Angesichts der großen praktischen und theoretischen Bedeutung der Neurowissenschaften ist es nicht weiter verwunderlich, dass mit dem Aufstieg dieser Disziplinen bald auch schon die Frage nach der Notwendigkeit einer Neuroethik bzw. einer Angewandten Ethik der Neurowissenschaften gestellt wurde (Roskies 2002; Glannon 2007). Betrachtet man als Bedingung für die Notwendigkeit einer Angewandten Ethik, dass eine bestimmte wissenschaftliche Disziplin oder ein Handlungsfeld ethische Fragen aufwirft, die nicht ohne eine nähere Kenntnis der Disziplin bzw. des Handlungsfelds zu beantworten sind, dann dürfte die Notwendigkeit (...) einer Angewandten Ethik der Neurowissenschaften unstrittig sein. Spezifische ethische Probleme werfen die Neurowissenschaften aber auch deshalb auf, weil sie sich mit dem Organ beschäftigen, das konstitutiv ist für unsere Fähigkeit, ethische Normen zu verstehen und ihnen entsprechend zu handeln. (shrink)

According to a widespread view, neuroscientific basic research tells us more about the essence of the mind than psychology and may, in the long run, even replace those higher level approaches. Contrary to this view, it is demonstrated that many features can only be observed and explained on a certain level of complexity. This is particularly obvious in the case of neuromarketing and neuroeconomics. In both cases, neuroscientific methods depend on behavioral paradigms. Still, neuroscientific research in these fields may enhance (...) our understanding of the underlying neural mechanisms. In addition, neuroeconomics provide excellent conditions for the study of human decision making. (shrink)

Keine wissenschaftliche Debatte ist in den letzten Jahren mit soviel Vehemenz in der Öffentlichkeit ausgetragen worden, wie der Streit um die Willensfreiheit. Der traditionelle Begriff von "Willensfreiheit", der auch dem deutschen Strafrecht und seinem Schuldbegriff zugrundeliegt, setzt voraus, daß Menschen jenseits aller psychologischen und neurobiologischen Determinanten entscheiden und handeln können. Eine solche Konzeption von Willensfreiheit ist weder begrifflich-philosophisch noch empirisch akzeptabel. In diesem Buch entwickeln Gerhard Roth und Michael Pauen gemeinsam ein neues Konzept der Willensfreiheit. Grundlage ist ein (...) "aufgeklärter Naturalismus", der vorwissenschaftliche Phänomene, philosophische Begriffe und wissenschaftliche Methoden gleichermaßen ernst nimmt. Hieraus ergibt sich ein Verständnis von Freiheit, das die Fähigkeit zu selbstbestimmtem Handeln auf der Basis eigener Wünsche und Überzeugungen in den Mittelpunkt stellt. Roth und Pauen entgehen damit den Schwierigkeiten vieler traditioneller Konzeptionen, erfassen das Alltagsverständnis von Willensfreiheit und werden zugleich auch den Erkenntnissen der Neurobiologie gerecht. Ihr Konzept, so argumentieren die Autoren, macht zudem ein wesentlich differenzierteres Verständnis von Schuld und Verantwortung möglich, aus dem sich weitreichende Konsequenzen für das Strafrecht und den Strafvollzug ergeben. "Freie Handlungen dürfen weder unter Zwang noch unter vollständiger Determination vollzogen werden. Wir bezeichnen diese Forderung als Autonomieprinzip, aber Handlungen, die wir frei nennen, dürfen auch nicht zufällig sein.". (shrink)

Dissociation thought experiments like Zombie and Inverted Spectrum cases play an essential role in the qualia debate. Critics have long since argued that these cases raise serious epistemic issues, undermining first person access to phenomenal states also in normal subjects. Proponents have denied this because, due to their phenomenal experience, normal subjects have epistemic abilities that Zombies don’t have. Here I will present a modified version of these thought experiments: Part-time Zombies and Part-time Inverts switch between normal and abnormal states (...) every now and then. Thus they provide insight into their epistemic situation showing that the mere possibility of Zombies and Inverts has consequences which undermine essential epistemic features of phenomenal properties even in normals. This line of reasoning will be corroborated by theoretical considerations on the epistemic requirements of phenomenal states. All this provides support for the “functional mapping hypothesis.” According to this hypothesis, any significant phenomenal difference can be mapped to a specific functional difference which is accessible from the third person perspective as well. (shrink)

Abstract The rise of social neuroscience has brought the second-person perspective back into the focus of philosophy. Although this is not a new topic, it is certainly less well understood than the first-person and third-person perspectives, and it is even unclear whether it can be reduced to one of these perspectives. The present paper argues that no such reduction is possible because the second-person perspective provides a unique kind of access to certain facts, namely other persons' mental states, particularly, but (...) not only, in social contexts. The paper starts with the idea that perspectives are ways of epistemic access that determine an epistemic subject's recognition of a certain object. While the first-person perspective is subjective because it is based on, and directed at, the epistemic subject's experiences, the third-person perspective, which is based on objective evidence and gives access to all kinds of entities, is objective. The second-person perspective, by contrast, is intersubjective because it is a relation between an epistemic subject and another sentient being's mental states. It involves the epistemic subject's replication of those states, a basic self/other distinction and a basic awareness of the relevant situational differences between the epistemic subject and the other being. This is why the second-person perspective is a perspective on a perspective, which involves a basic awareness of perspectivalness, even if second-person perspective taking may be subpersonal to a large extent. (shrink)

According to qualia-epiphenomenalism, phenomenal properties are causally inefficacious, they are metaphysically distinct from, and nomologically connected with certain physical properties. The present paper argues that the claim of causal inefficacy undermines any effort to establish the alleged nomological connection. Epiphenomenalists concede that variations of phenomenal properties in the absence of any variation of physical/functional properties are logically possible, however they deny that these variations are nomologically possible. But if such variations have neither causal nor functional consequences, there is no way (...) to detect themanot only in scientific experiments, but also from the first-person perspective. Since neither third- nor first- person evidence can rule out the actual occurrence of such dissociations, the alleged nomological connection between phenomenal and physical properties cannot be established, in principle. As a consequence, the distinction between logical and nomological possibility breaks down and it cannot be ruled out that such dissociations occur in an unlimited number of cases. (shrink)

According to many philosophers, an 'explanatory gap' exists between third-person scientific theories and qualitative firstperson experience of mental states like pain feelings or colour experiences such that the former can't explain the latter. Here it is argued that the thought experiments that are invoked by this position are inconsistent, that the position requires a specific kind of first-person privilege which actually does not exist, and that the underlying argument is circular because it is based on the very 'intuition of distinctness'which (...) it allegedly confirms. The second part of the paper argues that the intuition of distinctness which has seen a significant change during the history of science is itself a product of scientific development. It would follow that future scientific developments can change this intuition and even make the explanatory gap problem disappear. (shrink)

Many philosophers agree that mental states are subject to privileged first-person access. Exactly what privileged, first-person access means is controversial, but it seems that, while our third-person access to mental states is only indirect because it depends on behavioral observation, first-person access seems to be direct because it depends on no such mediation.

According to a long-standing belief, introspection provides privileged access to the mind, while objective methods, which we denote as “extrospection”, suffer from basic epistemic deficits. Here we will argue that neither an introspective privilege exists nor does extrospection suffer from such deficits.We will focus on two entailments of an introspective privilege: first, such a privilege would require that introspective evidence prevails in cases of conflict with extrospective information. However, we will show that this is not the case: extrospective claims can (...) prevail in cases of conflict. These conflicts are resolved by an inference to the explanation that best accounts for the available evidence. This explanation may speak in favor of extrospection.Second, given an introspective privilege, the development of extrospective measurement techniques should be restricted by the accuracy of introspective reports. We will argue that this problem is part of a more general issue that comes up with the establishment of measurement in the natural sciences. We will identify three strategies that have proven successful in dealing with the problem in the natural sciences. It will turn out that all these strategies are available for extrospective measurement as well. Consequently, the insufficiencies of introspective reports do not impose a limit on the accuracy of extrospective measurement methods.We conclude that neither an introspective privilege nor basic extrospective deficits exist. This does not mean that extrospection will ever replace introspection. Rather, both approaches provide independent and indispensable forms of epistemic access to the mind. (shrink)

Auch der Philosoph Michael Pauen, Professor an der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin und Sprecher der Berlin School of Mind and Brain betont die menschliche Verantwortung für virtuelles Handeln. Sein Credo: Statt uns Angst vor Algorithmen einjagen zu lassen, sollten wir erkennen, dass hinter den Computern letztlich immer Menschen stehen. Wenn die Digitalisierung unsere Autonomie einschränkt, statt neue Freiheitsspielräume zu eröffnen, dann liegt dies also lediglich an unserem Umgang mit Computern. Pauen entlarvt allerdings auch die sozialen Dynamiken, die Autonomie (...) erschweren. (shrink)

Auch der Philosoph Michael Pauen, Professor an der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin und Sprecher der Berlin School of Mind and Brain betont die menschliche Verantwortung für virtuelles Handeln. Sein Credo: Statt uns Angst vor Algorithmen einjagen zu lassen, sollten wir erkennen, dass hinter den Computern letztlich immer Menschen stehen. Wenn die Digitalisierung unsere Autonomie einschränkt, statt neue Freiheitsspielräume zu eröffnen, dann liegt dies also lediglich an unserem Umgang mit Computern. Pauen entlarvt allerdings auch die sozialen Dynamiken, die Autonomie (...) erschweren. (shrink)

It is commonly believed that there is a fundamental incompatibility between multiple realization and type identity in the philosophy of mind. This claim can be challenged, however, since a single neural type may be realized by different microphysical types. In this case, the identity statement would connect the psychological and the neural type, while the neural type, in turn, could be multiply realized by different microphysical types. Such a multiple realization of higher level types occurs quite frequently even within physics (...) and it should be acceptable for physicalism in general. (shrink)

We discuss methodological problems and present our own empirical data on calculation tasks in toddlers. We propose to develop enriching theoretical models concerning quantity representations, based on empirical findings from developmental psychology. A revitalization of the debate is worthy, because it is reminiscent of the philosophical dispute on universal entities in scholasticism and Plato's theory of ideal numbers.