Beauchamp and Childress here collaborate to provide a set of action-guides or principles which in their judgment apply to a wide range of biomedical problems. Their work consists of eight chapters and two appendices. In the first two chapters attention centers on the nature of a moral dilemma and moral reasoning and on types of normative ethical theories. Chapters 3 through 6 discuss the principles of autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence, and justice, while chapters 7 and 8 deal, respectively, with the professional-patient (...) relationship and with the role that virtues, ideals, personal integrity, and conscience have to play in the moral life. Appendix I provides twenty-nine case studies illustrating dilemmas in biomedical ethics, and reference to those studies is made throughout the text. Appendix II gives the texts of important biomedical codes of ethics. (shrink)

The title of Hopkins’ book is apt in at least two ways. First, it is a "companion"—a book which is best read in conjunction with a serious reading of Anselm’s works. Hopkins states that his book is "envisioned primarily as a handbook for students", but that is true in the sense that Taylor’s book on Plato or Gilson’s books on Augustine, Bonaventure, and Aquinas could be said to be intended for students. Secondly, it is a study of practically all of (...) Anselm’s philosophical and theological contributions. The only significant work that is not treated in some detail is De Grammatico, a lacuna which is understandable in light of the complex and recondite nature of that dialogue: one either says nothing or very much about it. There are chapters on the unity and chronology of and the historical influences on Anselm’s works; the role of faith and reason in Anselm; the Ontological Argument; Anselm’s writings on the nature of the Trinity and the relations between the three persons; Anselm on human nature, truth, freedom of choice, and evil; and Anselm on the necessity of the Incarnation, Christology, and original sin. There are two appendices: one consisting of a translation of Ein neues unvollendetes Werk..., and the other on "Anselm’s Methods of Arguing." There is also a very helpful sixteen-page bibliography. One of the valuable side features of the book is the wealth of references to the works of Augustine. Southern’s Saint Anselm and His Biographer, Henry’s The Logic of Saint Anselm, and Hopkins’ Companion all approach Anselm from different perspectives, and lay emphasis on different issues, but they are the three most important books on the historical, philosophical, and theological Anselm in English.-W.E.M. (shrink)

Subtitled "Ideas and Arguments from Plato to Sartre," this volume is intended, as are many others, to serve both as a textbook for introductory courses in philosophy and as an introduction to philosophic thinking. One of its goals, and one admirably achieved, is to provide some hearing both to all the very greatest figures in the history of western philosophy and to some major opposing traditions. No one can read the volume and fail to grasp something of the content and (...) spirit in the work of such men as Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Descartes, Hume, Kant, Wittgenstein and others. What makes Flew's work creative and original is a combination of factors. First of all, he combines in a very stimulating and integral way two methods commonly adopted in works of this kind, namely representative selections from original sources and expository and critical commentary. Almost one half of the work consists of material taken from the primary sources, but these selections are not set off in large chunks interspersed with commentary. Rather they are worked into the text to illustrate the thrust of the arguments and ideas involved, and thus we find Hobbes' militant manifesto of metaphysical materialism confronting the Eleatic Stranger's argument for the existence of "certain incorporeal Forms which are objects of the mind" in The Sophist, Hume's views on finality contrasted with the argument developed by Aquinas in his fifth way, and Frege's polemic against confusing the logical with the psychological set opposite the arguments of Locke concerning the meaning of human understanding. In addition, in offering his own critical comment Flew deliberately seeks to set forth his own conclusions even in areas that have been and are controversial. Thus the work is by no means an impersonal account but conveys something of the enthusiasm and excitement that the author experiences in trying to forge sound arguments and assess the soundness of arguments advanced by others--and this, for Flew, is the principal work of the philosopher. One could argue over many of the nuances that Flew's way of proceeding gives to the meaning of the philosophies discussed, but this in no way detracts from the value of this stimulating and exceptionally informative introduction.--W. E. M. (shrink)

The purpose of this work is to supply readers, and the author has in mind chiefly college students, with a competent and objective presentation and reasoned evaluation of the major conflicting "philosophies of life" current in the contemporary world. The work opens with a chapter dealing with the "moral climate" of our day. Binkley sees this as a climate typified by the demise of traditional certitudes and the emergence of a relativistic attitude toward human values, a relativism that received its (...) most sustained treatment at the hands of Edward Westermarck. He sees it likewise as permeated by a pragmatic mind concerned with workable and realizable goals, not with eternal certitudes. And he sees it, finally, as a climate in which many are seeking to establish new ultimates to take the place of those that have been the victims of a new understanding of man and the universe. In subsequent chapters Binkley examines in some detail the philosophies of life or value systems competing for man’s allegiance today. Among these he includes the following: the communist vision of Marx, the psychoanalytic humanism of Freud and Fromm, the Kierkegaardian projection of the authentic Christian and Nietzsche’s proposal of the Overman who creates his own values, the humanistic existentialism of Sartre, and the religious existentialism advocated by Barth, Tillich, and such advocates of the "new morality" as Bishop Robinson and Joseph Fletcher. Finally, he examines the meta-ethical views of men such as Toulmin and Hare, discerning in their proposals some useful therapeutic devices for making some kind of intelligent choice among the competing value systems presented to contemporary man. In a final chapter Binkley stresses that the choice of a way of a life, of a basic moral posture, is a choice that only the individual can make after careful consideration and evaluation of pertinent data. All in all, his is a very useful and intelligent work, packed with information.—W. E. M. (shrink)

In this intelligently constructed and clearly written work readers will discover a worthwhile discussion of man as a moral being. Central to the position developed by the authors is the notion that men are capable of freely determining their own lives through their own choices. The work begins by analyzing the notion of freedom and by distinguishing the freedom of self-determination, the basic freedom that makes man to be a moral being, from other types of freedom, e.g., freedom from external (...) coercion, freedom to do as one pleases, political freedom. A self-referential argument is directed against determinism. (shrink)

This volume by a political scientist has important implications for the philosopher, in particular the ethicist. Schall recognizes the urgency for men to come to grips intelligently and realistically with the issues associated with population control and ecology, but he argues that the central issue at stake is the meaning of man himself. Schall argues that in general in the western philosophical tradition nature is not its own norm but serves a necessary though functional relation to man. Man is the (...) norm of the natural, not vice versa. Man, because of his power of reflective thought and freedom of choice, has been regarded as in some way unique and superior to other beings. In this tradition lower animals and inanimate nature were directly related to man as his natural supports inasmuch as man could know and use them. The world of animals and non-living nature was accorded respect, but this respect was ultimately a respect for man, who, because of his intelligence, could understand this world and improve it. In addition, in this tradition each human being was regarded as something valuable in himself, with a right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; he was not regarded as a pure function or instrument of a larger whole, the human species, expendable if he lost his functional utility. Finally, in this tradition man was regarded as essentially two-sexed, male and female, with human offspring begotten by a union of a human male and a human female and brought to maturity and nurtured in a human family. Today, Schall notes, all these characteristics thought historically to constitute man as a distinct being in nature are being seriously challenged and brought into question. Joshua Lederberg, Charles Galton Darwin, Julian Huxley, Eugene P. Odum, Lynn White, Jean Rostand, and many other biologists, geneticists, zoologists and others are urging a new view of man, a view that subordinates the individual to the species, the species to the world of nature, a view that radically separates human sexuality from human reproductivity. What results basically is a new image of what constitutes a "good" man. The good man, in this view, is not the person who has achieved moral goodness as a result of moral choices taken personally by him in the companionship of his fellow men but is rather the result of genetic or behavioral control exercised by an elite during the process of his coming to be and growing to maturity. This well-documented work, despite occasional rhetorical overstatements, merits careful consideration by philosophers today.--W. E. M. (shrink)

The two interpretations with which La Croix is dissatisfied are 1) the traditional view, which focuses exclusively on St. Anselm’s argument for the existence of God in Proslogion II; and 2) the newer view, championed by Hartshorne and Malcolm, which claims that the argument in Proslogion III supercedes the material in Proslogion II, and is immune from the traditional criticisms. Neither view is correct, La Croix argues, because both assume that Proslogion II and III are logically separable. La Croix places (...) extreme emphasis on Anselm’s assertion in the Preface to the Proslogion that he found "one argument" by means of which he could prove both that God exists and that God possesses the traditional divine attributes. According to La Croix, the overall structure of the Proslogion is to show first, in chapters II and III, that that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-conceived exists, and then, in the subsequent chapters, that that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-conceived is God, i.e., has the various perfections traditionally ascribed to God. The major task of the book is to argue that neither chapter II nor chapter III contains a "logically complete and independent" argument for the existence of that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-conceived, but that taken together, they provide the premises for the propositions that that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-conceived exists, cannot be thought not to exist, and cannot not exist. Moreover, La Croix argues that there are no new arguments presented in Anselm’s Reply to Gaunilo: all the apparently new arguments merely make explicit what was left implicit in the Proslogion. As one can guess from these few remarks, there is much to quarrel with in La Croix’s book, but that is a never-ending feature of historical interpretation, and one can certainly sympathize with La Croix’s complaints against the other two interpretations. Unfortunately, La Croix relies on the Charlesworth translation of the Proslogion and the Reply, a translation which is not to be used without great care.—W. E. M. (shrink)

This anthology is intended primarily to provide students of theology with some of the basic writings of the major thinkers who have contributed to the development of the movement known as "process theology." Because of the content students of philosophy will likewise find it useful. The editor begins the work with an introduction in which he ably traces in broad perspective the various ways in which a mental attitude stressing process is reflected in contemporary culture, philosophy, and theology. The first (...) part of the volume then provides essays that center on process thought as this has emerged from the writings of Alfred North Whitehead and his American disciples. Two essays in this part are concerned with tracing the development of process thought, the one by Norman Pittenger centering on its historical evolution from Whitehead through Hartshorne and others into a distinct theological movement, whereas the one by Charles Hartshorne is concerned with the inner development of process thought as a noetic capable of dealing with relational reality. In other essays in this part Bernard Meland comments on the value of process thought in providing an imagery and concepts congenial to contemporary man in his struggle to understand his experience, and Bernard M. Loomer examines in detail the empirical basis and methodology central to Whitehead’s philosophy. The essays in the second part focus on the relationship between God and the world as this relationship is interpreted by process thinkers. Here selections include the final chapter of Whitehead’s Process and Reality, Hartshorne’s suggestive account of the philosophical and religious uses of the term "God," Schubert Ogden’s attempt to defend a concept of God modeled on process thought as more conformable to biblical testimony than the concept of God classical in Christian thought, Walter Stoke’s endeavor to integrate features of process thought within a more Thomistic framework relative to the being of God, and two essays by Daniel Day Williams and John B. Cobb, Jr. on the relationship between God and world and God and man. Essays in the third part, called "Christ and Redemption," reflect the efforts of three Whiteheadian-inspired theologians, Meland, Pittenger, and Henry Nelson Wieman, to rethink the Christian doctrine of the incarnation within the framework provided by process thought. In the fourth part of the work attention is directed from Whitehead to another major source of contemporary process theology, Teilhard de Chardin. The essays include Theodosius Dobzhansky’s lengthy critical appreciation of the major directions in Teilhard’s vision of the universe, Teilhard’s own views on a cosmic Christology, a development of his views on this topic by Henri de Lubac, and other studies of aspects of Teilhard’s thought by N. M. Wildiers, George Crespy, and Christopher F. Mooney. An appendix includes a comparative study of the metaphysics of Teilhard and Whitehead by Ian G. Barbour. A useful bibliography completes the anthology.—W. E. M. (shrink)

Bernard Lonergan is a Jesuit philosopher-theologian whose work is having an increasing influence, particularly on those concerned with identifying the nature of theological reflection and its relation to other areas of human inquiry. The purpose of this volume is to introduce a broader philosophical and theological audience to the world of Lonergan's thought. This world is principally characterized by Lonergan's notion of horizon-analysis. Perhaps the best way to explain what this means is to link it to Lonergan's view that man (...) is a being who can ask questions. Questions that he can raise and answer constitute the known. Questions that he can raise but cannot answer as yet constitute the known unknown, the docta ignorantia. There are still other questions, meaningful in themselves. that man, because of his historical situation, cannot even raise simply because they are not meaningful for him, and these constitute the unknown unknown, the indocta ignorantia. An horizon marks the boundary between the known unknown and the unknown unknown, that is, it provides the maximum field of knowledge available within the range of questions possible within a given methodological structure. A new horizon, that is, a new field of knowledge, emerges when a new kind of consciousness with an implicit new kind of method which makes it possible for a man to ask questions that previously were meaningless for him. Lonergan's work has been a careful attempt, based on horizon-analysis, to investigate the possibilities for metaphysical and theological understanding. Tracy, in setting forth as comprehensively as possible the full range of Lonergan's work, shows how his early studies of Thomas Aquinas focused on the centrality in the Thomistic noetic of the dynamic character of the act of knowing, an act that is not one of confrontation with an object but one of identity-in-being, of a deepening interiority making it possible for new questions to become meaningful. In his major epistemological study, Insight, Lonergan sought to show how the scientific method and the critical movement in philosophy were of crucial significance in providing new horizons for the question-asking being, man, whose dynamic interiority grounds a metaphysics and whose dynamism prolonged into doing grounds an ethics. The later Lonergan, the Lonergan of the post-Insight period, is the Lonergan who is seeking to discover how a new historical consciousness, a consciousness distinct from that of "classical" man, provides a new horizon for asking questions of philosophical and theological import. Thus Lonergan's major concern today is with method, that is, with a normative pattern of recurrent operations resulting in cumulative and progressive results. Through horizon-analysis Lonergan is currently seeking "to move fully and coherently from... a notion of theology as 'reason illuminated by faith' to 'method illuminated by faith'." Because Lonergan has significant things to say about human knowledge and because his highly original approach has affinities to developments in phenomenology and linguistic analysis, this patient and painstaking introduction to his thought should be of value to many contemporary philosophers.--W. E. M. (shrink)

Van der Poel’s book is a relatively comprehensive essay in ethics or, more properly, moral theology, providing outlines of a theological anthropology necessary for understanding man as a moral agent, a suggested process for determining the value of human actions, a consideration of conscience, and a discussion of virtue and vice. Van der Poel lays great stress on man’s historicity and the conditioned nature of moral laws and principles. He likewise attacks a naive dualism and proposes a view of man (...) influenced to considerable extent by contemporary existential phenomenology. The thought of Merleau-Ponty is quite strongly reflected in the anthropology proposed. Perhaps the most original section of the work is the one dealing with the evaluation of man’s moral acts. Van der Poel sharply distinguishes between the "material result" or physical activity and the agent’s intention and maintains that the "human reality" of the act is an interpenetration of these two aspects and that its moral worth is ultimately to be judged by "its impact upon the well-being of the individual and the human society." This view seems to have some kinship with utilitarian ethics, for it seems to make the final criterion of moral activity rest in its consequences. The comments of Paul Ramsey concerning the function of an "exception-making criterion" seem applicable to Van der Poel’s analysis of moral activity, and his way of describing human acts seems open to the same kind of criticism that Eric D'Arcy applied to the extreme utilitarianism of J. J. C. Smart in his Moral Acts: An Essay in their Evaluation.—W. E. M. (shrink)

Contextual learning pervades our perception and cognition and plays a critical role in adjusting to aversive and stressful events. Our ability to memorise spatial context has been studied extensive...

Humans do two types of actions, polimorphic actions and mimeomorphic actions. The ability to carry out polimorphic actions cannot be mastered outside of socialization. Mimeomorphic actions, however, can be learned in other ways; sometimes, they can be learned away from the context of practice. Polimorphic actions cannot be mimicked by machines, but some mimeomorphic actions can. Other mimeomorphic actions are too complex to mechanize. Actions that cannot be mechanized because they are physically complicated should not be confused with actions that (...) cannot be mechanized because socialization is needed to master them. The analysis has implications for recent debates concerning the differences and similarities between humans and machines. The implica tion of the analysis is that much more can be understood about the relationship between humans and machines if the difference is treated as being a consequence of the unique properties of human societies. In this article, the analysis is applied to cardiac catheteriza tion, pacemaker implantation, simulation of bodies, and work in a medical "SkillsLab.". (shrink)

Paperback. What has happened to the science of Logic, as an academic discipline and pursuit? The diagnoses do not coincide, but the recognition is growing that since the days of Mill, Russell or Beth, something has gone wrong. A logical vacuum - theoretical as well as practical - in large parts of contemporary culture is easily perceived and is particularly visible in politicis, precisely where logic as a science ought to make its greatest impact.The present volume offers analyses and reflections (...) of various types, written by logicians and other analytical philosophers. Some analyse the logic of political activists and thinkers, or the political thought of a logician. Other chapters offer concrete logico-analytical studies of burning political issues of our time, emphasizing the possibilities for an advancement of logic in, and through parliamentary debate, and of the problems connected with this goal. The final part of the book looks at possib. (shrink)

Knowledge about moral development and elderly persons is very limited. A hermeneutical interpretative study was conducted with healthy elderly persons in order to explore and describe their moral orientation based on the paradigms of justice and care . The types of moral reasoning, dominance, alignment and orientation were determined. All but one participant included both types of reasoning when discussing an ethical conflict. None of the men’s moral reasoning was dominated by caring, but justice dominated the reasoning of four women. (...) The implications for ethical decision-making and future research are discussed. (shrink)

At some time around August 324b.c., Antipater, the regent of Macedonia received orders from Alexander the Great that he was to be replaced with another eminent officer in the Macedonian court, Craterus. In addition to his removal from office, Antipater was ordered by Alexander to leave Macedonia for the East, bringing with him fresh levies to replenish those that comprised Craterus' own contingent of veterans from Opis. Though Craterus left Alexander's court shortly thereafter, neither man can be said to have (...) made the journey speedily or directly. A range of reasons has been given to explain Craterus' slow advancement, including the construction of infrastructure to allow the transportation of military resources from east to west, the poor state of his health, and the need to recruit more men. By the time of Alexander's death in June of 323, Craterus and his forces had only reached the province of Cilicia in southeastern Anatolia. Antipater's immediate reaction to his new role is not recorded, but what is known is that he remained steadfast in Macedonia, seemingly in defiance of Alexander's orders. It is the purpose of this paper to evaluate Antipater's refusal to depart from Macedonia, to explore whether tensions between Antipater and his replacement could account for Craterus' sluggish advance and to highlight the impact that Greek domestic politics had on Antipater's position in Macedonia. (shrink)

The integration of digital phenotyping in psychiatry promises unprecedented insights into mental health, particularly in college settings where mental well-being is a growing concern. The COVID-19...

This study explores the relationship between moral intensity and the use of different sensemaking strategies in military critical incidents. First, narratives of military personnel were used to select prototypical high/low moral intensity critical incidents. In a follow-up, a scenario study was conducted with active duty military personnel to examine the relationship between moral intensity and the use of sensemaking tactics. This study offers three main conclusions. First, the use of sensemaking tactics is strongly tied to the level of moral intensity (...) in the situation. In high-intense situations, the servicemen draw on previous experiences, prediction of consequences, and help of others to recognize and interpret the situation. Less attention goes out to higher level critical thinking. Thus, it seems that in these critical incidents, the servicemen react without giving room for thorough consideration and deliberation. Second, the number of deployments a serviceman experienced influences the perceived seriousness and harmfulness of the situation negatively in low-intense situations. Finally, and in line with earlier studies, the results indicate that the concept of moral intensity is formed out of three rather than the six dimensions originally proposed by Jones. The implications of these findings are discussed. (shrink)

Scientific authority and physician authority are both challenged by Thomas Kuhn's concept of incommensurability. If competing “paradigms” or “world views” cannot rationally be compared, we have no means to judge the truth of any particular view. However, the notion of local or partial incommensurability might provide a framework for understanding the implications of contemporary philosophy of science for medicine. We distinguish four steps in the process of translating medical science into clinical decisions: the doing of the science, the appropriation of (...) the scientific findings by the clinician, the transfer of the findings from the clinician to the patient, and the choice of a treatment regimen. Incommensurability can play a role in each stage. There is at least some theory- and value-ladenness in science that is dependent on the world view of those who construct the scientific theories. Clinicians who must use the results of scientific research will inevitably interpret the research from the standpoint of their own world view. There may be further incommensurability when these data are communicated to the patient. Finally, clinician and patient values must come into play in any decision about choice of treatment. No stage of medical research or practice is value-free. This position does not imply relativism; some scientific accounts are better than others. However, the challenge of the incommensurabilists shows that further analysis is needed to establish how particular accounts are better or worse. (shrink)

Van der Poel’s book is a relatively comprehensive essay in ethics or, more properly, moral theology, providing outlines of a theological anthropology necessary for understanding man as a moral agent, a suggested process for determining the value of human actions, a consideration of conscience, and a discussion of virtue and vice. Van der Poel lays great stress on man’s historicity and the conditioned nature of moral laws and principles. He likewise attacks a naive dualism and proposes a view of man (...) influenced to considerable extent by contemporary existential phenomenology. The thought of Merleau-Ponty is quite strongly reflected in the anthropology proposed. Perhaps the most original section of the work is the one dealing with the evaluation of man’s moral acts. Van der Poel sharply distinguishes between the "material result" or physical activity and the agent’s intention and maintains that the "human reality" of the act is an interpenetration of these two aspects and that its moral worth is ultimately to be judged by "its impact upon the well-being of the individual and the human society." This view seems to have some kinship with utilitarian ethics, for it seems to make the final criterion of moral activity rest in its consequences. The comments of Paul Ramsey concerning the function of an "exception-making criterion" seem applicable to Van der Poel’s analysis of moral activity, and his way of describing human acts seems open to the same kind of criticism that Eric D'Arcy applied to the extreme utilitarianism of J. J. C. Smart in his Moral Acts: An Essay in their Evaluation.—W. E. M. (shrink)

This article is part of a For-Discussion-Section of Methods of Information in Medicine about the paper "Biomedical Informatics: We Are What We Publish", written by Peter L. Elkin, Steven H. Brown, and Graham Wright. It is introduced by an editorial. This article contains the combined commentaries invited to independently comment on the Elkin et al. paper. In subsequent issues the discussion can continue through letters to the editor.

In modern approaches to phonology a lack of clarity exists on the issue of whether phonetic facts are psychological or physical realities. The results from an experiment suggest that phonetic facts can be considered as psychological realities, but with the restriction that they can take acoustical shape. More specifically, the syntactic material consisted of ambiguous French sentences of the following sort: On a tourné ce film intéressant pour les étudiants. They were spoken in disambiguating contexts, without the readers noticing the (...) ambiguities, and without context, but with the instruction to make a conscious effort to disambiguate. By tape splicing, the contexts were removed from the context-embedded sentences. Twenty-eight native speakers of French listened to the sentences and judged whether one or the other meaning had been intended by the speaker. Subjects performed significantly above chance: 60% correct identifications for context-embedded sentences, 75% for context-free sentences. Pitch-amplitude analyses were made to determine the acoustical differences involved. (shrink)