Official apologies and truth commissions are increasingly utilized as mechanisms to address human rights abuses. Both are intended to transform inter-group relations by marking an end point to a history of wrongdoing and providing the means for political and social relations to move beyond that history. However, state-dominated reconciliation mechanisms are inherently problematic for indigenous communities. In this paper, we examine the use of apologies, and truth and reconciliation commissions in four countries with significant indigenous populations: Canada, Australia, Peru, and (...) Guatemala. In each case, the reconciliation mechanism differentiated the goal of reconciliation from an indigenous self-determination agenda. The resulting state-centered strategies ultimately failed to hold states fully accountable for past wrongs and, because of this, failed to transform inter-group relations. (shrink)

Are there wrongs for which states cannot apologise? In this chapter, I argue that the answer is 'Yes'. I begin with the simple observation that reasoning as a state official requires a conception of what officials do, and so a conception of what is - and is not - properly undertaken on behalf of the state. To act as an official, then, requires a theory of what happens in a well functioning state: it requires a 'normative theory of the state. (...) What officials believe to be necessary for a state to be a good example of its kind will affect what they recognise as outside the bounds of what a state official ought to do. This limit on what can be recognised as something prior officials ought not to have done is illustrated by Canada's official apology for imposing residential schools on indigenous peoples. Canada's official apology left out a crucial feature of the schools policy in part because of the influence of integrationist theories of the state. An integrationist view of good statehood has limited officials' ability to see the project of restructuring indigenous communities and inculcating attachment to an overarching identity as a wrong in itself, and distorted officials' diagnosis of what went wrong in previous policy. One effect has been to allow contemporary officials to offer a sincere and comprehensive apology for past officials' human rights violations in indigenous communities while themselves pursuing policies in these communities that violate human rights. The lesson of the Canadian apology is that how state officials theorise the state can undermine their capacity to recognise human rights violations for what they are and distort their judgements of what must be done in remedy. (shrink)

We live in a world of states: a world in which the dominant form of “persisting structure” for the wielding of political power is characterized by territorially concentrated power exercised through political institutions that exert sovereign control in the sense of being able to exclusively command compliance. Within such a world, calls for reorganization of the way these institutions are organized so as to devolve power to groups oppressed or marginalized within existing structures are inevitable. However, for proponents of liberal (...) states, such calls for devolving power pose a problem. When substate groups call for a reorganization in which power is devolved rather than reformed, they imply that within some portions of the state’s territory, or for certain of the state’s inhabitants, state-level political institutions cannot rightfully command compliance, or at least, cannot do so exclusively. Proponents of liberal states might respond to this problem by letting go of the need for exclusive command. However, for many proponents of liberal states, the prospect of a competing source of rightful command that may assert priority over decision making that applies to the entire territory is impractical, and conceptually difficult to sustain. An alternative response, one that preserves the pre-eminent position of institutions that encompass the state’s entire territory and population, is to insist that such institutions have a vital role in ensuring that the decision making of sub-state groups meets minimal conditions of moral equality and respect for human rights. Emphasizing the role of institutions that encompass the entire territory in guaranteeing minimal conditions of moral equality and respect for human rights seems promising, but it cannot provide a satisfactory account of the desirability of empowering state officials to exercise powers of oversight, and so it cannot justify reserving such powers in the face of calls for power to be devolved. This is most obvious in relation to oppressed an marginalized groups, as state officials recognize cannot reasonably expect members of such groups to accept officials as credible guarantors of moral equality or human rights. This problem aside, there is a basic problem with the way decision making is conceived of in arguments for the importance of reserving powers of oversight as groups calling for devolution of power are not susceptible to the kind of characterization that state officials would have to engage in to effectively gauge whether to intervene to secure moral equality and human rights. (shrink)

In what follows we present group rights as portrayed in contemporary theoretical debates; compare this portrayal with some of the claims actually advanced by various indigenous groups throughout the world; and give reasons for preferring the practical to the theoretical treatments. Our findings suggest that liberal-individualist and corporatist accounts of group rights actually agree on the kind of importance that group interests have for persons and on what it is that groups who claim rights are concerned about. Both liberal-individualists and (...) corporatists locate the importance of group interests in the personal psychology of individual group members. As a result, both treat group interests (such as cultural integrity) as not only different in kind from individualized interests such as freedom of expression but as potentially in competition with them. In contrast, the real-world demands of indigenous groups place emphasis on concrete ways in which the preserving of communal life can be important to individuals’ well-being, in addition to the various spiritual and symbolic resources which such life may provide. These practical aspects of communal life make individuals’ group interests a lot like their individualized ones, and so suggest that group rights do not introduce new or distinctive theoretical questions. Instead, group rights are raise familiar questions about how individuals’ interests ought to be balanced against one another when they are in competition; what counts as an adequate institutional structure for the instantiation of a right; and who ought to be recognized as an authoritative judge of whether a right has been respected. (shrink)

Historically, culture has been treated as an object in international documents. One consequence of this is that cultural rights in international law have been understood as rights of access and consumption. Recently, an alternative conception of culture, and of what cultural rights protect, has emerged from international documents treating indigenous peoples. Within these documents culture is treated as an activity rather than a good. This activity is ascribed to peoples as well as persons, and protecting the capacity of both peoples (...) and persons to engage in culture is taken to be as basic a component of human dignity as are freedom of movement, freedom of speech, and freedom from torture. It is not an accident that this treatment of culture has emerged from international documents treating indigenous peoples. However, the value of this treatment of culture extends beyond the human rights of indigenous peoples. Treating culture as an activity establishes an understanding of what cultural rights protect that clarifies the relationship between cultural rights and other mechanisms for protecting minorities and frames the role of cultural communities in the realization of human dignity as an important physical and political issue, not just a psychological one. For these reasons, the norms regarding cultural rights that are emerging from international documents treating indigenous peoples are a much-needed step forward for peoples' rights more generally. (shrink)

Who constitutes the public on whose behalf such an official speaks and in whose name the apology is offered? In this paper I argue that in most cases, the “public” that the official offering an apology represents and on whose behalf the apology is offered is not the general public but the public sector: those who direct, control and populate the apparatus of the state. I argue that in most cases there is not a plausible model according to which public (...) sector actors can be treated as vehicles for actions, decisions, projects and values of the general public: a public sector actor is not an avatar of the general public. This makes for a gap between public officials and the general public that must be explicitly bridged with respect to actions, decisions and attitudes named in a public apology in order for members of the general public to perceive themselves as part of either the wrongs for which apology is offered or the apology itself. Recognizing this gap does not imply that members of the general public are not or cannot be responsible for wrongs perpetrated by public sector actors. However, it does imply that the source of the responsibility will not usually be found in public officials having acted at the behest of or for the sake of the general public. (shrink)

It seems undeniable that some cultures encourage individuals to act in ways that harm others, and/or to believe that there is nothing wrong when another acts in a way that harms them. And when this is the case it also seems undeniable that it would be better if the scope for such cultures to guide individuals' decision-making were minimized or even eliminated. From these observations a number of people have inferred that groups which exhibit bad cultures ought not to be (...) permitted to hold or exercise group rights. Susan Okin's liberal feminist critique of multiculturalism is one of the most interesting and persuasive examples of this type of argument. In this paper I take a closer look at Okin's critique and ask whether it actually does give one reason to be skeptical about group rights. I conclude that it does not. For although the worries which animate Okin's critique are good ones to have, it is a mistake to think that they are about group rights. Moreover, insofar as Okin's concerns are well motivated they are not actually worries about morally problematic cultures but rather worries about groups' internal political and social structures. These worries should not be equated. Ultimately (I argue) it is not only misleading but counterproductive to focus on the viciousness of a group's culture as a potential reason for disqualifying it from holding or exercising rights. (shrink)

The controversy that accompanied the publication and reprinting of cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammed as part of a 2005 editorial in the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten has been widely interpreted as yet another illustration of an ineliminable tension between multiculturalism and liberalism. Such an interpretation would have us believe that what is at issue in defending the cartoons is our commitment to civil liberties as a mainstay of liberal democracy. But is this really what is at issue? A closer examination suggests (...) that what is actually being defended in this case is not civil liberty but civil privilege. In particular, what is at issue is the privilege to exclude and define Muslims. (shrink)

Conventional wisdom suggests that promoting self-determination for peoples and protecting the human rights of individuals are competing priorities. By this is meant that securing individuals in their human rights requires limits on the rights of their peoples, and vice versa. In contrast, the Draft UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (the Draft Declaration) treats the two as not only mutually supporting but mutually necessary. In the Draft Declaration, the right of peoples to self-determination is more than a principle (...) that constrains states in their behavior towards other states and territories “outre-mer”; it also constrains states within their domestic realm. This view of self-determination reflects the experience of many indigenous groups, for whom refusal to respect the integrity of their group and failure to respect the integrity of their persons have gone hand in hand. In this chapter, I argue that the Draft Declaration’s treatment of self-determination is right: self-determination is a human right and this human right is the same right that underpins the rights of states. Treating an interest of peoples like self-determination as a constitutive element of human dignity raises practical worries about the stability of the international system, and philosophical worries about potential conflicts between individuals and peoples. But it also casts state sovereignty itself in a different light. This new light has interesting consequences both for international law and for philosophical debates about minorities within minorities. In particular, it allows one to think about questions about internal minorities as ultimately questions about legitimacy and representation. (shrink)

Most political philosophers are reluctant to treat cultural rights as basic. Instead, the predominant view is that cultural interests are only important derivatively, in virtue of their contribution to some other interest. In this chapter I argue that political philosophers ought to follow international human rights norms regarding the importance of culture. Not only do international human rights courts and committees come to the right conclusion about the significance of culture, but, as importantly, they come to this conclusion because they (...) think about what cultural rights protect inthe right way. Contemporary political philosophers prefer to treat cultural rights as derivative in part because they tend to treat culture as a “resource” or a “good,” but this is a mistake. Cultural rights are better understood as protecting and promoting an activity. Respecting and promoting cultural participation is a constitutive element of showing respect for human dignity because, like free expression, political participation, and freedom of conscience, cultural participation is something persons do as part of making a life for themselves. (shrink)

Robert Card argues that although Susan Okin’s analysis in Justice, Gender and the Family leads to the conclusion that justice within the family requires elimination of gendered roles within marriage, this conclusion is not compatible with a conception of justice in which neutrality between reasonable conceptions of the good, and protection of individuals’ contractual capabilities are taken to be fundamental values. Although Card is right that there is tension in Okin’s work between where the analysis of injustice within the gender-structured (...) family leads and where, as a reformer, Okin is willing to go, and he is right to locate the source of that tension in Okin’s attempt to remain within Rawlsian liberalism, Okin’s view has more resources to respond to this critique than Card acknowledges. In the end, these additional resources may not be sufficient to address the problems that Card notes, but they do suggest a more complex relationship between Okin’s view and the liberal tradition than Card allows.. (shrink)

Multicultural Odysseys by Will Kymlicka is a textbook example of how to effectively integrate empirical research and philosophical analysis. In it Kymlicka offers a measured and scrupulously honest assessment of what he takes to be both the potential and the limits of liberal multiculturalism as a model for democratization, seeking not to defend his views on multiculturalism in so much as try to understand them. In particular, he seeks to understand how his views on multiculturalism can be correct in the (...) context of Western democracies (as he does not doubt they are) and yet be limited in their potential for export. In approaching his project in this way, Kymlicka raises a number of questions about multiculturalism, about theorizing across borders, and about the nature of Western democracy that he does not directly address, but toward which the reader is inevitably spurred. In this commentary I focus on one especially important question: What does the analysis of this book imply about the future prospects for ideal theorizing? I argue that, without the author intending or necessarily foreseeing it, Multicultural Odysseys has made the world of political philosophy a much less hospitable place for ideal theorizing, at least as it has traditionally been understood. In the wake of Kymlicka’s treatment of the limits on liberal multiculturalism’s exportability it is difficult to imagine that ideal theorizing can occupy the same central place in normative analyses of multiculturalism, minority rights, liberalism, democracy, and global justice. (shrink)

In THE CONSTITUTION OF EQUALITY, Thomas Christiano takes on the question of why decisions that have been democratically arrived at should be treated as authoritative even if we do not agree with them. A key element of that argument is the concept of a “common world”. Christiano takes the connections between people produced by subjection to the same state as the paradigmatic case of a common world, and seems to assume that state-based common worlds take normative priority over common-world-like connections (...) produced by other social and institutional structures. This identification of the worlds created by states and other groupings is not necessary to the function that common worlds perform in Christiano’s argument, and there are good reasons for resisting such identification. These reasons become most apparent when we consider that the problems that minorities within a state face typically reflect ongoing injustice in the terms of their incorporation into the common world produced by the state that encompasses them. States’ capacities to produce and maintain common worlds depends on an international institutional context that accepts and reinforces exclusive jurisdiction with respect to a territory and population. This international context raises several questions: whether state-based groupings ought to be privileged in this way; how boundaries must be drawn for such privilege to be defensible; and what the proper relationship is between decisions by state-based and other groupings. The Constitution of Equality offers interesting resources for grappling with these questions. But we must be willing to think beyond the state. (shrink)

Chronic poverty comes in a variety of forms. It is multi-dimensional in its causes and multi-dimensional in its impacts . Although poverty "has an irreducible economic connotation," this connotation "does not necessarily imply the primacy of economic factors" . For example, violent conflict, access to land, and social relations of power are among the most important factors in food security . Integration into global economic markets is as likely to be a source of immiseration and impoverishment as it is a (...) solution . Access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation are significantly impacted by displacement and violent conflict and its aftermath; displacement and violent conflict often have an ethnic dimension. (shrink)

Theories that recognize group rights face an important challenge from both friends of rights and friends of groups: that rights discourse cannot accord priority to the needs of group life over those of any individual person because the theory of moral value which underwrites rights language cannot recognize groups as having oveniding interests or importance. The full import of this objection has often been missed by those against whom it is levelled because they focus on claims by groups against non-group (...) members. However the full weight of the problem is most apparent in claims groups make against their own members (what Kymlicka calls "internal restrictions"). In this paper I look more closely at the objection from internal restrictions to clarify what is -- and what is not -- at stake. I clarify: (i) why the moral theory that underpins rights language poses a problem that must be addressed; and (ii) why the strategies most commonly pursued by advocates of group rights do not make this problem go away. However, although it is true that some forms of collectivism are ruled out by rights discourse, distinguishing between the ethical and methodological commitments of a theory makes apparent that adopting some form of methodological collectivism need not imply a collectivist theory of moral value. Neither the (ethical) individualism of rights theory nor the (methodological) collectivism of most theories that value group membership are grounds for rejecting the coherence of group rights. (shrink)

The United Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. A burgeoning human rights movement followed, yielding many treaties and new international institutions and shaping the constitutions and laws of many states. Yet human rights continue to be contested politically and legally and there is substantial philosophical and theoretical debate over their foundations and implications. In this volume, distinguished philosophers, political scientists, international lawyers, environmentalists and anthropologists discuss some of the most difficult questions of human rights (...) theory and practice: what do human rights require of the global economy? Does it make sense to secure them by force? What do they require in jus post bello contexts of transitional justice? Is global climate change a human rights issue? Is there a human right to democracy? Does the human rights movement constitute moral progress? For students of political philosophy, human rights, peace studies and international relations. (shrink)

International human rights concepts and documents figure prominently within theories of global justice. Appeals to human rights often rely on theories and interpretations that rank human rights in relation to one another designating some as more important or more crucial than others such that they may or must be given priority. In this paper I argue that hierarchical ranking of human rights should be rejected by theorists of global justice because such ranking: (a) undermines the effectiveness with which human rights (...) operate as principled constraints on state actors; and (b) is inconsistent with the international legal framework and practice from which the human rights concepts and documents draw their rhetorical force. Instead theorists of global justice should accept the indivisibility principle, which states that all human rights are interrelated and interdependent and must be treated on the same footing and given the same emphasis. The attraction of hierarchical ordering rests on misguided concerns about the practicality of indivisibility that fail to properly distinguish between rights and claims and ignore important dimensions of human rights implementation and assessment. I argue that indivisibility is both pragmatically defensible, provides a better theoretical grounding for understanding complaints about violations, and offers a better framework for understanding the relationship between human rights and legitimacy than hierarchical ordering. (shrink)

In political philosophy and political theory justification is an important element of normative force – of rightful pull to compliance. To justify is to address a subject in a form or with a substantive content in virtue of which the subject is supposed to be bound. Theories of justification spell out how addresses are supposed to establish subjects as rightfully bound. All arguments that purport to establish that a practice, institution, requirement or legal regime rightfully exerts a pull to compliance (...) employ or make use of a theory of justification, and so are susceptible to challenges based in scepticism about the adequacy of that theory of justification. Theories of justification typically have epistemological and moral dimensions. The epistemological dimension of justification concerns features of the form or content of an address that generate normative force in virtue of their relationship or contribution to cognitive processes. The moral dimension of justification concerns features of the form or content of an address that generate normative force in virtue of their relationship or contribution to the requirements of morality. Both the epistemological and moral dimensions of theories of justification purport to explain what makes the form or content of an address rightfully compelling. Whether the explanation purports to explain compellingness in epistemological or moral terms, and how, precisely, the cognitive or ethical features of the address are supposed to bind is key to understanding how a specific theory of justification works. (shrink)

In Global Justice: A Cosmopolitan Account Gillian Brock makes three important claims: that we have duties of justice to all human beings and not only those with whom we share a state; that our duties to those outside our states are of the same scope and normative weight as our duties to those with whom we share a state; and that the existing framework of international institutions affords us a number of straightforward and accessible means to act on our duties (...) to persons outside our states that we ought to pursue. These claims are important in themselves, but the real interest of Brock’s book lies with the argumentative strategy she uses in support of them. This strategy, which includes emphasizing the compellingness of specific institutional and policy prescriptions and distancing her arguments from debates about the structure and plausibility of Rawlsian internationalism, bears interesting fruit in a number of respects. However, it also raises difficult questions about the coherence of the distinction between cosmopolitanism and nationalism on which Brock relies, and about the value of institutionalist approaches to justice more generally. (shrink)

Is there something special about group rights? Many would say "yes". For some, only certain kinds of groups---ones that are oppressed, or play a special role in well-being---may have rights. For others, the kind of group is not as important as the group's culture and internal structure. At the very least, many argue, group rights ought to be more restricted than individualistic ones. For these reasons, arguing the merits of a group right is often thought to require a theory of (...) groups or of group identity. If only certain kinds of groups may have rights then one has to identify the roles that various groups and/or identities play in personal well-being. If a group's culture or internal structure must meet certain standards then one must develop a theory of how culture or the internal organization of a minority influences people. ;I argue that it is a mistake to think that arguing a group right requires a theory of groups. This mistake reflects a tendency to think about group membership as a kind of good and to focus on its internal, psychological significance. But if one thinks about group membership as a vehicle of action, and focuses on the concrete effects it may have, it becomes apparent that arguing for a group right does not require a theory of groups, group identity or culture. For in the end, the issues that one must address in arguing a group rights are issues about groups. Rather, they are issues about political and moral authority, and about the extent to which moral and political norms ought to recognize and reinforce the ways that people depend upon one another. These are important issues and they raise pressing questions for political philosophy. But they are not about groups. (shrink)

A popular strategy for answering the question of why and how laws bind is to use the concept of political justification: to argue that laws bind when they can be justified in the political domain. Being defensible in the political domain is supposed to make laws emotionally compelling in virtue of their being justified for each member of the community, and intellectually compelling in virtue of their having emerged from a process that is subject to constraints of rationality such as (...) consistency and coherence. However, being politically justifiable does not and cannot explain why it is reasonable to expect individuals to conform because it places too much emphasis on deference to the judgments of public actors. In this paper I use a distinction between general availability and general acceptability accounts of publicity to explain why the answer to what makes laws binding lies in developing an account of good reasons, not an account of why political reasons should take priority. (shrink)

Everyone agrees that the international community must develop better mechanisms for responding to humanitarian crises. The best mechanism for responding is simply to intervene to prevent a crisis from developing in the first place. However, because the principle of sovereignty imposes strict constraints on action across state borders, international actors are often unwilling or unable to interpose themselves until after conditions have escalated into a full-blown crisis, by which time it has usually become a matter of managing human misery rather (...) than ending or averting it. Respect for sovereignty is an organizing principle of the existing international legal system, and so abandoning it would fundamentally change how the units of international politics are constituted and relate to one another. The strongest argument against abandoning sovereignty is the potential for unintended consequences with respect to peace, political stability, and the effective protection and promotion of human rights. One way to defuse this worry is to frame interventions across borders as principle-based exceptions to a general rule of state sovereignty. If we assume that protecting and promoting individual human rights is the primary goal of the international system, and that both state sovereignty and peace and security are important to us primarily as vehicles for achieving this, then (it is argued) we may use the standards of international human rights to identify, and limit, cases in which the presumption of sovereignty may legitimately be set aside. However, the relationship between sovereignty and humanitarian crises is more complex than this picture allows. Theorizing about humanitarian crises inevitably includes recommendations about states and this makes it a species of non-ideal theory. All actual states are rife with injustice, both in their internal structures and in the relationships these structures establish with those outside a state’s borders. This fact must be reflected in our reasoning about humanitarian responses. (shrink)

Conventional wisdom suggests that promoting self-determination for peoples and protecting the human rights of individuals are competing priorities. However, many recent international human rights documents include rights of peoples in their lists of basic human rights. In this paper, I defend including at least one people’s right, the right to self-determination, in the list of basic rights. Recognizing that self-determination is a constitutive element of human dignity casts state sovereignty in a different light, with interesting consequences both for international law (...) and for philosophical debates about the rights of minorities. (shrink)

It has come to be widely accepted that jus post bellum includes responsibilities to rebuild. Consequently, duties to establish a sustainable peace are increasingly defined in terms of duties to protect and promote international human rights, including duties to effectively investigate human rights violations, to ensure access to effective remedy, and to transform institutional and legal contexts that have facilitated or sustained human abuse. But what are investigations by transitional bodies seeking when they take on these tasks? Often, investigators present (...) themselves as seeking the truth and claim value for their findings based on having produced a better description or explanation than was antecedently available. But is truth worth pursuing for its own sake in transitions from conflict or must it contribute to some other goal to be valuable? In what follows I argue that the value of truth in transitions from conflict lies in the role of truth in ascribing knowledge. The connection between truth and knowledge makes it important to preserve distinctively epistemological grounds for accepting and rejecting claims and narratives. These distinctively epistemological grounds explain how, if it is conceived of as adequate responsiveness to experience, truth is a legitimate and important goal in transitions from violence that is worth pursuing for its own sake. In particular, I argue that there is value in insisting that adequate responsiveness to experience serve as an arbiter in the reception of claims and narratives because when responsiveness to experience plays an arbitral role it becomes possible for bodies such as truth commissions to serve as vehicles by which groups may attain or ascribe knowledge. (shrink)

In A Moral Theory of Political Reconciliation Colleen Murphy develops a rich and potentially transformative account of political reconciliation. The potential of this account is not fully realized because of limitations in how Murphy conceptualizes political relationships. For example, group-differentiated integration into states opens up important questions about partial legality and group-differentiated experiences of repression that Murphy does not address. Murphy’s framework is well-suited to take up these questions, once they are acknowledged. But doing so requires a revised understanding of (...) how states’ relationships with individuals structure individuals’ relationships with one another. (shrink)

The United Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. A burgeoning human rights movement followed, yielding many treaties and new international institutions and shaping the constitutions and laws of many states. Yet human rights continue to be contested politically and legally and there is substantial philosophical and theoretical debate over their foundations and implications. In this volume distinguished philosophers, political scientists, international lawyers, environmentalists and anthropologists discuss some of the most difficult questions of human rights (...) theory and practice: What do human rights require of the global economy? Does it make sense to secure them by force? What do they require in jus post bello contexts of transitional justice? Is global climate change a human rights issue? Is there a human right to democracy? Does the human rights movement constitute moral progress? For students of political philosophy, human rights, peace studies, and international relations. (shrink)

Review of Justice and Foreign Policy, Michael Blake, Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2013.

Cindy Holder and Bruce Landesman pose several interesting challenges for my account of Global Justice. In this article I address their concerns by discussing the content of what we owe one another. When we appreciate all the components of what it is to have a decent life, this will commit us to a much richer picture of what we owe one another than is commonly assumed when talking of decent lives. There is also considerable scope for concern with (...) inequality when that fuller picture is presented. I discuss and clarify the importance of a shared state in securing global justice and also how, in the absence of shared state structures, we are to see our options for ensuring that our institutions treat all human beings as having equal moral worth. There is scope for compatriot partiality and appropriate attention to non-compatriots. I explain how these can readily be combined. (shrink)

Cultural narratives shape how we think about the world, including how we decide when the end of life begins. Hospice care has become an integral part of the end‐of‐life care in the United States, but as it has grown, its policies and practices have also imposed cultural narratives, like those associated with the “six‐month rule” that the majority of the end of life takes place in the final six months of life. This idea is embedded in policies for a range (...) of care practices and reimbursement processes, even though six months is not always a meaningful marker. In the case of people living with advanced dementia, six months is both too early in the trajectory to facilitate conversations and too late in the trajectory to ensure decision‐making capacity. This essay encourages scholars and policy‐makers to consider how cultural narratives may limit what they think is possible in care for people living with dementia. (shrink)

Este estudio buscó describir e interpretar las teorías subjetivas sobre la identidad profesional docente que se construyen y difunden noticiosamente durante la educación de emergencia por la pandemia de COVID 19. Se utilizó un estudio de análisis documental, metodología cualitativa y un diseño de estudio de casos. El muestreo intencionado y por conveniencia corresponde a 40 noticias de prensa escrita en español, sobre el profesor(a) en pandemia y publicadas en diferentes medios que fueron recolectadas a través de Google Noticias desde (...) el 11 de marzo de 2020 y hasta el 01 de noviembre de 2020. A partir de una codificación temática, los resultados evidenciaron teorías subjetivas asociadas a las exigentes características, roles, funciones y valores con los que se identifica al profesorado durante la pandemia. El análisis mostró los distintos sentidos del ejercicio profesional y las competencias asociadas a su desempeño en la prensa. En la discusión, se utilizaron estudios relativos a la práctica docente para interpretar estos resultados. (shrink)

Biblical Exegesis and Mystical Theology in the Venerable Bede brings together seventeen essays by Arthur Holder exploring the theology and spirituality found in Bede's biblical commentaries and homilies. The volume shows that Bede was both a masterful student of received tradition and a creative thinker concerned to address the needs and concerns of his audience of Christian pastors and teachers in the eighth-century Northumbrian church. Although Bede is best known as the author of The Ecclesiastical History of the English (...) People, the last half-century of scholarship has demonstrated the sophistication and vast influence of his work in the fields of grammar, biblical interpretation, hagiography, poetry, computus, natural science, and theology. The chapters in this volume show how Bede's exegesis was integrally connected with his work in all those genres and with the monumental artistic productions of his monastery such as the illuminated bible manuscript known as the Codex Amiatinus. The five parts of the book deal with Bede as teacher and biblical scholar, his interpretations of the tabernacle and the temple, his commentary on the Song of Songs, his attitudes toward philosophy and heresy, and his mystical theology. This book will be of interest to students of Christian theology, mysticism, the development of biblical interpretation, and the history of early medieval England. (shrink)

Advancements in artificial intelligence and (social) robotics raise pertinent questions as to how these technologies may help shape the society of the future. The main aim of the chapter is to consider the social and conceptual disruptions that might be associated with social robots, and humanoid social robots in particular. This chapter starts by comparing the concepts of robots and artificial intelligence and briefly explores the origins of these expressions. It then explains the definition of a social robot, as well (...) as the definition of humanoid robots. A key notion in this context is the idea of anthropomorphism: the human tendency to attribute human qualities, not only to our fellow human beings, but also to parts of nature and to technologies. This tendency to anthropomorphize technologies by responding to and interacting with them as if they have human qualities is one of the reasons why social robots (in particular social robots designed to look and behave like human beings) can be socially disruptive. As is explained in the chapter, while some ethics researchers believe that anthropomorphization is a mistake that can lead to various forms of deception, others — including both ethics researchers and social roboticists — believe it can be useful or fitting to treat robots in anthropomorphizing ways. The chapter explores that disagreement by, among other things, considering recent philosophical debates about whether social robots can be moral patients, that is, whether it can make sense to treat them with moral consideration. Where one stands on this issue will depend either on one’s views about whether social robots can have, imitate, or represent morally relevant properties, or on how people relate to social robots in their interactions with them. Lastly, the chapter urges that the ethics of social robots should explore intercultural perspectives, and highlights some recent research on Ubuntu ethics and social robots. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Character of Claus Christmas Crowd Civic Claus Symbol of Supremacy? Common Claus.

Zaller's model of public-opinion formation portrays the average citizen as an automaton who responds unthinkingly to elite cues. That is, once people have received information from political elites, they tend to abide by whatever their respective cue-givers dictate, since rejecting information is more cognitively costly than simply accepting it. Empirical research in psychology on priming supports this view of the citizen as a passive receiver of information. For example, people are likely to be unconsciously influenced by subtle cues and they (...) tend to base their opinions on the accessibility of information in memory. However, some citizens, under certain conditions, may be ?active processors? of information: actively interpreting it, elaborating on its implications, and negotiating its meaning. Whether or not Zaller's model is an accurate representation of the process of public-opinion formation depends substantially upon the inclusiveness of the researcher's views about what constitutes public opinion and how to study its determinants. (shrink)

La conceptualización del saber artesanal es compleja y requiere del reconocimiento epistemológico dentro del contexto sociocultural y económico en el que opera lo artesanal, donde es necesario resaltar el valor ancestral, pues, dentro del aprendizaje hay una transferencia de conocimiento tradicional cuando no hay una ruptura en la producción de sentido que se constituye.Por ello, esta investigación busca, por medio de un documental, visibilizar la labor que cumplen los artesanos y cesteros del municipio de Tocaima, Cundinamarca, logrando construir un espacio (...) de integración y capacitación donde sean los cesteros quienes se beneficien y logren transmitir los saberes de la cestería. (shrink)