies of the “Manchester school” of anthropology and which addressed similar ethnographic materials. Strathern's work is regarded in this comment as bearing some similarity with current directions in actor-network theory, although sustaining an ontological approach that is seen by some as contributing to the risks of anthropological relativism. The comment attempts to work within the spirit of Strathern's original contribution and is concerned with how anthropological comparativism may avoid some of the pitfalls that are commonly associated with it. (shrink)

John Locke is known within anthropology primarily for his empiricism, his views of natural laws, and his discussion of the state of nature and the social contract. Marilyn Strathern and Marshall Sahlins, however, have offered distinctive, novel, and broad reflections on the nature of anthropological knowledge that appeal explicitly to a lesser-known aspect of Locke’s work: his metaphysical views of relations. This paper examines their distinctive conclusions – Sahlins’ about cultural relativism, Strathern’s about relatives and kinship – (...) both of which concern the objectivity of anthropological knowledge. Although Locke’s own views of relations have been neglected by historians of philosophy in the past, recent and ongoing philosophical discussions of Locke on relations create a productive trading zone between philosophy and anthropology on the objectivity of anthropological knowledge that goes beyond engagement with the particular claims made by Sahlins and Strathern. (shrink)

This article takes up Marilyn Strathern’s formulation of a law/culture ‘duplex’ – her term for the complementarity of anthropology and law as means to each other’s ends. She draws attention to the limitations of the duplex, and urges us to consider ethnography as a project of unwinding its entwinement. As a step toward that end, the article returns to classic texts by Emile Durkheim and Bronislaw Malinowski – texts that were foundational to the emergence of anthropology, and to (...) the establishment of law as an object of study for the social sciences. Re-read in light of Strathern’s insight, what has been widely taken as their relativism emerges instead as their defense of political community as a subject for ethnography, and the basis for a theoretical check on law conceived globally – within states or as colonial overrule. The article concludes with a discussion of the contemporary relevance of that position. (shrink)

Today, somewhat counter-intuitively, we no longer have an obvious venue for thinking-in-the world about our actuality. Despite, or because of, the endless conferences, seminars, mobility, publication outlets, new media and the like in which it is easier and easier to be connected, it is increasingly difficult to avoid the diagnostic that it is harder and harder to relate. This Foreword to the special issue ‘Social Theory After Strathern’ considers the contemporary problem of the inversion of connectedness and relatedness in (...) the light of Marilyn Strathern’s oeuvre. Proceeding from a discussion of the three kinds of friendship distinguished by Aristotle, Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of conceptual persona is invoked as a way of thinking through conceptual friendship and the forms of relationality that an engagement with Strathern’s work requires and sustains. (shrink)

A theoretical and empirical exploration of the concept of pedagogy and play in early childhood education... provides an in-depth examination of classical and contemporary theories of play, with a focus on post-developmental perspectives and Vygotskian theory."--Provided by publisher.