Can animals, and especially cattle, be the subject ofmoral concern? Should we care about their well-being?Two competing ethical theories have addressed suchissues so far. A utilitarian theory which, inBentham's wake, extends moral consideration to everysentient being, and a theory of the rights orinterests of animals which follows Feinberg'sconceptions. This includes various positions rangingfrom the most radical (about animal liberation) tomore moderate ones (concerned with the well-being ofanimals). Notwithstanding their diversity, theseconceptions share some common flaws. First, as anextension of primarily anthropocentric (...) theories (aboututility or rights) they still participate in the flawsof the original setting. Second, extending them tonon-human beings raises the problem of the borderwhich is to be drawn between what can be included inthe purview of moral consideration and what is leftoutside. Third, such theories are not able to distinguishbetween an ethics of wildlife and an ethics ofdomestic life, which too often leads to preposterousstatements. We would like to argue (i) that we should distinguishbetween environmental ethics (concerned withpopulations, species, biotic communities) and animalethics (where animals are taken into consideration individually);(ii) that individualist animal ethics are not relevantfor animal rearing; (iii) that animal rearing is a hierarchicalrelationship which rules are to be found in the fiction of a domesticcontract.Hence, we would like to construct a new conception ofthe ethics of the relation between men and the cattlethey breed based on the idea of a domestic contract.Our main assumption is Mary Midgleys's anthropologicalassumption, according to which human communities,since the Neolithic age, have always included variousanimals, so that relations of sociability have alwaysexisted between human beings and animals within thedomestic community (a mixed community). In order tospecify the hierarchical and non-egalitarian, butinclusive reciprocal obligations and relations insidesuch a community, we will elaborate on the notion ofa ``domestic contract'', an implicitly assumedidea traced back to Lucretius and whichwe will follow up to the physiocrats and Adam Smith.We will show that such an idea relies upon theassumption of communication between cattle farmer andanimals, of shared experience and exchanges betweenthe two parties. We will then show how modern factory,or battery animal farming, can be seen as unilaterallybreaking this domestic contract, forsaking ourduties towards domestic animals. (shrink)

This paper explores and discusses the various meanings of the stewardship concept in the field of sustainability science. We highlight the increasing differences between alternative approaches to stewardship and propose a typology to enable scientists and practitioners to more precisely identify the basis and objectives of the concept of stewardship. We first present the two dimensions we used to map the diversity of stances concerning stewardship. Second, we analyse these positions in relation to the limits of the systemic approach, ideological (...) manipulation, responsibility, and solidarity. In the final section we explain how the concept of ecological solidarity, a core principal in recent French law on biodiversity conservation and national park governance can contribute to the underpinning of a specific form of social-ecological stewardship. (shrink)

Comment répondre à la crise environnementale et aux menaces qu’elle fait peser sur la poursuite de notre mode de vie? Devons-nous mobiliser nos forces pour lutter contre la crise, changer radicalement nos comportements? Ne faudrait-il pas plutôt veiller à nous adapter à une situation transformée? Ces deux pôles sont présents dans les politiques environnementales. Pour répondre au changement climatique on envisage à la fois des politiques d’atténuation (mitigation) des émissions de gaz à ef...

This paper aims at understanding why Rousseau excluded women from citizenship. Citizenship, for Rousseau, is not a matter of right, not even a matter of behaviour (of how to behave individually to be a good citizen). It is a matter of social condition. How should society be constituted so that there can be citizens? The answer to this question is that there must be women in the private sphere so that there can be citizen in the public sphere. The paper (...) begins with Montesquieu's model of the republican condition of women, considers the way Rousseau updated this model, and concludes with the idea, that much more than the male figure of citizenship (which remains a stereotype), the woman, in Rousseau, is the true figure of modernity. (shrink)

La dimension politique du scepticisme, considère-t-on souvent, c'est le conformisme. Mais la séparation entre le domaine intérieur et l'espace public n'a pas pour seule conséquence l'injonction de suivre la coutume. Elle est d'abord constitution du domaine privé, qui est un lieu de liberté, à l'écart de la foule et du pouvoir. Cela permet de mieux comprendre la position sceptique en politique: le conseil du prince, en secret et en retrait de l'éclat public. Cela permet surtout de comprendre ce qu'apporte le (...) scepticisme aux conceptions modernes de la liberté: un modèle social de la libre poursuite de la vérité. (shrink)

“Act so that the effects of your action are compatible with the permanence of genuine human life on Earth.” How can we understand Jonas’ “maxim”? Is it too anthropocentric to be of any interest for an environmental ethic? Is is too limited to survival to have a moral signification in a truly human ethic? One can argue first that it is not so much anti-Kantian than that it challenges the current prevailing “presentism” and obliges us to take into consideration not (...) only future generations, but also the context in which one anticipates these future generations to be living. Therefore, we can distinguish two different interpretations of Jonas’ maxim: in a first stage, that of sustainable development, it was understood as taking into consideration not only the needs but also the rights of future generations; in a second stage, that of an Anthropocene and ecological transition, it means that making sense of humanity implies connecting human beings to the Earth and other living beings far from opposing them. (shrink)

Why Rousseau, this modern, has much more to say about nature than most of his contemporaries? And as he speaks it? This is what we investigate, taking the issue from three relationships: the humanity with nature (in its global dimension and a first approach, metaphysics), the human societies with nature, by the technique, and, finally, the lone hiker, the independent individual.

Conçue à l’origine comme une discipline globale concernée par la survie des populations humaines dans un environnement global, la bioéthique a été finalement redéfinie comme une éthique biomédicale, particulièrement par les applications des biotechnologies aux humains. La bioéthique a-t-elle profité de ce resserrement anthropocentrique? Nous défendrons l’idée que ce n’est pas le cas après avoir examiné la question des frontières morales entre humains et non humains, celle des limites de l’application des biotechnologies aux humains pour en éviter la mécanisation, et (...) celle des définitions de la santé. (shrink)

L’émergence de l’économique doit-elle être comprise comme l’émancipation des conduites privées de la tutelle politique, ou comme la promotion publique de conduites jusque-là simplement privées, ou particulières? Confrontant le récit classiquement libéral de l’auto-affirmation de l’individu à l’analyse de la recomposition des sphères sociales (famille, économie, État) à l’époque moderne, tout en s’appuyant sur la distinction entre économie formelle et économie substantielle, l’article argumente en faveur de l’étude des sphères qui permet non seulement de rendre compte de l’articulation de l’économique (...) et du politique, mais également du statut de l’individu. (shrink)

« La liberté consiste à n'être soumis qu'aux lois»: cette idée, que Turgot attribue aux «écrivains républicains», a sans doute sa place dans la tradition républicaine. Il s'agit cependant d'une idée essentiellement moderne, et pas nécessairement républicaine, développée dans la critique de l'absolutisme: on en retient l'importance qu'il y a à faire la loi, tout en refusant que qui que ce soit puisse se placer au-dessus des lois. Montesquieu fait du gouvernement modéré, qui peut être une monarchie, le gouvernement de (...) la loi, celle-ci garantit à l'action rationnelle la prévisibilité et la constance dont elle a besoin. C'est Rousseau qui fait du gouvernement de la loi un thème républicain, en identifiant autogouvernement et autonomie. Lier la liberté à la loi, c'est insister sur l'existence politique des libertés: depuis Turgot, les libéraux y voient une menace pour les droits. (shrink)

Notre conception dualiste de la nature n’est ni universelle ni universalisable. Cependant, posant l’extériorité de ce qui est humain et de ce qui est naturel, ce dualisme s’est décliné en un certain nombre d’oppositions : nature/culture ; naturel/artificiel. On pourrait a priori considérer qu’il en est de même de l’opposition entre le sauvage et le domestique. Or, entre le sauvage et le domestique, il y a un entre-deux de milieux (ce que les Romains dénommaient le saltus ), qu’il s’agisse des (...) espaces pastoraux ou des peuplements forestiers qui ne sont plus exploités, ou encore, des friches industrielles et urbaines. C’est ce que l’on qualifie en France de « nature férale », résultat d’ensauvagements multiples. L’auteur plaide pour la libre évolution de ces milieux comme stratégie alternative de protection de la nature. (shrink)

L’attention de Montesquieu pour la diversité empirique des institutions humaines ne se comprend pas seulement dans une perspective descriptive, visant à rendre compte des faits, elle est constitutive d’un effort pour penser une évaluation circonstanciée des institutions et des lois. En examinant la pluralité des États, la pluralité des pouvoirs et des puissances sociales qui constituent l’ordre politique, et la pluralité des hommes, on verra comment l’étude des rapports menée dans L’Esprit des lois vise un « savoir de la liberté (...) ». (shrink)

La question de l’écologie est celle de la nature, mais que faut-il entendre par là? La réflexion sur ces questions a longtemps hésité entre une vision dualiste (qui définit la nature par opposition à l’homme) et une vision moniste (l’homme fait partie de la nature). L’idée générale de cet article est que l’on n’échappe pas aux impasses du dualisme en se ralliant au monisme. L’un et l’autre constituent les deux faces, difficilement séparables, du naturalisme moderne. On sort du dualisme par (...) le pluralisme : l’opposition du naturel et de l’artificiel et celle du naturel et du culturel (ou du social), que l’on confond souvent, sont distinctes. Nature, artéfact et société dessinent trois pôles, que multiplie la pluralité des cultures. C’est en les prenant tous en considération que l’on peut apprendre à bien se conduire dans la nature, sans pour autant y disparaitre. (shrink)

For approximately a quarter of a century, moral reflection has turned to a new object: the environment. Environmental ethics has emerged primarily in the United States out of considerations on Nature in the wild state - the wilderness - and the duty to preserve it. As such, it divides into two trends. The first seeks to develop a general theory of moral value, an abstract, universal principle qualifying individual entities, such that the intrinsic value of living entities deserves our respect. (...) The second, first formulated by an American forester, Aldo Leopold, is an ethics of the biotic community: how Nature can be a community of which we are members, and in within which it is possible for us to conduct ourselves well. (shrink)

“Actúa de manera tal que los efectos de tu acción sean compatibles con la permanencia de la vida humana genuina en la Tierra”. ¿Cómo podemos entender esta máxima de Jonas? ¿Es demasiado antropocéntrica como para ser interesante para la ética ambiental? ¿Está demasiado limitada a la supervivencia como para tener un significado moral en una ética verdaderamente humana? En primer lugar, podríamos argumentar que no es tan anti-kantiana como para desafiar el “presentismo” actual imperante y nos obliga a tener en (...) cuenta no solo las generaciones futuras, sino también el contexto en el que anticipamos que estas futuras generaciones vivirán. Por lo tanto, deberíamos distinguir dos interpretaciones diferentes de la máxima de Jonas. En una primera etapa, la del desarrollo sostenible, se entendió que considera no solo las necesidades sino también los derechos de las generaciones futuras. En una segunda etapa, la de un Antropoceno y una transición ecológica, significa que dar sentido a la humanidad implica conectar a los seres humanos con la Tierra y otros seres vivos en lugar de oponerse a ellos. (shrink)

In what constitutes the only English-language collection of essays ever dedicated to the analysis of Montesquieu's contributions to political science, the contributors review some of the most vexing controversies that have arisen in the interpretation of Montesquieu's thought. By paying careful attention to the historical, political, and philosophical contexts of Montesquieu's ideas, the contributors provide fresh readings of The Spirit of Laws, clarify the goals and ambitions of its author, and point out the pertinence of his thinking to the problems (...) of our world today. (shrink)

Although pragmatism and phenomenology have both contributed significantly to the genealogy of so-called “4E” – embodied, embedded, enactive and extended – cognition, there is benefit to be had from a systematic comparative study of these roots. As existing 4E cognition literature has tended to emphasise one or the other tradition, issues remain to be addressed concerning their commonalities – and possible incompatibilities. We begin by exploring pragmatism and phenomenology’s shared focus on contesting intellectualism, and its key assumption of mindedness as (...) representation. We then outline distinctive insights from both traditions regarding the nature and role of habits, in order to put forward a habit-based epistemology as an alternative to the Cartesian idea-based epistemology that has dominated modern philosophy. We pay particular attention to the work of classical pragmatist C.S. Peirce, arguing that his semiotics, which analyses sign-use as habit, shows how theorists of embodied cognition can break a certain false dichotomy between embodiment and logical or intellectual structure which has prevented them from fully theorising propositional knowledge. In this way, our work both augments and challenges the Dewey/Merleau-Ponty connection that has been much more extensively explored by the field. (shrink)

But in this book, Catherine Malabou proposes a more radical meaning for plasticity, one that not only adapts itself to existing circumstances, but forms a ...

This chapter contains sections titled: Catherine Malabou : “Unbind Me” Judith Butler : What Kind of Shape Is Hegel's Body in? Catherine Malabou : What Is Shaping the Body? Judith Butler : A Chiasm between Us, but No Chasm.

This paper argues that we can acknowledge the existence of moral truths and moral progress without being committed to moral realism. Rather than defending this claim through the more familiar route of the attempted analysis of the ontological commitments of moral claims, I show how moral belief change for the better shares certain features with theoretical progress in the natural sciences. Proponents of the better theory are able to convince their peers that it is formally and empirically superior to its (...) rivals, and the better theory may be promoted to the status of the truth. Yet there is no 'decision-procedure' for ethics any more than there is for molecular biology. The betterness of true theories can be grasped through what I term 'undirectional narratives' of progress. And while there are true moral claims and perhaps numerous moral truths yet to be discovered, we should reject currently popular forms of moral realism with bivalence. Some moral claims lend themselves to the construction of fully reversible, bi-directional narratives and are likely neither true nor false. (shrink)

In this chapter, it is described and assessed how political scientists use rational choice theories to offer causal explanations. We observe that the ways in which rational choice theories are considered to be successful in political science differs, depending on the explanandum in question. Political scientists use empirical variants of rational choice theories to explain the political behavior of individual agents and analytical variants to explain the behavior of collective actors. Both variants are used for distinct explananda, which ask for (...) different modes of explanation that raise in turn different explanatory demands toward rational choice theories. We argue that when political scientists discuss the explanatory usefulness of rational choice theories, they should assess them in light of the demands they are supposed to meet. This would enable a more nuanced and problem-oriented appraisal of rational choice theories in political science. (shrink)

Tracing the sign -- Signing the trace -- The messianic without messianism -- Mourning terminable and interminable : law and (commmodity) fetishism -- Justice, law, and Antigone's singular act -- Generalizing the economy of fetishism.

Metaethics from a First Person Standpoint addresses in a novel format the major topics and themes of contemporary metaethics, the study of the analysis of moral thought and judgement. Metathetics is less concerned with what practices are right or wrong than with what we mean by 'right' and 'wrong.' Looking at a wide spectrum of topics including moral language, realism and anti-realism, reasons and motives, relativism, and moral progress, this book engages students and general readers in order to enhance their (...) understanding of morality and moral discourse as cultural practices. Catherine Wilson innovatively employs a first-person narrator to report step-by-step an individual's reflections, beginning from a position of radical scepticism, on the possibility of objective moral knowledge. The reader is invited to follow along with this reasoning, and to challenge or agree with each major point. Incrementally, the narrator is led to certain definite conclusions about 'oughts' and norms in connection with self-interest, prudence, social norms, and finally morality. Scepticism is overcome, and the narrator arrives at a good understanding of how moral knowledge and moral progress are possible, though frequently long in coming. Accessibly written, Metaethics from a First Person Standpoint presupposes no prior training in philosophy and is a must-read for philosophers, students and general readers interested in gaining a better understanding of morality as a personal philosophical quest."--Publisher's website. (shrink)

I argue that trustworthiness is an epistemic desideratum. It does not reduce to justified or reliable true belief, but figures in the reason why justified or reliable true beliefs are often valuable. Such beliefs can be precarious. If a belief's being justified requires that the evidence be just as we take it to be, then if we are off even by a little, the belief is unwarranted. Similarly for reliability. Although it satisfies the definition of knowledge, such a belief is (...) not trustworthy. We ought not use it as a basis for inference or action and ought not give others to believe it. The trustworthiness of a belief, I urge, depends on its being backed by reasons—considerations that other members of the appropriate epistemic community cannot reasonably reject. Trustworthiness is intersubjective. It both depends on and contributes to the evolving cognitive values of an epistemic community. (shrink)

Introduction: Platonic dramatology -- The political and philosophical problems. Using pre-Socratic philosophy to support political reform: the Athenian stranger ; Plato's Parmenides: Parmenides' critique of Socrates and Plato's critique of Parmenides ; Becoming Socrates ; Socrates interrogates his contemporaries about the noble and good -- Paradigms of philosophy. Socrates' positive teaching ; Timaeus-Critias: completing or challenging Socratic political philosophy? ; Socratic practice -- The trial and death of Socrates. The limits of human intelligence ; The Eleatic challenge ; The trial (...) and death of Socrates -- Conclusion: Why Plato made Socrates his hero. (shrink)

"Articulating a fresh vision for teaching, one that focuses on ensuring justice, believing people, and believing in people, this how-to offers evidence-based insights and draws from the author's own rich experiences as a professor to provide practical tips for reshaping syllabi, assessing student performance, and creating trust and belonging in the classroom"-Provided by publisher.

This paper contrasts the scholastic realisms of David Armstrong and Charles Peirce. It is argued that the so-called 'problem of universals' is not a problem in pure ontology (concerning whether universals exist) as Armstrong construes it. Rather, it pertains to which predicates should be applied where, issues which Armstrong sets aside under the label of 'semantics', and which from a Peircean perspective encompass even fundamentals of scientific methodology. It is argued that Peirce's scholastic realism not only presents a more nuanced (...) ontology (distinguishing existence and reality) but also illuminates why scholastic realism is a position worth fighting for. (shrink)

Virtues and Virtue Education in Theory and Practice explores questions about the locality versus the universality of virtues from a number of theoretical and practical perspectives. Written by leading international scholars in the field, it considers the relevance of these debates for the practice of virtue and character education. This volume brings together experts from education, philosophy, and psychology to consider how different disciplines might learn from each other and how insights from theory and practice can be integrated. It shows (...) that questions about virtue relativity or universality have not only theoretical significance but also important practical ramifications. The chapters explore different complexities of virtue ethics and different approaches to nurturing virtue and beyond, questioning how well virtues travel across geographical and cultural borders. By examining the philosophical literature and making links between theory and practice in an original way, the book offers scholarly research-informed suggestions for practice. It will be of great interest to researchers and academics and students in educational philosophy, character education, ethics, and psychology. (shrink)

This paper addresses some apparent philosophical tensions between realism and enactivism by means of Charles Peirce’s pragmatism. Enactivism’s Mind-Life Continuity thesis has been taken to commit it to some form of anti-realist ‘world-construction’ which has been considered controversial. Accordingly, a new realist enactivism is proposed by Zahidi (_Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences,_ _13_(3), 461–475, 2014 ), drawing on Ian Hacking’s ‘entity realism’, which places subjects in worlds comprised of the things that they can successfully manipulate. We review this attempt, and (...) argue that whilst Zahidi rightly urges enactivists towards ‘internal realism’, he cannot sustain a non-negotiable aspect of realism that is crucial for scientific progress – the claim that multiple subjects inhabit _the same world_. We explore Peirce’s pragmatism as an alternative solution, foregrounding his distinction between existence and reality, and his inquiry-based account of cognition. These theoretical innovations, we argue, fruitfully generalize Zahidi’s _manipulation-based_ enactivist realism to a richer, _inquiry-based_ enactivist realism. We explore how this realism’s pan-species monism about truth encourages and supports the investigation of non-human animal cognition, and conclude by considering some implications of our discussion for long-standing realism debates within pragmatism. (shrink)

Continuing her reflections on destructive plasticity, split identities and the psychic consequences experienced by those who have suffered brain injury or have been traumatised by war and other catastrophes, Catherine Malabou invites us to join her in a philosophic and literary adventure.