Collingwood wrote at a time when positivism was the dominant philosophical influence in British philosophy. Central to Collingwood's philosophical project was the task of rehabilitation of metaphysics against the backdrop of the positivistic deconstruction of metaphysics. Collingwood's defence of metaphysics is much nuanced in the sense that while Collingwood does not sympathize with the grandiose conception of metaphysics associated with traditional metaphysics he is nonetheless keen to argue for the possibility of metaphysics in some form by reconceptualising metaphysics as a (...) science of absolute presuppositions. Thus his reform of metaphysics is an answer to positivism at the same time an attempt to tone down the claims of metaphysics such as to bring it in accord with scientific rationality. Yet it remains to be seen whether Collingwood's rehabilitation of metaphysics is successful, so far as the so-called absolute presuppositions do not have any ontological bearing with the domain of reality as it is in-itself but are exclusively grounded as structural features of human rationality, writ large. In this sense, Collingwood's initiative appears to suffer from similar difficulties that bedevil its Kantian predecessor in reforming metaphysics in terms of the claims of his Copernican revolution in epistemology. (shrink)

Berkeley is popular in the philosophical tradition as the philosopher who denied the existence of matter in favor of spiritual substance. His esse est percipi thesis is understandably seen as a recipe for subjective idealism. While there is a point to this reading of Berkeley, it remains to be seen whether it does justice to the full significance of Berkeley’s philosophy. In Berkeley’s scholarship consequently the traditional understanding of Berkeley as a subjective idealist has been challenged by scholars such as (...) Jessop and Ardley who argue that Berkeley is better understood as a common sense realist. In approaching Berkeley’s Immaterialism from the standpoint of the philosophical issues raised by the emergence of modern science, this book is a sympathetic reconstruction of Berkeley’s philosophy. The contention is that if approached in this manner, Berkeley’s opposition to philosophical materialism not only emerges as an attempt to overcome false abstractions but it also becomes possible to make sense of Berkeley’s claimed alliance with common sense in his battle against philosophical materialism. While the realist portrait of Berkeley that emerges from this exercise is not free of difficulties, it arguably offers us a fuller conspectus of Berkeley’s immaterialism. (shrink)

In this important study D. M. Armstrong offers a comprehensive system of analytical metaphysics that synthesises but also develops his thinking over the last twenty years. Armstrong's analysis, which acknowledges the 'logical atomism' of Russell and Wittgenstein, makes facts the fundamental constituents of the world, examining properties, relations, numbers, classes, possibility and necessity, dispositions, causes and laws. All these, it is argued, find their place and can be understood inside a scheme of states of affairs. This is a comprehensive and (...) rigorously this-worldly account of the most general features of reality, argued from a distinctive philosophical perspective, and it will appeal to a wide readership in analytical philosophy. (shrink)

Without doubt, St Thomas Aquinas was the greatest of the medieval philosophers. Aquinas was a prolific writer and he made contributions to virtually every area of Philosophy and Theology. His account of the existence of God is perhaps the best known aspect of his work. This is especially true of the celebrated five arguments he adduced in demonstration of the existence of God. In exploring Aquinas’ Five ways, which some commentators regard as Aquinas’ substantive contribution to Philosophy of religion, our (...) contention is that they demonstrate the possibilities as well as the limits of natural theology, so far as while Aquinas does not deny that natural reason can establish the existence of God he nonetheless maintains that there are aspects of God’s nature that can be known only through the means of divine revelation. Consequently unless we take into account the double emphasis on the possibilities and limits of natural theology, we are sure underestimate the contemporary relevance of Aquinas’ Five ways. -/- . (shrink)

St Anselm is one of the major thinkers of the medieval epoch of the history of philosophy. Interest in Anselm usually focuses on his discussion of the problem of the existence of God especially as contained in the Proslogion. Indeed Anselm is mostly known for his attempt to proof the existence of God in the Proslogion. The argument he advances here which goes by the name ontological argument has been a point of reference all through the history of Western philosophy (...) and is usually viewed as his most substantive contributions to philosophy of religion, with Hume and Kant criticizing it in the eighteenth century and thinkers such as Hartshorne, Malcom and Plantinga endorsing it in the Twentieth century. Like Augustine before him and Aquinas after him, Anselm did not see any opposition between faith and reason, or again, between philosophy and theology, as he was concerned with providing rational ground for the doctrines of Christianity which he already accepted as a matter of faith. Indeed as commentators rightly note, Anselm’s thought can be summed up in the Augustinian dictum, “faith seeks understanding”, so that he is arguably one of the early pioneers of Christian theology, so far as he sees certain solidarity between faith and reason, with reason providing the excellent service of rational clarification of what we accept by faith. The inter-play Anselm sees as subsisting between faith and reason is one we must take into account if we must appreciate his contributions to theology and metaphysics, for this consideration permeates the whole of his thought. For him clearly, that there is no divorce between faith and reason means concretely that “I do not seek to understand in other that I may believe, but rather I believe in order that I may understand”. (shrink)

Ayer’s critique of Metaphysics is much indebted to Hume and Kant’s pioneering appraisals of metaphysics. Its uniqueness lies mainly in the attempt to ground the rejection of metaphysics on a linguistic basis rather than epistemic premise as Hume and Kant before him. Yet it remains to be seen whether Ayer’s initiative fares better than its predecessors in discrediting metaphysics.

Since the epistemological turn initiated by Descartes at the start of the modern period and subsequently cemented by Kant's Copernican revolution in epistemology, attention has focused more on the issue of criteria of truth than the essence of truth. This is especially true in respect of discussions in philosophy of truth in contemporary philosophy. While Bradley recognizes the importance of the issue of criteria as far as the problem of truth is concerned, he is nonetheless more concerned with the question (...) of the nature of truth in his engagement with the problem of truth. Bradley sees a fundamental continuity between both concerns, to the extent that in the final analysis truth cannot be divorced from reality, so that truth is not merely a property of propositions as many contemporary theories of truth maintain, but rather a feature of reality. Bradley's approach is peculiar, no doubt, but I argue that it helps to correct certain imbalances associated with contemporary philosophies of truth. (shrink)

Many commentators regard Ethical Studies as the most Hegelian of Bradley’s writings. The common perception is that the Fifth essay of that work, which articulates an ethics of “My Station and its Duties”, expresses Bradley’s position on the question of the nature of morality. Nonetheless when the dialectical structure of Ethical Studies is taken into account, the common perception is not only questionable, but it also emerges that, in interrogating the nature of morality, Bradley’s concern is beyond matters merely ethical, (...) in so far as, on Bradley’s view, the question of the nature of morality inevitably implicates the larger question as to the relation of morality to religion, and of religion to philosophy. Thus in accentuating the claim of ideal morality in the Sixth Essay against the apotheosis of social morality, Bradley’s attempt is to offer a larger perspective on the being of morality itself, as it bears on the question of the nature of ultimate reality. Paradoxically, Bradley concludes by way of anti-climax that the highest viewpoint on morality is still inadequate to the matter, given that morality is inherently self-contradictory. Given the often confused environment of much of the contemporary debates on the nature of morality in which communitarianism is dualistically opposed to individualism, and ethical relativism pitched against ethical objectivism, the relevance of Bradley’s accentuation of the ideality of morality is beyond question, as it provides useful resources for thinking together personal and social morality without reducing one to the other. (shrink)

The constitutive activity of the self and the ground of the unity of the self are two important aspects of understanding the self. This paper attempts to delineatethese considerations, tracing their use, function and implications in Bradley’s thesis on the self. The article argues that for Bradley, the focalization is on the understanding of the self and the relation of thought to reality. Furthermore, the article attempts to locate Bradley’s account of the self as appearance as a middle course between (...) Kant’s transcendental idealism to Hegel’s speculative idealism to demonstrate the overlaps, ruptures, and evolution of the philosophical journey of the concept of the self, its nature, and its expressions. (shrink)

Part 3 relates Bradley's philosophy to the situation of contemporary philosophy by assessing Russell and James's appraisal of Bradley.Praise for the book:This ...

-/- Bradley is one of the most important philosophers in the 20th century. He contributed to virtually every area of the philosophical discipline. However, he is mostly known for his work in metaphysics which finds a systematic exposition in his magnum opus: Appearance and Reality: An Essay in Metaphysics (1893). Bradley’s concept of metaphysics is implicit in all his writings, especially in his account of morality as self-realization in Ethical Studies and of course the theory of judgement and inference he (...) develops in the Principles of Logic. Same is true in respect of his discussion of the problem of truth and allied matters in Essays on Truth and Reality. Nonetheless it is in Appearance and Reality that his concept of metaphysics receives its explicit articulation. Bradley holds metaphysics in high esteem, seeing a close affinity between religion, mysticism and metaphysics. Hence he regards metaphysics as one of the highest vocations to which a human being is called. As a form of thinking, metaphysics provides us with an important avenue for understanding the nature of things as they are in themselves rather than merely in terms of their accidental determinations, that is to say, rather than merely as appearances. (shrink)

A striking feature of Bradley’s thought is its dialectical structure. This is evident in all his writings especially Ethical Studies in which he investigates the topic of self-realization within the larger context of the question of the nature of morality. In the Ethical Studies Bradley looks at different accounts of morality vis-à-vis the demand of self realization and finds none of them absolutely adequate albeit one is relatively adequate than the other. For this reason he condemns the “ethics of pleasure (...) for pleasure sake” and rates it lower than “ethics of duty for duty sake” even though from a larger standpoints he finds “ethics of duty for duty sake” equally inadequate whereas it takes it that the “ethics of my stations and duties” fares better than “ethics of duty for duty sake” even if it does not offer us any resting place. Although the structure of Bradley’s Ethical Studies is dialectical and to this extent is Bradley’s most Hegelian writing it is a mistake not to pay attention to Bradley’s divergence from Hegelianism which is already evident in Ethical Studies especially with regard to what he makes of the relationship between morality, religion and philosophy. What this means that despite his sympathy to dialectical thinking, Bradley’s relation to dialectics in the end is ambivalent. (shrink)

W. J. Mander and Stamatoula Panagakou’s book is one of the latest expressions of the resurgence of British Idealism after its demotion in British philosophy as a result of the ascendancy of analyti...

There is a tendency in recent development literature to couple the concept of good governance with the concept of sustainable development. The coupling of the two concepts witnesses to the correlation that subsists between good governance and sustainable development, such that given that sustainable development is a function of good governance, where there is good governance, we should not only expect that there will be progress, but, more importantly, we should also expect that the progress is sustainable, so that the (...) situation is one of growing from strength to strength rather than one of progress today and retrogression tomorrow. Yet paradoxically just as sustainable development is predicated on good governance, good governance itself is a function of effective communication, so that where there is lack of effective communication the result is always bad governance, which, in turn, means the possibility of sustainable development is impeded, as we cannot maximize the resources at our disposal, but wallow in endless recrimination and negativities that fail to contribute to our overall well being. Our aim is to show that there is a direct correlation between diplomacy and good governance on the one hand and good governance and sustainable development on the other, so that the best way to promote sustainable development in every sphere of life is to ensure an effective management of the resources at our disposal such as to satisfy all legitimate and competing interests. (shrink)

One of the enduring contributions of Descartes to philosophy is Descartes’ response to the challenge of scepticism. In addressing the challenge of scepticism Descartes understood that scepticism was a philosophical challenge which needed to be answered by taking into account its inner logic. It is not surprising therefore that Descartes sought to demonstrate as a counter-point to scepticism that there is at least one truth we can know with certitude, namely, the truth of the self. By fulfilling the demand of (...) indubitability the emergence of the truth of the self, as it were, signals certain victory for Descartes in his fight against scepticism. Yet so far as we cannot say that the truth of the cogito is objective unless God guarantees its objectivity, it remains to be seen whether Descartes’ victory over scepticism is conclusive. Consequently, while the discovery of the cogito represents a key moment in Descartes’ effort to contain scepticism so far as it furnishes him with an indubitable foundation, his effort to reconstruct the edifice of knowledge ends in failure so far as it witnesses a resurgence of scepticism in respect of our knowledge of the external world. The argument of this paper is that Descartes’ appeal to God as the guarantor of the objective certainty of the truth of the cogito grossly undermines the overall success of Descartes’ response to the challenge of scepticism. (shrink)

A prominent feature of the contemporary society in the last couple of decades is the phenomenon of globalization. While globalization has brought immense benefits to Africa on the one hand, Africa’s entrance into and participation in the global scene has also precipitated a crisis of confusion and identity for Africa–a situation which is analogous to the effect of her encounter with colonialism, so that unless the dialectic of identity and difference that inevitably arises from this situation is constructively managed, it (...) will be difficult for Africa to make the best of the opportunities inherent in globalization. Given that no one can make the best of any opportunity for interaction with others unless one is clear about one’s identity and priorities, a major challenge Africa has to address in the context of globalization is the need to assume personal responsibility in defining her priorities and interests such as to allow these to inform her engagement with the various participants in the global world. More often than not, the Achilles heel of Africa is lack of clear focus in respect of her priorities as well as failure to allow her interests to drive her engagement with other participants in the global system. To reverse the situation of dependency which this mode of operation fosters, we argue that, Africa needs to relocate the locus of control internally and put in place a strong regime of internal democracy based on rule of law to tackle the menace of corruption and mismanagement that has undermined development initiatives since independence. (shrink)

The influence of James’s anti-intellectualism on his reading of Bradley is clearest in his “Bradley or Bergson?,” an article James contributed to the Journal of Philosophy in 1910. The fact that the article appeared late in James’s career makes it an important document. But aside from this, the article is also important for the light it casts on the assumptions behind James’s portrait of Bradley as an intellectualist. As the article intimates, James is fully aware of the affinity between him (...) and Bradley. Indeed, for the most part one finds James celebrating the so-called affinity. But he is also aware of the divergence between them, except that one gets the impression that James is at a loss as to why such a divergence should exist. As far as I can see, the article evinces a dual level narrative: an “is” discourse, as distinguished from an “ought” discourse. An “is” discourse articulates what is the case without the implication of a prescriptive burden, while the hallmark of an “ought” discourse is its prescriptivism, in the sense that it not only articulates a promise, but also implies that the prevalent order does not measure up to the prescribed ideal. It is just this type of discourse that we find in “Bradley or Bergson?” Both levels of discourse are integrated into a unified narrative to the extent that the entire story is aimed at advancing a supposedly paradigmatic interpretation of the relation between Bradley’s philosophy and James’s. If “Bradley or Bergson?” is a complex and tricky document the clue lies in its prescriptivism, which gravitates on the implicit dual level narrative that drives it. Perhaps also it is the key to unravelling the truth about the logic of James’s rejection of Bradley’s Absolutism. (shrink)

The influence of James’s anti-intellectualism on his reading of Bradley is clearest in his “Bradley or Bergson?,” an article James contributed to the Journal of Philosophy in 1910. The fact that the article appeared late in James’s career makes it an important document. But aside from this, the article is also important for the light it casts on the assumptions behind James’s portrait of Bradley as an intellectualist. As the article intimates, James is fully aware of the affinity between him (...) and Bradley. Indeed, for the most part one finds James celebrating the so-called affinity. But he is also aware of the divergence between them, except that one gets the impression that James is at a loss as to why such a divergence should exist. As far as I can see, the article evinces a dual level narrative: an “is” discourse, as distinguished from an “ought” discourse. An “is” discourse articulates what is the case without the implication of a prescriptive burden, while the hallmark of an “ought” discourse is its prescriptivism, in the sense that it not only articulates a promise, but also implies that the prevalent order does not measure up to the prescribed ideal. It is just this type of discourse that we find in “Bradley or Bergson?” Both levels of discourse are integrated into a unified narrative to the extent that the entire story is aimed at advancing a supposedly paradigmatic interpretation of the relation between Bradley’s philosophy and James’s. If “Bradley or Bergson?” is a complex and tricky document the clue lies in its prescriptivism, which gravitates on the implicit dual level narrative that drives it. Perhaps also it is the key to unravelling the truth about the logic of James’s rejection of Bradley’s Absolutism. (shrink)

Kant’s criticism of Metaphysics is informed by his reception of Hume’s skepticism. While the claims of the synthetic a priori, for Kant, constitute a transcendental refutation of Hume’s skepticism, Kant remains in fundamental sympathy with Hume’s empiricism. On the one hand he invokes the synthetic a priori in limiting the unbridled empiricism that conflates the distinction between sources of knowledge and origin of knowledge. On the other hand he also underscores the inherent limitation of human knowledge as legislated by the (...) same empirical ideal, so that in the final analysis there is a fundamental tension in the critical philosophy with respect to Kant’s commitment to idealism and empiricism. (shrink)

One of the best known aspects of Oakeshott’s philosophy is his critique of rationalism. Because it is often read in a manner that dissociates it from the larger milieu in which it subsists, namely, Oakeshotts’s philosophy of experience, Oakeshott is sometimes labeled as an enemy of politics, one who is uninterested in political affairs; or, again, as a conservative, one who is at odds with modernity. Yet it remains to be seen whether these labels do justice to the complexity of (...) Oakeshott. Indeed, if Oakeshott’s critique of rationalism is inserted into the background of his philosophy of experience as articulated in Experience and its Modes, we begin to see that Oakeshott’s concern in his critique of rationalism is to separate political activity from political theorization and ground ideology in tradition, so that with a bit of detachment from political experience, the philosopher of politics can assume philosophy’s oversight function in critically interrogating the assumption behind political activity and political theorization, with a view to underscoring the limits of ideological politics and the priority of tradition. Our contention is that this way of looking at Oakeshott’s critique of the sovereignty of reason allows for a better appreciation of the contemporary relevance of Oakeshott’s contributions to political discourse. (shrink)

Parmenides is one of the greatest thinkers in the history of Western philosophy. His thought has been a major point of reference for many metaphysical discussions that define the history of philosophy. Indeed there is virtually no moment in the history of metaphysics that his thought has not been influential. It is usual to contrast his philosophy of the unchanging reality of the One with Heraclitus' philosophy of change and becoming. While his counter-intuitive denial of change is questionable the philosophical (...) burden is rethink his monism by infusing change into it without prejudice to the general idea that reality is a whole in which unity and diversity are reconciled. (shrink)

Like many of his contemporaries such as Bradley and Collingwood, Whitehead wrote at a time when positivism was the dominant philosophical influence in British philosophy, following the disintegration of the Hegelian synthesis. Central to Whitehead’s philosophical project is the task of rehabilitation of metaphysics against the backdrop of its deconstruction by logical positivism. While Whitehead is broadly sympathetic to the ideal of metaphysics, he believes that the grandiose conception of metaphysics as science of being qua being associated with traditional metaphysics (...) is out of tune with scientific rationality and as such is problematic. At the core of Whitehead’s rehabilitation of metaphysics, therefore, is an attempt to broker rapprochement between metaphysical rationality and scientific rationality by converting metaphysics into speculative metaphysics, with the ambition of focusing on our universe of experience rather than all universes of discourse, as is typical of traditional metaphysics. While there is no doubt that Whitehead’s rehabilitation of metaphysics is an answer to positivism, it is at the same time an attempt to tone down the claims of metaphysics such as to bring it in accord with scientific rationality. Yet it remains to be seen whether Whitehead’s rehabilitation of metaphysics is successful in so far as the reconciliation of metaphysical rationality and scientific rationality through speculative philosophy focuses only on particular experiences rather than universal experiences, so that the concern of metaphysics to address the fundamental nature of the real in all its expressions remain pressing beyond the ideal of speculative philosophy. (shrink)

Like many of his contemporaries such as Bradley and Collingwood, Whitehead wrote at a time when positivism was the dominant philosophical influence in British philosophy, following the disintegration of the Hegelian synthesis. Central to Whitehead’s philosophical project is the task of rehabilitation of metaphysics against the backdrop of its deconstruction by logical positivism. While Whitehead is broadly sympathetic to the ideal of metaphysics, he believes that the grandiose conception of metaphysics as science of being qua being associated with traditional metaphysics (...) is out of tune with scientific rationality and as such is problematic. At the core of Whitehead’s rehabilitation of metaphysics, therefore, is an attempt to broker rapprochement between metaphysical rationality and scientific rationality by converting metaphysics into speculative metaphysics, with the ambition of focusing on our universe of experience rather than all universes of discourse, as is typical of traditional metaphysics. While there is no doubt that Whitehead’s rehabilitation of metaphysics is an answer to positivism, it is at the same time an attempt to tone down the claims of metaphysics such as to bring it in accord with scientific rationality. Yet it remains to be seen whether Whitehead’s rehabilitation of metaphysics is successful in so far as the reconciliation of metaphysical rationality and scientific rationality through speculative philosophy focuses only on particular experiences rather than universal experiences, so that the concern of metaphysics to address the fundamental nature of the real in all its expressions remain pressing beyond the ideal of speculative philosophy. (shrink)

" -- Africa Today "The excellence of this book lies in the wealth of perspectives that it brings to the discussion on what constitutes philosophy, rationality, ...

Authors philosophical notes on life, conduct of life from the perspective of a life.

A comprehensive introduction to the ways in which meaning is conveyed in language. Alan Cruse covers semantic matters, but also deals with topics that are usually considered to fall under pragmatics. A major aim is to highlight the richness and subtlety of meaning phenomena, rather than to expound any particular theory. Rich in examples and exercises, Meaning in Language provides an invaluable descriptive approach to this area of linguistics for undergraduates and postgraduates alike.

This book: * assumes no mathematical background and keeps the technicalities to a minimum * explains the most important applications of probability theory to ...

In this entry we provide a critical review of recent work on the nature and ethics of blame, including issues of moral standing.

A record of the words and teachings of Confucius, _The Analects_ is considered the most reliable expression of Confucian thought. However, the original meaning of Confucius's teachings have been filtered and interpreted by the commentaries of Confucianists of later ages, particularly the Neo-Confucianists of the Song dynasty, not altogether without distortion.In this monumental translation by Professor D. C. Lau, an attempt has been made to interpret the sayings as they stand. The corpus of the sayings is taken as an organic (...) whole and the final test of the interpretation rests on the internal consistency it exhibits. In other words, _The Analects_ is read in the light of _The Analects._This results in a truer understanding of Confucius' thought than the traditional interpretation and paves the way for a re-assessment of its importance in the history of Chinese thought and its relevance to the present day world.This volume also contains an introduction to the life and teachings of Confucius, and three appendices on the events in the life of Confucius, on his disciples, and on the composition of _The Analects._. (shrink)

The Greeks have long been regarded as innovators across a wide range of fields in literature, culture, philosophy, politics and science. However, little attention has been paid to how they thought and felt about novelty and innovation itself, and to relating this to the forces of traditionalism and conservatism which were also present across all the various societies within ancient Greece. What inspired the Greeks to embark on their unique and enduring innovations? How did they think and feel about the (...) new? This book represents the first serious attempt to address these issues, and deals with the phenomenon across all periods and areas of classical Greek history and thought. Each chapter concentrates on a different area of culture or thought, while the book as a whole argues that much of the impulse towards innovation came from the life of the polis which provided its setting. (shrink)

In identifying that the 'essential tension' is the balance between conservative and innovative approaches in the development of knowledge - tried-and tested or new directions - Kuhn pointed out that these two attitudes are both appropriate. This study adds to this picture the social and psychological dynamics that underpin any such balancing.

Abstract:Contemporary common sense holds that authenticity is an ethical ideal: that there is something bad about inauthenticity, and something good about authenticity. Here we criticize the view that authenticity is bad because it detracts from the wellbeing of the inauthentic person, and propose an alternative moral account of the badness of inauthenticity, based on the idea that inauthentic behaviour is potentially misleading.

The verb 'imagine' admits of perspectival modification: we can imagine things from above, from a distant point of view, or from the point of view of a Russian. But in such cases, there need be no person, either real or imagined, who is above or distant from what is imagined, or who has the point of view of a Russian. We call this the puzzle of perspectival displacement. This paper sets out the puzzle, shows how it does not just concern (...) language, but also states of imagining themselves, and then presents a solution. The solution draws on the idea that many reports of imagining conceal a distinctive kind of question, and such concealed questions have an extra argument place for (what we will call) an experiencer from whose perspective things are imagined. This solution has a range of advantages over other proposals in the literature, and helps to advance two debates concerning perspectival engagement with fiction. (shrink)