One solution to the problem of moral knowledge is to claim that we can acquire it a posteriori through moral experience. But what is a moral experience? When we examine the most compelling putative cases, we find features which, I argue, are best explained by the hypothesis that moral experiences are emotions. To preempt an objection, I argue that putative cases of emotionless moral experience can be explained away. Finally, I allay the worry that emotions are an unsuitable basis for (...) moral knowledge. I conclude that those who believe in moral experience should hold that it consists of emotion. (shrink)

How is ethical knowledge possible? One of the most promising answers is the moral sense view: we can acquire ethical knowledge through emotional experience. But this view faces a serious problem. Emotions are unreliable guides to ethical truth, frequently failing to fit the ethical status of their objects. This threatens to render the habit of basing ethical beliefs on emotions too unreliable to yield knowledge. I offer a new solution to this problem, with practical implications for how we approach ethical (...) decision-making. I argue that an agent can have a reliable belief-forming habit despite having unreliable emotions, so long as she is suitably attentive to defeaters. In moderately virtuous agents, unfitting ethical emotions are frequently accompanied by warning signs, such as negative metaemotions, epistemic feelings, moods, and social cues. An agent who cultivates the attentional skill of noticing these signs can prevent many of her unfitting emotions from translating into false beliefs. For a moderately virtuous agent with this skill, the habit of basing ethical beliefs on emotions will be reliable. The upshot is that emotion-based ethical knowledge is possible even for people whose emotions are unreliable, but only if we cultivate the skill of spotting defeaters. (shrink)

In the “Second Analogy,” Kant argues that, unless mental contents involve the concept of causation, they cannot represent an objective temporal sequence. According to Kant, deploying the concept of causation renders a certain temporal ordering of representations necessary, thus enabling objective representational purport. One exegetical question that remains controversial is this: how, and in what sense, does deploying the concept of cause render a certain ordering of representations necessary? I argue that this necessitation is a matter of epistemic normativity: with (...) certain causal presuppositions in place, the individual is obliged to make a judgment with certain temporal contents, on pain of irrationality. To make this normatively obligatory judgment, the subject must place her perceptual representations in a certain order. This interpretation fits Kant's text, his argumentative aims, and his broader views about causal inference, better than rival interpretations can. This result has important consequences for the ongoing debate over the role of normativity in Kant's philosophy of mind. (shrink)

Kant holds that some nonhuman animals “are acquainted with” objects, despite lacking conceptual capacities. What does this tell us about his theory of human cognition? Numerous authors have argued that this is a significant point in favour of Nonconceptualism—the claim that, for Kant, sensible representations of objects do not depend on the understanding. Against this, I argue that Kant’s views about animal minds can readily be accommodated by a certain kind of Conceptualism. It remains viable to think that, for Kant, (...) humans’ sensible representations necessarily represent objects as temporally structured in ways that allow us to have thoughts about them, and such representations are produced, and could only be produced, by the understanding. This allows Conceptualists to maintain that humans’ sensible representations depend on the understanding, while accepting that animals have sensible representations of objects too. We must, therefore, reassess both the warrant for Nonconceptualism and the shape Conceptualist readings must take. (shrink)

Jonna Vance and Preston Werner argue that humans’ mechanisms of perceptual attention tend to be sensitive to morally relevant properties. They dub this tendency “Attentional Moral Perception” (AMP) and argue that it can play all the explanatory roles that some theorists have hoped moral perception can play. In this article, I argue that, although AMP can indeed play some important explanatory roles, there are certain crucial things that AMP cannot do. Firstly, many theorists appeal to moral perception to explain how (...) moral knowledge is possible. I argue that AMP cannot put an agent in a position to acquire moral knowledge unless it is supplemented with some other capacity for becoming aware of moral properties. Secondly, theorists appeal to moral perception to explain “moral conversions”, i.e., cases in which an experience leads an agent to form a moral belief that conflicts with her pre-existing moral beliefs. I argue that AMP cannot explain this either. Due to these shortcomings, theorists should turn to emotions for a powerful and psychologically realistic account of virtuous agents’ sensitivity to the moral landscape. (shrink)

In the Second Analogy, Kant argues that every event has a cause. It remains disputed what this conclusion amounts to. Does Kant argue only for the Weak Causal Principle that every event has some cause, or for the Strong Causal Principle that every event is produced according to a universal causal law? Existing interpretations have assumed that, by Kant’s lights, there is a substantive difference between the two. I argue that this is false. Kant holds that the concept of cause (...) contains the notion of lawful connection, so it is analytic that causes operate according to universal laws. He is explicit about this commitment, not least in his derivation of the Categorical Imperative in Groundwork III. Consequently, Kant’s move from causal rules to universal laws is much simpler than previously assumed. Given his commitments, establishing the Strong Causal Principle requires no more argument than establishing the Weak Causal Principle. (shrink)

Enth.: Dugoald Stewart's account of Adam Smith / ed. by I.S. Ross.

In this article, I examine both the problem of so-called postmodern history as it relates to the Holocaust and suggest the ways that Saul Friedlander's recent work successfully mediates between the somewhat overly polemicized positions of "relativist" and "positivist" history. In this context, I find that in his search for an adequately self-reflexive historical narrative for the Holocaust, Hayden White's proposed notion of "middle-voicedness" may recommend itself more as a process for eyewitness writers than as a style for historians after (...) the fact. From here, I look at the ways Saul Friedlander's reflections on the historian's voice not only mediate between White's notions of the ironic mode and middle-voicedness, but also suggest the basis for an uncanny history in its own right: an anti-redemptory narrative that works through, yet never actually bridges, the gap between a survivor's "deep memory" and historical narrative.For finally, it may be the very idea of "deep memory" and its incompatibility to narrative that constitutes one of the central challenges to Holocaust historiography. What can be done with what Friedlander has termed "deep memory" of the survivor, that which remains essentially unrepresentable? Is it possible to write a history that includes some oblique reference to such deep memory, but which leaves it essentially intact, untouched and thereby deep? In this section, I suggest, after Patrick Hutton, that "What is at issue here is not how history can recover memory, but, rather, what memory will bequeath to history." That is, what shall we do with the living memory of survivors? How will it enter the historical record? Or to paraphrase Hutton again, "How will the past be remembered as it passes from living memory to history?" Will it always be regarded as so overly laden with pathos as to make it unreliable as documentary evidence? Or is there a place for the understanding of the witness, as subjective and skewed as it may be, for our larger historical understanding of events?In partial answer to these questions, I attempt to extend Friedlander's insights toward a narrow kind of history-telling I call "received history"-a double-stranded narrative that tells a survivor-historian's story and my own relationship to it. Such a narrative would chart not just the life of the survivor-historian itself but also the measurable effect of the tellings-both his telling and mine-on my own life's story. Together, they would compose a received history of the Holocaust and its afterlife in the author's mind-my "vicarious past.". (shrink)

John Fleming , later professor in Aberdeen and Edinburgh, made his combative contribution to natural history between 1812 and 1832. As an Edinburgh student he had followed Robert Jameson's ‘Wernerian’ lead. His earliest publications, from 1813, expressed what was to be a lifelong hostility to the work of James Hutton. Yet his own thinking moved increasingly towards a ‘uniformitarian’ as opposed to a ‘catastrophist’ view of earth history. His Philosophy of Zoology embodied criticism of Cuvier. More dramatically, he (...) became embroiled in controversy with Buckland and later with Conybeare. By then the ‘uniformitarian’ hypothesis had been adopted by Lyell, with whom Fleming was in close touch from the mid-1820s. Fleming may have had some grounds for feeling that his priority in advocating uniformitarianism was later overlooked. His History of British Animals included a preface in which he elaborated his earlier hypothesis as to ‘revolutions … in the animal kingdom’ correlated with six geological epochs. Tension had then developed in Fleming's relationship with Jameson, and the early 1830s found him in a mood of increasing frustration. Reconciliation with Buckland and approval by Sedgwick still left ‘the Zoological Ishmael’ feeling that his advancement in the scientific world was blocked, perhaps permanently. In historical perspective Fleming may be seen as a minor but not insubstantial figure in the scientific landscape of the early nineteenth century. (shrink)

James Hutton defended the doctrine of phlogiston in two lengthy dissertations 1792 and 1794. Empirical, biographical and disciplinary contexts jointly explain his position. Observationally, Hutton based his argument on facts about heat, light and the storage of energy, explicitly contrasting them to concerns about weight relationships. Hutton's intellectual development shows how he found these particular problems centrally relevant, and focusing on phlogiston indicates how his better known geology fits into more fundamental thinking about the natural economy. (...) The resonance of Hutton's views with many contemporaries highlights the significance of his views, and suggests how we might reconsider the role of phlogiston in late-eighteenth-century chemistry. (shrink)

James Hutton knew before its publication that his geological theory would be subjected to religious criticism, and in an eventually rejected preface he endeavoured to mitigate that criticism. His theory is an almost perfect expression of the deistic tenets in which he believed. But he sensed that his attempted defence was inadequate, and so he submitted his preface to William Robertson for advice. Robertson rewrote Hutton's preface for him but also suggested tactfully that it not be published, (...) advice which Hutton took. Upon publication, his theory received its full measure of religious opposition, but it is unlikely that Hutton's preface would have forestalled any of it. I transcribe and attempt to date the preface, discuss its contents, and suggest its usefulness in Huttonian studies. (shrink)

James Hutton held shares in the company that built the Forth and Clyde canal, and was closely involved in its construction. For seven years he attended meetings on and off the site, helping to decide on the route, the supply of building stone and other problems. As far as we know it is the only occasion on which he used his geological knowledge in a public enterprise.

James Hutton is known to have regarded exploration as an important source of geological knowledge, and to have studied the accounts of travellers with close attention. Unpublished letters in the Fitzwilliam Museum, Cambridge, however, show that he was more actively involved in exploration than had been previously supposed. During the preparation for Cook's second voyage, he gave advice about both geological and marine research. He advised Banks against making a major voyage to Arctic regions, on the grounds that (...) it would be unprofitable geologically. He encouraged Banks and other friends to measure sea and air temperatures on their voyages, and there are indications that he himself took part in marine experiments. His interest in oceanography, which has not been discussed before, is found to complement his work in meteorology. (shrink)

By bringing together information in published and unpublished works of the eighteenth and early nineteenth century, notably Hutton's unpublished manuscript the ‘Elements of Agriculture’, it is possible to augment our meagre knowledge of Hutton's agricultural activities. His decision to farm is discussed, as are his time as a student of agriculture in East Anglia and on the Continent , his life as a farmer at Slighhouses in Berwickshire , his research after he returned to Edinburgh , and his (...) opinions on the role of government in agricultural affairs. The section on Slighhouses deals not only with Hutton's agricultural experiments and improvements, but also with his personal life, travel, and scientific studies. Investigation shows that his interest in agriculture gave impetus to his studies in other disciplines, and that his years as a farmer were ones of great intellectual activity which laid the foundation for many of his future achievements, particularly in geology. (shrink)

Hutton made a geological collection to illustrate his theory of the Earth, and frequently cited phenomena displayed by specimens in it to support his arguments. His followers also considered that the evidence provided by the collection would help to establish his views. After Hutton's death it was given to the Royal Society of Edinburgh which, however, under the terms of its charter, was obliged to lodge it in the Natural History Museum of the University. The Museum's curator, the (...) Wernerian, Robert Jameson, thought the collection of little account, and neither displayed it nor kept it together. By the mid-1830s most of it had been dispersed or thrown away, and nothing is known of it since. The list of specimens compiled by its first trustees has also disappeared. By piecing together information in Hutton's writings and letters, and in those of his friends, we learn something about the contents of the collection and how it was formed, and also add to our knowledge of his acquaintance. The final section of the article brings together all Hutton's descriptions of his rocks and minerals and, in doing so, demonstrates the weight of proof that he rested on careful visual analysis of hand specimens. (shrink)

(1994). The correspondence between James Hutton (1726–1797) and James Watt (1736–1819) with two letters from Hutton to George Clerk-Maxwell (1715–1784): Part I. Annals of Science: Vol. 51, No. 6, pp. 637-653.

There are eleven previously unpublished letters between James Hutton and James Watt in the Doldowlod collection, which Birmingham City Archives acquires from Lord Gibson-Watt in 1994. They were written between 1774 and 1795. Very little of Hutton's other correspondence survives, so these letters add significantly to our knowledge. The earliest letters together with two letters from Hutton to George Clerk-Maxwell , describe geological tours that Hutton made through Wales, the Midlands, and the south-west of (...) England in 1774. The correspondence after 1774 reveals Watt's expertise in geology, and also discusses meteorology, varnish making, Symington's steam engines, the first experiments with steam navigation, pneumatic medicine, and other topics. (shrink)