Call a belief ”non-negotiable’ if one cannot abandon the belief without the abandonment of one’s religious perspective. Although non-negotiable beliefs can logically exclude other perspectives, a non-reductive approach to religious pluralism can help to create a space within which the non- negotiable beliefs of others that contradict one’s own non-negotiable beliefs can be appreciated and understood as playing a justificatory role for the other. The appreciation of these beliefs through cognitive resonance plays a crucial role to enable the understanding of (...) those who hold other perspectives. epistemological and spiritual consequences of this claim are explored. (shrink)

This article provides a brief background of how Comparative Theology is understood today, to point out features of how it is practiced that are responsive to issues peculiar to contemporary Catholicism, and to suggest how a version of CT might be developed that is more consistent with Islamic traditions of thought on related issues. In order to accomplish this last goal, a brief introduction to the traditional “Islamic sciences” is provided. It will be suggested that an Islamic Comparative Theology (ICT) (...) can be understood as a multidisciplinary field that draws on several Islamic sciences, as well as research in religious studies. I argue in favor of a blurring of the distinction between Comparative Religion and Comparative Theology, and point out that relevant discussions are to be found across a variety of traditional Islamic sciences, but that it would be advantageous to collect these discussions together and to augment them with information gleaned from both secular and Islamic approaches to the teachings of Muslim thinkers about theological issues, broadly understood, in comparison with what is found in non-Islamic traditions in such a manner to enrich our own understandings of the issues and those with whom we engage in dialogue. (shrink)

The leading idea of the book is to focus on the common roots of Islamic and Western traditions and to increase awareness of the chances of systematic philosophical dispute, with the aim to promote a substantial dialogue on an academic level. Most of the collected papers in this edition are results of contributions to a workshop, organized by the editors of the volume, as an integrated part of a visit to the Imam Khomeini Education and Research Institute (IKERI) of Qom (...) by a delegation of philosophers from the University of Innsbruck in May 2008. The organizational frame of the workshop and also of this edition is the partnership between the IKERI and the University of Innsbruck the first formal high-level academic partnership between an Iranian Institution and a European University. The contributions in this edition investigate the topic Soul in an interdisciplinary and comparative way: Psychologists, Philosophers, and Theologians from both, Islamic and Western traditions, should be brought into dialogue with the focus on the general theme.". (shrink)

The seventeenth century Muslim philosopher Muhammad Sadr al-Din Shirazi, known as Mulla Sadra, introduced the idea of substantial motion in Islamic philosophy. This view is characterized by a continuity criterion for diachronic identity, a four-dimensional view of individual substances, the notion that possibilities change, and the continual creation of all creatures. Modern philosophical logic provides means to model a variety of claims about individuals, substances, modality and time. In this paper, the semantics of formal systems discussed by Carnap, Bressan (...) and Gupta are reviewed with regard to the issue of substance and identity. Next a model introduced by Storrs McCall is described that is able to build upon and yet resolve some of the issues about substance and identity as characterized by Bressan and others. McCall’s model is also shown to be able to provide an illustration of Mulla Sadra’s doctrine of substantial motion. (shrink)

While the ontological arguments of Anselm and Descartes continue to be the source of controversy among philosophers and theologians in the West, scant attention has been paid to the ontological argument first formulated by Ibn Sina (370/980 - 429/1037), and thereafter reformulated by various Muslim philosophers throughout the centuries up to the present day. Here several versions of the argument will be presented in historical sequence, and some of the most important recent discussions of the argument by contemporary Muslim philosophers (...) will be mentioned. Some reflections on the argument and the discussions of it will then be presented along with comments of a comparative nature regarding contemporary Islamic philosophy and Western philosophy of religion. (shrink)

Call a belief ‘non-negotiable’ if one cannot abandon the belief without the abandonment of one’s religious perspective. Although non-negotiable beliefs can logically exclude other perspectives, a non-reductive approach to religious pluralism can help to create a space within which the non- negotiable beliefs of others that contradict one’s own non-negotiable beliefs can be appreciated and understood as playing a justificatory role for the other. The appreciation of these beliefs through cognitive resonance plays a crucial role to enable the understanding of (...) those who hold other perspectives. epistemological and spiritual consequences of this claim are explored. (shrink)

The place of philosophy in Iranian society is prominent. Philosophy is discussed in popular media as well as specialized journals, and in seminaries, research centers, and universities. Philosophy in Iran is often divided into Western and Islamic. Sometimes these are taken to be rivals. The methods of instruction differ to some extent, as well as the languages needed for advanced study. The question of the nature of Islamic philosophy is itself a controversial topic in Iran, and positions on this issue (...) are often driven by ideological trends. The study of philosophy in the Islamic seminaries has its own history. Today Islamic philosophy may be considered a philosophical tradition that is being carried on with increasing interaction with the study of Western philosophy in Iran. (shrink)

Much recent discussion of the epistemology of religious belief has focused on justification of belief in the existence of God. Religious belief, however, includes much more than belief in God. In this paper, it is argued that the justification of belief in God is best seen in the context of other interrelated religious beliefs and practices. Philosophers of religion argue about whether religious belief requires evidence and on the sorts of arguments that have been presented. In this paper, a dialectical (...) approach to the justification of religious belief is suggested that draws upon Hegel, Peirce, and W. E. Hocking. Rational reflection on the nature of experience that provides the solution to the problems of skepticism and solipsism in the Hegelian tradition, a tradition self-consciously developed by both Peirce and Hocking. If reason itself is only manifest in social exchanges, then the rationality of religious belief cannot be a private affair restricted to the subject of experience; rather it is the process of communicative interactions in accord with the overlapping norms of those who participate in them. Finally, some implications of this approach for the problem of religious diversity are sketched. * Professor of Philosophy, The Imam Khomeini Education and Research Institute, Qom, Iran. (shrink)

In Reason and the Heart, William Wainwright defends a kind of religious evidentialism, one that takes int consideration the promptings of the heart, provided the heart is a virtuous one; and he claims that this view is able to avoid relativism. Here, Wainwright’s evidentialism is examined in relation to other views that have gone by that name. Wainwright’s position is briefly stated together with an expression of doubt about its ability to fend off relativism. Following this, an outline of the (...) history of evidentialism is presented. It is concluded that Wainwright’s view is not really a form of evidentialism at all. Evidentialism may be weakened in two ways: (1) redefining “evidence” to include elements that are not recognized by objectifying inquiry; (2) allowing subjective factors, such as religious emotions, to govern the interpretation of the evidence. Wainwright describes his view as a form of evidentialism because it does not avail itself of (1); but it is only misleadingly called “evidentialism” because of (2). After making this case, several reasons are presented for rejecting evidentialism. It is argued that evidentialists focus attention of what the evidence is to determine whether beliefs are justified or rational, while how the evidence is treated is of no less importance when beliefs are supported by reasons. Furthermore, there are beliefs the justification of which is a practical matter of commitment to a more general framework rather than inference from some body of evidence. It is suggested that some religious beliefs may fall into this category. (shrink)

The problem of epistemic luck arises when a person has a true belief that is only true by luck. Before Gettier, it was believed that the element of justification would be sufficient for knowledge; but he showed that it is possible to have a justified true belief that is not an example of knowledge because of the intrusion of luck. Duncan Pritchard has examined epistemic luck in an extensive and detailed manner. He offers a modal account of luck based on (...) two elements: a possible-worlds analysis of counterfactual conditions and a significance condition for the factors that make the truth of the belief lucky. Pritchard argues for the superiority of this account to those that focus on whether the truth of the belief is “accidental” and on whether the believer has sufficient control over the belief. Epistemic luck may be “reflective” or “veritic”. Both undermine knowledge claims, although Pritchard gives the central role to veritic luck in his anti-luck epistemology, which is based on two elements: a safety principle and a condition to ensure that the cognitive faculties of the agent are not impaired. In this article, we will describe, analyze, and subsequently, evaluate the viewpoint of Pritchard. In addition to the critiques offered by others, ambiguities in his counterfactual account of luck and other components of his theory detract from his theory. (shrink)

نسبی‌انگاری اخلاقی یکی از مکاتب کهن فرااخلاقی است که به وجود ویژگی‌های اخلاقی، و صدق و توجیه احکام اخلاقی می‌پردازد. با این حال، بخشی از بحث‌های مربوط به نسبی‌انگاری متوجّه معناشناسی جملات نسبی است. نظریات نسبی‌انگارانۀ سنّتی زمینه‌گرا هستند، به این معنا که احکام اخلاقی را دارای عنصری می‌دانند که به نحوی ارجاع به گوینده دارد. این دیدگاه نسبی‌انگاری را با چالش‌هایی مواجه می‌کند، از جمله این‌که اختلاف نظر که یکی از اسباب عمدۀ گرایش به نسبی‌انگاری است، به سوء تفاهم (...) فروکاسته می‌شود. برخی نسبی‌انگاران اخیراً تلاش کرده‌اند تا نظریاتی ارائه دهند که با ثابت دانستن محتوای احکام، دچار مشکلات زمینه‌گرایی سنتی نباشد. یکی از این تلاش‌ها، نظریۀ نسبی‌انگاریِ دربارۀ خود (de se relativism) اندی ایگن است. ایگن با ترکیب نظریۀ دیوید لویس درباب محتوای باور، نظریۀ رابرت استالنیکر درباب اظهار، و نظریۀ استعدادی دیوید لویس درباب ارزش، بر آن است که نظریه‌ای نسبی‌انگارانه دربارۀ ارزش ارائه کند که با طبیعی‌انگاری، درونی‌انگاری احکام اخلاقی، و شناختی‌انگاری سازگار باشد، و از اشکالات دیگری که خودِ او بر زمینه‌گرایی وارد می‌کند مبرّا باشد. در این مقاله نظریۀ ایگن بررسی می‌شود و نشان داده می‌شود که نظریۀ او نه‌تنها از اشکالات وارد بر زمینه‌گرایی رها نیست، بلکه به دلیل پذیرش نظریۀ لویس در باب محتوای باور بار بیشتری بر دوش دارد که آن را نسبت به دیگر نظریات نسبی‌انگارانه مرجوح می‌سازد. -/- . (shrink)

Various criteria for the natural/non-natural distinction have been suggested in metaethics. Shafer-Landau first claimed that natural properties are properties that are used in scientific disciplines. But firstly, this definition is not comprehensive, and secondly it is ambiguous; according to the second criterion, two lists must be prepared; the first list includes terms that most people consider to be natural. The terms that are not included in the first list, are transferred to the list of non-natural terms. I argue, however, that (...) this criterion also does not help in distinguishing natural properties from non-natural ones. If we wish to maintain Shafer-Landau’s view, we can find a criterion for natural properties using normative ethics. For example, by accepting Kant’s principle of humanity as a non-natural reality, those descriptive properties that follow from this principle can be the foundational properties for moral properties. But by presenting a serious criticism on Shafer-Landau’s metaethics and accepting views that are invulnerable to this critique, a criterion for the distinction of natural/non-natural in meta-ethics can be found. One of these views is Fitzpatrick’s view, according to which many of the aspects of the world that are empirically investigable are also inherently value-laden. Therefore, the world of human experience is a dual-aspect world. One of these aspects is natural and the other is non-natural. (shrink)

Although Ibn Sina’s metaphysics is heavily indebted to Aristotle’s, with regard to the substantiality of the rational soul and God, Aristotle and Ibn Sina take opposite positions: Aristotle holds that theos is a substance, while Ibn Sina denies that God is a substance; Aristotle holds that the soul is not a substance, while Ibn Sina claims that it is. In both of these regards we observe the movement toward greater abstraction in Ibn Sina. The concept of God is more abstract (...) when considered outside the categories, and the soul is understood more abstractly, not merely as the form of an organism, but as independent of any materiality. God is freed from the constraints of substantiality while the soul is freed from the constraints of corporeality. Ibn Sina argues that since God transcends the categories, God is not a substance. Another argument is that everything that falls under the categories is contingent in its existence, God, however, is necessary in His existence. Hence, God is not a substance. Ibn Sina’s main argument, however, is that a condition for being a substance is, according to Arsitotle, not to be in a subject. This condition should be understood in such a manner that it does not imply the existence of what satisfies it. The existence of a necessary being, however, is implied by such a condition. Hence, God does not have the condition, and, thus, is not a substance. (shrink)

This volume aims to investigate the topic of Substance and Attribute. The way leading to this aim is a dialogue between Islamic and Western Philosophy. Our project is motivated by the observation that the historical roots of Islamic and of Western philosophy are very similar. Thus some of the articles in this volume are dedicated to the history of philosophy in Islamic thinking as well as in Western traditions. But the dialogue between both philosophies is not only an historical issue, (...) it also has systematic relevance for actual philosophical questions. The topic Substance and Attribute particularly has systematic relevance for the actual ontological debate. (shrink)

Biography and thoughts of Raden Mas Panji Sosrokartono on Javanese moral philosophy.

Sculpting the Self addresses “what it means to be human” in a secular, post-Enlightenment world by exploring notions of self and subjectivity in Islamic and non-Islamic philosophical and mystical thought. Alongside detailed analyses of three major Islamic thinkers (Mullā Ṣadrā, Shāh Walī Allāh, and Muhammad Iqbal), this study also situates their writings on selfhood within the wider constellation of related discussions in late modern and contemporary thought, engaging the seminal theoretical insights on the self by William James, Jean-Paul Sartre, (...) and Michel Foucault. This allows the book to develop its inquiry within a spectrum theory of selfhood, incorporating bio-physiological, socio-cultural, and ethico-spiritual modes of discourse and meaning-construction. Weaving together insights from several disciplines such as religious studies, philosophy, anthropology, critical theory, and neuroscience, and arguing against views that narrowly restrict the self to a set of cognitive functions and abilities, this study proposes a multidimensional account of the self that offers new options for addressing central issues in the contemporary world, including spirituality, human flourishing, and meaning in life. This is the first book-length treatment of selfhood in Islamic thought that draws on a wealth of primary source texts in Arabic, Persian, Urdu, Greek, and other languages. Muhammad U. Faruque’s interdisciplinary approach makes a significant contribution to the growing field of cross-cultural dialogue, as it opens up the way for engaging premodern and modern Islamic sources from a contemporary perspective by going beyond the exegesis of historical materials. He initiates a critical conversation between new insights into human nature as developed in neuroscience and modern philosophical literature and millennia-old Islamic perspectives on the self, consciousness, and human flourishing as developed in Islamic philosophical, mystical, and literary traditions. (shrink)

In the post-Trump era, the Black lived experience continues to come under assault. Emerging from the suffering imposed on Black bodies comes Black Existential Philosophy, an umbrella term encompassing the multiple depictions of Black life under White subjugation. Whether taking the form of first hand narratives of the lives of enslaved Blacks, the racialized theological discourse of the Nation of Islam, or the writings of W.E.B. Du Bois and Frantz Fanon, the works comprising Black Existentialism offer a look into both (...) the world of the racialized Black "Other" as well as the never-ending quest to recapture and reassert Black humanity. In Discovering Black Existentialism, E. Anthony Muhammad documents his personal and academic journey to Black Existentialism. In doing so, the book illuminates the power of curriculum as a shaping agent in the life of an educator and researcher. As a combination of autobiography, theory, and pedagogy, this work gives the reader an intimate view into the developmental arc of a Black Existentialist scholar. This book offers valuable insights to students searching for direction, to researchers attempting to find meaning in their work, and to educators striving to make their pedagogy relevant to the lives of their students. (shrink)

Scientists cannot devise theories, construct models, propose explanations, make predictions, or even carry out observations, without first classifying their subject matter. The goal of scientific taxonomy is to come up with classification schemes that conform to nature's own. Another way of putting this is that science aims to devise categories that correspond to 'natural kinds.' The interest in ascertaining the real kinds of things in nature is as old as philosophy itself, but it takes on a different guise when one (...) adopts a naturalist stance in philosophy, that is when one looks closely at scientific practice and takes it as a guide for identifying natural kinds and investigating their general features. This Element surveys existing philosophical accounts of natural kinds, defends a naturalist alternative, and applies it to case studies in a diverse set of sciences. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core. (shrink)

Saba Mahmood’s anthropological work studies the gain in skills, agency and capacity building by the women’s dawa movement in Egypt. These women increase their virtue toward the goal of piety by following dominant, often patriarchal norms. Mahmood argues that “teleological feminism” ignores this gain in agency because this kind of feminism only focuses on opposition or resistance to these norms. In this paper I defend Mahmood’s “anti-teleological” feminist work from criticisms that her project valorizes oppression and has no vision for (...) a nonoppressive feminist future. I argue the future envisioned by teleological feminists gets caught in “the Hegelian” trap of replicating past oppression in their feminist future. I find in Mahmood’s work the tools to escape this trap. I argue, rather than a movement of overcoming oppression, Mahmood’s work suggests an immanent and creative movement that emphasizes difference for a truly new future. I turn to a Bergsonian metaphor and argue that this movement can be seen as akin to the movement of biological evolution. I conclude using the work of Eve Sedgwick that the Egyptian women that Mahmood studies are being read in a “paranoid” fashion and demonstrate using Leila Ahmed a better “reparative” reading of these women. (shrink)

On the discourse of Islamic ethics and its relation to contemporary modern societies based on the thoughts of Tariq Ramadan, a prominent Muslim scholar.

GMOS and Political Stance: Global GMO Regulation, Certification, Labeling, and Consumer Preferences provides a foundational-to-current challenges resource for those involved in developing and applying regulations to these important resources. Beginning with basics of GMOs, the book first familiarizes the reader with the history, economic status, associated risks, global politics, and socio-economics of GMOs. From exploring the necessity of GMO regulations with the existing GMO technology as well as new gene editing technologies to discussion by GMO regulations experts from different continents (...) and countries, readers will find the information necessary to understand the laws, rules, regulations and policies at domestic and international scale. A last chapter delivers an update and future look on gene-edited food and feed and discusses the possibilities on the future risk assessment, legislation and regulation of gene-edited products. GMOS and Political Stance provides a unique and applicable synchronization of all regulatory information on GMOs to facilitate effective and efficient regulatory development and adherence." -- Amazon. (shrink)

I begin the first part by showing how situationism should make us question traditional understandings of virtues as intrinsic dispositions. I concentrate specifically on situationist experiments related to mood. I then introduce Islamic virtue ethics and the dawa movement. In parts two and three I examine ethnography of the dawa movement to explore how they deal with worries about the influence of mood on their virtue. In part two I show how they train their habits in very traditional virtue ethics (...) ways in order to be more resilient when faced with virtue-diminishing affective situations. In part three I show how the situation, rather than hindering practitioners, is recruited into helping these women achieve piety. I conclude, in part four, by showing the dawa movement's creative use of the Islamic veil as a way to help these women deal with the objection that one cannot avoid all bad situations. Going beyond social psychological experiments, I examine two methodological sources not found in situationist debates. First, I argue for ethnography as an empirical method through which to study virtue. I draw on ethnography of the Islamic women's dawa movement. Secondly, the work in the philosophy of mind on ‘affective scaffolding’. (shrink)

Muslim communities in the village facing the COVID-19 Pandemic attempts to find refuge from the plague and hope for survival. However, this led to more caution, which may lead to xenophobia. Via ethnography, this study unmasks the xenophobic attitude. This research discusses the root causes of panic in the community so that remedies can be implemented. The research attempts to explain, from a socio-anthropological viewpoint, how people and religious groups in the village perceive the pandemic of COVID-19 based on their (...) belief in their faith and in the science. The research takes place in Cigagak village, an area of approximately 7000 m2 on the outskirts of Bandung of West Java of Indonesia. This study examines the selected respondents from about 190 inhabitants who had close ties to managing places of worship and public places. This study utilises a collaborative self-ethnographic method and qualitative analysis. The influence of COVID-19 has moved to new exclusive and disintegrating practices from the inclusion-cohesive religious tradition. Therefore, this study tries to find out ways on how to reduce exclusive perception and religious practices to a minimum level and how to disappear xenophobia. Amid the COVID-19 Pandemic, inclusive awareness and actions were re-established, and even social cohesiveness was fostered. This study concludes that in its deep conviction nature, theology can change exclusive behaviour to be inclusive if it is based on the religious principles that are raised in response to human events. In this case, the Muslim community in a village can change the fear of COVID-19 pandemic to be a reducer of the panic based on the support of the religious doctrines.Contribution: This article used a collaborative self-ethnography with a religious socio-anthropological viewpoint. This study could help to solve social problems through theological convergence in Islamic milieu, especially that of the government’s formal Islamic organisation and organic Islamic leaders of the society. (shrink)

The most striking difference between Christian and Muslim theologies is that while, for Christians, God is a person, Muslims worship an impersonal deity. Despite the importance of this difference for a host of theological issues, it is a difference which has gone largely unnoticed by Christians and Muslims alike. Yet Christians everywhere will affirm that God is a person, while the average Muslim will readily deny this. Theism is often defined by philosophers of religion who work in the Christian tradition (...) in such a manner as to require the belief that God is a person. Thus The Encyclopedia of Philosophy has it that, ‘THEISM signifies belief in one God who is personal, worthy of adoration, and separate from the world but continuously active in it”. John H. Hick admits that, ‘ Theism …is strictly belief in a deity, but is generally used to mean belief in a personal deity”. Richard Swinburne states that a theist is one who believes that there is a God who is a ‘person without a body who is eternal, free, able to do anything, knows everything, is perfectly good, is the proper object of human worship and obedience, the creator and sustainer of the universe”, and J. L. Mackie, while arguing the case of atheism, endorses Swinburne's definition of theism. (shrink)

With the growing call for private sector actors to address global challenges, it is necessary to first assess whether regions with the greatest needs are accessing corporate philanthropy. In this paper, we ask whether corporate philanthropy is reaching those with the greatest health-care needs. Drawing on economic geography and corporate homophily, we argue that corporate philanthropy tends to exacerbate health inequality as grants are destined for counties with fewer health problems. We test and find support for this hypothesis using data (...) on health grants made by US corporate foundations and county-level health data. Our results that corporate health grants are less likely to go to counties which have a lower proportion of medical service providers and insured citizens suggest that corporate foundations are unwittingly complicit in worsening the resource gap between small, poor, rural counties and large, wealthy, urban counties. From an ethical perspective, we provide some guidance as to how this may be corrected. (shrink)

The notion of 'natural kinds' has been central to contemporary discussions of metaphysics and philosophy of science. Although explicitly articulated by nineteenth-century philosophers like Mill, Whewell and Venn, it has a much older history dating back to Plato and Aristotle. In recent years, essentialism has been the dominant account of natural kinds among philosophers, but the essentialist view has encountered resistance, especially among naturalist metaphysicians and philosophers of science. Informed by detailed examination of classification in the natural and social sciences, (...) this book argues against essentialism and for a naturalist account of natural kinds. By looking at case studies drawn from diverse scientific disciplines, from fluid mechanics to virology and polymer science to psychiatry, the author argues that natural kinds are nodes in causal networks. On the basis of this account, he maintains that there can be natural kinds in the social sciences as well as the natural sciences. (shrink)

On Islam related to democracy and politics in Indonesia.

On business ethics from Islamic perspective in Indonesia.

Practice and implementation of Islamic teachings for better quality of human resources in Indonesia; collected articles.