Takes up Kripke's theory of reference for proper names and natural kind words. Advocates investigation by means of ordinary language examples. Finds the problem for which Kripke's theory is offered as an answer seems to rest on an implausible picture of language.

"[Reading Ebersole] requires and often succeeds in producing a radical reorientation of one´s thinking . . . " from a book review Things We Know is a collection of fifteen essays that focus on perennial philosophical problems about knowledge. The essays let you participate in Frank Ebersole´s unique struggles to come to terms with such questions as: Can we know the world? . . . the past? . . . the future? . . . of God´s existence? (...) . . . whether our actions are free? . . . the foundations of logic and language? This is not just another philosophy book about problems of knowledge. In Things We Know, Ebersole, by carefully using examples, exposes the problems to be the products of philosophical pictures. The examples also make the pictures less compelling. Thus, by reading this philosophy book readers can join the author in working to free themselves from some perplexing philosophical concerns. How the Second Edition differs from the First Edition This edition differs from the First Edition (University of Oregon Books, 1967) in three ways. An essay is added. "Everyman´s Ontological Argument" has been inserted as Essay 14, following two other essays about the ontological argument. "Everyman´s Ontological Argument" was published in the Fall 1978 issue of Philosophical Investigations. (The original Chapter 14, "Where the Action Is," is now Chapter 15.) An essay is replaced. The original Essay 3, "How Philosophers See Stars," has been replaced by a modified version that was printed in Philosophy Today (no. 2, 1969). The replacement includes some further improvements. The text is improved. Throughout the book, the author has made corrections, stylistic improvements, and changed the wording as needed to make clearer his line of thought. Summary Each of the fifteen essays takes up a philosophical problem. In most of the essays, Ebersole first clarifies the problem and reviews common attempts to resolve the problem. Then he focuses on the central ideas and terms used to state the problem and creates examples of people using the terms under consideration. The examples are unique because of their focus on the context and point of what we say. If his investigations fail to find a use of the terms that supports the philosophical problem, he is led to conclude that the problem does not really derive from a philosophical insight but rather arises from a philosophical picture or model. Preface The essays in Things We Know address some of the perennial philosophical problems of knowledge. The essays are unified by being similar in method and philosophic aim. Ebersole exposes a picture behind each problem. In the essays he works through some of the ways that pictures control our thinking and tries to make the pictures less compelling. Chapters 1 6: Perception and Language Chapter 1: "Seeing Red in Red Things" Philosophical problem: Must words for simple visual properties (e.g., "red") refer to things because the things share some property (e.g., redness)? Can we see this property? Topics investigated: Family resemblances, properties of colors, when we regard things as the same, when we regard colors as the same, when we regard things as having common properties, language-world philosophical pictures. Philosophers discussed: A. J. Ayer, J. Herder, J. S. Mill. Chapter 2: "Seeing Things" Philosophical problem: Do hallucinations and afterimage. (shrink)

Interessanter Artikel. Ebersole fordert ein extensionales Kriterium für die Unterscheidung, erklärt die Suche aber für aussichtslos. Er betont, dass nur Aussagen analytisch sind, nicht Sätze. Er betont, dass empirische Allsätze weder prinzipiell analytisch noch synthetisch sind, ihr Wahrheitswert ist unbestimmt. Erst, wenn wir alle Gegenstände kennen, die unter den allquantifizierten Begriff fallen, können wir dies sagen. (Hier habe ich Probleme, da ich Allquantifikation über undefinierten Begriffen unzulässig finde.).

[Frank Ebersole is a philosopher] "whose contribution to philosophy... is the greatest of anyone this [the 20th] century, especially in the areas of philosophy of language, theory of knowledge, and perception." from Wittgenstein, Empiricism, and Language by John W. Cook (Oxford University Press, 1999). Language and Perception has nine chapters: seven that address philosophical problems about language and two (chapters 2 and 9) that are more metaphilosophical The metaphilosophical chapters discuss philosophical pictures and some of Frank (...) class='Hi'>Ebersole's basic ideas about philosophy. The other seven essays let you participate in his unique struggles to come to terms with such questions as: What is the meaning of a word? Isn't Wittgenstein's idea that things called by the same name have family resemblances significantly flawed? Does language determine what we perceive? Does a thing's being red cause it to look red (the causal theory of perception)? Must the action of speaking be analyzed into simpler actions such as making sounds? Can a bodily movement be part of an action? Is fatalism implied by "what one might say" about the future? Are "natural-kind" words like proper names? are they rigid designators? This and its companion volume, Meaning and Saying, are not just other philosophy books about the philosophy of language. In both books Ebersole, by carefully using examples, convincingly shows that the problems are the products of philosophical pictures. The examples also make the pictures less compelling. How the Second Edition Differs from the First Edition This edition differs from the first edition (University Press of America, 1979) in several ways. Pictures: Material that was formerly part of a postscript to chapter 1 has been revised and is now its own chapter, chapter 2, "Pictures and Wittgenstein on Pictures." As a result the following chapters were renumbered. Essay removed: Chapter 7 in the first edition, "Truth and Fate: Future Actions," has been removed. Essay added: A new essay, entitled "Proper Names and Other Names," has been added to the volume. It's a revised version of an essay originally published in Philosophical Investigations, Oct., 1982, with the title "Stalking the Rigid Designator." Postscript: Material that was formerly part of the preface is now revised and placed as chapter 9 at the end, entitled "Postscript." Improved text: Throughout the book, Ebersole has made corrections, stylistic improvements, and changed the wording to remove ambiguities. Preface The book is concerned with questions about the "relations of language to reality": Does physical reality predetermine the form of our language? Does it determine the kinds of words in our simple, basic vocabulary? Does our language in basic ways determine the way we perceive reality? Does our language embody the outlines of a certain theory of perception? And does it incorporate a certain view of human actions and of the future? These questions are expressions of the problems in the philosophy of language that people inevitably get themselves into while dealing with other philosophical problems. And these are problems in the philosophy of language that have direct consequences for the way one deals with problems in other branches of philosophy. At. (shrink)

I want to consider some difficulties which I have on rereading the passages on “common properties” or “common features” and “family resemblances” in The Blue Book and in Philosophical Investigations. These passages are not as easy to read as they once were. Wittgenstein tells us that we think, or have a tendency to think, that all the things to which we apply a general word have some property or feature in common, and he tells us that we believe it is (...) because of this common property or feature that we apply the same word to them. In The Blue Book the phrase is “common property”; in Philosophical Investigations it is “common feature.” Wittgenstein may have changed from the word “property” to the word “feature” because the word “property” is obviously too limited in its application. We speak of the properties of mercury or neoprene but not of the properties of barnowls or slatterns. The word “feature” also seems too limited in a way, but he may have chosen this word mainly because it fits his metaphor of family resemblances. I do not think that Wittgenstein wants to impose any special restriction at this point, so I shall use the word “feature” only where it is appropriate, and I shall use the less limiting word “characteristic” where it seems more appropriate than the word “feature.” Thus I assume that Wittgenstein means to examine our tendency to think that a general word is applied to things because those things have some features or features, characteristic or characteristics in common. (shrink)

Examines why parapsychology has been held in disdain by scientists, philosophers, and theologians, explores the evidence for ESP, psychokinesis, and life after death, and suggests that these phenomena provide support for a meaningful postmodern spirituality.

Recently Steven E. Boër gave another turn to the discussion of the free will defence by claiming that the free will defence is irrelevant to the justification of moral evil. Conceding that free will may be of real value, Boër claims that free will could have been allowed creatures without that leading to any moral evil at all. What I shall hereafter refer to as the ‘Boër reform’ is the suggestion that God could have allowed creatures to exercise free choices (...) but have intervened with ‘coincidence miracles’ to prevent all the intended evil from actually occurring. What is important to the free will defence, according to Boër, is the ability to choose freely and not the ability to succeed in effecting what we have intended to accomplish. It is no intrusion on the freedom of our wills for God to prevent us from accomplishing what we tried to do with our free wills as long as we were free to try. (shrink)

I submit as a good rule of thumb that if a discussion of any major philosophical position or proposition ends with the conclusion that that position or proposition is ‘absurd’ or ‘meaningless’ then a mistake has been made in the discussion. The mistake often turns out to be the accuser's failure to appreciate precisely what the position being attacked really is.

Resurrection has been used as the conceptual basis for attempted solutions to two problems that occur in the context of western theism, the problem of cognitive meaning and the problem of theodicy. Because John Hick has proposed resurrection as a solution to both problems so extensively, and because Antony Flew and Terence Penelhum have examined those solutions so strenuously, I will use their writings to lay out the problem. My aim is to improve upon Hick by overcoming a weakness in (...) his defence of resurrection. My narrower focus will be on resurrection and the ‘replica objection’, rather than the wider use of resurrection to solve problems of evil or the meaningfulness of theistic discourse, but some brief remarks on the wider problems will be necessary to set the stage. (shrink)

It has been known for some time that there is a primitive recursive permutation of the nonnegative integers whose inverse is recursive but not primitive recursive. For example one has this result apparently for the first time in Kuznecov [1] and implicitly in Kent [2] or J. Robinson [3], who shows that every singularly recursive function ƒ is representable aswhere A, B, C are primitive recursive and B is a permutation.

Deep ecology is examined from the perspective of scientific ecology. Two norms, self-realization and biocentric equality, are considered central to deep ecology, and are explored in brief. Concepts of scientific ecology that seem to form a bridge to these norms are ecological hierarchical organization, the exchange of energy, material and information, and the development of species within ecosystems and the biosphere. While semantic problems exist, conceptually it appears that deep ecology norms can be interpreted through scientific ecology.

Deep ecology is examined from the perspective of scientific ecology. Two norms, self-realization and biocentric equality, are considered central to deep ecology, and are explored in brief. Concepts of scientific ecology that seem to form a bridge to these norms are ecological hierarchical organization, the exchange of energy, material and information, and the development of species within ecosystems and the biosphere. While semantic problems exist, conceptually it appears that deep ecology norms can be interpreted through scientific ecology.

This unusually accessible account of recent Anglo-American philosophy focuses on how that philosophy has challenged deeply held notions of subjectivity, mind, and language. The book is designed on a broad canvas in which recent arguments are placed in a historical context. The author then explores such topics as mental content, moral realism, realism and antirealism, and the character of subjectivity. Much of the book is devoted to an investigation of Donald Davidson's philosophy, and there is also a sustained critique of (...) the position of Richard Rorty. A final chapter defends the realist position against objections from postmodern thought. As a rigorous and historically sensitive account of recent philosophy, this book should enjoy a wide readership among philosophers of many different persuasions, literary theorists, and social scientists who have been influenced by postmodern thought. (shrink)

This unusually accessible account of recent Anglo-American philosophy focuses on how that philosophy has challenged deeply held notions of subjectivity, mind, and language. The book is designed on a broad canvas in which recent arguments are placed in a historical context (in particular they are related to medieval philosophy and German idealism). The author then explores such topics as mental content, moral realism, realism and antirealism, and the character of subjectivity. Much of the book is devoted to an investigation of (...) Donald Davidson's philosophy, and there is also a sustained critique of the position of Richard Rorty. A final chapter defends the realist position against objections from postmodern thought. As a rigorous and historically sensitive account of recent philosophy, this book should enjoy a wide readership among philosophers of many different persuasions, literary theorists, and social scientists who have been influenced by postmodern thought. (shrink)

“We raised the power of reason, the power of manipulating words, above all other faculties. The written word became our god. We forgot that before words there were actions … that there have always been things beyond words. We forgot that spoken words preceded the written one. We forgot that written form of our letters came from ideographic pictures … that standing behind every letter is an image like an ancient ghost. The image stands for natural movements of the body (...) and other living things.” Frank Herbert. (shrink)