v. 1. Bibliographia historiæ philosophiæ.--v. 2. Bibliographia philosophiæ.

My dissertation has three interrelated aims: to defend introspectivism, the view that the deliverances of introspection should be basic data for philosophical theories of the mind, from pivotal objections which inspire the currently prevailing anti-introspectivist approach to mentality; to advance a substantive account of introspection; and to lay the groundwork for a more general theory about the mental. ;I begin by analyzing a host of philosophical problems about the mind; in each, I isolate the source of perplexity in an epistemic (...) factor. The body of the thesis is devoted to elucidating the ontological and epistemological status of mind by considering, in turn, phenomenality and intentionality. ;Physicalism lacks the resources to explain the individual subject's greater epistemic authority regarding the phenomenal as compared to the physical. My detailed account of phenomenal state introspection is therefore preferable to the physicalist explanations of phenomenal knowledge; its consequences include a counterexample to a widely-accepted constraint on concept possession and a minor modification to one familiar theory of de se reference. ;Similarly, functionalist reduction of intentional states cannot countenance our refusal to defer to empirical science regarding one's occurrent mental states to the same extent that we defer regarding physical states. My account of introspection, which does justice to the measure of authority we retain about our own intentional states, undermines both functionalism and content externalism about such states. ;Grave difficulties face each of the four currently popular views about the relation between phenomenality and intentionality. According to my alternative, occurrent phenomenal states and occurrent intentional states are importantly different yet share an epistemic feature which distinguishes them from physical states: our deference to empirical science regarding such occurrent states is limited in a way that our deference regarding physical states is not. The key to understanding the mind is thus intimately related to the primary source of philosophical problems about it, namely, the disparity between our knowledge of the mental and our knowledge of the physical. (shrink)

Pero queda, a través de este devenir, la luz mosaica, las Tablas de la Ley, las sentencias del Talmud, las profecías de la Biblia. Este es el Tesoro del pueblo Judaico, el único que se ha conservado a través de los siglos; el que todavía suena en los momentos de la mayor angustia para la Humanidad y que vése conmovido por el impetuoso torrente de la vida contemporánea que exige nueva vitalidad en todos los aspectos de la existencia humana. DR. (...) ADALBERTO GARCÍA DE MENDOZA. (shrink)

El hombre crea su moral tomando en cuenta las aportaciones más íntimas de su espíritu. Así como la historia de la humanidad presenta una serie gradual y emocional de conquistas espirituales, así también la moral se ha logrado a través de la historia, pero siempre sobre el fundamento de la esencia humana, pues no cabe duda de que la jerarquía de los valores depende de cada ser humano. Ella orienta toda su conducta y señala sus grandes metas. El espíritu religioso (...) coloca, en primer término, a los valores de la religión, el moralista a los éticos, el pragmático a los útiles; el estético a las bellas artes, dando preferencia cada una a su valor favorito. (shrink)

En el socialismo de la transición, De los Ríos fue una figura a recuperar. Su sentido humanista del socialismo permitió al PSOE fundar en su propia historia republicana el nuevo compromiso del socialismo con la libertad. En el socialismo de los derechos civiles también tiene un lugar. De los Ríos apadrinó a Federico García Lorca, desde Granada a Nueva York y con La Barraca. El amor y el exilio acabó uniendo sus familias. También nombra a la primera mujer alto cargo (...) gubernamental: Victoria Kent, directora de prisiones.Se conoce menos otra dimensión de su trayectoria política de la que se ocupa este libro: su laicismo religioso. Dos rasgos que en la España de duelos a garrotazos parecen antagónicos. Sin embargo, ambos son característicos de su personalidad política e intelectual. Fue el ministro que lideró la política laicizadora de la II República, desde Justicia, primero, e Instrucción pública, después, llevando "siempre la batuta"?como informaba Tedeschini, el nuncio de la época -. Por otra parte, desde un cristianismo heterodoxo, no dejó de estimar la emoción religiosa, como lugar donde "fecundan los más hondos deseos del ideal". Se autodefinió "cristiano erasmista". Así le caracterizan Indalecio Prieto, en el obituario tras su muerte en el exilio, y el propio García Lorca, su poeta. (shrink)

En este libro se estudia la disciplina filosófica que trata de los pensamientos. Se divide en diferentes etapas empezando con la Lógica de la Edad Antigua con Aristóteles, el fundador de la Lógica, Platón, Euclides y otros mas. La Edad Media con Porfirio y Santo Thomas de Aquino, La Edad Moderna con René Descartes y su nueva ciencia de la Geometria Analítica y la Edad Contemporanea con Auguste Comte, fundador de la doctrina del positivismo.

Professor Franklin is correct to say that there are significant areas of agreement between his account of formal science (Franklin, 1994) and my critique of his account. We both agree that the domain-independence exhibited by the formal sciences is ontologically and epistemically interesting, and that the concept of ‘structure’ must be central in any analysis of domain-independence. We also agree that knowledge of the structural, relational properties of physical systems should count as empirical knowledge, and that it makes sense to (...) talk about an empirical ‘science’ of structure. Where we disagree is over the frequency of occasions where ‘practical certainty’ is actually attained: Franklin argues that practical certainty is not uncommon in the formal sciences, while I argue that there are barriers to practical certainty that Franklin fails to appreciate. In Franklin’s response, he briefly presents and offers criticisms of my two main arguments against his central thesis. Franklin asserts that the flaw in my first argument is that it does not appreciate that modern mathematical models exhibit structural stability, and thus that many of their predictions are robust under small variations in input or parameter values (and hence, insensitive to the inevitable gaps between estimates and actual values). Nevertheless, what I had in mind in using the term ‘realistic modelling situations’ were models of fairly complex natural systems, such as the dripping faucet, spruce budworm and ecosystem ecology examples. My objection is not that mathematical models of such systems cannot legitimately and accurately describe structural properties that are genuinely predicable of real-world systems, but simply that for.. (shrink)

This introduction just aims to be a fast foreword to the special topic now turned into an e-book. The Editorial "Decision-Making Experiments under a Philosophical Analysis: Human Choice as a Challenge for Neuroscience" alongside with my opinion article "Neurophilosophical considerations on decision making: Pushing-up the frontiers without disregarding their foundations" play the real role of considering in more details the articles and the whole purpose of this e-book. What I must highlight in this foreword is that our intention with such (...) a project was to deepen into the very foundations of our current paradigms in decision neuroscience and to philosophically moot its foundations and repercussions. Normal Science (a term coined by Philosopher Thomas Kuhn) works under a research consensus among a scientific community: A shared paradigm, consolidated methods, widespread convictions. Pragmatically, winning formulas must be kept, although, not at any cost. What differentiates a gifted and revolutionary scientist from a more bureaucratic colleague is the capacity and willingness of constantly reevaluating, depurating and refining his/her own paradigm. That is best strategy to avoid that a paradigm itself would gradually come under challenge. In my view, some achievements, in this sense, were brought about in our project. The e-book will be inspiring and informative for both neuroscientists that are concerned with the very foundations of their works and for philosophers that are not blind to empirical evidence. Kant once said: “Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind”. Paraphrasing Kant we could say: Philosophy without science is empty, science without philosophy is blind. (shrink)

This is a bilingual edition of the selected peer-reviewed papers that were submitted for the International Symposium on Jesuit Studies on the thought of the Jesuit Francisco Suárez (1548-1617). The symposium was co-organized in Seville in 2018 by the Departamento de Humanidades y Filosofía at Universidad Loyola Andalucía and the Institute for Advanced Jesuit Studies at Boston College. Suárez was a theologian, philosopher and jurist who had a significant cultural impact on the development of modernity. Commemorating the four-hundredth anniversary of (...) his death, the symposium studied the work of Suárez and other Jesuits of his time in the context of diverse traditions that came together in Europe between the late Middle Ages, the Renaissance, and early modernity. (shrink)

Benadering van enkele klassieke filosofische kwesties vanuit een door de Angelsaksische taalfilosofie geïnspireerde visie op de zingevende rede.

During his long and continuing scholarly career, Patrick Suppes contributed significantly both to the sciences and to their philosophies. The volume consists of papers by an international group of Suppes colleagues, collaborators, and students in many of the areas of his expertise, building on or adding to his insights. Michael Friedman offers an overview of Suppes accomplishments and of his unique perspective on the relation between science and philosophy. Paul Humphreys, Stephen Hartmann, and Tom Ryckman present essays in the philosophy (...) of physics. Jens-Erik Fenstad, Harvey Friedman, and Jaako Hintikka consider problems in the foundations of mathematics, while the late Duncan Luce, Jean-Claude Falmagne, Brian Skyrms, and Hannes Leitgeb have contributed essays in theory of measurement, decision theory and probability. Foundations of economics and political theory are addressed by Adolfo Garcia de la Sienra, Russell Hardin, and Kenneth Arrow. Psychology, language, and philosophy of language are addressed by Elizabeth Loftus, Anne Fagot-Largeault, Willem Levelt, Dagfinn Follesdal, and Marcos Perreau-Guimares and some of Suppes most recent research in neurobiology is addressed in essays by Colleen Crangle, Acadio de Barros and Claudio Carvalhes. Finally Nancy Cartwright and Alexandre Marcelles consider the alignment (or misalignment) of method and policy. Each of the essays is accompanied by a response from Suppes.". (shrink)

Residency training in the Netherlands is to be restructured over the coming years. To this end a general competence profile for medical specialists has been introduced. This profile is nearly the same as the Canadian CanMEDS 2000 model, which describes seven general areas of medical specialist competence, one of which is professionalism. In order to establish a training programme for residents and their instructors based on this competence, it is necessary to develop a vision that does justice to everyday medical (...) practice. The two most prevailing views of professionalism—as personal, or as a behavioural characteristic—fall short of this. Only when professionalism is understood as reflective professionalism does it encompass the fundamental contextuality of medical treatment. This means that the focus of training and assessment must be shifted to accountability for treatment. (shrink)

Echte Freiheit läßt sich nach Leibniz nicht auf die Möglichkeit reduzieren, so zu handeln, wie man handeln will. Vielmehr muß echte Freiheit mit dem moralischen Verdienst in Verbindung gebracht werden. In diesem Zusammenhang erweist sich die Idee der logischen Kontingenz von besonderer Wichtigkeit. Eine Person hat kein moralisches Verdienst, wenn sie blindlings durch das Gute geleitet wird. Sie hat allein dann ein moralisches Verdienst, wenn sie das Schlechte zurückweist und bewußt das Gute wählt, das sich vom Schlechten abhebt. Insofern ist (...) derjenige, der moralisch richtig handelt, sich anderer Möglichkeiten bewußt. Leibniz trägt dieser Erfahrungstatsache durch den Gedanken Rechnung, daß eine freie Handlung logisch kontingent ist. Diesem Gedanken verleiht Leibniz einen metaphysischen Status: die möglichen Welten haben einen objektiven Gehalt. (shrink)