Discusses philosophical ethics in the canonical Gospels, both in its normative (formal and material) dimension, and in a descriptive dimension (as science about morality). It argues that the ethics present in the Gospels has a universal and non-denominational character, although it is not reduced to it. The author argues that in the Gospels Jesus mad acceptance and the implementation of ethical goods, values and material norms dependent on the level of ethical awareness of his recipients. --Book cover.

The subject of this paper is modern representative democracy. Instead of discussing the many theories which strive to define and describe the essence of democracy, such as the classic, the competitive, the structural, the participatory, the concessionary, etc., it is our aim to present the various practical approaches to "democracy in action" in the post-Communist period, i.e., to characterize the various notions of the axiological and philosophical assumptions that provide the cornerstone of democracy.

Summary The logical structure of the complete process of argumentation in the historical science is deductive. It implies confirmation and disconfirmation of hypotheses with the help of the concept of the indicator, which is more objective and more universal than the one of the source; the problem of the objectivity of criteria of the reasoning of hypotheses is being discussed.

The paper tries to show that the theory of Srzednicki and Żurkowska can be viewed as an new and interesting solution of the classical problem: Can we cognize the objective reality? The theory discussed here conquer the cognitive skepticism on the condition, that there is not a impassable gap between the pre-ego experiencing without the notions and the subject cognizing by using the notions.

The paper proposes a metaaxiological political framework, which is the ground for the thesis that the central idea that underlies politics is well-being and its improvement. Every political activity relies on certain goods, values and standards forming its operational framework. The aim and essence of politics is to ensure the realization of constitutive values. These values include the normative concept of the human being and constitutive values underpinning the functioning of the state and political community (i.e. good life, justice, freedom, (...) security, peace, identity, unity, rule of law, representation, sovereignty, legitimacy). On the one hand, the normative values represent preconditions that have to be present in every political sphere. On the other, they serve as ideals pursued by states and political systems. They are investigated by means of normative typological categories. (shrink)

The use of specific language in the democratic Polish Constitution enacted on 2 April 1997 has created the essential differences in the status of religions and Churches in Poland to this in some other countries. It accepts the modern principles and values (tolerance, freedom, mutual independence of state and churches) but precludes the atheistic, hostile or indifferent to religions interpretations and implementations of these values and principles.

As with any historical study, including that of knowledge and ideas, the progress of the semiology of the theater is subject to periodicity. The aim of any division into periods is to obtain a global view, even at the price of simplifications, but it can also bring out the hidden aspects of the phenomena under study.The semiology or semiotics of the theater, that is, the application of the idea of sign to the art of the spectacle, has a long past, (...) in which several stages may be distinguished, and first of all those that I would call the presemiology and the protosemiology of the theater. (shrink)

Argues that the key distinction between human and nonhuman social cognition consists in our complex, diverse and flexible capacities to shape each other's minds in ways that make them easier to interpret.

Argues that the key distinction between human and nonhuman social cognition consists in our complex, diverse and flexible capacities to shape each other's minds in ways that make them easier to interpret.

Hilary Putnam (1926–2016) was prone to change his mind on variety of philosophical issues and almost constantly to modify his views. The last period of the development of his philosophy is known as the phase of commonsense or natural realism, eloquently presented in his 1994 Dewey Lectures. This paper is focused on three facets of his position and tries to identify three difficulties it encounters. Firstly, Putnam claims that in the contemporary realism debate we have, on the one hand, proponents (...) of extravagant metaphysical realism, and, on the other hand, advocates of various versions of irresponsible antirealism. Unfortunately, the delineation of the debate is too coarse-grained, since there are many forms of metaphysical realism, and lumping together various antirealisms is confusing and unhelpful. Secondly, Putnam’s naïve direct realism in the philosophy of perception seems incompatible with his transactional account of perception. Thirdly, for some time Putnam was under a spell of Wittgensteinian quietism that distorted the true character of his philosophical ideas. (shrink)