Infants can anticipate the future location of a moving object and execute a predictive reach to intercept the object. When a moving object is temporarily hidden by darkness or occlusion, 6‐month‐old infants’ reaching is perturbed, but performance on darkness trials is significantly better than occlusion trials. How does this reaching behavior change over development? Experiment 1 tested predictive reaching of 6‐ and 9‐month‐old infants. While there was an increase in the overall number of reaches with increasing age, there were significantly (...) fewer predictive reaches during the occlusion compared to visible trials and no age‐related changes in this pattern. The decrease in performance found in Experiment 1 is likely to apply not only to the object representations formed by infants but also those formed by adults. In Experiment 2 we tested adults with a similar reaching task. Like infants, the adults were most accurate when the target was continuously visible and performance in darkness trials was significantly better than occlusion trials, providing evidence that there is something specific about occlusion that makes it more difficult than merely lack of visibility. Together, these findings suggest that infants’ and adults’ capacities to represent objects have similar signatures throughout development. (shrink)

Decades of research conducted in Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, & Democratic (WEIRD) societies have led many scholars to conclude that the use of mental states in moral judgment is a human cognitive universal, perhaps an adaptive strategy for selecting optimal social partners from a large pool of candidates. However, recent work from a more diverse array of societies suggests there may be important variation in how much people rely on mental states, with people in some societies judging accidental harms just (...) as harshly as intentional ones. To explain this variation, we develop and test a novel cultural evolutionary theory proposing that the intensity of kin-based institutions will favor less attention to mental states when judging moral violations. First, to better illuminate the historical distribution of the use of intentions in moral judgment, we code and analyze anthropological observations from the Human Area Relations Files. This analysis shows that notions of strict liability—wherein the role for mental states is reduced—were common across diverse societies around the globe. Then, by expanding an existing vignette-based experimental dataset containing observations from 321 people in a diverse sample of 10 societies, we show that the intensity of a society's kin-based institutions can explain a substantial portion of the population-level variation in people's reliance on intentions in three different kinds of moral judgments. Together, these lines of evidence suggest that people's use of mental states has coevolved culturally to fit their local kin-based institutions. We suggest that although reliance on mental states has likely been a feature of moral judgment in human communities over historical and evolutionary time, the relational fluidity and weak kin ties of today's WEIRD societies position these populations' psychology at the extreme end of the global and historical spectrum. (shrink)

Intent and mitigating circumstances play a central role in moral and legal assessments in large-scale industrialized societies. Al- though these features of moral assessment are widely assumed to be universal, to date, they have only been studied in a narrow range of societies. We show that there is substantial cross-cultural variation among eight traditional small-scale societies (ranging from hunter-gatherer to pastoralist to horticulturalist) and two Western societies (one urban, one rural) in the extent to which intent and mitigating circumstances influence (...) moral judgments. Although participants in all societies took such factors into account to some degree, they did so to very different extents, varying in both the types of considerations taken into account and the types of violations to which such considerations were applied. The particular patterns of assessment characteristic of large-scale industrialized societies may thus reflect relatively recently culturally evolved norms rather than inherent features of human moral judgment. (shrink)

The use of placebos in randomised controlled trials is a subject of considerable ethical debate. In this paper we present a set of considerations to evaluate the ethics of placebo controlled trials that includes: social value of the study; need for a randomised controlled trial and placebo; standards of care; risks of harm due to administration of placebo and the harm benefit balance; clinical equipoise; and double standards. We illustrate the application of these considerations using a case study of a (...) large ongoing multicentre, placebo-controlled, double-blinded, randomised trial to determine primaquine anti-relapse efficacy in vivax malaria. There is an urgent need for primaquine anti-relapse studies in order to rationalise the management of a potentially fatal disease. An ethical justification for the use of the placebo arm is provided on the grounds that the actual current applied standard of care in most endemic places does not include primaquine. It has also been argued that there is clinical equipoise among the primaquine study arms and that the risk of harms of being in the placebo arm is the risk of having relapse, which is no more than not being included in the trial, and that there are no double standards. Based on our set of considerations, we conclude that a placebo arm is not only justified but imperative in this study. We propose that similar considerations should be prospectively applied to other placebo controlled trials and observational control arms where no treatment is offered. (shrink)

MEDIEVAL LOGICS LAMBERT MARIE DE RIJK (ed.), Die mittelalterlichen Traktate De mod0 opponendiet respondendi, Einleitung und Ausgabe der einschlagigen Texte. (Beitrage zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, Neue Folge Band 17.) Miinster: Aschendorff, 1980. 379 pp. No price stated. THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY MARTA FATTORI, Lessico del Novum Organum di Francesco Bacone. Rome: Edizioni dell'Ateneo 1980. Two volumes, il + 543, 520 pp. Lire 65.000. VIVIAN SALMON, The study of language in 17th century England. (Amsterdam Studies in the Theory (...) and History of Linguistic Science, Series 111: Studies in theHistory of Linguistics, Volume 17.) Amsterdam: John Benjamins B.V., 1979.x + 218 pp. Dfl. 65. Theoria cum Praxi. Zum Verhaltnis von Theorie und Praxis im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert. (Akten des 111. Internationalen Leibnizkongress, Hannover, 12. bis 17.November 1977, Band 111: Logik, Erkenntnistheorie, Wissenschaftstheorie, Metaphysik, Theologie.) Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1980. vii + 269 pp. DM 48. CLASSICAL AND NON-CLASSICAL LOGICS MICHAEL CLARK, The place of syllogistic in logical theory. Nottingham: University of Nottingham Press, 1980. ix + 151 pp. £3.00. A.F. PARKER-RHODES, The theory of indistinguishables. Dordrecht, Boston and London: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1981. xvii + 216 pp. Dfl.90.00/$39.50. NICHOLAS RESCHER and ROBERT BRANDOM, The logic of inconsistency. Oxford:Basil Blackwell, 1980. x + 174 pp. f 11.50. MISCELLANEOUS J. ZELENY, The logic of Marx. Translated from the German by T. Carver. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980. xcii + 247 pp. £12.50. FELIX KAUFMANN, The infinite in mathematics. Edited by Brian McGuinness. Introduction by E. Nagel. Translation from the German by Paul Foulkes. Dordrecht: Reidel, 1978. xvii + 235 pp. Dfl 85/$39.50 (cloth); Dfl 45/$19.95 (paper). PAMELA MCCORDUCK, Machines who think. San Francisco: W.H. Freeman and Company, 1979. xiv + 275 pp. $14.95. J. MITTELSTRASS (ed.), Enzyklopadie Philosophie und Wissenschaftstheorie Bd. 1 : A-G. Mannheim, Wien, Ziirich: Bibliographisches Institut, 1980. 835 pp. DM 128. (shrink)

Unter den griechischen exegetischen Werken zu den Schriften des Aristoteles kommt dem von um 200 n. Chr. wirkenden Alexander von Aphrodisias (Bücher 1-5) und einem byzantinischen Gelehrten des 13. Jahrhunderts, bekannt als Pseudo-Alexander, (Bücher 6--?14) stammenden Kommentar zur Metaphysik des Aristoteles eine überragende Bedeutung zu. Der Wert des durch fundierte Kenntnisse der Philosophie des Aristoteles ausgezeichneten Kommentars ist sowohl für die denkerische Durchdringung der aristotelischen Metaphysik als auch für die Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie nicht genug hochzuschätzen. Den Denkern des Mittelalters (...) lag der Text aber nicht vor. Erst im Jahre 1527 machte der berühmte spanische Humanist Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda (1490?-1573) der breiten Öffentlichkeit den Kommentar zur Metaphysik erst zugänglich. Seine immer noch geschätzte, in gewissem Sinne auch unentbehrliche Übersetzung des Kommentars zu den ersten zwölf Büchern erstellte er aufgrund der Kollationierung der ihm zu Gebote stehenden Handschriften mit philologischer Gewissenhaftigkeit und ermöglichte auf diese Weise die immer noch nicht erforschte Rezeption des Textes in den folgenden drei Jahrhunderten bis zur ersten Edition des vollständigen griechischen Originals durch Hermann Bonitz 1847. Ein Nachdruck der 'editio princeps' dieser lateinischen Übersetzung, die 1561 zum fünften und letzten Mal erschienen ist, ist nicht nur ein Akt der antiquarischen Pietät, sondern kommt gerade im digitalen Zeitalter einer Forderung der Forschung nach. (shrink)

In diesem Buch wird Friedrich Schleiermachers Sozialtheorie des Christentums entfaltet. Grundlage sind die bisher unzulänglich publizierten Vorlesungen über die Christliche Sittenlehre, in denen der Berliner Theologe die kulturelle Wirksamkeit der christlichen Religion diachron und synchron entfaltet. Neben den Kirchen werden eine Reihe von sozialen Formationen identifiziert, in denen sich der christliche Glaube durch das Handeln der Christinnen und Christen realisiert und gesellschaftlich sichtbar wird. Die christliche Sittenlehre mündet in einer multiplen Sozialtheorie des Christentums, aus der man für die Beschreibung der (...) Lage der christlichen Religion in der Gegenwart methodische und kategoriale Anregungen entnehmen kann, insofern die übliche Gleichsetzung von Christentum und Kirche(n) überwunden wird und Formen der Vergemeinschaftung auf der Basis schwacher oder volatiler Institutionalisierung in den Blick genommen werden. (shrink)

We review the famous no-hidden-variables theorem in von Neumann’s 1932 book on the mathematical foundations of quantum mechanics. We describe the notorious gap in von Neumann’s argument, pointed out by Hermann and, more famously, by Bell. We disagree with recent papers claiming that Hermann and Bell failed to understand what von Neumann was actually doing.

Obscurcie par l'érudition des uns et galvaudée par la vulgarisation des autres, la philosophie n'est pas mieux comprise aujourd'hui qu'hier. Ce livre veut lui rendre sa véritable destination, celle de la vie, de la vie qui entend vivre aux trois sens de vouloir, d'écouter et de comprendre. A mi-chemin entre le récit et l'essai, La Chose qui donne à penser se présente comme une pensée en première personne sans référence extérieure, en abordant quelques problèmes centraux de l'existence, abruptement et justement, (...) comme ils se donnent. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungDer Verfasser geht auf Beziehungen zwischen dem von C. I. Lewis eingeführten Begriff der « strikten » Implikation und dem von ihm selbst eingeführten Begriff der « strengen » Implikation ein. Er zeigt, dass sich innerhalb des Systems der strengen Implikation ein weiterer Folgebegriff definieren lässt, der alle Eigenschaften hat, die von der strikten Implikation verlangt werden. Als dieser Folgebegriff wird genommen, dass die Konjunktion von A und dem Gegenteil von B unmöglich ist, was in dem System der strengen Implikation (...) keineswegs damit identisch ist, dass A in strenger Weise B impliziert. Das System der strikten Implikation wird dabei in einer von Arnold Schmidt gegebenen Form zugrunde gelegt.RésuméIl s'agit des relations entre la conception d'implication stricte introduite par C. I. Lewis et la conception de « strenge » implication introduite par l'auteur. L'auteur indique qu'une conception d'implication se laisse définir dans le système de « strenge » implication qui a toutes les qualités d'implication stricte. La définition est la suivante: A implique B a ce sens si la conjonction de A et non B est impossible ce qui n'équivaut pas à la proposition qu'il y a de « strenge » implication de A à B. Le système d'implication stricte est considéré sous la forme qui lui a été donnée par Arnold Schmidt.In this paper the author enters into the particulars of the relations of the concept of « strict » implication introduced by C. I. Lewis with the concept of « strenge » implication introduced by himself. He points out that within the system of « strenge »implication a further concept of implication may be defined which has all the qualities of strictimplication. The definition is the following: A implies B in this sense if the conjunction of A and non‐B is impossible, which is not the same as the « strenge » implication between A and B. The system of strict implication is taken in the form as formerly given by Arnold Schmidt. (shrink)