This book explores the puzzling phenomenon of new veiling practices among lower middle class women in Cairo, Egypt.

The celebration of the eight-hundredth anniversary of the birth of Moses Maimonides, Casa de las Españas, Columbia University, March 30, 1935: Introduction by N. M. Butler. Moses Maimonides, the philosopher, by R. McKeon. Maimonides, the scientist, by R. Gottheil. Maimonides, the leader and lawgiver, by S. W. Baron.--Homage to Maimonides, by E. Gilson.--The literary character of the Guide for the perplexed, by L. Strauss.--Maimonides' treaties on resurrection: a comparative study, by J. Finkel.--A responsum of Maimonides, by R. Gottheil.--The economic (...) views of Maimonides, by S. W. Baron.--The medical work of Maimonides, by M. Meyerhof. (shrink)

This Festschrift for Professor Baron's sixtieth birthday displays an astonishing variety of interests on the part of his former students, from the sociological study of the American conservative Rabbinate to the correspondence of Tobias ben Moses and the New York cloakmakers' strike of 1910. Essays of philosophic interest are Bokser's "Morality and Religion in the Theology of Maimonides," Hahn's "Wellhausen's Interpretation of Israel's Religious History," Blau's "Tradition and Innovation," and Ben-Horin's "Toward the Dawn of History". The volume includes an (...) extensive bibliography of Baron's writings. --L. S. F. (shrink)

A popular principle about grounding, “Internality”, says that if A grounds B, then necessarily, if A and B obtain, then A grounds B. I argue that Internality is false. Its falsity reveals a distinctive, new kind of explanation, which I call “ennobling”. Its falsity also entails that every previously proposed theory of what grounds grounding facts is false. I construct a new theory.

ABSTRACT Our goal in this paper is to extend counterfactual accounts of scientific explanation to mathematics. Our focus, in particular, is on intra-mathematical explanations: explanations of one mathematical fact in terms of another. We offer a basic counterfactual theory of intra-mathematical explanations, before modelling the explanatory structure of a test case using counterfactual machinery. We finish by considering the application of counterpossibles to mathematical explanation, and explore a second test case along these lines.

According to orthodoxy, the most fundamental kind of causation involves one event causing another event. I argue against this event‐causal view. Instead, the most fundamental kind of causation is thing causation, which involves a thing causing a thing to do something. Event causation is reducible to thing causation, but thing causation is not reducible to event causation, because event causation cannot accommodate cases of fine‐grained causation. I defend my view from objections, including C. D. Broad's influential “timing” argument, and I (...) conclude with implications for agent‐causal theories of free will. (shrink)

Why do we so often care about the outcomes of games when nothing is at stake? There is a paradox here, much like the paradox of fiction, which concerns why we care about the fates and threats of merely fictional beings. I argue that the paradox threatens to overturn a great deal of what philosophers have thought about caring, severing its connection to value and undermining its moral weight. I defend a solution to the paradox that draws on Kendall Walton's (...) solution to the paradox of fiction, developing his idea that it be extended to games. The solution takes games to involve make‐believe: in particular, players and spectators make‐believe that the outcome of the game matters. I also explore how the phenomenon extends beyond games. And I explore some moral implications: in particular, my view preserves the idea that we have reason not to impede others in their pursuit of what they care about. (shrink)

One of the major difficulties facing presentism is the problem of causation. In this paper, I propose a new solution to that problem, one that is compatible with intrinsic, fundamental causal relations. Accommodating relations of this kind is important because (i) according to David Lewis (2004), such relations are needed to account for causation in our world and worlds relevantly similar to our own, (ii) there is no other strategy currently available that successfully reconciles presentism with relations of this kind (...) and (iii) resolving the problem of causation by accommodating intrinsic, fundamental causal relations provides the presentist with a far more general solution to the problem of causation than those currently on offer. (shrink)

We develop a new version of the causal theory of spacetime. Whereas traditional versions of the theory seek to identify spatiotemporal relations with causal relations, the version we develop takes causal relations to be the grounds for spatiotemporal relations. Causation is thus distinct from, and more basic than, spacetime. We argue that this non-identity theory, suitably developed, avoids the challenges facing the traditional identity theory.

In folk psychology and some academic psychology, utilitarian thinking is associated with coldness and deontological thinking is associated with emotion. I suggest, mostly through personal examples, that these associations are far from perfect. Utilitarians experience emotions, which sometimes derive from, and sometimes cause or reinforce, their moral judgments.

Work in quantum gravity suggests that spacetime is not fundamental. Rather, spacetime emerges from an underlying, non-spatiotemporal reality. After clarifying the type of emergence at issue, I argue that standard conceptions of emergence available in metaphysics won’t work for the emergence of spacetime. I go on to consider spacetime functionalism as a way to make sense of spacetime emergence. I argue that a functionalist approach to spacetime modelled on mental state functionalism is not a viable alternative to the standard conception (...) of emergence in metaphysics. I go on to consider an alternative: ‘partial’ functionalism, whereby certain aspects of spacetime are functionalised, rather than spacetime as a whole. (shrink)

According to dialetheism, there are some true contradictions. According to the A-theory, the passage of time is a mind-independent feature of reality. On some A-theories, the passage of time involves the movement of the present. I show that by appealing to dialetheism one can explain why the present moves. I then argue that A-theorists should adopt this explanation. To do this, I defend two claims. First, that the dialetheic explanation is an improvement on the only other explanation available for why (...) the present moves and, second, that adopting the explanation is better than leaving the motion of the present unexplained. Assuming that A- theorists should adopt the best available version of their view, it follows that they should adopt a dialetheic explanation of why time passes. (shrink)

Surrogacy and adoption are both family-making measures subject to extensive domestic and international regulation. In this nationally representative survey study (N = 1552), we explore public attitudes to various forms of surrogacy and adoption in the United Kingdom, in response to an early proposal to allow “double donor” surrogacy as part of the ongoing legal reform project. We sought to both gauge public moral support for adoption and surrogacy generally, the effect that prospective parents’ fertility had on this support, and (...) the extent to which the public would find equivalencies between “double donor” surrogacy (DDS) and planned private adoption (PPA) to be morally significant. Our findings indicate that whilst there is broad baseline support for all forms of adoption and surrogacy, this support increases significantly when one or both prospective parents are infertile. These findings also suggest that the language in which a family-making arrangement is characterized has a greater influence on moral support for the arrangement than practical features such as the biological relationship (or absence thereof) between one/both parents and the child. (shrink)

Background: The vascular depression hypothesis emphasizes the significance of vascular lesions in late-life depression. At present, no meta-analytic model has investigated whether a difference in hyperintensity burden compared to controls between late-life and late-onset depression is evident. By including a substantial number of studies, focusing on a meaningful outcome measure, and considering several moderating and control variables, the present meta-analysis investigates the severity of hyperintensity burden in major depressive disorder (MDD) and bipolar disorder (BD). A major focus of the present (...) meta-analysis refers to the role of age at illness onset. It is analyzed whether late-onset rather than late-life depression characterizes vascular depression. Method: In total, 68 studies were included in the meta-analysis and a multilevel random effects model was calculated using Hedges’ g as the effect size measure. Results: The severity of hyperintensity burden was significantly greater in the patient group compared to the control group. This effect was evident regarding the whole patient group (g = 0.229) as well as both depression subgroups, with a significantly greater effect in BD (g = 0.374) compared to MDD (g = 0.189). Hyperintensity burden was more pronounced in late-onset depression than in early-onset depression or late-life depression. A considerable heterogeneity between the included studies was observed, which is reflected by the large variability in effects sizes. Conclusion: In conclusion, the present meta-analysis underscores the association of hyperintensities with MDD and BD. Especially late-onset depression is associated with an increased hyperintensity burden, which is in line with the vascular depression hypothesis. The results suggest that it might be more feasible to confine the concept of vascular depression specifically to late-onset depression as opposed to late-life depression. Further research is needed to understand the causal mechanisms that might underlie the relation between hyperintensity burden and depression. (shrink)

Recent work on quantum gravity suggests that neither spacetime nor spatiotemporally located entites exist at a fundamental level. The loss of both brings with it the threat of empirical incoherence. A theory is empirically incoherent when the truth of that theory undermines the empirical justification for believing it. If neither spacetime nor spatiotemporally located entities exist as a part of a fundamental theory of QG, then such a theory seems to imply that there are no observables and so no way (...) that the theory can be confirmed. The threat of empirical incoherence can be addressed by treating spacetime and spatiotemporally located entities as emergent. The question then arises as to what the metaphysical nature of this emergence might be. In this paper, I explore a functionalist approach to this kind of emergence in the context of loop quantum gravity. I begin by rehearsing the spacetime functionalist’s account of emergence, clarifying the view along the way. I proceed to sketch out a functionalist treatment of spatiotemporally located entities and combine the two forms of functionalism into a double functionalism, according to which both spacetime and matter have the same functional realisers. (shrink)

The great powers of regeneration shown by freshwater planarians, capable of regenerating a complete organism from any tiny body fragment, have attracted the interest of scientists throughout history. In 1814, Dalyell concluded that planarians could “almost be called immortal under the edge of the knife”. Equally impressive is the developmental plasticity of these platyhelminthes, including continuous growth and fission (asexual reproduction) in well‐fed organisms, and shrinkage (degrowth) during prolonged starvation. The source of their morphological plasticity and regenerative capability is a (...) stable population of totipotent stem cells—“neoblasts”; this is the only cell type in the adult that has mitotic activity and differentiates into all cell types. This cellular feature is unique to planarians in the Bilateria clade. Over the last fifteen years, molecular studies have begun to reveal the role of developmental genes in regeneration, although it would be premature to propose a molecular model for planarian regeneration. Genomic and proteomic data are essential in answering some of the fundamental questions concerning this remarkable morphological plasticity. Such information should also pave the way to understanding the genetic pathways associated with metazoan somatic stem‐cell regulation and pattern formation. BioEssays 28: 546–559, 2006. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

This book focuses on the history and theories relating to case study methodology. It also examines the implications of utilizing case studies in university settings and explores how case studies prepare professionals for real-life career-related scenarios.

1. Da Leibniz a Kant.--2. L'algebra della logica.

Justifications and excuses are defenses that exculpate. They are therefore much more like each other than like such defenses as diplomatic immunity, which does not exculpate. But they exculpate in different ways, and it has proven difficult to agree on just what that difference consists in. In this paper I take a step back from justification and excuse as concepts in criminal law, and look at the concepts as they arise in everyday life. To keep the task manageable, I focus (...) primarily on excuses and excusing activities, distinguishing them from justifications as well as from other close relatives, in particular, forgiving and pardoning. I draw upon J.L. Austin’s classic A Plea for Excuses, but expand on his account, suggesting that we offer excuses for reasons besides those he mentions. My hope is that my examination of excuses and excusing activities will help us rethink our views on just how justifications and excuses differ, views which often are worked out without much attention to how these concepts function in everyday life and to the connection between offers of excuses and justifications and the rules of civility. (shrink)

What is intelligence? Can it be increased by teaching? If so, how, and what difference would an increase make? Before we can answer these questions, we need to clarify them. Jonathan Baron argues that when we do so we find that intelligence has much to do with rational thinking, and that the skills involved in rational thinking are in fact teachable, at least to some extent. Rationality and Intelligence develops and justifies a prescriptive theory of rational thinking in terms (...) of utility theory and the theory of rational life plans. The prescriptive theory, buttressed by other assumptions, suggests that people generally think too little and in a way that is insufficiently critical of the initial possibilities that occur to them. However these biases can be - and sometimes are - corrected by education. (shrink)