Infants can see someone pointing to one of two buckets and infer that the toy they are seeking is hidden inside. Great apes do not succeed in this task, but, surprisingly, domestic dogs do. However, whether children and dogs understand these communicative acts in the same way is not yet known. To test this possibility, an experimenter did not point, look, or extend any part of her body towards either bucket, but instead lifted and shook one via a centrally pulled (...) rope. She did this either intentionally or accidentally, and did or did not address her act to the subject using ostensive cues. Young 2-year-old children but not dogs understood the experimenter’s act in intentional conditions. While ostensive pulling of the rope made no difference to children’s success, it actually hindered dogs’ performance. We conclude that while human children may be capable of inferring communicative intent from a wide variety actions, so long as these actions are performed intentionally, dogs are likely to be less flexible in this respect. Their understanding of communicative intention may be more dependent upon bodily markers of communicative intent, including gaze, orientation, extended limbs, and vocalisations. This may be because humans have come under selective pressure to develop skills for communicating with absent interlocutors – where bodily co-presence is not possible. (shrink)

In contrast to apes’ seemingly sophisticated skill at producing pointing gestures referentially, the comprehension of other individual’s pointing gestures as a source of indexical information seems to be less pronounced.One reason for apes’ difficulty at comprehending pointing gestures might be that in former studies they were mainly confronted with human declarative pointing gestures, whereas apes have largely been shown to point imperatively and towards humans. In the present study bonobos, chimpanzees and orangutans were confronted with a conspecific’s imperative pointing gesture (...) in a competitive context, therefore mirroring former studies that have investigated apes’ skills at producing these gestures.However, apes in the present study did not use their conspecific’s pointing gestures. Apes have been shown to use indexical information when provided noncommunicatively and to interpret other individuals’ actions in terms of motives. Thus, it is discussed whether apes treat a pointing gesture as intentional act of indexical reference. (shrink)

In contrast to apes' seemingly sophisticated skill at producing pointing gestures referentially, the comprehension of other individual's pointing gestures as a source of indexical information seems to be less pronounced.One reason for apes' difficulty at comprehending pointing gestures might be that in former studies they were mainly confronted with human declarative pointing gestures, whereas apes have largely been shown to point imperatively and towards humans. In the present study bonobos, chimpanzees and orangutans were confronted with a conspecific's imperative pointing gesture (...) in a competitive context, therefore mirroring former studies that have investigated apes' skills at producing these gestures.However, apes in the present study did not use their conspecific's pointing gestures. Apes have been shown to use indexical information when provided noncommunicatively and to interpret other individuals' actions in terms of motives. Thus, it is discussed whether apes treat a pointing gesture as intentional act of indexical reference. (shrink)

In contrast to apes’ seemingly sophisticated skill at producing pointing gestures referentially, the comprehension of other individual’s pointing gestures as a source of indexical information seems to be less pronounced.One reason for apes’ difficulty at comprehending pointing gestures might be that in former studies they were mainly confronted with human declarative pointing gestures, whereas apes have largely been shown to point imperatively and towards humans. In the present study bonobos, chimpanzees and orangutans were confronted with a conspecific’s imperative pointing gesture (...) in a competitive context, therefore mirroring former studies that have investigated apes’ skills at producing these gestures.However, apes in the present study did not use their conspecific’s pointing gestures. Apes have been shown to use indexical information when provided noncommunicatively and to interpret other individuals’ actions in terms of motives. Thus, it is discussed whether apes treat a pointing gesture as intentional act of indexical reference. (shrink)

Der vorliegende Band bietet die erste Gesamtbibliographie aller deutschsprachigen Veröffentlichungen zu Sren Kierkegaard (1813 - 1855); darüber hinaus werden sämtliche deutschsprachigen Übersetzungen von Kierkegaards veröffentlichten und unveröffentlichten Schriften sowie von seinen Journalen und Aufzeichnungen erfasst. Der Band ist damit ein unverzichtbares Hilfsmittel zur Erforschung der Übersetzungs- und Rezeptionsgeschichte Kierkegaards im deutschen Sprachraum.

It is shown that the expressive power of second-order propositional modal logic whose modalities are S4.2 or weaker is the same as that of second-order predicate logic.

Some of my colleagues will sadly not be attending the IAB World Congress in Qatar. Amongst other things, they wish to take a stand against Qatar’s human rights record and the treatment of women and...

For the last 40 years or so the is/ought gap, the fact/value distinction and the naturalistic fallacy have figured prominently in ethical debates. This longevity, however, has had an adverse side effect. So familiar have they become that they—and their respective rationales—have tended to become blurred. It is the purpose of this paper to explain why they should be kept distinct.

The first ever global overview of philosophy: how it developed around the world and impacted the cultures in which it flourished.

This book offers comparative ontologies of both Islam and liberalism as discourses more broadly construed. The author argues that, despite recent efforts to speak of overlapping consensuses and discursive congruence, the fundamental categories that constitute 'Islam' and 'Liberalism' remain very different, and that these differences should be taken seriously. Thus far, no recent scholarly works have explicitly or meticulously broken down where these differences lie. The author rigorously explores questions related to rights, moral epistemologies, the role of religion in the (...) public sphere, and more general approaches to legal discourse, via primary and canonical sources constitutive of both Islam and liberalism. He then goes on to articulate why communitarian modes of thought are better suited for engaging with Islam and contemporary socio-political modes of organization than liberalism. This book will be of great interest to students and scholars of Politics and International Relations, Islam, Liberalism, and Communitarianism. (shrink)

It is argued here that understanding John Dewey's thought as that of a prodigal liberal or a fellow traveller does not capture the complexity of his work. It is also important to recognise the portion of his work that is historie morale. In the very best sense it is epic, encapsulating the hopes and dreams of a history of the American people in the early 1900s. It is a work that simultaneously pursues modernity and the past — for the sake (...) of coping with the present. It also calls attention to an unnoticed element in his work 'inexperience'. (shrink)

Van Inwagen proposes that besides simples only living organisms exist as composite objects. This paper suggests expanding van Inwagen’s ontology by also accepting composite objects in the case that physical bonding occurs (plus some extra conditions). Such objects are not living organ-isms but rather physical bodies. They include (approximately) the complete realm of inanimate ordinary objects, like rocks and tables, as well as inanimate scientific objects, like atoms and mol-ecules, the latter filling the ontological gap between simples and organisms in (...) van Inwagen’s origi-nal picture. We thus propose a compositional pluralism claiming that composition arises if and on-ly if bonding or life occurs. (shrink)

By now, it should be clear: in the face of disinformation and disaster, we cannot hot take, life hack, or meme our way to a better future. But how should we respond instead? In How to Think like a Philosopher, Julian Baggini turns to the study of reason itself for practical solutions to this question, inspired by our most eminent philosophers, past and present. Baggini offers twelve key principles for a more human, balanced, and rational approach to thinking: pay attention; (...) question everything (including your questions); watch your steps; follow the facts; watch your language; be eclectic; be a psychologist; know what matters; lose your ego; think for yourself, not by yourself; make connections, not theories; and don't give up. Each chapter is chockfull of real-world examples showing these principles at work-from the discovery of penicillin to the fight for trans rights-and how they lead to more thoughtful conclusions. More than a book of tips and tricks (or ways to be insufferably clever at parties), How to Think like a Philosopher is an invitation to develop the habits of good reasoning that our world desperately needs. (shrink)

2007 will be remembered as the year in which the Tour de France died. Race leader and likely eventual winner, Michael Rasmussen, was eliminated near the end on an allegation of doping. Since the 1960s, the idealistic drug crusaders have been on a mission to reverse the course of history, and eliminate drugs from the sport. But this “zero tolerance” strategy to drugs has failed, as 2007's Tour spectacularly showed. Only around 10–15% of professional athletes are drug tested. Currently, it (...) is illegal to use erythropoietin (EPO) or blood doping to move your haematocrit from 48 to 49% even though some people will have a normal level of 49%. A regulated permissive policy would paradoxically reduce risk to athletes. The present system creates an environment of risk to the athlete. A rational policy on doping would allow safe performance‐enhancing interventions which are consistent with the spirit of a particular sport. (shrink)

Julian Wolfreys starts with loss. All memory is the memory of loss... All that we are, all we experience, all we remember, all that we forget but which leaves nevertheless a trace on us, in us, a trace that countersigns and writes us as who we are (in effect the constellated matrix of Being's becoming): this is a process of loss. This just is loss. Loss is who we are. Loss is authentically the necessary and inescapable inessential essence of Being. (...) Loss names the ghosts, the revenants of Being, Being's others. Neither there nor not there, loss persists as the always already becoming of the thinking of Being. There is more than one loss. There is no one loss. Loss never arrives for a first time. All loss is the return of what is lost to Being's being in the world. From that starting point, the author explores the nature of being and dwelling... of memory and the nature of the traces of the past... of apparition and appearance and perception... of touch and being touched... of the material and the (a)material. In a book that draws in multiple threads from 19th- and 20th-century European literature, he references extensively Heidegger, Derrida, Lacan, Cixous, Celan, Husserl, Woolf, Joyce, Hegel, Badiou, Rilke, Merleau-Ponty, Winterson, Stockhausen and True Detective in an impressive and eclectic tour of the being-becoming-loss.". (shrink)

Mental explanations of behaviour are physical explanations of a special kind. Mental events are physical events. Mental explanations of physical behaviour are not mysterious, they designate events with physical causal powers. Mentalistic terms differ from physicalistic ones in the way they specify events: the former cite extrinsic properties, the latter intrinsic properties. The nature of explanation in general is discussed, and a naturalistic view of intentionality is proposed. The author shows why epistemological considerations rule out the elimination of "mentalistic talk" (...) from explanations of behaviour. (shrink)

El prejuicio más aciago de la filosofía es que su historia jalona rivalidades sangrientas, conflictos insuperables, superaciones radicales, reinicios absolutos, fines y clausuras. Se trata de una concepción pobre y desangelada de esta pasión que impulsa mi viaje por la tierra. El paisaje de lo trascendental se anima cuando se lo concibe como el trabajo conjunto de una saga de artistas embriagados por el pensamiento. Esto no quiere decir que se trate de una suave danza de almas bellas; por el (...) contrario, esa misma embriaguez lleva a enfrentamientos salvajes: hay interpretaciones en las que se nos va la vida, hay conceptos cuya importancia nos desvela, hay posturas que nos parecen escandalosas. Sin embargo, también cuando la danza se hace tan turbulenta que se parece más bien a una brutal pelea de box, lo que importa es esa violencia que fuerza a pensar, y no quién tiene razón. Discutimos porque pensamos juntos, nos respetamos cuando nos criticamos de forma salvaje. Así se construye el pensamiento común: en la tensión y no en la calma, en la pasión de la embriaguez que alterna afinidades radicales y diferencias que parecen irreconciliables.Este libro se propone sostener tal visión de la filosofía a través de un experimento crucial: mostrar que entrelazando a Hegel y a Deleuze podemos construir una potente ontología práctica, que tome la multiplicidad como prius, para dar cuenta del mundo y de la experiencia, donde se conjugan movimiento y devenir con identidades y persistencias. Con ese objetivo, a lo largo de estas páginas expondré a la multiplicidad como una fuerza capaz de determinarse en formas concretas y precisas. La alianza de Deleuze y Hegel nos brinda herramientas conceptuales preciosas para esa tarea: el primero nos ofrece esa ontología de la multiplicidad, mientras el segundo nos plaga de determinaciones sutiles hasta el agotamiento. Una lectura de Hegel desde una perspectiva deleuziana abre nuestros ojos a las miríadas de diferencias y al sutil recorrido incluso de lo más bajo (en su filosofía de la naturaleza hay un secreto slum naturalismo: un amor apasionado por la vileza y las formas más precarias de la existencia). Una lectura de Deleuze desde la perspectiva hegeliana abre nuestros ojos a la máquina de determinación y constitución de lo existente que se alimenta de los flujos y rizomas que lo han hecho célebre. (shrink)