This essays attempts to bridge the debate between Hu Shih and D.T. Suzuki concerning the role of history vs. practice in Chan/Zen Buddhism.

This essay attempts to reconcile the debate between Hu Shi's historical perspective and D.T. Suzuki's practice perspective concerning Zen Buddhism.

Zen Buddhism as it has been discovered by the West in our time emerges as one of the great challenges to Western philosophy, psychology, and religion. The present volume, composed of the work of D. T. Suzuki, Zen's chief exponent in English, and presented to Western readers by William Barrett, is intended to introduce the general reader to the history and spirit of Zen.

D.T. Suzuki. A Biography. A. Irwin Switzer III. Edited and enlarged by John Snelling. The Buddhist Society, London 1985. 63 pp. I11.

The small connective words “soku” and “sokuhi,” typically found in the writings of the Kyoto school thinkers, have baffled many a Western reader. Describing what he termed the “logic of sokuhi,” Daisetz T. Suzuki famously wrote: “To say ‘A is A’ is to say ‘A is not A.’ Therefore, ’A is A.’” “Soku” is a connective word, meaning “that is,” or “id est”; “hi” negates the compound-word, adding the meaning of “not.” Nishida adopted and situated the “logic of sokuhi” (...) in a philosophical context, especially in his final essay “Bashoteki ronri to shūkyōteki sekaikan” or “The Logic of Topos and the Religious Worldview”. This logic of sokuhi, however, came to Nishida’s attention only in the very last years of his life, leaving him very little time to develop it fully. In this paper, I explore the birth of this “logic of sokuhi” in Suzuki’s writings, its context and the import in the Diamond Sūtra, and Nishida’s elaboration of this logic. The goal of this paper is to elucidate this key phrase of Nishida’s thought and to evaluate its philosophical relevance. (shrink)

This paper analyses the concept of the Imagination of Henry Corbin (1903–1978) in relation to Daisetsu T. Suzuki (1870–1966). Besides being a renowned orientalist and scholar of Islamic thought, Corbin was a philosopher par excellence whose original thought deserves to be studied. So, I present this paper as a contribution to the evaluation of Corbin as a philosopher. In doing so, I shall shed light upon the philosophical affinity between Corbin and Suzuki, which has thus far rarely been (...) discussed in depth. Their ideas, in fact, resonate with each other—or Corbin is sympathetic to Suzuki—at a deep level, especially on the argument of Imagination, through Suwedenborgian thought, into whom both channel their interests. An exploration of this relationship of influence with Suzuki shall make a great contribution to a better understanding of Corbin’s own concept of Imagination, which could shake up our taken-for-granted idea of “imagination.”. (shrink)

Pain may appear to undermine the radically intentionalist view that the phenomenal character of any experience is entirely constituted by its representational content. That appearance is illusory. After categorizing versions of pain intentionalism along two dimensions, I argue that an 'objectivist' and 'non-mentalist' version is the most promising, if it can withstand two objections concerning what we say when in pain, and the distinctiveness of pain. I rebut these objections, in a way available to both opponents of and adherents to (...) the view that experiential content is entirely conceptual. (shrink)

The logic of soku-hi is presented as an articulation of a post-Kantian view of reality that embraces the truths of science with the assumption of the transcendental subject. As such, soku-hi represents the philosophical posture of both the secular Zen of the Kyoto School and the new materialists of contemporary continental philosophy. It describes how material reality is not all even though there is nothing else.

This Paper Offers A New Interpretation of Phaedo 96a–103a. Plato has devoted the dialogue up to this point to a series of arguments for the claim that the soul is immortal. However, one of the characters, Cebes, insists that so far nothing more has been established than that the soul is durable, divine, and in existence before the incarnation of birth. What is needed is something more ambitious: a proof that the soul is not such as to pass out of (...) existence. According to Socrates’s initial response to Cebes at 95e8–96a1, giving such a demonstration requires a thorough investigation into “the reason for coming to be and passing away in general” (ὅλως γὰϱ δεῖ πεϱὶ γενέσεως ϰαὶ Φθοϱᾶς τὴν αἰτίαν διαπϱαγματεύσασθαι .. (shrink)

Jehovah's Witnesses are students of the Bible. They refuse transfusions out of obedience to the scriptural directive to abstain and keep from blood. Dr Muramoto disagrees with the Witnesses' religious beliefs in this regard. Despite this basic disagreement over the meaning of Biblical texts, Muramoto flouts the religious basis for the Witnesses' position. His proposed policy change about accepting transfusions in private not only conflicts with the Witnesses' fundamental beliefs but it promotes hypocrisy. In addition, Muramoto's arguments about pressure to (...) conform and coerced disclosure of private information misrepresent the beliefs and practices of Jehovah's Witnesses and ignore the element of individual conscience. In short, Muramoto resorts to distortion and uncorroborated assertions in his effort to portray a matter of religious faith as a matter of medical ethical debate. (shrink)

Near Eastern Tribal Societies during the Nineteenth Century: Economy, Society and Politics between Tent and Town. By Eveline van der Steen. London: Equinox, 2013. Pp. xvii + 302. $110. [Distributed by ISD, Bristol, Conn.].