Perceptions are externally-directed—they present us with a mind-independent reality, and thus contribute to our abilities to think about this reality, and to know what is objectively the case. But perceptions are also internally-dependent—their phenomenologies depend on the neuro-computational properties of the subject. A good theory of perception must account for both these facts. But naive realism has been criticized for failing to accommodate internal-dependence. This paper evaluates and responds to this criticism. It first argues that a certain version of naive (...) realism, often called “selectionism”, does indeed struggle with internal-dependence. It then develops an alternate version of naive realism which does not. This alternate version, inspired by an idea of Martin’s, accommodates the internal-dependence of perceptions by recognizing the role that the subject’s neuro-computational properties play in shaping perceptual phenomenology. At the same time, it retains the distinctive naive realist account of the external-directedness of perceptions. (shrink)

The phenomenal particularity thesis says that if a mind-independent particular is consciously perceived in a given perception, that particular is among the constituents of the perception’s phenomenology. Martin, Campbell, Gomes and French and others defend this thesis. Against them are Mehta, Montague, Schellenberg and others, who have produced strong arguments that the phenomenal particularity thesis is false. Unfortunately, neither side has persuaded the other, and it seems that the debate between them is now at an impasse. This paper aims to (...) break through this impasse. It argues that we have reached the impasse because two distinct conceptions of phenomenology—a “narrow” conception and a “broad” conception—are compatible with our what-it-is-like characterizations of phenomenology. It also suggests that each of these two conceptions has its own theoretical value and use. Therefore, the paper recommends a pluralistic position, on which we acknowledge that there are two kinds of phenomenology: narrow phenomenology and broad phenomenology. The phenomenal particularity thesis is true only with respect to the latter. (shrink)

Unconscious perceptions have recently become a focal point in the debate for and against naive realism. In this paper I defend the naive realist side. More specifically, I use an idea of Martin’s to develop a new version of naive realism—neuro-computational naive realism. I argue that neuro-computational naive realism offers a uniform treatment of both conscious and unconscious perceptions. I also argue that it accommodates the possibility of phenomenally different conscious perceptions of the same items, and that it can answer (...) a further challenge to naive realism raised by Berger and Nanay. (shrink)

In the early 1980’s van Inwagen presented the Direct Argument for the incompatibility of determinism with moral responsibility. In the course of the ensuing debate, Fischer, McKenna and Loewenstein have replied, each in their own way, that versions of the Direct Argument do not pose even a prima facie threat to compatibilism. Their grounds were that versions of the Direct Argument all use the “Transfer NR” inference rule in a dialectically problematic way. I rebut these replies here. By so doing, (...) I hope to set the Direct Argument debate on a more fruitful path. (shrink)

The volume offers a lively and wide-ranging debate on the major questions of perceptual epistemology, including how perceptual experiences can bestow positive epistemic standing to empirical judgments and beliefs; the relative epistemic import of veridical and non-veridical perceptual experiences; the relation between experience and knowledge; and the nature of experience in view of its epistemic linkages to discursive contents. The volume is centered around five cutting-edge essays by leading authors in these areas—Anil Gupta, Andrea Kern, Christopher Peacocke, Susanna Schellenberg and (...) Crispin Wright—along with no less than thirty contributions scrutinizing and critically discussing the essays, prompting detailed rejoinders from the lead authors. The volume closes with an extensive debate between Annalisa Coliva, Gupta and Wright. Taken as a whole, the volume covers much ground in epistemology of perception and displays a variety of approaches and perspectives through fruitful and accessible exchanges. It will be of interest not only to researchers working in perceptual epistemology but also to students new to the subject. (shrink)

Leibniz's views about human freedom are much debated today. While traditionalists hold that Leibniz was a compatibilist about freedom, some commentators are now suggesting that Leibniz can be read as an incompatibilist. This exciting new reading is often based on Leibniz's "Necessary and Contingent Truths" (AVI, 4 B, 1514-1524; henceforth: NCT). This paper shall argue that NCT supports not only an understanding of Leibniz as a freedom incompatibilist, but more radically, as embracing a particularly intriguing kind of libertarianism. On this (...) Leibnizian brand of libertarianism, a human action may be both free and unavoidable (in the sense that the agent could not have acted otherwise). (shrink)

We notice a number of interesting overlaps between the views on personhood of Ifeanyi Menkiti and Marya Schechtman. Both philosophers distance their views from the individualistic ones standard in western thought and foreground the importance of extrinsic or relational features to personhood. For Menkiti, it is ‘the community which defines the person as person’; for Schechtman, being a person is to have a place in person-space, which involves being seen as a person by others. But there are also striking differences. (...) Schechtman sees this aspect as expanding the scope of personhood to infants and those who are severely mentally disabled. Menkiti thinks that there is a line to be drawn at some point between those humans that are persons and those who are not. We consider the cases offered in questioning how the dispute between the two views should be resolved. (shrink)

The discourse on climate politics so far is an expert and elitist discourse in which peoples, societies, citizens, workers, voters and their interests, views and voices are very much neglected. So, in order to turn climate change politics from its head onto its feet you have to take sociology into account. There is an important background assumption which shares in the general ignorance concerning environmental issues and, paradoxically, this is in corporated in the specialism of environmental sociology itself — this (...) is the category of ‘the environment’. If ‘the environment’ only includes everything which is not human, not social, then the concept is sociologically empty. If the concept includes human action and society, then it is scientifically mistaken and politically suicidal. (shrink)

Heinrich Beck ist Jahrgang 1929, als o. Professor Inhaber des Lehrstuhls Philosophie I an der Otto-Friedrich-Universität Bamberg bis 1997, Titular- und Honorarprofessor an sechs weiteren Universitäten in Europa und in Amerika, Dr. h.c. in Buenos Aires, Mitglied der Europäischen Akademie der Wissenschaften und Künste, Korrespondierendes Mitglied der Königlichen Spanischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Träger des deutschen Bundesverdienstkreuzes. Zentrum und Schlüssel seines philosophischen Denkens ist eine trinitarische Ontologie, die vor allem von Thomas von Aquin und Hegel inspiriert und zum christlichen Glauben (...) hin offen ist. Die von ihm in systematischen Analysen immer wieder aufgedeckte 3-gliedrige Bewegungsstruktur der Wirklichkeit unterscheidet und verbindet die einzelnen Bereiche des Seins. So gelangt er zu einer Seinsauffassung, die weder absoluten Monismus noch absoluten Pluralismus besagt, sondern vielmehr ein Mittleres zwischen beiden begründet, nämlich eine gestufte Ähnlichkeit (Analogie) in Wechselbeziehung und Auseinandersetzung (Dialog). Damit versucht er, zur Bewältigung von zentralen Problemen und Herausforderungen der aktuellen philosophischen Diskussion beizutragen. In diesen Zusammenhang fällt auch sein langjähriges, in weltweiter Zusammenarbeit betriebenes Forschungsprojekt: «Kreativer Friede durch Begegnung der Weltkulturen», das er durch die Erfahrung zahlreicher Forschungs- und Vortragsreisen konkretisiert hat; er gilt heute als einer der Begründer und Nestoren der interkulturellen Philosophie. Der vorliegende Band will durch die Auswahl von 30 Aufsätzen einen repräsentativen Überblick über seine akademische Lehr- und Forschungstätigkeit vermitteln. Dabei soll die Vielfalt seiner Arbeitsbereiche zum Ausdruck kommen. Sie sind hier nach drei thematischen Blöcken geordnet: 1. Erziehungsphilosophie und Anthropologie, 2. Erkenntnistheorie, Ontologie, Metaphysik und Religionsphilosophie und 3. Ethik, Geschichts- und Kulturphilosophie. (shrink)

Standing is a peculiar norm, allowing for deflecting that is rejecting offhand and without deliberation interventions such as directives. Directives are speech acts that aim to give directive-reasons, which are reason to do as the directive directs because of the directive. Standing norms, therefore, provide for deflecting directives regardless of validity or the normative weight of the rejected directive. The logic of the normativity of standing is, therefore, not the logic of invalidating directives or of competing with directive-reasons but of (...) ‘exclusionary permission’. That is, standing norms provide for permission to exclude from practical deliberation directive-reasons if given without the requisite standing, regardless of their normative weight. As such, standing is a type of second-order norm. Numerous everyday practices involve the deflection of directives, such as pervasive practices of deflecting hypocritical and officious directives. Of various possible models, the one that best captures the normative structure of these practices of deflection is the standing model. Accordingly, the normativity of standing is pervasive in our everyday practices. Establishing that standing, although a neglected philosophical idea, is a significant and independent normative concept. (shrink)

Philosophers have traditionally used thought-experiments in their endeavours to find a satisfactory account of the self and personal identity. Yet there are considerations from empirical psychology as well as related ones from philosophy itself that appear to completely undermine the method of thought-experiment. This paper focuses on both sets of considerations and attempts a defence of the method.

Representations seem to play a major role in many neuroscientific explanations. Philosophers have long attempted to properly define what it means for a neural state to be a representation of a specific content. Teleosemantic theories of content which characterize representations, in part, by appealing to a historical notion of function, are often regarded as our best path towards an account of neural representations. This paper points to the anti-representationalist consequences of these accounts. I argue that assuming such teleosemantic views will (...) deprive representations of their explanatory role in computational explanations. My argument rests on the claim that many explanations in cognitive neuroscience are entirely independent of any historical considerations. In making this claim, I will also offer an adapted version of the famous Swampperson thought experiment, which is better suited to discussions of subpersonal neural representations. (shrink)

This paper introduces the Cummins Functions Approach to neural representations, which aims to capture the notion of representation that is relevant to contemporary neuroscientific practice. CFA shares the common view that “to be a representation of X” amounts to “having the function of tracking X,” but maintains that the relevant notion of function is defined by Robert Cummins’s account. Thus, CFA offers a notion of neural representation that is dependent on explanatory context. I argue that CFA can account for the (...) normativity of neural representations, and defend its dependence on explanations. (shrink)

When economists perform experiments, they do so typically in one of two traditions: cognitive psychology experiments in the heuristics and biases tradition (H&B-experiments) and experimental economics in the tradition of Vernon Smith. What sets these two traditions apart? In this paper, I offer a novel conceptualization of their pervasive disagreements. Focusing on how each camp approaches preferences, one of the most fundamental concepts in economics, I argue that experimental economics can be reconstructed as holding that the constituents of preferences can (...) be partially located in agents’ environments, while H&B-experiments implicitly assume that the constituents of preferences are entirely located within agents’ bodies. The paper (i) outlines how my reconstruction can account for the disagreement between the two paradigms, (ii) defends the plausibility of this reconstruction, and (iii) highlights its implications for the debate about the nature of preferences in economics. (shrink)

What justifies practices of “standing”? Numerous everyday practices exhibit the normativity of standing: forbidding certain interventions and permitting ignoring them. The normativity of standing is grounded in facts about the person intervening and not on the validity of her intervention. When valid, directives are reasons to do as directed. When interventions take the form of directives, standing practices may permit excluding those directives from one’s practical deliberations, regardless of their validity or normative weight. Standing practices are, therefore, puzzling – forbidding (...) giving reasons and, if given, permitting disregarding such reasons. What justifies standing practices are the values that they protect, including privacy, autonomy, independence, valuable relationships, and equal respect. These values count in favor of standing’s duty against certain interventions and, when these duties of non-intervention are breached, the values underpinning those duties count in favor of standing’s permission to discount or exclude those interventions from one’s practical deliberations – the normative weight of those interventions notwithstanding. (shrink)

Volume 20, Issue 7, July 2020, Page 89-92.

We report a series of experiments examining whether people ascribe knowledge for true beliefs based on probabilistic evidence. Participants were less likely to ascribe knowledge for beliefs based on probabilistic evidence than for beliefs based on perceptual evidence or testimony providing causal information. Denial of knowledge for beliefs based on probabilistic evidence did not arise because participants viewed such beliefs as unjustified, nor because such beliefs leave open the possibility of error. These findings rule out traditional philosophical accounts for why (...) probabilistic evidence does not produce knowledge. The experiments instead suggest that people deny knowledge because they distrust drawing conclusions about an individual based on reasoning about the population to which it belongs, a tendency previously identified by “judgment and decision making” researchers. Consistent with this, participants were more willing to ascribe knowledge for beliefs based on probabilistic evidence that is specific to a particular case. 2016 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

Der vorliegende Beitrag nimmt seinen Ausgangspunkt in der Beobachtung zunehmender Verweise auf Menschenbilder oder ein spezielles Menschenbild in öffentlichen und fachwissenschaftlichen Debatten um wissenschaftlichen und technologischen Wandel (1). Zunächst wird ein knapper Überblick über die Bedeutung, Funktion und Herkunft von Menschenbildern gegeben (2), gefolgt von einer Übersicht über die Fragestellungen und Methodik der noch jungen Disziplin einer Ethik der Ernährung (3). Daran anschließend wird der Zusammenhang zwischen lebensweltlichen Menschenbildern und Ernährungsweisen am Beispiel der öffentlichen und wissenschaftlichen Diskurse um Fleischkonsum expliziert (...) (4). Ein knappes Fazit fasst die Ergebnisse zusammen (5). (shrink)

Theodor W. Adornos Jargon der Eigentlichkeit (1963) gehört zu den umstrittensten Texten der Kritischen Theorie. Während der Titel inner- und außerhalb der akademischen Debatte längst zu einem geflügelten Wort mutiert ist, steht diesem die Kenntnis des Inhalts diametral gegenüber. Zumeist wird die Schrift als eine Polemik gegen Martin Heidegger abgehandelt, die zu einer 'philosophischen Kommunikationsverweigerung' Hermann Mörchen) zwischen Frankfurt und Freiburg geführt habe. Plattitüden dieser Art verkennen jedoch den ideologiekritischen Charakter der Streitschrift. Adornos Kritik am neudeutschen Jargon richtet sich keineswegs (...) primär gegen Heidegger, sondern bezieht sich auf ein breites gesellschaftliches Phänomen. Sie hat ihren Ursprung bereits in den 1920er-Jahren in der Kritik Siegfried Kracauers an der Bibel-Übersetzung von Martin Buber und Franz Rosenzweig. Ziel des Sammelbandes ist es, den Jargon der Eigentlichkeit jenseits akademischer Departementalisierungen zu erschließen und auf die Aktualität von Adornos Kritik hinzuweisen. (shrink)

Speaking with conversational AIs, technologies whose interfaces enable human-like interaction based on natural language, has become a common phenomenon. During these interactions, people form their beliefs due to the say-so of conversational AIs. In this paper, I consider, and then reject, the concepts of testimony-based beliefs and instrument-based beliefs as suitable for analysis of beliefs acquired from these technologies. I argue that the concept of instrument-based beliefs acknowledges the non-human agency of the source of the belief. However, the analysis focuses (...) on perceiving signs and indicators rather than content expressed in natural language. At the same time, the concept of testimony-based beliefs does refer to natural language propositions, but there is an underlying assumption that the agency of the testifier is human. To fill the lacuna of analyzing belief acquisition from conversational AIs, I suggest a third concept: technology-based beliefs. It acknowledges the non-human agency-status of the originator of the belief. Concurrently, the focus of analysis is on the propositional content that forms the belief. Filling the lacuna enables analysis that considers epistemic, ethical, and social issues of conversational AIs without excluding propositional content or compromising accepted assumptions about the agency of technologies. (shrink)

There is an existing debate regarding the view that technological instruments, devices, or machines can assert ‎or testify. A standard view in epistemology is that only humans can testify. However, the notion of quasi-‎testimony acknowledges that technological devices can assert or testify under some conditions, without ‎denying that humans and machines are not the same. Indeed, there are four relevant differences between ‎humans and instruments. First, unlike humans, machine assertion is not imaginative or playful. Second, ‎machine assertion is prescripted and (...) context restricted. As such, computers currently cannot easily switch ‎contexts or make meaningful relevant assertions in contexts for which they were not programmed. Third, ‎while both humans and computers make errors, they do so in different ways. Computers are very sensitive to ‎small errors in input, which may cause them to make big errors in output. Moreover, automatic error control ‎is based on finding irregularities in data without trying to establish whether they make sense. Fourth, ‎testimony is produced by a human with moral worth, while quasi-testimony is not. Ultimately, the notion of ‎quasi-testimony can serve as a bridge between different philosophical fields that deal with instruments and ‎testimony as sources of knowledge, allowing them to converse and agree on a shared description of reality, ‎while maintaining their distinct conceptions and ontological commitments about knowledge, humans, and ‎nonhumans.‎. (shrink)

Eric Olson argues in The Human Animal that thought-experiments involving body-swapping do not in the end offer any support to psychological continuity theories, nor do they pose any threat to his Biological View. I argue that he is mistaken in at least the second claim.

This article introduces and discusses a short correspondence that took place in November 1931 between Gershom Scholem and Jacob Gordin. Gordin was a Russian-Jewish philosopher of religion, an expert on Hermann Cohen, and a founding figure of the postwar Paris School of Jewish Thought. The initial motivation for the correspondence was Scholem’s wish to produce a critical edition of the 17th century kabbalistic work, Shaar Hashamayim by Abraham Cohen Herrera, for which he asked for Gordin’s help. A close reading of (...) Gordin’s response to Scholem and Scholem’s belated response to Gordin highlight the respective views of these thinkers regarding the relationship between kabbalah and Western philosophy in the modern era, and in German idealism in particular. The article is followed by a translation of the correspondence. (shrink)

This article examines ancient depictions of the death of Troilus in art and literature and challenges the widespread belief that the Iliad implies an alternative version of the myth in which Troilus dies in battle. In particular, it argues that the death-in-battle interpretation is both insufficiently supported by the internal evidence and incompatible with the external evidence. Given the evident popularity of the story of Achilles’ ambush of Troilus in the Archaic period, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that (...) the poet of the Iliad knew the story of Troilus’ death by ambush. That the poem's only reference to Troilus does not contradict this story, and possibly even alludes to it, should persuade critics of the strong likelihood that the popular story of Troilus’ ambush at the fountain was also the one in the poet's mind. (shrink)

By working with underserved communities, anthropologists may play a larger role in democratizing society. The growth of disparities challenges anthropology to be used for social justice. This engaged stance moves the application of anthropological theory, methods, and practice toward action and activism. However, this engagement also moves anthropologists away from traditional roles of observation toward participatory roles that become increasingly involved with those communities or social groupings being studied. The chapters in this book suggest the roles anthropologists are able to (...) play to bring us closer to a public anthropology characterized as engagement. Sam Beck is Senior Lecturer in the College of Human Ecology and Director of the Urban Semester Program of Cornell University. His publications include Ethnicity and Nationalism in Southeastern Europe (1981, ed with John W. Cole) and Manny Almeida's Ringside Lounge: The Cape Verdean Struggle for their Neighborhood (1992). Carl A. Maida is Professor in the Institute of the Environment and Sustainability at the University of California, Los Angeles. His publications include Sustainability and Communities of Place (2007), Pathways through Crisis: Urban Risk and Public Culture (2008), Children and Disasters (1999), and The Crisis of Competence: Transitional Stress and the Displaced Worker (1990). (shrink)

This paper aims to advance two claims. First, it aims to show that Hume's argument against the rationality of induction is sound. However, I claim that the conclusion does not follow merely from the self-defeating attempts to justify the rule of induction, unlike traditional readings of the argument. Rather, the skeptical conclusion must also take into account Hume's argument that the secret powers that are present in bodies and give rise to sensible qualities are unknowable. The paper's second aim is (...) to show that Newtonian induction escapes Hume's secret powers argument, given that it includes a transductive inference, from observable phenomena to the powers present in the ultimate parts of matter. Consequently Hume's argument against the rationality of induction does not demonstrate the non-rational nature of Newtonian induction. (shrink)

Purpose: This paper aims at identifying how the Medieval Christian history provides insights, and suggests solutions in regard to present corruption-related social problems in in the modern world. The study is expected to show that the Church is a human organization that is dynamic rather than static, a community that does not have immunity over other forces operating on earth such as corruption. Methodology: Key data was acquired from literature materials dealing with the history of Christianity during the Middle Ages (...) or medieval period. The second group of literature materials provided information that has to do with the current social moral issues, with special focus on corruption. The study applies narrative method of literature review to fill the gaps on what corruption entails. Both qualitative and quantitative study designs were engaged. Findings: The desire for power and prestige, simony and investiture, feudalism, sale of indulgences, and nepotism are all identified with the medieval period church history. The Church must be given credit for the effort it put in eradicating those evils, and the modern Church’s challenge is to continue fighting for the same. The modern Church has been challenged to learn from the mistakes of the medieval Church and make sure that they are not repeated. Moral depravity, lack of proper education, poverty, land issues, and love of money have been highlighted as the key factors that contribute to the increase of corruption in Kenya and many other countries in Africa. Change of values, instilling of accountability systems, playing a mediating role, and establishing anti-corruption education are stated as the key methods that Christians should incorporate in their fight against corruption. Unique Contribution to theory, practice and policy: The Church of the medieval period portrayed a clear picture that the whole human society was subject to the will of God. In spite of the many pitfalls that accompanied Christianity, there still remained many faithful people who were true ambassadors of Christ. It must also be known that Christianity deserves unreserved credit for her forefront participation in the development of the modern societies. The church is recommended to take a forefront position in the fight against corruption. (shrink)

Metasemantics is the metaphysics of semantic endowment: it asks how expressions become endowed with their semantic significance. Assuming that semantics is of the usual truth-conditional sort, metasemantics asks after the determinants of expressions’ distinctive contributions to truth-conditions. There are two widely divergent general approaches to the metasemantic project. Some theories – “productivist” ones such as causal theories or intention-based theories – emphasize conditions of production or employment of the items semantically endowed. Other metasemantic theories – “interpretationist” ones – emphasize conditions (...) of interpretive consumption or reception of such items. The book aims to articulate a set of considerations that favour metasemantic productivism over metasemantic interpretationism, to reconcile a general productivist metasemantic approach with contemporary truth-conditional semantics, and to apply the approach to more specialized case studies in the philosophy of language broadly construed. Finally, a major concern in contemporary philosophy of language after Quine is semantic indeterminacy, the worry that there is no fact of the matter as to the semantic significance of our words. The book articulates a distinctly metasemantic strategy to counter the worry. It is shown how the present approach delivers a more successful response to semantic indeterminacy than extant alternatives, a response that emphasizes the priority of reference over truth, which is both intuitively compelling and theoretically motivated. (shrink)

Embryonale Stammzellen, Klonen, Präimplantationsdiagnostik, Gendiagnose, Euthanasie - das sind Stichworte einer Medizin im Umbruch, die mit ihrem Menschenbild und ihrer ethischen Fundierung in eine Sackgasse geraten ist. Wir stehen am Beginn einer Epoche, die dabei ist, den Menschen in seinen frühesten Stadien zum Material zu machen, zum Material für Medikamente für andere Menschen. Mit der Invitro-Fertilisation hat die Herstellung von menschlichem Leben ausserhalb des mütterlichen Organismus begonnen. Es ist frei verfügbar geworden. Wohin führt uns diese Entwicklung der modernen naturwissenschaftlichen Medizin? (...) Beck gibt Denkanstösse, wie die moderne Medizin über ihre Sicht auf die materielle (vielleicht noch psychosomatische) Verfasstheit des Menschen hinaus noch philosophisch-theologische Zugänge zum Menschen und existentiellen Fragen nach dem Dasein einbeziehen kann. (Quelle: www.buch.ch). (shrink)

Phenomenology is a challenging method for many students to understand and apply. Introduction to Phenomenology: Focus on Methodology breaks down the history, methodology, and application so students can more easily write proposals and conduct phenomenological research. Author Cheryl Tatano Beck draws on her depth of experience in applying and teaching phenomenological methods to distill the method into a single guidebook for students and new researchers alike. This introductory book provides a clearer picture of phenomenology as method and its applications (...) to social, behavioral, and health sciences, covering both interpretive and descriptive phenomenology from research design through analysis. (shrink)

This is a fluently written history of ancient Greece seen from the perspective of localism and the origins of the Greek City-State. Much like our own time, from the 8th century BCE until and even beyond its imperial end, the Greek world was constantly expanding and experiencing growing connectivity with the world at large. Conquest, exploration and exchange all grew Greece's global presence and helped develop an expanded world where a need to define and cherish the local would inevitably arise. (...) Beck draws on a breathtaking range of materials: texts, some of them rare, by both well-known and obscure writers; numismatics, visual culture, pottery analysis, landscape and traditional field archaeology. He brings all this together in developing fine-grained case studies about tensions between metropolis and local communities such as Miletus, Ithaca, and rural Attica in relation to Athens and other major centers. (shrink)

I desire mercy, not sacrifice." Echoing Hosea, Jesus defends his embrace of the "unclean" in the Gospel of Matthew, seeming to privilege the prophetic call to justice over the Levitical pursuit of purity. And yet, as missional faith communities are well aware, the tensions and conflicts between holiness and mercy are not so easily resolved. At every turn, it seems that the psychological pull of purity and holiness tempts the church into practices of social exclusion and a Gnostic "flight" from (...) the world into a "too spiritual" spirituality. In an unprecedented fusion of psychological science and theological scholarship, Richard Beck describes the pernicious (and largely unnoticed) effects of the psychology of purity upon the life and mission of the church. (shrink)

Are there moral rights to do moral wrong? A right to do wrong is a right that others not interfere with the right-holder’s wrongdoing. It is a right against enforcement of duty, that is a right that others not interfere with one’s violation of one’s own obligations. The strongest reason for moral rights to do moral wrong is grounded in the value of personal autonomy. Having a measure of protected choice (that is a right) to do wrong is a condition (...) for an autonomous life and for autonomous moral self-constitution. This view has its critics. Responding to these objections reveals that none refute the coherence of the concept of a ‘moral right to do moral wrong’. At most, some objections successfully challenge the weight and frequency of the personal autonomy reasons for such rights. Autonomy-based moral rights to do moral wrong are therefore conceptually possible as well as, at least on occasion, actual. (shrink)