In this paper, I develop a quasi-transcendental argument to justify Kant’s infamous claim “man is evil by nature.” The cornerstone of my reconstruction lies in drawing a systematic distinction between the seemingly identical concepts of “evil disposition” (böseGesinnung) and “propensity to evil” (Hang zumBösen). The former, I argue, Kant reserves to describe the fundamental moral outlook of a single individual; the latter, the moral orientation of the whole species. Moreover, the appellative “evil” ranges over two different types of moral failure: (...) while an “evil disposition” is a failure to realize the good (i.e., to adopt the motive of duty as limiting condition for all one’s desires), an “evil propensity” is a failure to realize the highest good (i.e., to engage in the collective project of transforming the legal order into an ethical community). This correlation between units of moral analysis and types of obligation suggests a way to offer a deduction of the universal propensity on behalf of Kant. It consists in tracing the source of radical evil to the same subjective necessity that gives rise to the doctrine of the highest good. For, at the basis of Kant’s two doctrines lies the same natural dialectic between happiness and morality. While the highest good brings about the critically acceptable resolution of this dialectic, the propensity to evil perpetuates and aggravates it. Instead of connecting happiness and morality in an objective relation, the human will subordinatesmorality to the pursuit of happiness according to the subjective order of association. If this reading is correct, it would explain why prior attempts at a transcendental deduction have failed: interpreters have looked for the key to the deduction in the body of Kant’s text, where it is not to be found, for it is tucked, instead, in the Preface to the first edition. (shrink)

An Essay on Kant’s Theory of Evil shows the centrality of the doctrine of radical evil within Kant's critical philosophy. Combining textual accuracy with systematic ethical theory, it fills the gaps Kant left open in his own doctrine, and provides a non-mystifying account of human immorality, which shows the pertinence of the Kantian view to our moral concerns.

The main purpose of these introductory remarks is to give the reader a sense of Philip Rossi’s philosophical project and its importance. I will then advance an interpretation of what motivates Kant’s commitment to community, and, on its basis, object to Rossi’s views on radical evil –a point which affects how one should conceive the moral vocation of humanity and the role that politics and religion play within it. My reconstruction concludes with a sketch of how the five contributions to (...) this Symposium fit together and deepen our understanding of Rossi’s overall project. (shrink)

This Guide is designed to restore the theological background that informs Kant’s treatment of grace in Religion to its rightful place. This background is essential not only to understand the nature of Kant’s overall project in this book, namely, to determine the “association” or “union” between Christianity (as a historical faith) and rational religion, but also to dispel the impression of “internal contradictions” and conundrums” that contemporary interpreters associate with Kant’s treatment of grace and moral regeneration. That impression, we argue, (...) is the result of entrenched interpretative habits that can be traced back to Karl Barth’s reading of the text. Once we realize that such a reading rests on a mistake, much of the anxiety and confusion that plague current discussions on these issues can be put to rest. (shrink)

Kant infamously claimed that all human beings, without exception, are evil by nature. This collection of essays critically examines and elucidates what he must have meant by this indictment. It shows the role which evil plays in his overall philosophical project and analyses its relation to individual autonomy. Furthermore, it explores the relevance of Kant's views for understanding contemporary questions such as crimes against humanity and moral reconstruction. Leading scholars in the field engage a wide range of sources from which (...) a distinctly Kantian theory of evil emerges, both subtle and robust, and capable of shedding light on the complex dynamics of human immorality. (shrink)

In recent years, there has been a growing interest in Kant's doctrine of radical evil, arising from as diverse quarters as philosophy, psychoanalysis and the social sciences. This interest has contributed to the revival of the notion of evil, which had been displaced from the center of philosophical discussion in the 20th century. A common trait in the recent literature is that it takes the relevance of the use of the concept of evil for granted. Yet, before understanding what Kant (...) really means by radical evil, it seems appropriate to ask first whether the notion of evil as such is necessary. For, given its religious background, this notion elicits expectations that may be incompatible with the secular concerns of moral philosophy. Such misgivings are aggravated by additional doubts about the concept's explanatory function in the first place. The pertinence of reviving a concept so allegedly flawed cannot be taken at face value. Thus, the task I set for myself here is to show the necessity of the concept of evil as it lies at the core of Kant's moral philosophy already in the Groundwork, far before he actually coins the notion of “radical evil” in the Religion. Whether this latter account is defensible or not, we will at least be sure that talk about an evil which is said to be radical is not in vain. (shrink)

Publications in the Kant-Studien have a dual focus: firstly contributions to the interpretation, history and editorial questions of Kant’s philosophy, and secondly systematic debates on transcendental philosophy. In addition, there are investigations on Kant’s precursors and on the effects of his philosophy. The journal also contains a documentation section, in which the current state of research is indicated by means of a continually updated bibliography with reviews and references.

ABSTRACT: Kant and Mendelssohn published almost simultaneously influential essays on the Enlightenment. I use this historical contingency as occasion to reflect on the presuppositions and implications their views have with respect to philosophy and politics. In the first part, I compare Mendelssohn's discursive strategy with that of traditional liberalism. A contradiction emerges from this contrast, which, in the second part, I interpret in Kantian terms as an antinomy of modern political reason. Kant's notion of “autonomy,” I suggest, is an attempt (...) to overcome this very antinomy. Putting things this way allows us to better appreciate the originality of Kant's defense of the free use of public reason and his contribution to the liberal tradition. (shrink)

This paper analyzes the system of inferences Kant uses to determine whether an agent is evil.

This paper reflects on the exchange that took place in a session organized by the North American Kant Society at the Eastern Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association in Washington, DC (January, 2016). The session, “New Perspectives in Kant’s Psychology,” marked a rare occurrence: the almost simultaneous publication in 2014 of two important new books on this topic, Corey Dyck’s Kant and Rational Psychology (Oxford University Press) and Patrick Frierson’s Kant’s Empirical Psychology (Cambridge University Press). At first glance, these (...) books have little in common. While the bulk of Dyck’s project is devoted to interpreting Kant’s Paralogisms in light of 18th century German discussions of rational psychology, Frierson shows how Kant’s conception of human beings as objects of empirical investigation is essential to understanding his theory of action, cognition, and moral motivation. If one looks more closely, however, these projects share a fundamental assumption, namely, that in order to understand what motivates and shapes the development of Kant’s transcendental philosophy, one must grapple with the implications of his empirical psychology. (shrink)

Immanuel Kant’s Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (1793) is a formidably difficult book, which since its very inception was ripe for controversy. Part of the difficulty in understanding Kant’s text is thematic: in the idea of God and the questions surrounding faith in God’s existence, all interests of reason seem to converge –metaphysics, epistemology, morality, politics, the purposiveness of nature, and the destiny of the human species all unite in Kant’s view of religion and give it a distinctive (...) polyphonic tone. Part of the difficulty is ideological: Kant’s treatment of religious matters—relying on the assumption that a rational a priori core (identical to the principles of his morality) underlies and shapes all historical revelations—distances itself from both dogmatism and atheism. Those who accept religious orthodoxy, no less than those who are committed to a purely secular view of human affairs, are doomed to be displeased with the ambiguities of Kant’s approach, which preserves religion but subverts the meaning of this term so drastically as to make it unrecognizable in its traditional understanding. James DiCenso’s Commentary, “the first complete English language commentary on the work” (according to the dust-jacket), is thus a daring philosophical undertaking: it required not only comprehensive knowledge of Kant’s corpus but also the intellectual versatility to appreciate Kant’s innovative view. (shrink)

Against the impression that Rousseau is an eclectic thinker, this paper is an attempt to reconstruct the systematic core of his anthropology. First, I discuss the methodological starting-point. Second, I develop the structural framework required to make the concept of nature operative as an ideal within social contexts. Finally, I interpret Rousseau's genetic account in terms of this framework. Such a procedure allows me to solve two interpretative problems, the aporia of the origin of wickedness and the question of man's (...) natural isolation. A twofold notion of logic is introduced to integrate the demands of history and structure, which overlap with those of freedom and necessity in Rousseau's thought. This organizes my argument in a mirror-like way. I call this undertaking an essay, for it is the endeavor to think what Rousseau must have thought in order to write what he wrote. Key Words: amour de soi • amour propre • bourgeois • ego sentio • human make-up • human nature • natural as ideal • other-centered • savage • self-centered • totalities of feeling • totalities of needs. (shrink)

This paper provides a defense of the ethical/political dimensions of Kant’s liberalism by gauging the strength of the critique of one of its most acerbic contemporary critics, Richard Rorty. Rorty’s dissatisfaction with Kant’s position can be traced back to a narrative of the coming to age of our culture, which bears surprising similarities to Kant’s account of the Enlightenment. Yet, in Rorty’s version of the story, Kant’s philosophy is mistakenly assimilated to a form of “Platonism.” This is due, I argue, (...) to the fact that Rorty confuses the “transcendental” with the “transcendent” in Kant. To set the score straight, I present a “de-Platonized” reading of Kant’s 1784 Enlightenment essay, whose goal is to protect the achievements of liberalism against Rorty’s poetic excesses. (shrink)

In a note introduced into the second edition of Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (1794), Kant assigns a systematic role to the General Remarks at the end of each Part of his book. He calls those Remarks, “as it were, parerga to religion within the boundaries of pure reason; they do not belong within it yet border on it” (RGV 6:52). As Kant sees them, the parerga are only a “secondary occupation” that consists in removing transcendent obstacles. This (...) paper is skeptical of Kant's view. It proposes an alternative account, according to which the parerga are essential to our moral education, since they force human reason to confront its own limitations and resist the urge to take refuge in spurious religious beliefs. That urge, I argue, is linked to the propensity to evil, and uses religious orthodoxy to undermine moral religion. By clipping our dogmatic wings, the parerga encourage reason to face its own dialectical tendencies and direct its speculative interest to immanent practical use. This redirection counteracts the debilitating effects of the propensity to evil and plays a key role in our moral regeneration. To consider the parerga “derivative,” as Kant himself does, is therefore a grave mistake. (shrink)

In a note introduced into the second edition of Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (1794), Kant assigns a systematic role to the General Remarks at the end of each Part of his book. He calls those Remarks, “as it were, parerga to religion within the boundaries of pure reason; they do not belong within it yet border on it” (RGV 6:52). As Kant sees them, the parerga are only a “secondary occupation” that consists in removing transcendent obstacles. This (...) paper is skeptical of Kant's view. It proposes an alternative account, according to which the parerga are essential to our moral education, since they force human reason to confront its own limitations and resist the urge to take refuge in spurious religious beliefs. That urge, I argue, is linked to the propensity to evil, and uses religious orthodoxy to undermine moral religion. By clipping our dogmatic wings, the parerga encourage reason to face its own dialectical tendencies and direct its speculative interest to immanent practical use. This redirection counteracts the debilitating effects of the propensity to evil and plays a key role in our moral regeneration. To consider the parerga “derivative,” as Kant himself does, is therefore a grave mistake. (shrink)

This article offers a short biography of Kant and explains why his work was so important.

This paper suggests a general interpretative strategy for reading Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason namely, as an attempt to find a middle ground between what Kant considers two forms of excess: the appeal to a transcendent conception of God and the denial of any claim that presupposes God’s existence. To make my case, I use the example of two contemporary thinkers (Wolterstorff and Rorty) and trace their dispute to the antinomic character of “religious reason.” Putting things this way (...) underscores the originality of Kant’s view: the wake-up call of an antinomy serves us to motivate Kant’s solution to the problem raised by dogmatic religious claims, as well as to capture what is the distinctive ethical function he reserved for religion in the critical system, i.e., the support of the non-individualistic virtues involved in shared undertakings and common pursuits. Throughout the discussion, I show the importance that radical evil had in Kant’s “constructing” the idea of God. (shrink)

The series Rethinking Kant, now in its fourth volume, has become a mirror of Kantian studies in North America. It gathers papers presented at the various study groups of the North American Kant Society, along with contributions from hosts, session chairs, and keynote speakers. Because of its broad and unique composition, it offers a sample of a whole generation of Kantian thought, ranging from recent PhDs, to up and coming young scholars, to some well-established and influential players in the field. (...) Contributions are subjected to strenuous peer review and are, without exception, examples of the most innovative and cutting-edge research done in this area. Anyone interested in taking the pulse of contemporary Kantian scholarship and engaging in the humbling but rewarding task of rethinking Kant, should consider it. (shrink)

The series Rethinking Kant, now in its fifth volume, has become a mirror of Kantian studies in North America. It gathers papers presented at the various study groups of the North American Kant Society, along with contributions from hosts, session chairs, and keynote speakers. Because of its broad and unique composition, it offers a sample of a whole generation of Kantian thought, ranging from recent Ph.Ds, to up and coming young scholars, to some well-established and influential players in the field. (...) Contributions are subjected to strenuous peer review, and are, without exception, examples of the most innovative and cutting-edge research done in this area. Any one interested in taking the pulse of contemporary Kantian scholarship and engage in the humbling, but rewarding task of rethinking Kant, should consider it. (shrink)

Since his pioneering Kant’s Impure Ethics (Oxford University Press, 2000), Robert Louden has helped us put a human face to the abstract a priori principles of Kant’s pure practical philosophy. Through a continuous spate of publications, some of which are gathered in his latest book Kant’s Human Being, Louden has managed to show the importance of the empirical dimension of Kantian ethics—a dimension which had been ignored or dismissed for more than two hundred years by scholars obsessed with “keeping philosophy (...) pure.” This paper discusses the motivation behind Louden’s project and raises some doubts about his understanding of “moral anthropology,” arguing that it is perhaps too empirically-minded and hence fails to do justice to the complexity of Kant’s own thought. (shrink)

Against the charge that Kant's doctrine of radical evil is inconsistent and alien to his practical philosophy, my aim is to show its necessity within the critical system. First, I undermine the alleged vacuity of Kant's notion of evil by showing that, already in the Groundwork, an evil will is the necessary conceptual correlate of a good will. "Good" and "evil" characterize the agent's form of willing and represent the source of value of right and wrong actions. Then, I show (...) how the doctrine of radical evil derives from Kant's notion of evil. That evil lies at the level of an individual Gesinnung is the result of Kant's radicalizing the use of transcendental freedom. That there is a propensity to evil in the whole species is the result of Kant's naturalizing the principles of his moral psychology. Although Kant is not clear about this distinction, the consistency of his doctrine depends on indicating that an "evil Gesinnung" and the "propensity to evil" are not equivalent concepts. Rather, they refer to different units of moral analysis, the individual and the whole species, and represent a failure to comply with different types of moral obligation: the duty to realize the good and the duty to realize the highest good. The correlation between units of moral analysis and types of obligation explains the isomorphism that Kant detects between them, as well as their logical independence, without which the individual's choice of Gesinnung would be analytically contained in the species' choice of moral nature . Finally, to account for the problem of moral self-constitution I argue for the necessity of assuming a transcendental volitional structure, the unity of acknowledgement or "I will". At the different levels of analysis, this structure organizes the will's manifold intentions according to unifying principles that allow it to recognize them as its own. Although Kant does not mention it, the "I will" is a necessary assumption to account for the continuity of choice and for its possible imputation to an agent. (shrink)

This paper explores a usually neglected notion in Kant’s account of moral fall and regeneration in Religion: the notion of “heart” (Herz). This notion belongs to a constellation of concepts that Kant develops for the purposes of moral imputation and the attribution of responsibility. The other chief components of Kant’s conceptual framework are “propensity” (Hang), “character” (Charakter), and “disposition” (Gesinnung). Although interpreters have tended to use these notions interchangeably, understanding their proper meaning, function, and scope in Kantian ethics is essential (...) to preserve the consistency of the doctrine of radical evil. To make good on this claim, I discuss the contributions that the notion of “heart” makes to Kant’s account of the human moral condition and argue that it is irreducible to the other components of his conceptual framework. This notion, we discover, is crucial to the success of Kant’s anthropological argument in Religion and invites us to reevaluate the role emotions play in our moral lives. (shrink)

The aim of Kant’s Sources in Translation is to retrieve the rich intellectual world that influenced Kant’s philosophical development. In its first stage, the series makes available the most important textbooks Kant used throughout his long teaching career. Many of these textbooks are in Latin or in German and remain inaccessible to Anglophone readers. Lacking this material, however, it is difficult to appreciate Kant’s originality and process of philosophical maturation, for readers are unable to understand what prompted Kant to introduce (...) a distinction, offer a qualification, attack a position, or develop a new thesis. This background is essential to understand the genesis of Kant’s thought. -/- This volume provides a translation of Georg Friedrich Meier’s Auszugaus der Vernunftlehre, the textbook that serves not only as the basis for Kant’s lectures on logic and related Reflexionen but is also crucial for studying the so-called Jäsche Logic of 1800, which is redacted from the marginal and interleave notes found in Kant’s personal copy of Meier’s book. Given the recent growth in scholarship on Kant’s logic, normative epistemology, and the psychology of belief, this volume makes a major contribution to contemporary debates in the field. (shrink)

The aim of Kant’s Sources in Translation is to retrieve the rich intellectual world that influenced Kant’s philosophical development. In its first stage, the series makes available the most important textbooks Kant used throughout his long teaching career. Many of these textbooks are in Latin or in German and remain inaccessible to Anglophone readers. Lacking this material, however, it is difficult to appreciate Kant’s originality and process of philosophical maturation, for readers are unable to understand what prompted Kant to introduce (...) a distinction, offer a qualification, attack a position, or develop a new thesis. This background is essential to understand the genesis of Kant’s thought. -/- This volume provides the first English translation of Johann August Eberhard’s Preparation for Natural Theology, as well as the Danzig transcript of Kant’s course on rational theology. Given the growing contemporary interest in Kant’s philosophy of religion and the heated debates on how to read his bewildering Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, the material published here is key to shedding light on the formative stages of Kant’s mature thoughts on these matters. (shrink)

In this paper, I develop a quasi-transcendental argument to justify Kant’s infamous claim “man is evil by nature.” The cornerstone of my reconstruction lies in drawing a systematic distinction between the seemingly identical concepts of “evil disposition” (böseGesinnung) and “propensity to evil” (Hang zumBösen). The former, I argue, Kant reserves to describe the fundamental moral outlook of a single individual; the latter, the moral orientation of the whole species. Moreover, the appellative “evil” ranges over two different types of moral failure: (...) while an “evil disposition” is a failure to realize the good (i.e., to adopt the motive of duty as limiting condition for all one’s desires), an “evil propensity” is a failure to realize the highest good (i.e., to engage in the collective project of transforming the legal order into an ethical community). This correlation between units of moral analysis and types of obligation suggests a way to offer a deduction of the universal propensity on behalf of Kant. It consists in tracing the source of radical evil to the same subjective necessity that gives rise to the doctrine of the highest good. For, at the basis of Kant’s two doctrines lies the same natural dialectic between happiness and morality. While the highest good brings about the critically acceptable resolution of this dialectic, the propensity to evil perpetuates and aggravates it. Instead of connecting happiness and morality in an objective relation, the human will subordinate morality to the pursuit of happiness according to the subjective order of association. If this reading is correct, it would explain why prior attempts at a transcendental deduction have failed: interpreters have looked for the key to the deduction in the body of Kant’s text, where it is not to be found, for it is tucked, instead, in the Preface to the first edition. (shrink)

The aim of Kant’s Sources in Translation is to retrieve the rich intellectual world that influenced Kant’s philosophical development. In its first stage, the series makes available the most important textbooks Kant used throughout his long teaching career. Many of these textbooks are in Latin or in German and remain inaccessible to Anglophone readers. Lacking this material, however, it is difficult to appreciate Kant’s originality and process of philosophical maturation, for readers are unable to understand what prompted Kant to introduce (...) a distinction, offer a qualification, attack a position, or develop a new thesis. This background is essential to understand the genesis of Kant’s thought. -/- This volume provides a translation of Georg Friedrich Meier’s Auszugaus der Vernunftlehre, the textbook that serves not only as the basis for Kant’s lectures on logic and related Reflexionen but is also crucial for studying the so-called Jäsche Logic of 1800, which is redacted from the marginal and interleave notes found in Kant’s personal copy of Meier’s book. Given the recent growth in scholarship on Kant’s logic, normative epistemology, and the psychology of belief, this volume makes a major contribution to contemporary debates in the field. (shrink)

This is a review of Yovel’s latest book, "Kant’s Philosophical Revolution: A Short Guide to the Critique of Pure Reason.".

Book Reviews Pablo Muchnik, Kantian Review, FirstView Article.

Book Reviews Pablo Muchnik, Kantian Review, FirstView Article.

Laura Papish’s new book comes in the wake of a series of studies of Kant’s conception of evil. Two features distinguish her approach: its emphasis on the connection between evil and self-deception (chapters 1–5), and its attentiveness to the role of self-cognition in moral reform (chapters 6–8). Lucidly written and conversant with recent debates in social and moral psychology, Papish’s book expands the range of topics that typically worry Kantians. Its most important contribution is perhaps to have shown that self-deception (...) and self-cognition are countervailing concepts, which together shed light on the neglected, epistemic dimension of Kant’s practical philosophy. My review will adopt the three-part structure of the book indicated in its title. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Kant-Studien Jahrgang: 108 Heft: 4 Seiten: 665-671.

Tenemos el agrado de acercar a nuestros lectores el diálogo mantenido con Pablo Muchnik, en el que hemos conversado sobre cuestiones relativas a la filosofía kantiana, pero también al desarrollo de la investigación kantiana en general y en español en particular.

Volume 27, Issue 5, September 2019, Page 1055-1057.

In this book review, I assess the merits of the book as a whole (it's good!) while focusing in particular on chapters by Claudia Card, Patrick Frierson, Robert Louden, Pablo Muchnik, Jeanine Grenberg, and Allen Wood.

Daniel Isaacson has advanced an epistemic notion of arithmetical truth according to which the latter is the set of truths that we grasp on the basis of our understanding of the structure of natural numbers alone. Isaacson’s thesis is then the claim that Peano Arithmetic (PA) is the theory of finite mathematics, in the sense that it proves all and only arithmetical truths thus understood. In this paper, we raise a challenge for the thesis and show how it can be (...) overcome. We introduce the concept of purity for theories of arithmetic: a theory of arithmetic is pure when it only proves arithmetical truths. Then, we argue that, under Isaacson’s thesis, some PA-provable truths—including transfinite induction claims for infinite ordinals and some consistency statements—are seemingly not arithmetical in Isaacson’s sense, and hence that Isaacson’s thesis might entail the impurity of PA. Nonetheless, we conjecture that the advocate of Isaacson’s thesis can avoid this undesirable consequence: the arithmetical nature, as understood by Isaacson, of all contentious PA-provable statements can be justified. As a case study, we explore how this is done for transfinite induction claims with infinite ordinals below ε0. To this end, we show that the PA-proof of such claims employs exclusively resources from finite mathematics, and that ordinals below ε0 are finitary objects despite being infinite. (shrink)

This paper is concerned with the claim that supervaluationist consequence is not classical for a language including an operator for definiteness. Although there is some sense in which this claim is uncontroversial, there is a sense in which the claim must be qualified. In particular I defend Keefe's position according to which supervaluationism is classical except when the inference from phi to Dphi is involved. The paper provides a precise content to this claim showing that we might provide complete (and (...) sound) systems of deduction for supervaluationist consequence in which proofs are completely classical with the exception of a single last step (involving the above mentioned inference). (shrink)

To what degree can language be acquired from linguistic input alone? This question has vexed scholars for millennia and is still a major focus of debate in the cognitive science of language. The complexity of human language has hampered progress because studies of language–especially those involving computational modeling–have only been able to deal with small fragments of our linguistic skills. We suggest that the most recent generation of Large Language Models (LLMs) might finally provide the computational tools to determine empirically (...) how much of the human language ability can be acquired from linguistic experience. LLMs are sophisticated deep learning architectures trained on vast amounts of natural language data, enabling them to perform an impressive range of linguistic tasks. We argue that, despite their clear semantic and pragmatic limitations, LLMs have already demonstrated that human-like grammatical language can be acquired without the need for a built-in grammar. Thus, while there is still much to learn about how humans acquire and use language, LLMs provide full-fledged computational models for cognitive scientists to empirically evaluate just how far statistical learning might take us in explaining the full complexity of human language. (shrink)

Topics in Cognitive Science, Volume 14, Issue 3, Page 634-645, July 2022.

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction On Law and Morality Legal Rights and Legal Principles Law and Legal Systems Deontic Logic and Legal Philosophy Philosophical Doctrines in Latin America Conclusion References.