We examined the course of caregiver motherese and the course of the infant’s response based on home movies from two single cases: a boy with typical development and a boy with autistic development. We first blindly assessed infant CG interaction using the Observer computer-based coding procedure, then analyzed speech CG production using a computerized algorithm. Finally we fused the two procedures and filtered for co-occurrence. In this exploratory study we found that the course of CG parentese differed based on gender (...) and child status. The course of an infant’s response to CG vocalization differed according to the type of speech and child status. Mothers spent more time interacting with infants, and fathers appeared to interact with their child preferentially between 12 and 18 months in the TD boy, but not in the AD boy. The TD boy responded equally well to motherese compared to other speech after 1 year of age. For the AD boy, the responses to both types of speech were lower than in the boy with TD and decreased from the second to the third semester. Keywords: Autism; motherese; early interaction; computational methods. (shrink)

Dr. M is a fifty-nine-year-old internist with a successful practice in a major Eastern United States city. He has lived in this city his whole life and is a highly esteemed citizen. Because of his broader social concerns and energetic support of activities to improve access to health care and quality of care for the underserved, Dr. M became involved in a number of local and regional medical organizations and quickly rose to prominence as as a director of a board (...) of a major national organization. In this position, he was an effective, articulate spokesperson, highly respected for his integrity and thoughtfulness.Before one of the meetings of thithis s board, Dr. M personally contacted the organization's other directors, including me, to warn us that we might be hearing some scandalous news about him. He wanted us first to hear it from him personally. This was the scandalous news.Dr. M had assumed the care of a patient of a recently retired colleague. The patient was an older woman with multiple musculoskeletal complaints related to lumbar stenosis and advanced degenerative arthritis of the spine, which left her in immense pain. (shrink)

Dr. M is a fifty-nine-year-old internist with a successful practice in a major Eastern United States city. He has lived in this city his whole life and is a highly esteemed citizen. Because of his broader social concerns and energetic support of activities to improve access to health care and quality of care for the underserved, Dr. M became involved in a number of local and regional medical organizations and quickly rose to prominence as as a director of a board (...) of a major national organization. In this position, he was an effective, articulate spokesperson, highly respected for his integrity and thoughtfulness.Before one of the meetings of thithis s board, Dr. M personally contacted the organization's other directors, including me, to warn us that we might be hearing some scandalous news about him. He wanted us first to hear it from him personally. This was the scandalous news.Dr. M had assumed the care of a patient of a recently retired colleague. The patient was an older woman with multiple musculoskeletal complaints related to lumbar stenosis and advanced degenerative arthritis of the spine, which left her in immense pain. (shrink)

Ethical thought is articulated around normative concepts. Standard examples of normative concepts are good, reason, right, ought, and obligatory. Theorists often treat the normative as an undifferentiated domain. Even so, it is common to distinguish between two kinds of normative concepts: evaluative or axiological concepts, such as good, and deontic concepts, such as ought. This encyclopedia entry discusses the many differences between the two kinds of concepts.

One difficulty in understanding recent debates is that not only have many terms been used to refer to weakness of will – “akrasia” and “incontinence” have often been used as synonyms of “weakness of will” – but quite different phenomena have been discussed in the literature. This is why the present entry starts with taxonomic considerations. The second section turns to the question of whether it is possible to freely and intentionally act against one’s better judgment.

The goals of medicine -- A story about a patient with aortic stenosis -- What are facts in medicine? -- Clarify the chain of events that led to the present state : the case as a narrative -- The case of Myra Manner -- Examine your presuppositions and preconceptions -- Separate and examine the values at issue -- A question of judgment -- The patient, the doctor, and the relationship -- Observation, prognosis, and prognosticating -- Thinking in medicine -- Accepting (...) the challenge. (shrink)

Christine Battersby rethinks questions of embodiment, essence, sameness and difference, self and "other", patriarchy and power. Using analyses of Kant, Adorno, Irigaray, Butler, Kierkegaard and Deleuze, she challenges those who argue that a feminist metaphysics is a a contradiction in terms. This book explores place for a metaphysics of fluidity in the current debates concerning postmodernism, feminism and identity politics.

Emotions often misfire. We sometimes fear innocuous things, such as spiders or mice, and we do so even if we firmly believe that they are innocuous. This is true of all of us, and not only of phobics, who can be considered to suffer from extreme manifestations of a common tendency. We also feel too little or even sometimes no fear at all with respect to very fearsome things, and we do so even if we believe that they are fearsome. (...) Indeed, instead of shunning fearsome things, we might be attracted to them. Emotions that seem more thought-involving, such as shame, guilt or jealousy, can also misfire. You can be ashamed of your big ears even though we can agree that there is nothing shameful in having big ears, and even though you judge that having big ears does not warrant shame. And of course, it is also possible to experience too little or even no shame at all with respect to something that is really shameful. Many of these cases involve a conflict between one’s emotion and one’s evaluative judgement. Emotions that are thus conflicting with judgement can be called ‘recalcitrant emotions’. The question I am interested in is whether or not recalcitrant emotions amount to emotional illusions, that is, whether or not these cases are sufficiently similar to perceptual illusions to justify the claim that they fall under the same general heading. The answer to this depends on what emotions are. For instance, the view that emotions are evaluative judgments makes it difficult to make room for the claim that emotional errors are perceptual illusions. Fearing an innocuous spider would simply amount to making the error of judging that the spider is fearsome while it is in fact innocuous. This might involve an illusion of some sort, but it certainly does not amount to anything like a perceptual illusion. In this chapter, I argue that recalcitrant emotions are a kind of perceptual illusion.. (shrink)

Ethics committees now require that individuals give informed consent to much health services research, in the same way as for clinical research. This is misguided. Existing ethical guidelines do not help us decide how to seek consent in these cases, and have allowed managerial experimentation to remain largely unchecked. Inappropriate requirements for individual consent can institutionalise health inequalities and reduce access to services for vulnerable groups. This undermines the fundamental purpose of the National Health Service , and ignores our rights (...) and duties as its members, explored here. Alternative forms of community consent should be actively pursued. (shrink)

Christine M. Korsgaard presents a compelling new view of our moral relationships to the other animals. She offers challenging answers to such questions as: Are people superior to animals, and does it matter morally if we are? Is it all right for us to eat animals, experiment on them, make them work for us, and keep them as pets?

When Carol Gilligan (1982) first introduced the ethic of care she did so from the discipline of psychology using empirical data that questioned Kohlberg's (1981) negative assumptions about the mora...

Cet ouvrage est une réédition numérique d’un livre paru au XXe siècle, désormais indisponible dans son format d’origine.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 10.3 (2003) 225-226 [Access article in PDF] Travelers in the Land of Sickness Eric J. Cassell THE PROBLEM OF knowing another person and the world in which that person lives, particularly someone with major mental illness, is addressed in this interesting and rich essay. The number of different metaphors and concepts Potter employs to describe the task of crossing into and then understanding the thoughts, (...) emotions, symptoms, constraints, context, and perspectives of another testifies to the difficulties involved.Yet, as I read the essay, it was not clear what the clinician world traveler, moral tourist, empathizer (and other categories) is supposed to do on the journey to another person. Why do we reach out to the sick person? What is it that we want to know or do that makes this trip necessary? Potter is primarily concerned with mental illness—the examples she cites are patients with schizophrenia—while my experience has in the main been with persons with physical illness, but for the moment, the differences are less important than the central lesson. The illness that the patient presents—the experience of the symptoms, the impairments, disability, and disruptions of the emotional and social existence that happen because of the disease result from an amalgam of the disease process with the specific nature of the sick person. There is no disease in pure form; there is no disease in abstract for clinicians. There is only this sick person. She correctly quotes me, because of all this, as pointing out the importance of integrating knowledge of this particular patient with the abstract knowledge of disease to understand the illness as it is expressed in this person. All to form a basis for the treatment of the patient and especially to help relieve suffering because suffering is always personal, particular, and individual. (It is important in thinking about this topic to remember that most serious diseases, psychiatric and otherwise, are chronic and take place over significant lived time. The acute schizophrenic symptoms or the acute infectious diseases, as dramatic as they are, distract attention from the importance of the place of the sick person.)In physical disease, our long (and continuing) history of separating human beings from nature and the body, and the importance medicine places on objectivity and the objective, have made the inevitable personalization of the disease and symptoms virtually invisible. After ages of explaining psychiatric diseases as the alienation of the person, and a long psychoanalytic period of finding their origins in the person, in the last 30 years these diseases have become increasingly objectified. The place of the person has been diminished as psychiatry has entered the DSM, neurotransmitter, and effective psychotropic drug era. For both physical and mental disease, however, and whatever the current ideology, the nature of person is crucial in determining the onset, diagnosis, course, treatment, and outcome of each illness. It is in order to have an impact on these crucial aspects of sickness that clinicians must come to know their patients to the degree possible. [End Page 225]But there is something more. Nancy Potter quotes a woman with schizophrenia as saying, "All that was my former self has crumbled and fallen together and a creature has emerged of whom I know nothing. She is a stranger to me... She is not real—she is not I... She is I—and because I still have myself on my hands, even if I am a maniac, I must deal with me somehow." (Potter, 2003, p. 215)Must she deal with this crazy self alone? Is that not what her doctors and caregivers are for? But how can they take care of her, protect her, keep what is left intact, and sustain her until she is (hopefully) better without knowing who she is? She makes clear in those few phrases that inside her there is a person with a past, a family, a world, a culture, a role(s) in life, relationships, a body, dreams for the future, things she does, and all the other things that make up a person. It is in... (shrink)

Here is a thoroughly updated edition of a classic in palliative medicine. Two new chapters have been added to the 1991 edition, along with a new preface summarizing where progress has been made and where it has not in the area of pain management. This book addresses the timely issue of doctor-patient relationships arguing that the patient, not the disease, should be the central focus of medicine. Included are a number of compelling patient narratives. Praise for the first edition "Well (...) written. . .should be read by everyone in medical practice or considering a career in medicine."---JAMA. "Memorable passages, important ideas, and critical analysis. This is a book that clinicians and educators should read."---New England Journal of Medicine. (shrink)

Uncovering the theoretical and creative interconnections between posthumanism and philosophies of immanence, this volume explores the influence of the philosophy of immanence on posthuman theory; the varied reworkings of immanence for the nonhuman turn; and the new pathways for critical thinking created by the combination of these monumental discourses. With the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari serving as a vibrant node of immanence, this volume maps a multiplicity of pathways from Deleuze, Guattari and their theoretical allies - including (...) Spinoza and Nietzsche - to posthuman thought. As positions that insist, respectively, on the equal yet distinct powers of mind and body (immanence) and the urgent need to dismantle human privilege and exceptionality (posthumanism), each chapter reveals concepts for rethinking established notions of being, thought, experience, and life. The authors here take examples from a range of different media, including literature and contemporary cinema, featuring films such as Enthiran/The Robot (India, 2010) and CHAPPiE (USA/Mexico, 2015), and new developments in technology and theory. In doing so, they investigate Deleuzian and Guattarian posthumanism from a variety of political and ethical frameworks and perspectives, from afro-pessimism to feminist thought, disability studies, biopolitics, and social justice. Countering the dualisms of Cartesian philosophy and flattening the hierarchies imposed by Humanism, From Deleuze and Guattari to Posthumanism launches vital interrogations of established knowledge and sparks the critical reflection necessary for life in the posthuman era. (shrink)

What do psychedelics reveal about consciousness? What impact have psychedelics had on philosophy? In this rapidly growing area of study, this is the first volume to explore the philosophy of psychedelic experience, from a range of interdisciplinary and cross-cultural perspectives. In doing so, Philosophy and Psychedelics reveals just why the place of psychedelics in our societies should not be left to medical sciences alone, as psychedelic experience opens up new perspectives on fundamental philosophical questions relating to human experience, ethics, and (...) the metaphysics of mind. Mapping a range of philosophical responses to the surge in studies into psychedelic drugs in the cognitive sciences, this go-to volume examines topics including psychedelics and the role of governance; psychedelics and mysticism; what psychedelics can tell us about dyadic thankfulness; and psychedelics as ways to gain new knowledge. Written by leading international scholars, the essays cover Western and non-Western traditions, from analytic philosophy to Zen Buddhism, and discuss a variety of hallucinogens, such as LSD, MDMA, and Ayahuasca, in order to build a much-needed bridge between the rapidly growing scientific research and the philosophy behind psychedelic experience. (shrink)

This volume examines works of the early Frankfurt School that are concerned with gender identities, institutions, and ideologies, as well as the ongoing relevance of early Frankfurt School ideas for contemporary feminist analyses of gender, sex, and sexuality.

L’étude menée sur les coupes de Droop attiques découvertes dans les fouilles de l’Artémision de Thasos a permis d’attirer notre attention sur un groupe de fragments décorés d’un thème peu fréquent sur cette forme : le retour d’Héphaïstos dans l’Olympe. Il n’est cependant pas rare sur d’autres classes de coupes contemporaines, en particulier sur les coupes à bande des Petits Maîtres dont la coupe de Droop est une variante. Mais si l’étude des fragments de l’Artémision permet de renforcer le lien (...) étroit existant dans la seconde moitié du vie s. av. J.‑C. entre la production des coupes à bande et celle des coupes de Droop, elle permet surtout de mettre en valeur une œuvre d’exception par la rareté de sa thématique, la qualité de son décor et ses dimensions généreuses. Son attribution au Peintre d’Oakeshott, proche compagnon du Peintre d’Amasis, lui confère une place privilégiée au sein des découvertes de céramiques attiques de l’île de Thasos. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Notes.

Ich vergesse - Diese erschreckende Feststellung wird innerhalb der Geschichte der Philosophie in unterschiedlicher Weise begleitet von einem philosophischen Staunen; einem Staunen über die eindrückliche und gleichzeitig rätselhafte Fähigkeit des Menschen, an sich selbst Vergessen zu bemerken. Die Untersuchung der Formen individuellen Vergessens führt vor Augen, inwiefern der Mensch seinem Denken selbstbestimmt eine Richtung geben kann und auch, inwieweit dies nicht gelingt. Sie liefert damit einen Beitrag zu einer aktuellen Theorie des Gedächtnisses aus geisteswissenschaftlicher, insbesondere philosophischer Perspektive.

C'est en 1941, dans le contexte chaotique de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale, que Simone Weil, très tôt préoccupée par les questions du malheur et de la vérité, découvre le principe de la kénose divine en lisant l'hymne aux Philippiens de saint Paul (Ph 2, 5-11). La lecture de ce texte est un moment philosophique et spirituel décisif dans le parcours de la philosophe car, prenant pleinement en charge les questions universelles et paradoxales de l'amour de Dieu et du malheur, l'hymne (...) paulinien lui permet de tisser un lien de cohérence métaphysique entre sa recherche personnelle de la vérité, l'existence du malheur et ses expériences spirituelles. A contrario d'un texte-miracle qui nierait le réel et minimiserait l'impact du malheur sur nos vies, Simone Weil accueille effectivement cet hymne comme l'expression universelle de l'abaissement du divin qui s'incarne dans la condition humaine et appelle tout homme à le suivre, et à se libérer de son sentiment de toute-impuissance face au mal écrasant. Après cette rencontre scripturaire. Simone Weil n'aura alors de cesse d'actualiser, dans ses écrits et ses engagements dans le monde, cette invitation explicite de saint Paul à l'imitatio Christi. Sa pensée s'élaborera en une théologie pratique nourrie par l'Amour du Père et du Christ qui rejoint chacun de nous. II s'agira alors, pour elle, de comprendre concrètement "comment nous pouvons l'imiter?" et d'étudier de quelles manières le caractère universel de la vérité de la kénose divine est, comme l'exprime l'antique doctrine des "semences du Verbe", préfiguré dans les différentes cultures et traditions du bassin indo-européen. (shrink)