Many people appear to attach great value to sad music. But why? One way to gain insight into this question is to turn away from music and look instead at why people value sad conversations. In the case of conversations, the answer seems to be that expressing sadness creates a sense of genuine connection. We propose that sad music can also have this type of value. Listening to a sad song can give one a sense of genuine connection. We then (...) explore the nature of this value in two experimental studies. The results suggest a striking relationship between music and conversation. People see something distinctively musical in works that express precisely those emotions that they think most create connection within conversation. (shrink)

The paper attempts to bridge a gap between two prevalent conceptions of forgiveness that are widely thought to be in opposition. On one side of things, forgiveness is often characterized as a gift. The image is an ever-present one, enduring in popular culture no less than in the sober prose of analytic philosophy. But we also talk of forgiveness as a moral imperative, an important, even vital aspect of our moral life. I argue that, contrary to what may at first (...) appear, the two sides are not in tension, and each gets at something important about the nature of forgiveness. Forgiveness is indeed a gift but, much like actual gifts, it is one we are sometimes required to give. (shrink)

Moral obligation, according to one influential conception, is distinct among other moral concepts in at least two respects. First, obligation is linked with demands. If I am obligated to you to do X, then you can demand that I do X. Second, obligation is linked with blame and the rest of our accountability practices. If I am obligated to you to do X, failure to do so is blameworthy and you may hold me accountable for it. The puzzle is the (...) following: when it comes to our attitudes, in particular to our emotional responses, these two components seem to come apart. We do not appear to demand that others feel a given emotion. And yet, we do blame others (and ourselves) for feeling them. The challenge I take on in this paper is to sort out the moral status of emotions given these facts. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to reject what I call the entitlement model of directed obligation: the view that we can conclude from X is obligated to Y that therefore Y has an entitlement against X. I argue that rejecting the model clears up many otherwise puzzling aspects of ordinary moral interaction. The main goal is not to offer a new theory of obligation and entitlement. It is rather to show that, contrary to what most philosophers have assumed, directed (...) obligation and entitlement are not the same normative concept seen from two different perspectives. They are two very different concepts, and much is gained by keeping them distinct. (shrink)

Contemporary accounts of luck, though differing in pretty much everything, all agree that the concept of luck is descriptive as opposed to normative. This widespread agreement forms part of the framework in which debates in ethics and epistemology, where the concept of luck plays a central role, are carried out. The hypothesis put forward in the present paper is that luck attributions are sensitive to normative considerations. I report five experiments suggesting that luck attributions are influenced by the normative features (...) of the case, and not merely by descriptive notions like agential control or modal fragility. I discuss the implications of this effect for theories of luck and debates in ethics and epistemology. (shrink)

Most models of lexical access assume that bilingual speakers activate their two languages even when they are in a context in which only one language is used. A critical piece of evidence used to support this notion is the observation that a given word automatically activates its translation equivalent in the other language. Here, we argue that these findings are compatible with a different account, in which bilinguals “carry over” the structure of their native language to the non-native language during (...) learning, and where there is no activation of translation equivalents. To demonstrate this, we describe a model in which language learning involves mapping native language phonological relationships to the non-native language, and we show how it can explain the results attributed to automatic activation of translation equivalents. (shrink)

Responding to recent concerns about the reliability of the published literature in psychology and other disciplines, we formed the X-Phi Replicability Project to estimate the reproducibility of experimental philosophy. Drawing on a representative sample of 40 x-phi studies published between 2003 and 2015, we enlisted 20 research teams across 8 countries to conduct a high-quality replication of each study in order to compare the results to the original published findings. We found that x-phi studies – as represented in our sample (...) – successfully replicated about 70% of the time. We discuss possible reasons for this relatively high replication rate in the field of experimental philosophy and offer suggestions for best research practices going forward. (shrink)

Appendix 1 was incomplete in the initial online publication. The original article has been corrected.

In a recent article, Mario Attie-Picker maintains that a number of experimental studies provide evidence against Sextus Empiricus’s empirical claims about both the connection between belief and anxiety and the connection between suspension of judgement and undisturbedness. In this article, I argue that Sextus escapes unharmed from the challenge raised by the studies in question for the simple reason that he does not make the claims ascribed to him. In other words, I argue that Attie-Picker (...) is attacking a straw man. (shrink)

This book shows the surprising dynamism of the field of civil procedure through its examination of a cross section of recent developments within civil procedure from around the world. It explores the field through specific approaches to its study, within specific legal systems, and within discrete sub-fields of civil procedure. The book reflects the latest research and conveys the dynamism and innovations of modern civil procedure - by field, method and system. The book's introductory chapters lay the groundwork for researchers (...) to appreciate the flux and change within the field. The concluding chapters bring the many different identified innovations and developments together to show the field's ability to adapt to modern circumstances, while retaining its coherence even across different legal systems, traditions, fields and analytic approaches. Specifically, in this book the presence of dynamism is explored in the legal systems of the EU, France, the US, Brazil, Australia, the UK and China. So too that dynamism is explored in the contributions' analyses and discussions of the changes or need for change of specific aspects of civil procedure including litigation costs, class actions, derivative actions, pleadings, and res judicata. Furthermore, most of the individual contributions may be considered to be comparative analyses of their respective subjects and, when considered as a whole, the book presents the dynamism of civil procedure in comparative perspective. Those discrete and aggregated comparative analyses permit us to better understand the dynamism in civil procedure - for change in the abstract can be less visible and its significance and impact less evident. While similar conclusions may have been drawn through examinations in isolation, employing comparative analytic methods provided a richer analysis and any identified need for change is correspondingly advanced through comparative analysis. Furthermore, if that analysis leads to a conclusion that change is necessary then comparative law may provide pertinent examples for such change - as well as methodologies for successfully transplanting any such changes. In other words, as this book so well reflects, comparative law may itself usefully contribute to dynamism in civil procedure. This has long been a raison d'être of comparative law and, as clear from this book's contributions, in this particular time and field of study we find that it is very likely to achieve its lofty promise. (shrink)

Should decision-making algorithms be held to higher standards of transparency than human beings? The way we answer this question directly impacts what we demand from explainable algorithms, how we govern them via regulatory proposals, and how explainable algorithms may help resolve the social problems associated with decision making supported by artificial intelligence. Some argue that algorithms and humans should be held to the same standards of transparency and that a double standard of transparency is hardly justified. We give two arguments (...) to the contrary and specify two kinds of situations for which higher standards of transparency are required from algorithmic decisions as compared to humans. Our arguments have direct implications on the demands from explainable algorithms in decision-making contexts such as automated transportation. (shrink)

It is generally argued that if the wave-function in the de Broglie–Bohm theory is a physical field, it must be a field in configuration space. Nevertheless, it is possible to interpret the wave-function as a multi-field in three-dimensional space. This approach hasn’t received the attention yet it really deserves. The aim of this paper is threefold: first, we show that the wave-function is naturally and straightforwardly construed as a multi-field; second, we show why this interpretation is superior to other interpretations (...) discussed in the literature; third, we clarify common misconceptions. (shrink)

Most social scientists and philosophers claim that sociology and philosophy are disjoint fields of inquiry. Some have wondered how to trace the precise boundary between them. Mario Bunge argues that the two fields are so entangled with one another that no demarcation is possible or, indeed, desirable. In fact, sociological research has demonstrably philosophical pre-suppositions. In turn, some findings of sociology are bound to correct or enrich the philosophical theories that deal with the world, our knowledge of it, or (...) the ways of acting upon it. While Bunge's thesis would hardly have shocked Mill, Marx, Durkheim, or Weber, it is alien to the current sociological mainstream and dominant philosophical schools. Bunge demonstrates that philosophical problematics arise in social science research. A fertile philosophy of social science unearths critical presuppositions, analyzes key concepts, refines effective research strategies, crafts coherent and realistic syntheses, and identifies important new problems. Bunge examines Marx's and Durkheim's thesis that social facts are as objective as physical facts; the so-called Thomas theorem that refutes the behaviorist thesis that social agents react to social stimuli rather than to the way we perceive them; and Merton's thesis on the ethos of basic science which shows that science and morality are intertwined. He considers selected philosophical problems raised by contemporary social studies and argues forcefully against tolerance of shabby work in academic social science and philosophy alike. (shrink)

I WOULD LIKE TO respond to the four commentaries in turn. In each case I have started by setting out what I think the commentaries are claiming; in doing so, I may reveal that I have misunderstood or misconstrued, and I apologize where this is the case. My responses in many cases are provisional: the commentaries have given me much to think about. Also, my responses are selective—there are many points not touched upon here that deserve consideration. Finally, the order (...) of my responses is arbitrary. (shrink)

Slightly revised version of the author's habilitation--Universitèat Gèottingen, 2014.

This feature in Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology (PPP) is intended to provide ongoing commentary on main articles previously published in PPP. The essay by Pickering below is a response to Bengt Brülde’s paper in PPP (14, no. 2:93–102).

This is a book about how politics, government - and much else - needs to change in response to the transition from the Holocene to the Anthropocene, the emerging epoch of human-induced instability in the Earth system and its life-support capacities.

This paper aims to show how medical scientists may use metaphor in ways closely parallel to poets. Those who believe metaphor has any role at all in science may describe its use in various ways. Associationists think metaphors are based upon likenesses, and collapse the notions of model and metaphor together. But, as an example from the work of Louis Pasteur suggests, metaphor need not be based upon likenesses. Rather it may play a role in making possible a model'sexplanatory significance. (...) Models may presuppose metaphors. The Pasteur example also suggests metaphor may play a part in creating likenesses through its role in classification and reclassification. It is in these ways that the use of metaphor in medical science most closely parallels that in poetry. (shrink)

A fundamental issue in the philosophy of psychiatry is that of the reality of mental illness: is there any such thing as mental illness? The dominant means of resolving this issue—either for or against—is the likeness argument. This states that mental illness exists, or does not, depending on the extent to which putative mental illnesses (such as alcoholism or schizophrenia) are like universally accepted illnesses (such as pneumonia). To succeed, this argument has to assume (1) that the features of conditions (...) such as schizophrenia will decide whether they are illnesses or not and (2) that the existence of these features can be determined independently of the question whether they are illnesses or not. Both assumptions can be questioned. A weaker objection to the likeness argument questions the first, but it is possible to overcome it. A stronger objection questions the second assumption, and is successful in undermining it. This also undermines the first assumption. As a result, the likeness argument will fail. Two major objections to the stronger objection are considered and accommodated. (shrink)

English summary: What is Religious Experience? For more than a hundred years the term "religious experience" has been part of the vocabulary of philosophy of religion. However, there is no common understanding of the meaning of religious experience. Mario Fischer analyzes Heidegger's early phenomenology of religious life and its background in contemporaneous theological and philosophical developments. The young Martin Heidegger developed his first autonomous phenomenological approaches by considering how the Christian experience of life is expressed in the letters of (...) the apostle Paul and in Augustine's onfessions These studies led to his later analysis of aseinin eing and Time In conclusion, Fischer examines the significance of Heidegger's understanding of religious experience for current discussions in the philosophy of religion. German description: Was ist religiose Erfahrung? Auch wenn seit etwas mehr als einem Jahrhundert der Begriff der religiosen Erfahrung aus der Religionsphilosophie nicht mehr wegzudenken ist, besteht kein einheitliches Verstandnis dessen, was unter religioser Erfahrung zu verstehen ist. Mario Fischer untersucht Heideggers fruhe Phanomenologie des religiosen Lebens vor dem Hintergrund der zeitgeschichtlichen theologischen und philosophischen Entwicklungen. Der junge Freiburger Privatdozent Martin Heidegger wollte nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg die Philosophie neu grundlegen und entwickelte seine ersten Ansatze einer eigenstandigen Phanomenologie. Dabei spielte die Auseinandersetzung mit Fragen nach der Bedeutung und Erfassung religioser Erfahrung eine wesentliche Rolle. Zunachst befasste sich Heidegger mit der Struktur religioser Erlebnisse, weitete seinen Blick dann aber auf die Struktur der Lebenserfahrung und ihre religiose Dimension. Dazu untersuchte er, wie sich diese konkret in den Briefen des Apostels Paulus und in den Confessiones Augustins ausdruckt. Spater fuhrten diese Studien zu seiner Daseinsanalyse in Sein und Zeit und stellten die Grundlage seines spateren Gesprachs mit Bultmann dar. Die Darstellung orientiert sich an Heideggers Biographie bis zu seinem Weggang aus Freiburg im Jahre 1923. Bewusst setzt sie nicht erst mit dem Beginn seiner philosophischen Lehrtatigkeit ein, sondern nimmt auch die Einflusse aus Heideggers Kindheit und Jugend sowie aus seiner Studentenzeit mit in den Blick. So entsteht ein vielgestaltiges und spannendes Bild der verschiedenen Geistesstromungen um den Ersten Weltkrieg. Abschliessend fragt Fischer nach der Bedeutung von Heideggers phanomenologischen Studien fur die gegenwartige religionsphilosophische Diskussion um religiose Erfahrung. (shrink)

This paper investigates the historical origin and ancestors of typicality, which is now a central concept in Boltzmannian Statistical Mechanics and Bohmian Mechanics. Although Ludwig Boltzmann did not use the word typicality, its main idea, namely, that something happens almost always or is valid for almost all cases, plays a crucial role for his explanation of how thermodynamic systems approach equilibrium. At the beginning of the 20th century, the focus on almost always or almost everywhere was fruitful for developing measure (...) theory and probability theory. It was apparently Hugh Everett III who first mentioned typicality in physics in 1957 while searching for a justification of the Born rule in his interpretation of quantum mechanics. The historically closest concept before these developments is moral certainty, which was invented by the medieval French theologian Jean Gerson, and it became a standard concept at least until the Age of Enlightenment, when Jakob Bernoulli proved the Law of Large numbers. (shrink)

This paper explores public sentiment towards strike action among healthcare workers, as a result of their perceived inadequate pay. By analysing survey data collected in England between 2022 and 2023, the study focuses on NHS nurses and junior doctors, due to their critical role in delivering essential public services. Results indicate higher public support for strikes by nurses and junior doctors compared to other professions such as postal workers, teachers, rail workers, airport workers, civil servants and university lecturers. However, variation (...) in support for strikes by healthcare workers is observed across societal segments. Significant disparities in support are linked to individual political affiliations, left–right ideological positions and trust in the NHS. In short, nonconservative voters, individuals leaning towards left‐wing politics and those with greater trust in the NHS demonstrate higher likelihoods of supporting strikes by health workers. These findings carry implications for future strike decisions and highlight specific target groups for enhanced communication efforts to garner increased public support. (shrink)

It is a welcome development when academic philosophy starts to concern itself with practical issues, in such a way as to influence people's lives. Recently this has happened with one moral issue in particular—but infortunately it is the wrong issue, and people's actions have been influenced in the wrong way. The issue is that of the moral status and treatment of animals. A number of philosophers have argued for what they call ‘animal liberation’, comparing it directly with egalitarian causes such (...) as women's liberation and racial equality and suggesting that, if racism and sexism are rationally indefensible, so is ‘speciesism’. If one ought to give equal consideration to the interests of all human beings, then, so they daim, one must on the same grounds and in the same way recognize that ‘all animals are equal’, be they human or non-human. We believe that this assimilation of ‘animal liberation’ to human liberation movements is mistaken. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Milieu Philosophy or Physics? Apprenticeship Starting Research and Minerva From Physics to Philosophy Causality and Levels Teaching Acknowledgment Books by Mario Bunge.

Rothstein (2010) argues that groups may be harmed by research on deidentified data. He concludes that researchers are obligated to minimize group harms and demonstrate respect for a studied group t...

I want to combine two hitherto largely independent research projects, scientific understanding and mechanistic explanations. Understanding is not only achieved by answering why-questions, that is, by providing scientific explanations, but also by answering what-questions, that is, by providing what I call scientific descriptions. Based on this distinction, I develop three forms of understanding: understanding-what, understanding-why, and understanding-how. I argue that understanding-how is a particularly deep form of understanding, because it is based on mechanistic explanations, which answer why something happens in (...) virtue of what it is made of. I apply the three forms of understanding to two case studies: first, to the historical development of thermodynamics and, second, to the differences between the Clausius and the Boltzmann entropy in explaining thermodynamic processes. (shrink)

We propose a method of learning indicative conditional information. An agent learns conditional information by Jeffrey imaging on the minimally informative proposition expressed by a Stalnaker conditional. We show that the predictions of the proposed method align with the intuitions in Douven, 239–263 2012)’s benchmark examples. Jeffrey imaging on Stalnaker conditionals can also capture the learning of uncertain conditional information, which we illustrate by generating predictions for the Judy Benjamin Problem.

We put forth an account for when to believe causal and evidential conditionals. The basic idea is to embed a causal model in an agent’s belief state. For the evaluation of conditionals seems to be relative to beliefs about both particular facts and causal relations. Unlike other attempts using causal models, we show that ours can account rather well not only for various causal but also evidential conditionals.