Bien qu'il soit critique à son endroit, Deleuze invente une nouvelle histoire de la philosophie conçue comme un art du portrait conceptuel, une forme de collage et de théâtre, où il ne s'agit pas de brosser un tableau fidèle, mais de produire la ressemblance en éprouvant la puissance des concepts.

ABSTRACT“: We cannot say psychoanalysts are very jolly people; see the dead look they have, their stiff necks.” In 1972, the tone Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari used in Anti-Oedipus caused an immediate public reaction: it was regarded as the mark of a fatal critique of psychoanalysis. However, critique, in philosophy, is used in certain technical and precise senses. We will try to demonstrate that, technically, Anti-Oedipus is a delimitation of a Kantian sort, an evaluation of a Nietzschean kind, and, (...) finally, a divergence in terms of Deleuze himself. Thanks to this precision, we will find that the target of Anti-Oedipus is not psychoanalysis in general but what Deleuze and Guattari call, respectively, “the illegitimate use of the synthesis of the unconscious,” a conception of life presupposed by psychoanalysis, and a configuration of desire that explains both psychoanalysis and the system in which it functions. (shrink)

Où commence la philosophie? Il s’agit là d’un problème que nous rencontrons au début de plusieurs grandes oeuvres philosophiques. Gilles Deleuze avance une solution dans le troisième chapitre de Différence et Répétition. Or si l’aspect formel de cette solution apparaît clairement, ce n’est pas tellement le cas de l’aspect matériel. Nous nous proposons d’éclaircir cette solution non seulement pour présenter de façon concrète la conception deleuzienne du commencement en philosophie mais surtout pour montrer comment cette conception renferme la clé pour (...) déterminer la façon dont commence la philosophie deleuzienne elle-même. (shrink)

En el presente artículo me ocupo de la discusión acerca de cuán exigentes son nuestras obligaciones de contribuir con dinero y tiempo a las agencias humanitarias que asisten a personas en situación de pobreza extrema en el mundo. Defiendo una posición intermedia, moderada, frente a la posición extrema formulada por Peter Singer y frente a la posición según la cual nuestras obligaciones son mínimas. La objeción principal contra esas dos posiciones es que, cuando analizan la situación en que los potenciales (...) donantes se encuentran frente a las personas en situación de pobreza extrema, omiten el carácter iterativo que es propio de esa situación. La posición moderada, en cambio, tiene en cuenta ese carácter, gracias a que entiende a nuestras obligaciones hacia los pobres globales como obligaciones imperfectas. In this article I engage in the debate about the demandingness of our duties to contribute with money and time to humanitarian agencies that assist people who live in extreme poverty around the world. I defend an intermediate, moderate, view against Peter Singer's extreme view, and also against the view according to which our duties are minimal. The main objection regarding those two views is that, when they analyze the situation in which potential donors are vis-à-vis people who live in extreme poverty, they miss its distinctive iterative character. The moderate view, on the contrary, pays heed to that character, thanks to its account of our duties towards the global poor as imperfect duties. (shrink)

La philosophie « sert à nuire à la bêtise », écrit Deleuze en 1962. Huit ans plus tard, dans Différence et Répétition, après avoir défini la bêtise de plusieurs manières différentes, il l’évoque pourtant comme « la source du plus haut pouvoir » de la pensée. Le but de cet article est de reconstruire l’unité et la compatibilité de ces diverses formules, notamment à partir du chapitre 3 de Différence et Répétition. On s’intéresse d’abord à l’objet central de ce chapitre, (...) « l’image dogmatique de la pensée ». On s’interroge ensuite sur la variété des définitions de la bêtise, que cette « image dogmatique » prétend ramener à l’erreur. On précise enfin les rapports de la bêtise avec les autres « structures de la pensée » que Deleuze mentionne au titre des « négatifs » de la pensée. La relation entre la pensée philosophique et la bêtise est destinée à rester aussi étroite que tendue : la question est finalement celle du rôle qu’y joue « l’image de la pensée » elle-même. (shrink)

En la vida cotidiana y el lenguaje corriente, muchas veces la idiotez remite a una falta de inteligencia o a un defecto del pensamiento. Se trata de una concepción que alcanzó gran precisión en la psiquiatría clásica y que no se halla totalmente ausente de la filosofía contemporánea. Sin embargo, a juicio de Deleuze y Guattari, el idiota constituye el personaje filosófico por excelencia. ¿En qué medida este personaje supone o permite construir una concepción alternativa de la idiotez? En realidad, (...) existen tres tipos de idiotas en la obra de Deleuze: uno que se identifica con el tonto, otro que se identifica con el loco y un tercero que ríe de la creencia en este mundo. Intentaremos ofrecer una respuesta al interrogante anterior analizando cada uno de estos tres personajes. In everyday life and common language, idiocy often refers to a lack of intelligence or a defect in thinking. This conception achieved great precision in classical psychiatry and it is not totally absent from contemporary philosophy. However, according to Deleuze and Guattari, the idiot constitutes the philosophical persona par excellence. To what extent does this persona entail or allow constructing an alternative conception of idiocy? Actually, there are three kinds of idiots in Deleuze’s work: one that identifies itself with the fool, another that identifies itself with the madman and a third that laughs at the belief in this world. We will try to offer an answer to the aforementioned question by analyzing each of these three characters. (shrink)

La relación de Borges con la filosofía parece haber sido objeto de tres interrogaciones: ¿Es acaso Borges un filósofo? ¿Cuál es su filosofía? ¿Qué hace con la filosofía? Sin embargo, no es seguro que en las respuestas a estas preguntas se explicite cuál es el valor de Borges para la filosofía. Se trata aquí de una pregunta diferente que, si la condición de filósofo de Borges es precisamente lo que se halla en juego, no podemos esperar contestarla desde su propia (...) obra. Proponemos hacerlo a partir de la historia de la filosofía y la teoría del discurso filosófico de Gilles Deleuze. En efecto, creemos que es posible encontrar allí un modo novedoso de interpretar la famosa sentencia borgeana según la cual la filosofía sería una rama de la literatura. Borges's relationship with philosophy seems to have arisen three questions: Is Borges a philosopher? Which is his philosophy? What does he do with philosophy? However, it isn't certain that the answers to these questions specify the value of Borges for philosophy. This is a different question, which can't be answered from Borges´s own work, precisely because it is its philosophical condition what is at stake. Therefore we propose to do it from the history of philosophy and philosophical discourse theory of Gilles Deleuze. Indeed, we believe that it is possible to find here a new way of interpreting Borges's famous sentence according to which philosophy would be a branch of literature. (shrink)

Si, contre la conception hégélienne de l’histoire de la philosophie comme succession de systèmes, Deleuze et Guattari proposent l’idée d’une coexistence de plans, c’est pour éviter de penser la relation entre les philosophies comme opposition, réfutation ou dépassement, pour construire un cadre à partir duquel apprécier la singularité de chaque philosophie. Alors pourquoi proclament-ils ensuite Spinoza « le Christ des philosophes »? Et l’idée même d’une coexistence de plans, d’une coexistence des grands philosophes, des véritables créateurs de concepts, ne suppose-t-elle (...) pas elle aussi une sélection, la constitution d’un panthéon philosophique? La relation entre l’histoire de la philosophie hégélienne et la deleuzienne se révélera beaucoup plus complexe qu’une opposition. De fait, il est possible de repérer différents modèles historiographiques dans l’oeuvre de Deleuze, de même que dans celle de Hegel. Par conséquent, on verra osciller la place du second par rapport au premier selon l’histoire qu’on prendra comme cadre de référence. (shrink)

Gilles Deleuze définit la philosophie comme création de concepts. S'agit-il d'une définition originale? La fonction du concept consiste à « donner une consistance au virtuel ». Qu'est-ce que cela signifie? On montre que c'est à partir de la distinction bergsonienne entre la matière et l'esprit qu'il faut comprendre la distinction entre l'actuel et le virtuel, et que c'est à partir de la philosophie critique qu'il faut comprendre l'expression « donner de la consistance ». Le repérage de ces deux sources et (...) des déplacements que Deleuze opère permet de préciser en partie l'originalité de sa définition de la philosophie. L'examen de la façon dont le concept de concept est lui-même construit permet aussi de mieux comprendre les mécanismes à l'œuvre dans la création philosophique Gilles Deleuze defines philosophy as a creation of concepts. Is that an original definition? The function of concept lies in "giving consistency to the virtual". What does that mean? We show how the distinction between the actual and the virtual may be understood in terms of the Bergsonian distinction between matter and mind, and how the phrase "to give consistency" may be referred to critical philosophy. Identifying these two sources, as well as the displacements Deleuze operates, help to pinpoint some of the originality of his definition of philosophy. This examination of how the concept of concept itself is constructed sheds new light on the concrete mechanisms at work in philosophical creation. (shrink)

The present paper argues for a more complete integration between recent “genealogical” approaches to the problem of knowledge and evolutionary accounts of the development of human cognitive capacities and practices. A structural tension is pointed out between, on the one hand, the fact that theexplicandumof genealogical stories is a specifically human trait and, on the other hand, the tacit acknowledgment, shared by all contributors to the debate, that human beings have evolved from non-human beings. Since humans differ from their predecessors (...) in more ways than just the lack of a particular concept or cognitive ability, this casts doubt on the widely shared assumption (the “Constancy Assumption”) that, when constructing a genealogical narrative for a particular concept (e.g., our contemporary concept of knowledge), it is permissible to hold all other factors (e.g., individual “on-board” cognitive capacities) fixed. What is needed instead, I argue, is an ecological perspective that views knowledge as an adaptive response to an evolutionary constellation that allows for a diversity of selective pressures. Several examples of specific conceptual pressures at different stages in human evolution are discussed. (shrink)

Das Buch bietet in 24 Kapiteln einen systematischen Einblick in methodische und thematische Fragen der Medizin- und Bioethik in Deutschland von 1995 bis 2016. Dieser beginnt mit metaethischen Aspekten der Relation zwischen Ethik und Moral sowie mit der keineswegs unproblematischen Fächerkombination von Medizinethik und Medizingeschichte an den deutschen Universitäten. Sodann werden zentrale bioethische und biopolitische Diskursfelder wie Stammzellforschung, Präimplantationsdiagnostik, prädiktive Medizin sowie Sterbehilfe und Transplantationsmedizin erörtert, die ausnahmslos brisante normative Probleme am Beginn und am Ende des menschlichen Lebens betreffen. Anders (...) als im derzeitigen bioethischen „Mainstream“ liegt in diesem Buch der Akzent auf der Betonung des Vorrangs der unantastbaren Würde des Menschen vor dessen niemals absolut zu denkender Autonomie. (shrink)

Bringing together historical and cultural perspectives on the senses, and their association with body, emotion, cultural memory and tradition, this book examines the significance of senses in the understanding of the world and the self. Further, in comparing Indian and western theories of senses, it highlights the anthropological, philosophical and religious underpinnings of our engagement with a changing world, globalization, and new media.

In this pathbreaking study, Axel Honneth argues that "the struggle for recognition" is, and should be, at the center of social conflicts. Moving smoothly between moral philosophy and social theory, Honneth offers insights into such issues as the social forms of recognition and nonrecognition, the moral basis of interaction in human conflicts, the relation between the recognition model and conceptions of modernity, the normative basis of social theory, and the possibility of mediating between Hegel and Kant.

Though to deny the geological impact of human force on nature is now essentially quasi-criminal, many theorists remain, nonetheless, unimpressed with what this “new era” has afforded us in terms of critical potential. This article is concerned with what Srinivas Aravamudan deems “the escapist philosophy of various dimension of the hypothesis concerning the Anthropocene.” Following Erik Swyngedouw's indictment of apocalyptic discourses' vital role in displacing social antagonisms and nurturing capitalism, this article argues that the new regimes of Anthropocenean consciousness have (...) been powerful in disavowing racial antagonisms. It discusses the ways in which Anthropocene ethics have foreclosed proper political framings by promoting a moral philosophy unequipped to face the racial histories of our current ecological predicament. It contends that the “political Anthropocene” will remain an impossibility until it is able to wrestle with the problem of black suffering. (shrink)

This volume addresses the interdependencies between visual technologies and epistemology with regard to our perception of the medical body. It explores the relationships between the imagination, the body, and concrete forms of visual representations: Ranging from the Renaissance paradigm of anatomy, to Foucault's "birth of the clinic" and the institutionalised construction of a "medical gaze"; from "visual" archives of madness, psychiatric art collections, the politicisation and economisation of the body, to the post-human in mass media representations. Contributions to this volume (...) investigate medical bodies as historical, technological, and political constructs, constituted where knowledge formation and visual cultures intersect. Contributors are: Axel Fliethmann, Michael Hau, Birgit Lang, Carolyn Lau, Heikki Lempa, Stefanie Lenk, Joanna Madloch, Barry Murnane, Jill Redner, Claudia Stein, Elizabeth Stephens, Corinna Wagner, and Christiane Weller. (shrink)

Taking scientific practice as its starting point, this book charts the complex territory of models used in science. It examines what scientific models are and what their function is. Reliance on models is pervasive in science, and scientists often need to construct models in order to explain or predict anything of interest at all. The diversity of kinds of models one finds in science – ranging from toy models and scale models to theoretical and mathematical models – has attracted attention (...) not only from scientists, but also from philosophers, sociologists, and historians of science. This has given rise to a wide variety of case studies that look at the different uses to which models have been put in specific scientific contexts. By exploring current debates on the use and building of models via cutting-edge examples drawn from physics and biology, the book provides broad insight into the methodology of modelling in the natural sciences. It pairs specific arguments with introductory material relating to the ontology and the function of models, and provides some historical context to the debates as well as a sketch of general positions in the philosophy of scientific models in the process. (shrink)

Despite being a new term, ‘fake news’ has evolved rapidly. This paper argues that it should be reserved for cases of deliberate presentation of false or misleading claims as news, where these are misleading by design. The phrase ‘by design’ here refers to systemic features of the design of the sources and channels by which fake news propagates and, thereby, manipulates the audience’s cognitive processes. This prospective definition is then tested: first, by contrasting fake news with other forms of public (...) disinformation; second, by considering whether it helps pinpoint conditions for the proliferation of fake news. (shrink)

Dewi et Eka sont de vraies jumelles nées dans la province sud du Kalimantan, à Bornéo. La première est sauvée d’un effroyable incendie dans lequel tout le monde pense qu’a péri Eka. En fait, cette dernière a été récupérée par une femelle orang-outan qui l’élèvera. Dewi, elle, sera l’une des femmes les plus brillantes de sa génération, et recevra le prix Nobel de physiologie et médecine. Eka, quant à elle, bien que recueillie dans une société humaine à dix ans, restera (...) une enfant sauvage souffrant d’un grave retard mental. Elle mourra misérablement. Les deux soeurs ont pourtant les mêmes gènes. Comment Dewi a-t-elle pu développer les outils d’un brillant épanouissement pleinement humain, quelles en furent les étapes et les conditions? Pourquoi tout cela n’a-t-il pu s’enclencher chez Eka? Axel Kahn utilise la fiction pour introduire la thématique qu’il développe à travers un essai, s’attachant à enrichir, touche après touche, l’observation de ses héroïnes gémellaires dont l’image et l’exemple traversent l’ouvrage. Il rappelle le rôle de l’altérité de l’un et l’autre, comme deux bûches incandescentes qui s’embrasent l’une l’autre, et nous enjoint : «Osons vouloir, alors nous pourrons, peut-être.». (shrink)

Cognitive niche construction is the process whereby organisms create and maintain cause–effect models of their niche as guides for fitness influencing behavior. Extended mind theory claims that cognitive processes extend beyond the brain to include predictable states of the world. Active inference and predictive processing in cognitive science assume that organisms embody predictive (i.e., generative) models of the world optimized by standard cognitive functions (e.g., perception, action, learning). This paper presents an active inference formulation that views cognitive niche construction as (...) a cognitive function aimed at optimizing organisms' generative models. We call that process of optimization extended active inference. (shrink)

Values in dialogue offers a practical and theoretical model for ethics in care, that has grown from experience and research. The foundation of this ethical model is laid in the care relationship and in relational personalism. It consists of three pillars: values, dialogue, and attitudes. On this basis, a practical model for ethical reflection is developed. The aim is to empower professionals in their own ethical reflection and responsibility in concrete care situations. The model is applied on several topics, such (...) as collaboration between professionals, collaboration with clients and significant others, restriction of freedom and use of coercion, and exchange of information and confidentiality. 'Values in dialogue' is written for care professionals in their daily practice and in ethics commitees, but also for teachers and students in ethics courses. It focuses in particular on mental healthcare, support for people with mental disabilities, and care for elderly persons. (shrink)

Die vorliegende Bildmonographie Eugen Finks (1905-1975) ruft die eindrucksvolle Gestalt des Freiburger Philosophen, Phänomenologen und Pädagogen in die Erinnerung zurück. Sie bietet zum ersten Male aufschlussreiche Einblicke in die nachgelassenen Bilddokumente, aus denen der Takt seines Lebenslaufes selbst vernommen werden kann. über die biographischen Schlaglichter hinaus führt sie den Leser schrittweise in die Werkstatt seiner nachgelassenen Manuskripte und Entwürfe, in ausgewählte Partien seines Briefwechsels, in die Akten und Urkunden hinein, die seinen beruflichen Werdegang dokumentieren. Auf diese Weise stellt sie nicht (...) nur die Gesamtausgabe der Werke Eugen Finks in ein umgreifendes Landschaftsbild hinein, sondern hebt zugleich die vielfältigen Motive und Beweggründe der phänomenologischen Bewegung hervor, als deren Vermittler und Bindeglied Eugen Fink weltweite Anerkennung zuteilde wurde. (shrink)

Diese Studie bietet eine pragmatistische Deutung von Erkenntnis. Durch eine detaillierte Analyse im Kontext von Sprachphilosophie und Philosophie des Geistes legt der Autor dar, warum Wissen seinen Ursprung im Konnen hat. Denn bei genauer Betrachtung beschreiben die Bedingungen fur Wissen letztlich eine praktische Kompetenz. Durch die Verknupfung einer normativen Pragmatik mit einer inferentiellen Semantik macht der Autor deutlich, warum es einer solchen Kompetenz bedarf, um Uberzeugungen uberhaupt erst haben und rechtfertigen zu konnen. Im Rahmen eines Deflationismus zeigt er dagegen, dass (...) Wahrheit keine notwendige Bedingung fur Wissen, sondern vielmehr ein Mittel der Zustimmung und der Verallgemeinerung ist.". (shrink)

In Sweden, palliative care has, over the past decades, been object to policies and guidelines with focus on how to achieve “good palliative care”. The aim of this study has been to analyse how experts make sense of the development and the current state of palliative care. Departing from this aim, focus has been on identifying how personal experiences of ‘the self’ are intertwined with culturally available meta-level concepts and how experts contribute to construct new scripts on palliative care. Twelve (...) qualitative interviews were conducted. Four scripts were identified after analysing the empirical material: 1. script of paths towards working within palliative care; 2. script of desirable and deterrent reference points; 3. script of tensions between improvement and bureaucracy; and 4. script of low status and uncertain definitions. The findings of this study illustrate how experts in complex ways intertwine experiences of ‘the self’ with meta-levels concepts in order to make sense of the field of palliative care. The participants did not endorse one “right way” of “good” deaths. Instead, palliative care was considered to be located in a complex state where the historical development, consisting of both desirable ideals, death denials and lack of guidelines, and more recent developments of strives towards universal concepts, “improvement” and increased bureaucracy altogether played a significant role for how palliative care has developed and is organised and conducted today. (shrink)

The first book since Coady's 1992 'Testimony: A Philosophical Study' to offer a thorough survey and a philosophical introduction to testimony and its epistemological problems, while at the same time advancing a novel view that proposes independent justificatory pathways for the acceptance and rejection of testimony, respectively. // Table of Contents: // Introduction / 1. What is Testimony? / 2. The Testimonial Conundrum / 3. Testimony, Perception, Memory, and Inference / 4. Testimony and Evidence / 5. Reductionism and Anti-Reductionism / (...) 6. Hybrid Theories of Testimony / 7. Testimonial Knowledge: Transmission and Generation / 8. Trust and Assurance / 9. Expert Testimony / 10. Pathologies of Testimony / 11. Testimony and the Value of Knowledge / Glossary / Bibliography / Index. (shrink)