This chapter focuses on one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy called “adverse consequences”. The argument from adverse consequences can be seen as an argument that is intended to be pragmatic ‐ about what we should do, not about what is true ‐ but then comes to the wrong kind of conclusion. In many genuinely pragmatic arguments, however, adverse consequences are relevant to the conclusion and no fallacy is committed. So it is important to notice exactly what the conclusion (...) of the argument is. (shrink)

Several themes of David Lewis's theory of counterfactuals, especially their sensitivity to context, pave the way for a viable theory of non-trivial counterpossibles. If Lewis was successful in defending his account against the early objections, a semantics of counterpossibles can be defended from similar objections in the same way. The resulting theory will be extended to address 'might' counterfactuals and questions about the relative "nearness" of impossible worlds.

Plausibly, no agent ever performs an action without some desire to perform that action. If so, a regress argument shows that, given incompatibilism, we are only rarely free. The argument sidesteps recent objections to this thesis.

Against the historically widespread view that divine conservation is a continuation of the act of creation, William Lane Craig argues that conservation is a different kind of act since, unlike creation ex nihilo, it is diachronic and it acts on a patient. Timothy Miller poses a timing objection against Craig's view, arguing that on such a view either the existence of a conserved entity is discontinuous, or the conserving activity overdetermines its effect, or the conserving activity is not continuous. The (...) present paper explores the options that remain for a diachronic, agent-patient account of conservation. It includes several models of conservation on which divine activity is continuous but not overdetermined since its effect at each time is something less specific than the existence of a created being at a time. (shrink)

A recently advanced argument for purgatory hinges on the need for complete sanctification before one can enter heaven. The argument has a modal gap.The gap can be exploited to fashion a competing account of how sanctification occurs in the afterlife according to which it is in part a heavenly process.The competing account usefully complicates the overall case for purgatory and raises questions about how the notion ought to be understood.

The best arguments for possible worlds as states of affairs furnish us with equally good arguments for impossible worlds of the same sort. I argue for a theory of impossible worlds on which the impossible worlds correspond to maximal inconsistent classes of propositions. Three objections are rejected. In the final part of the paper, I present a menu of impossible worlds and explore some of their interesting formal properties.

In much of Christian thought humans are taken to have an ultimate end, understood as the highest attainable good. Christians also anticipate “the life everlasting.” Together these ideas generate a paradox. If the end can be reached in a finite amount of time, some longer-lasting state will be better still, so the purported end is not the highest good after all. But if the end is to possess some good forever, then it will never be reached. So it seems an (...) everlasting being cannot have an ultimate end—a conclusion that apparently makes human life pointless. How can the paradox be solved? (shrink)

This entry provides a brief exposition and formal reconstruction of the argument for possible worlds in David Lewis's _Counterfactuals_.

The theory of possible worlds has permeated analytic philosophy in recent decades, and its best versions have a consequence which has gone largely unnoticed: in addition to the panoply of possible worlds, there are a great many impossible worlds. A uniform ontological method alone should bring the friends of possible worlds to adopt impossible worlds, I argue, but the theory's applications also provide strong incentives. In particular, the theory facilitates an account of counterfactuals which avoids several of the implausible results (...) of David Lewis's account, and it paves the way for the analogues of Kripkean semantics for epistemic and relevant logics. On the theories of possible worlds as abstract objects, worlds bear a strong resemblance to propositions. I contend that if there are distinct necessarily false propositions, then there are likewise distinct impossible worlds. However, one who regards possible worlds as concrete objects must not recognize impossible worlds, in part because concrete worlds cannot misrepresent certain features of reality, as some impossible worlds must. Accordingly, I defend and develop a theory of impossible worlds as maximal impossible states of affairs. Impossible worlds perform admirably in the analysis of counterfactuals with impossible antecedents. I argue that, contrary to standard accounts, not all counterpossibles are trivially true, and I develop a Lewis-style semantics which allows this result. The point is crucial, since many views presuppose that some counterpossibles are substantive philosophical truths. Finally, I show that impossible worlds hold great promise for doxastic and relevant logics. Epistemic logic needs a domain of propositions which is not closed under strict implication to avoid the problem of logical omniscience, and relevant logic needs such a domain to avoid the famous paradoxes of implication. In sum, impossible world theory promises natural, elegant solutions to philosophical problems in numerous areas where possible worlds alone flounder. These solutions come to most possible world theorists at no cost, since the existence of impossible worlds is entailed by theses they already hold. (shrink)

Whether certain objects compose a whole at a given time does not seem to depend on anything other than the character of those objects and the relations between them. This observation suggests a far-reaching constraint on theories of composition. One version of the constraint has been explicitly adopted by van Inwagen and rules out his own answer to the composition question. The constraint also rules out the other well-known moderate answers that have so far been proposed.

Plausibly, if an object persists through time, then its later existence must be caused by its earlier existence. Many theists endorse a theory of continuous creation, according to which God is the sole cause of a creature's existence at a given time. The conjunction of these two theses rather unfortunately implies that no object distinct from God persists at all. What strategies for resolving this difficulty are available? (Published Online April 7 2006).

Arguments concerning divine conservation and concurrence often assume that actions of certain descriptions would be superfluous if God were to perform them, and it is then concluded that God does not perform such actions. In particular, it often seems that atomic actions cannot be the result of cooperative activity between God and creatures since there is no apparent way to divide the labor between the two. However, the actions that are atomic in one model of divine action may not be (...) atomic on another. On fine-grained models there may be unexpected prospects for nonredundant divine action. (shrink)

In comparison with a highest attainable good, a future of everlasting progress may appear subjectively dissatisfying or objectively deficient. This is the satisfaction problem. I defend the progressive view against three strands of the satisfaction problem and argue that the notion of a highest good faces a satisfaction problem of its own.

This volume comprises essays presented to Alvin Plantinga on the occasion of his 70th birthday.

A review of Kevin Corcoran's Rethinking Human Nature.

According to Brian Leftow's modal voluntarism, some necessary truths about created beings depend on the divine will. One might expect this view to be in tension with Molinism, according to which some contingent truths about creatures' free actions are independent of the divine will. It is argued that modal voluntarism is consistent with a lightly modified Molinism.

Structured interviews were held with 149 registered nurses in seven countries in America, Asia, Australia and Europe concerning the feeding of severely demented patients who do not accept food. The most common reasons for nurses being willing to change their decision to feed or not to feed were an order from the medical head, a request from the patient's husband and/or the staff meeting. There was a connection between the willingness to feed and the ranking of ethical principles. Nurses who (...) were most prone to feed the patient most often gave a high rank to the ethical principle of sanctity of life, while those who primarily chose not to feed the patient gave a high rank to the ethical principle of autonomy. All nurses stressed the ethical principle of beneficence. Des interviews structurés ont eu lieu avec 149 infirmiers/ères dans sept pays en Amérique, Asie, Australie et Europe concernant l'alimentation des malades gravement dément qui refusent de manger. La raison la plus générale pour des infirmiers/ères d'être prêt à changer leures décisions de donner à manger ou non sont: un ordre du médecin, la demande du mari de la malade ou de la réunion du personnel. Il y avait un lien entre la volonté de nourir et le rang des principes éthiques. Les infirmiers/ères les plus enclins de nourir la malade le plus souvent donnaient un rang supérieur au principe éthique de la sainteté de vie, pendant que ceux et celles qui choisissaient de ne pas nourrir la malade donnaient un rang supérieur au principe éthique de l'autonomie. Tous insistaient sur l'importance du principe éthique de la bienfaisance. Konstruktive Interviews wurden mit 149 ausgebildeten Krankenschwestern und Pfleger in sieben Ländern in Amerika, Asien, Australien und Europa gehalten über die Ernährung von schwer von Dementia praecox leidenden Patienten, die das Essen verweigern. Die gewöhnlichsten Gründe des Pflegepersonals für die Bereitwilligkeit, ihre Entscheidung, zu ernähren oder nicht, zu ändern, waren Anordnungen vom medizinischen Chef, Anfragen vom Ehemann der Patientin und/oder einer Personalsitzung. Es bestand ein Zusammenhang zwischen der Bereitwilligkeit zur Ernährung und dem Rang der ethischen Prinzipien. Die Pflegenden, die sich am meisten neigten, die Patientin zu ernähren, gaben dem ethischen Prinzip der Heiligkeit des Lebens einen hohen Rang, während die, die meistens vorzogen, die Patientin nicht zu ernähren, gaben dem ethischen Prinzip der Autonomie einen hohen Rang. Alle Pflegenden legten grossen Wert auf das ethische Prinzip der Wohltätigkeit. (shrink)

Offering a unique and wide-ranging examination of the theory of knowledge, the new edition of this comprehensive collection deftly blends readings from the foremost classical sources with the work of important contemporary philosophical thinkers. Human Knowledge: Classical and Contemporary Approaches, 3/e, offers philosophical examinations of epistemology from ancient Greek and Roman philosophy ; medieval philosophy ; early modern philosophy ; classical pragmatism and Anglo-American empiricism ; and other influential Anglo-American philosophers. Organized chronologically and thematically, Human Knowledge, 3/e, features exceptionally broad (...) coverage and nontechnical selections that are easily accessible to students. An ideal text for both undergraduate and graduate courses in epistemology, it is enhanced by the editors' substantial general introduction, section overviews, and up-to-date bibliographies. The third edition offers expanded selections on contemporary epistemology and adds selections by Thomas Reid, Richard Rorty, David B. Annis, Richard Feldman and Earl Conee, Ernest Sosa, Barry Stroud, and Louise M. Antony. Human Knowledge, 3/e, offers an unparalleled introduction to our ancient struggle to understand our own intellectual experience. (shrink)

Offering a unique and wide-ranging examination of the theory of knowledge, the new edition of this comprehensive collection deftly blends readings from the foremost classical sources with the work of important contemporary philosophical thinkers. Human Knowledge: Classical and Contemporary Approaches, 3/e, offers philosophical examinations of epistemology from ancient Greek and Roman philosophy (Plato, Aristotle, Sextus Empiricus); medieval philosophy (Augustine, Aquinas); early modern philosophy (Descartes, Locke, Leibniz, Berkeley, Hume, Reid, Kant); classical pragmatism and Anglo-American empiricism (James, Russell, Ayer, Lewis, Carnap, Quine, (...) Rorty); and other influential Anglo-American philosophers (Chisholm, Kripke, Moore, Wittgenstein, Strawson, Putnam). Organized chronologically and thematically, Human Knowledge, 3/e, features exceptionally broad coverage and nontechnical selections that are easily accessible to students. An ideal text for both undergraduate and graduate courses in epistemology, it is enhanced by the editors' substantial general introduction, section overviews, and up-to-date bibliographies. The third edition offers expanded selections on contemporary epistemology and adds selections by Thomas Reid, Richard Rorty, David B. Annis, Richard Feldman and Earl Conee, Ernest Sosa, Barry Stroud, and Louise M. Antony. Human Knowledge, 3/e, offers an unparalleled introduction to our ancient struggle to understand our own intellectual experience. (shrink)

International Rules brings together exemplary works from the most prominent approaches to international rules of International Law and International Relations disciplines. Included are chapters on Natural Law, Legal Positivism, Classical Realism, the New Haven School, Institutionalism, Structural Realism, the New Stream, and Feminist Voices. Each of the eight chapters begins with a brief overview, offers a representative work or works, and concludes with a selected bibliography. From Hugo Grotius to David Kennedy, from George Kennan to Robert Keohane, the featured (...) authors provide valuable insights into their common subject: international rules. Despite divergent methods and objectives, they address fundamentally the same questions: What is the nature of such rules? What is their purpose? How do they originate? What role, if any, do they play in politics? Framing the selections assembled are two original chapter-length essays. The first chapter of this volume assesses the prospects for interdisciplinary collaboration; the final one suggests a direction for future research. (shrink)

Arguments for Restrictivism – the position that we are rarely free– have been proposed by incompatibilists Peter van Inwagen and David Vander Laan among others. This article is concerned much more with these arguments than with quantifying the frequency of free actions. There are two general ways to argue for restrictivism. First, one may take a Negative Strategy, arguing that the situations in which one is not free are common and predominant. Second, one may focus on situations (...) in which one is apparently free, and argue directly that these situations are rare – the Inventory Strategy. I conclude that both types of arguments for restrictivism are unconvincing. (shrink)

Since the publication of David Lewis’ Counterfactuals, the standard line on subjunctive conditionals with impossible antecedents (or counterpossibles) has been that they are vacuously true. That is, a conditional of the form ‘If p were the case, q would be the case’ is trivially true whenever the antecedent, p, is impossible. The primary justification is that Lewis’ semantics best approximates the English subjunctive conditional, and that a vacuous treatment of counterpossibles is a consequence of that very elegant theory. Another (...) justification derives from the classical lore than if an impossibility were true, then anything goes. In this paper we defend non-vacuism, the view that counterpossibles are sometimes non-vacuously true and sometimes non-vacuously false. We do so while retaining a Lewisian semantics, which is to say, the approach we favor does not require us to abandon classical logic or a similarity semantics. It does however require us to countenance impossible worlds. An impossible worlds treatment of counterpossibles is suggested (but not defended) by Lewis (Counterfactuals. Blackwell, Oxford, 1973), and developed by Nolan (Notre Dame J Formal Logic 38:325–527, 1997), Kment (Mind 115:261–310, 2006a: Philos Perspect 20:237–302, 2006b), and Vander Laan (In: Jackson F, Priest G (eds) Lewisian themes. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004). We follow this tradition, and develop an account of comparative similarity for impossible worlds. (shrink)

Perfect for students with no background in logic or philosophy, Simple Formal Logic provides a full system of logic adequate to handle everyday and philosophical reasoning. By keeping out artificial techniques that aren’t natural to our everyday thinking process, Simple Formal Logic trains students to think through formal logical arguments for themselves, ingraining in them the habits of sound reasoning. Simple Formal Logic features: a companion website with abundant exercise worksheets, study supplements (including flashcards for symbolizations and for deduction rules), (...) and instructor’s manual two levels of exercises for beginning and more advanced students a glossary of terms, abbreviations and symbols. This book arose out of a popular course that the author has taught to all types of undergraduate students at Loyola University Chicago. He teaches formal logic without the artificial methods–methods that often seek to solve farfetched logical problems without any connection to everyday and philosophical argumentation. The result is a book that teaches easy and more intuitive ways of grappling with formal logic–and is intended as a rigorous yet easy-to-follow first course in logical thinking for philosophy majors and non-philosophy majors alike. (shrink)

Although agreement on the positive sign of the relationship between corporate social and financial performance is observed in the literature, the mechanisms that constitute this relationship are not yet well-known. We address this issue by extending management’s stakeholder theory by adding insights from psychology’s prospect decision theory and sociology’s resource dependence theory. Empirically, we analyze an extensive panel dataset, including information on disaggregated measures of social performance for the S&P 500 in the 1997–2002 period. In so doing, we enrich the (...) extant literature by focusing on stakeholder heterogeneity, perceptional framing, and disaggregated measures of corporate social performance. (shrink)

What are the philosophical views of professional philosophers, and how do these views change over time? The 2020 PhilPapers Survey surveyed around 2000 philosophers on 100 philosophical questions. The results provide a snapshot of the state of some central debates in philosophy, reveal correlations and demographic effects involving philosophers' views, and reveal some changes in philosophers' views over the last decade.

A leading political theorist’s groundbreaking defense of ideal conceptions of justice in political philosophy Throughout the history of political philosophy and politics, there has been continual debate about the roles of idealism versus realism. For contemporary political philosophy, this debate manifests in notions of ideal theory versus nonideal theory. Nonideal thinkers shift their focus from theorizing about full social justice, asking instead which feasible institutional and political changes would make a society more just. Ideal thinkers, on the other hand, question (...) whether full justice is a standard that any society is likely ever to satisfy. And, if social justice is unrealistic, are attempts to understand it without value or importance, and merely utopian? Utopophobia argues against thinking that justice must be realistic, or that understanding justice is only valuable if it can be realized. David Estlund does not offer a particular theory of justice, nor does he assert that justice is indeed unrealizable—only that it could be, and this possibility upsets common ways of proceeding in political thought. Estlund engages critically with important strands in traditional and contemporary political philosophy that assume a sound theory of justice has the overriding, defining task of contributing practical guidance toward greater social justice. Along the way, he counters several tempting perspectives, including the view that inquiry in political philosophy could have significant value only as a guide to practical political action, and that understanding true justice would necessarily have practical value, at least as an ideal arrangement to be approximated. Demonstrating that unrealistic standards of justice can be both sound and valuable to understand, Utopophobia stands as a trenchant defense of ideal theory in political philosophy. (shrink)

David Hume's Enquiry concerning Human Understanding is the definitive statement of the greatest philosopher in the English language. His arguments in support of reasoning from experience, and against the "sophistry and illusion"of religiously inspired philosophical fantasies, caused controversy in the eighteenth century and are strikingly relevant today, when faith and science continue to clash. The Enquiry considers the origin and processes of human thought, reaching the stark conclusion that we can have no ultimate understanding of the physical world, or (...) indeed our own minds. In either sphere we must depend on instinctive learning from experience, recognizing our animal nature and the limits of reason. Hume's calm and open-minded skepticism thus aims to provide a new basis for science, liberating us from the "superstition" of false metaphysics and religion. His Enquiry remains one of the best introductions to the study of philosophy, and his edition places it in its historical and philosophical context. (shrink)

The paper first formalizes the ramified type theory as (informally) described in the Principia Mathematica [32]. This formalization is close to the ideas of the Principia, but also meets contemporary requirements on formality and accuracy, and therefore is a new supply to the known literature on the Principia (like [25], [19], [6] and [7]).As an alternative, notions from the ramified type theory are expressed in a lambda calculus style. This situates the type system of Russell and Whitehead in a modern (...) setting. Both formalizations are inspired by current developments in research on type theory and typed lambda calculus; see [3]. (shrink)

The zetetic turn in epistemology raises three questions about epistemic and zetetic norms. First, there is the relationship question: what is the relationship between epistemic and zetetic norms? Are some epistemic norms zetetic norms, or are epistemic and zetetic norms distinct? Second, there is the tension question: are traditional epistemic norms in tension with plausible zetetic norms? Third, there is the reaction question: how should theorists react to a tension between epistemic and zetetic norms? Drawing on an analogy to practical (...) philosophy, I develop a focal point view to resolve these motivating questions. On the focal point view, traditional epistemic norms and zetetic norms answer different types of normative questions. There is nevertheless a familiar type of evaluative tension between traditional epistemic norms and zetetic norms, but this tension is an unavoidable feature of the normative landscape and not a sign that traditional epistemic norms need revision. But if traditional epistemic norms are not zetetic norms, then in what sense is zetetic epistemology a project for epistemologists? I conclude by articulating a sense in which some nontraditional epistemic norms are zetetic norms, and in which zetetic epistemology is an important part of the study of theoretical rationality. (shrink)

By means of an example, shows the possibility of beliefs that are separately rational whilst together inconsistent.

One of the enduring concerns of moral philosophy is deciding who or what is deserving of ethical consideration. Much recent attention has been devoted to the "animal question" -- consideration of the moral status of nonhuman animals. In this book, David Gunkel takes up the "machine question": whether and to what extent intelligent and autonomous machines of our own making can be considered to have legitimate moral responsibilities and any legitimate claim to moral consideration. The machine question poses a (...) fundamental challenge to moral thinking, questioning the traditional philosophical conceptualization of technology as a tool or instrument to be used by human agents. Gunkel begins by addressing the question of machine moral agency: whether a machine might be considered a legitimate moral agent that could be held responsible for decisions and actions. He then approaches the machine question from the other side, considering whether a machine might be a moral patient due legitimate moral consideration. Finally, Gunkel considers some recent innovations in moral philosophy and critical theory that complicate the machine question, deconstructing the binary agent--patient opposition itself. Technological advances may prompt us to wonder if the science fiction of computers and robots whose actions affect their human companions could become science fact. Gunkel's argument promises to influence future considerations of ethics, ourselves, and the other entities who inhabit this world. (shrink)

This book is an attempt to get to the bottom of an acute and perennial tension between our best scientific pictures of the fundamental physical structure of the world and our everyday empirical experience of it. The trouble is about the direction of time. The situation (very briefly) is that it is a consequence of almost every one of those fundamental scientific pictures--and that it is at the same time radically at odds with our common sense--that whatever can happen can (...) just as naturally happen backwards. Albert provides an unprecedentedly clear, lively, and systematic new account--in the context of a Newtonian-Mechanical picture of the world--of the ultimate origins of the statistical regularities we see around us, of the temporal irreversibility of the Second Law of Thermodynamics, of the asymmetries in our epistemic access to the past and the future, and of our conviction that by acting now we can affect the future but not the past. Then, in the final section of the book, he generalizes the Newtonian picture to the quantum-mechanical case and (most interestingly) suggests a very deep potential connection between the problem of the direction of time and the quantum-mechanical measurement problem. The book aims to be both an original contribution to the present scientific and philosophical understanding of these matters at the most advanced level, and something in the nature of an elementary textbook on the subject accessible to interested high-school students. Table of Contents: Preface 1. Time-Reversal Invariance 2. Thermodynamics 3. Statistical Mechanics 4. The Reversibility Objections and the Past-Hypothesis 5. The Scope of Thermodynamics 6. The Asymmetries of Knowledge and Intervention 7. Quantum Mechanics Appendix: Gedankenexperiments with Heat Engines Index Reviews of this book: The foundations of statistical mechanisms are often presented in physics textbooks in a rather obscure and confused way. By challenging common ways of thinking about this subject, Time and Chance can do quite a lot to improve this situation. --Jean Bricmont, Science Albert is perfecting a style of foundational analysis that is uniquely his own...It has a surgical precision...and it is ruthless with pretensions. The foundations of thermodynamics is a topic that has accumulated a good deal of dead wood; this is a fire that will burn and burn. --Simon W. Saunders, Oxford University As usual with Albert's work, the exposition is brisk and to the point, and exceptionally clear...The book will be an extremely valuable contribution to the literature on the subject of philosophical issues in thermodynamics and statistical mechanics, a literature which has been thin on the ground but is now growing as it deserves to. --Lawrence Sklar, University of Michigan. (shrink)

How should one react when one has a belief, but knows that other people—who have roughly the same evidence as one has, and seem roughly as likely to react to it correctly—disagree? This paper argues that the disagreement of other competent inquirers often requires one to be much less confident in one’s opinions than one would otherwise be.

IntroductionBurnout is a growing problem among young researchers, affecting individuals, organizations and society. Our study aims to identify burnout profiles and highlight the corresponding job demands and resources, resulting in recommendations to reduce burnout risk in the academic context.MethodsThis cross-sectional study collected data from young researchers at five Flemish universities through an online survey measuring burnout risk, work engagement, sleeping behavior, and the most prominent job demands and resources. We conducted Latent Profile Analysis to identify burnout profiles in young researchers (...) and subsequently compared these groups on job demands and resources patterns.ResultsFive burnout profiles were identified: High Burnout Risk, Cynical, Overextended, Low Burnout Risk, and No Burnout Risk. Each burnout profile was associated with a different pattern of job demands and resources. For instance, high levels of meaningfulness decreased the odds to being classified in the Cynical profile.ConclusionOur findings show that the Cynical profile corresponds to a relatively high number of young researchers, which may imply that they are particularly vulnerable to the cynicism dimension of burnout. Additionally, work-life interference and perceived publication pressure seemed the most significant predictors of burnout risk, while meaningfulness, social support from supervisor and learning opportunities played an important protective role. (shrink)

14 essays which examine the efforts of Socrates' associates to preserve his speeches for posterity. The papers place particular emphasis on the non-Platonic tradition.

I attempt to get as clear as possible on the chain of reasoning by which irreversible macrodynamics is derivable from time-reversible microphysics, and in particular to clarify just what kinds of assumptions about the initial state of the universe, and about the nature of the microdynamics, are needed in these derivations. I conclude that while a “Past Hypothesis” about the early Universe does seem necessary to carry out such derivations, that Hypothesis is not correctly understood as a constraint on the (...) early Universe’s entropy. (shrink)