1. Introduction . In the chapter which he devotes to the applications of his principle of individual liberty, Mill considers the question ‘how far liberty may legitimately be invaded for the prevention of crime, or of accident’. On the latter topic, he writes:—‘… it is a proper office of public authority to guard against accidents. If either a public officer or anyone else saw a person attempting to cross a bridge which had been ascertained to be unsafe, and there were (...) no time to warn him of his danger, they might seize him and turn him back, without any real infringement of his liberty; for liberty consists in doing what one desires, and he does not desire to fall into the river.”. (shrink)

Human conflict and its resolution is obviously a subject of great practical importance. Equally obviously, it is a vast subject, ranging from total war at one end of the spectrum to negotiated settlement at its other end. The literature on the subject is correspondingly vast and, in recent times, technical, thanks to the valuable contributions made to it by game theorists, economists, and writers on industrial and international relations. In this essay, however, I shall discuss only one familiar form of (...) conflict-resolution. There is room for such a discussion, because philosophers have lately neglected compromise, despite the interest shown in it by the aforementioned experts, and despite the classic treatments of it by Halifax, Burke and Morley. Truly, ‘…compromise is not so widely discussed by philosophers as one might expect’, and ‘…the idea of compromise has been largely neglected by Anglo-American jurisprudence’. (shrink)

Moral dilemmas, or moral conflicts, present a leading problem in Ethics. Ross calls them the problem of conflicting prima facie moral obligations. Lemmon calls them ‘moral dilemmas’, and Sinnott-Armstrong in his recent book discusses them thoroughly and provides extensive references to relevant literature.

Burgess, J.P. and Rosen, G. Subject with No ObjectElliott, R.Faking Nature.

The philosophical problems of liberty may be classified as those of definition, of justification and of distribution. They are so complex that there is a danger of being unable to see the wood for the trees. It may be helpful, therefore, to provide an aerial photograph of a large part of the wood, namely, the liberty ofindividual persons. But it is, of course, a photograph taken from an individual point of view, as Leibniz would have put it.

This discussion completes 'Moral Dilemmas, Compromise and Compensation' ("Philosophy", Vol. 66. No. 257, July 1991). In correction of the earlier discussion, the claim that resolution of moral dilemmas by compromise is always preferable to resolution by compensation, is withdrawn. In a particular case, the decision which is preferable requires judgment (Subsec. 3.8). In amplification of the earlier discussion, it is observed that another way of resolving moral conflicts is what M P. Follett calls 'Integration'. In this, the one claimant is (...) made better off and the other claimant is made no worse off. This is in fact an application of a principle of Pareto's. Here again, in a particular case, the decision whether resolution by integration is preferable to resolution by compromise, requires judgment (Subsec. 3.5). (shrink)

Like theories of punishment, theories of reverse discrimination can usefully be divided into forward-looking ones and backward-looking ones. One example of the former type of theory is Dworkin's, who defends the policy on the ground that it will produce ‘a more equal society’. Another is Sher's, who defends it on the ground that it increases equality of opportunity. This essay is an examination of the latter type of theory. Compensatory discrimination is related, then, to discrimination thus: discrimination is the genus, (...) of which reverse discrimination is a species, of which compensatory discrimination is a sub-species. It will be convenient to proceed by examining successively the ideas of discrimination, of compensation, and of compensatory discrimination. (shrink)

Mill holds a metaphysical theory about the nature of things which is of the sensationalist or phenomenalist variety, and which he derives admittedly from the idealism of Berkeley. This metaphysical theory is introduced into a discussion in which he is attempting something different, namely, to offer a rival psychological account to Hamilton's intuitionist one of how it is that men possess that familiar but complex conception, Nature or the external world. It will be convenient to consider his psychological theory first.

Some affirm, but others deny, that works of fine art, or at any rate certain sorts of them, should be true or probable. This is the question which I investigate in the present essay. It has been debated by philosophers from Plato on, and much can still be learnt from earlier writers, particularly Aristotle. But I have found some recent discussions especially helpful; namely, what Strawson and Hart say about and in connexion with presupposition; Hospers' and Harris' remarks about truth-to (...) and plausibility respectively; and Beardsley's treatment of these matters in his admirable survey of the problems of aesthetics. (shrink)

In disproof of the materialist principle, that common things exist unperceived, and in defence of the New Principle, Philonous here objects that it is inconceivable that a common thing should do so. Hylas replies that, on the contrary, we can and do think of, e.g., a tree standing alone as opposed to a tree being perceived by an observer. But Philonous counter-objects to this reply that it contains a contradiction, since it asserts that we can think of something which is (...) not thought of. (shrink)

According to Berkeley, then, the unconscious process of inference of the scientist goes as follows. He notices that, when he does not have his house within visual range, he cannot see it just by wishing to; and that, when he does have it within visual range and his eyes open, he cannot prevent himself from seeing it just by wishing not to. He therefore infers that he is not the efficient cause of these sensations. But, since he holds that they (...) must have some efficient cause, he concludes that this is a congeries of "material substances," which are numerically distinct and partly dissimilar from the sensations, and which exist even when unperceived, or "externally to the mind." As a psychological theory, this seems to be at any rate plausible. (shrink)

Both these developments would have surprised Berkeley. He would have found it paradoxical that the vulgar should have rejected his vulgar immaterialism as paradoxical, since he of course believed himself to be on their side in the matter, and characterised his own philosophy as a.

First published in 1987. "Justice and liberty are the central concepts of social and political thought." These true words of Raphael's indicate the importance of these concepts, which resides in the fact that they are significantly linked to most of the other key notions in this field of thought, so that an understanding of them is indispensable for an adequate grasp of Social Philosophy. The author explores these concepts on essays on freedom and fairness, and will be of great interest (...) to students of philosophy. (shrink)