The author replies to ronald suter's "russell's 'refutation' of meinong in 'on denoting'," "philosophy and phenomenological research," june, 1967. suter's interpretation of one of russell's arguments is criticized on exegetical grounds, and his defense of another argument is rebutted on logical grounds. meinong's thesis is presented as the thesis that all statements of a certain form are true. it is argued that all of russell's arguments are attempts to pose counter-examples to this single view. meinong is defended (...) against russell's counter-examples. (shrink)

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THIS PAPER DISCUSSES TWO THINGS. FIRST, STRAWSON'S EXPLANATION IN "ON REFERRING" ("MIND," 1950) WHY TWO USES OF SENTENCES OF THE FORM NN=NN MUST DIFFER FROM THOSE OF THE FORM NN=THE F, WHERE 'NN' AND 'THE F' ARE PROPER NAMES AND DEFINITE DESCRIPTIONS, RESPECTIVELY. IT IS SHOWN THAT HIS ACCOUNT OF THE MATTER HAS UNACCEPTABLE CONSEQUENCES. SECONDLY, IT IS DEMONSTRATED THAT HIS EXPLANATION OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SENTENCES OF THE FORM NN=THE F AND THOSE OF THE FORM NN IS (AN) F (...) IS EVEN LESS SATISFACTORY. STRAWSON'S CONFUSIONS HERE DERIVE CHIEFLY FROM HIS NOTION OF A 'PRESUPPOSITION'. (shrink)

HINTIKKA ("COGITO, ERGO SUM: INFERENCE OR PERFORMANCE?") WISHES TO REJECT (1) IF B(A) THEN THERE EXISTS X SUCH THAT X=A, POINTING OUT THAT IT WOULD CEASE TO BE PROVABLE IN QUANTIFICATION THEORY IF LOGICIANS DROPPED THE DUBIOUS ASSUMPTION THAT (2) ALL THE SINGULAR TERMS WITH WHICH WE HAVE TO DEAL DESIGNATE SOME ACTUALLY EXISTING INDIVIDUAL. HE ALSO ARGUES FOR THE FALSITY OF (3) THINKING ENTAILS EXISTENCE. WILLIAMS ("THE CERTAINTY OF THE COGITO") CONTENDS THAT DESCARTES INFERRED 'I EXIST' FROM 'I THINK' (...) USING (4) 'B(A)' PRESUPPOSES THAT THERE EXISTS X SUCH THAT X=A AS HIS PRINCIPLE OF INFERENCE. IN THIS PAPER, THE AUTHOR SHOWS WHY (3) SHOULD BE AFFIRMED AND (1), (2), AND (4) REJECTED. WHILE HE THUS AGREES WITH HINTIKKA AND WILLIAMS THAT APPEAL TO OUR LOWER FUNCTIONAL CALCULI FAILS TO EXPLAIN THE NECESSITY OF THE CONNECTION BETWEEN 'COGITO' AND 'SUM', HE OFFERS AN ALTERNATIVE ACCOUNT OF WHY 'SUM' IS NEVERTHELESS A LOGICAL CONSEQUENCE OF 'COGITO'. (EDITED). (shrink)

Saul Kripke is struck by a skeptical argument which he says is neither Wittgenstein’s nor his own. I call this new skeptic “Saul Wittgenstein”. SW’s conclusion is that there is no such thing as following a rule. My first aim is to show that Kripke misunderstands the Investigations when he says it offers a “skeptical solution” to SW’s paradox. Wittgenstein’s view of philosophy commits him to a dissolution of the paradox. I show next that LW’s writing contains an implicit dissolution (...) of it. Finally, I point out the main lesson to be derived from Kripke’s discussion--namely, that there is nothing which is common and peculiar to what we call following a rule. (shrink)

Saul Kripke is struck by a skeptical argument which he says is neither Wittgenstein’s nor his own. I call this new skeptic “Saul Wittgenstein”. SW’s conclusion is that there is no such thing as following a rule. My first aim is to show that Kripke misunderstands the Investigations when he says it offers a “skeptical solution” to SW’s paradox. Wittgenstein’s view of philosophy commits him to a dissolution of the paradox. I show next that LW’s writing contains an implicit dissolution (...) of it. Finally, I point out the main lesson to be derived from Kripke’s discussion--namely, that there is nothing which is common and peculiar to what we call following a rule. (shrink)

Saul Kripke is struck by a skeptical argument which he says is neither Wittgenstein’s nor his own. I call this new skeptic “Saul Wittgenstein”. SW’s conclusion is that there is no such thing as following a rule. My first aim is to show that Kripke misunderstands the Investigations when he says it offers a “skeptical solution” to SW’s paradox. Wittgenstein’s view of philosophy commits him to a dissolution of the paradox. I show next that LW’s writing contains an implicit dissolution (...) of it. Finally, I point out the main lesson to be derived from Kripke’s discussion--namely, that there is nothing which is common and peculiar to what we call following a rule. (shrink)

THE AUTHOR REPLIES TO RONALD SUTER'S "RUSSELL'S\n'REFUTATION' OF MEINONG IN 'ON DENOTING'," "PHILOSOPHY AND\nPHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH," JUNE, 1967. SUTER'S\nINTERPRETATION OF ONE OF RUSSELL'S ARGUMENTS IS CRITICIZED\nON EXEGETICAL GROUNDS, AND HIS DEFENSE OF ANOTHER ARGUMENT\nIS REBUTTED ON LOGICAL GROUNDS. MEINONG'S THESIS IS\nPRESENTED AS THE THESIS THAT ALL STATEMENTS OF A CERTAIN\nFORM ARE TRUE. IT IS ARGUED THAT ALL OF RUSSELL'S ARGUMENTS\nARE ATTEMPTS TO POSE COUNTER-EXAMPLES TO THIS SINGLE VIEW.\nMEINONG IS DEFENDED AGAINST RUSSELL'S COUNTER-EXAMPLES.

This is the first publication of these ideas in book form. 'It is a rare treat--important, original philosophy that is also a pleasure to read.

This chapter contains section titled: Part I Part II Part III Part IV.

Many people assume that the claims of scientists are objective truths. But historians, sociologists, and philosophers of science have long argued that scientific claims reflect the particular historical, cultural, and social context in which those claims were made. The nature of scientific knowledge is not absolute because it is influenced by the practice and perspective of human agents. Scientific Perspectivism argues that the acts of observing and theorizing are both perspectival, and this nature makes scientific knowledge contingent, as Thomas Kuhn (...) theorized forty years ago. Using the example of color vision in humans to illustrate how his theory of “perspectivism” works, Ronald N. Giere argues that colors do not actually exist in objects; rather, color is the result of an interaction between aspects of the world and the human visual system. Giere extends this argument into a general interpretation of human perception and, more controversially, to scientific observation, conjecturing that the output of scientific instruments is perspectival. Furthermore, complex scientific principles—such as Maxwell’s equations describing the behavior of both the electric and magnetic fields—make no claims about the world, but models based on those principles can be used to make claims about specific aspects of the world. Offering a solution to the most contentious debate in the philosophy of science over the past thirty years, Scientific Perspectivism will be of interest to anyone involved in the study of science. (shrink)

The underlying thesis of the research in ethical autonomy for lethal autonomous unmanned systems is that they will potentially be capable of performing more ethically on the battlefield than are human soldiers. In this article this hypothesis is supported by ongoing and foreseen technological advances and perhaps equally important by an assessment of the fundamental ability of human warfighters in today's battlespace. If this goal of better-than-human performance is achieved, even if still imperfect, it can result in a reduction in (...) noncombatant casualties and property damage consistent with adherence to the Laws of War as prescribed in international treaties and conventions, and is thus worth pursuing vigorously. (shrink)

In Dangerous Minds, Ronald Beiner traces the deeper philosophical roots of such far-right ideologues as Richard Spencer, Aleksandr Dugin, and Steve Bannon, to the writings of Nietzsche and Heidegger—and specifically to the aspects of their thought that express revulsion for the liberal-democratic view of life.

Despite both positive and negative perceptions of the current state of higher education, the contemporary debate over what it is to be a university is limited. Most of all, it is limited imaginatively. The range of imagined options is narrow. The imagination has not been given anything even approaching a wide scope. As a result, our sense as to what a university could be and could become in the modern age is itself impoverished. If we are seriously to develop a (...) wide range of ideas of the university that is adequate to the challenges of the modern world, the imagination itself needs to be freed. Imagining the University seeks to address each of these sets of issues and will do so by first, identifying a very wide range of ideas of the university as it is now unfolding and could become; secondly, by evaluating those conceptions of the university with a classification of ideas of the university; and thirdly, by reflecting on the imagination itself, its current impoverishment and its possibilities. Whether studying, researching or deciding policy, this book is vital reading to all those involved in the planning and delivery of higher education. (shrink)

Religious atheism? -- The universe -- Religious freedom -- Death and immortality.

All these specialist aspects of one life are different facets of the intellectual diamond which scintillates in the huge quarry of The Bertrand Russell Archives at McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario. This is the quintessential man, the bundle of contradictions passionately dedicated to intellect, at times carrying the rational argument to irrational extremes; the natural-born emotional adventurer forever hampered by orphaned youth and too-early marriage. This Russell in the round is greater than the sum of his constituent parts, a man of (...) epic proportions, struggling through a lifetime beset with frustration and near-disaster; in youth the constitutional sceptic, in old age the sometimes splendid figure with "courage never to submit or yield.". (shrink)

Inner speech is commonly understood as the conscious experience of a voice within the mind. One recurrent theme in the scientific literature is that the phenomenon involves a representation of overt speech, for example, a representation of phonetic properties that result from a copy of speech instructions that were ultimately suppressed. I propose a larger picture that involves some embodied objects and their misperception. I call it “the Body Error Theory,” or BET for short. BET is a form of illusionism, (...) but the particular version I favor is a cross-modal illusion. Newly described here, my hypothesis is that the experience of inner speech arises from a mix of interoception and audition. Specifically, there is the detection of slight but well-confirmed activities in the speech musculature that occur during inner speech, which helps to transform representations of normal but quiet nonverbal sounds that inevitably occur during inner speech, from breathing to background noise, into a mistaken perception of inner speech. Simply put, activities in the speech musculature mix with sounds to create the appearance of speech sounds, which thus explains the “voice within the mind.” I also show how BET’s cross-modal system fits with standard information processing accounts for speech monitoring and how it accommodates the central insights of leading theories of inner speech. In addition, I show how BET is supported by data from experience-sampling surveys and how it can be empirically tested against its rivals. (shrink)

The part that the university plays is increasingly of external and economic value, ignoring the importance of the value of knowledge in itself. By analyzing the university's current relationship with knowledge, this book tackles the problem head-on. It considers how the concept of knowledge can be reclaimed in an era of post truth and alternative fact, provides conceptual tools for people to think and debate about knowledge and education in new ways and offers a clear focus for the future development (...) of academia. This fascinating book is recommended reading to anyone engaged with the idea of rethinking universities in the 21st century. (shrink)

Meaning and communication -- Mighty dead: Kant and Hegel -- Scorekeeping -- Sentence meaning, term meaning, Anaphora -- Empirical content and empirical knowledge -- Logical discourse -- Representation and communication -- Objectivity and phenomenalism about norms.

Forty years ago, Vaughn Ball demonstrated that the then received notion of conditional relevance served no useful purpose, as it would only come into effect if the probability of an element were 0.0. But, if the probability of an element were 0.0, a directed verdict would be in order and so once again conditional relevancy was doing no work. I extended that analysis to include the relationship between proffers of evidence and facts of consequence to demonstrate that the work that (...) conditional relevancy was supposedly doing was isomorphic to that done by relevancy in all significant ways, and yet the Federal Rules of Evidence provide different standards for the two situations to determine admissibility. I thus proposed an amendment to FRE 104(b) to provide for the same standard to be applied to ‘relevancy’ and ‘conditional relevancy’. In a recent article, Matthew Kotzen appears to subject this work to intense scrutiny and criticism, yet at the same time reaches, so far as I can tell, identical conclusions. This raises the question, which I examine, whether this is an example of cross-disciplinary difficulties in communication. (shrink)

In this paper I explore the extent to which a perspectival understanding of scientific knowledge supports forms of “scientific pluralism.” I will not initially attempt to formulate a general characterization of either perspectivism or scientific pluralism. I assume only that both are opposed to two extreme views. The one extreme is a (monistic) metaphysical realism according to which there is in principle one true and complete theory of everything. The other extreme is a constructivist relativism according to which scientific claims (...) about any reality beyond that of ordinary experience are merely social conventions. (shrink)

Protein turnover (PT) has been formally defined only in equilibrium conditions, which is ill‐suited to quantify PT during dynamic processes that occur during embryogenesis or (extra) cellular signaling. In this Hypothesis, we propose a definition of PT in an out‐of‐equilibrium regime that allows the quantification of PT in virtually any biological context. We propose a simple mathematical and conceptual framework applicable to a broad range of available data, such as RNA sequencing coupled with pulsed‐SILAC datasets. We apply our framework to (...) a published dataset and show that stimulation of mouse dendritic cells with LPS leads to a proteome‐wide change in PT. This is the first quantification of PT out‐of‐equilibrium, paving the way for the analysis of biological systems in other contexts. (shrink)

Secularization has accelerated. From 1981 to 2007, most countries became more religious, but from 2007 to 2020, the overwhelming majority became less religious. For centuries, all major religions encouraged norms that limit women to producing as many children as possible and discourage any sexual behavior not linked with reproduction. These norms were needed when facing high infant mortality and low life expectancy but require suppressing strong drives, and are rapidly eroding. These norms are so strongly linked with religion that abandoning (...) them undermines religiosity. Religion became pervasive because it was conducive to survival, encouraged sharing when there was no social security system, and it is conducive to mental health and coping with insecure conditions. People need coherent belief systems, but religion is declining. What comes next? The Nordic countries have consistently been at the cutting edge of cultural change. Protestantism left an enduring imprint, but the 20th Century welfare added universal health coverage, high levels of state support for education, welfare spending, child care, pensions and an ethos of social solidarity. These countries are also characterized by rapidly declining religiosity. Does this portend corruption and nihilism? Apparently not. These countries lead the world on numerous indicators of a well-functioning society, including economic equality, gender equality, low homicide rates, subjective well-being, environmental protection and democracy. They have become less religious, but their people have high levels of interpersonal trust, tolerance, honesty, social solidarity and commitment to democratic norms. The decline of religiosity has far-reaching implications. This book explores what comes next. (shrink)

In this essay I argue that T. S. Kuhn, at least in his later works, can be regarded as a perspectival realist. This is a retrospective interpretation based mainly on the essays published posthumously under the title The Road Since Structure (Kuhn 2000). Among the strongest grounds for this interpretation is that Kuhn explicitly states that one must have a “lexicon” in place before raising questions about the truth or falsity of claims made using elements of the lexicon. This, in (...) a linguistic framework, can be understood as an affirmation of perspectival realism. The essay concludes with an examination of Donald Davidson’s famous paper, “On The Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme,” arguing, along lines Kuhn himself suggested, that Davidson’s presentation is no threat to his notion of a conceptual scheme, or, I would add, a theoretical perspective. (shrink)

Adopting the stage metaphor suggested in Brown’s review, and treating Scientific perspectivism as a play in five acts, I respond to his review as a playwright might respond to a generally favorable review. Taking the reader behind the stage door, I discuss the playwright’s intentions for each act, paying special attention to the expected audience for the play as a whole. The result, therefore, supplements the review from the standpoint of the playwright. It also provides answers to some of the (...) reviewer’s questions.Keywords: Matthew Brown; Scientific perspectivism. (shrink)

Talk of a “genetic program” has become almost as common in cell and evolutionary biology as talk of “genetic information”. But what is a genetic program? I understand the claim that an organism’s genome contains a program to mean that its genes not only carry information about which proteins to make, but also about the conditions in which to make them. I argue that the program description, while accurate in some respects, is ultimately misleading and should be abandoned. After that, (...) I sketch an alternative framework which is better suited to capturing the full informational nature of genes. This framework is centered on the notion of a signaling game, as originally developed by David Lewis, but expanded upon considerably by Brian Skyrms in more recent years. On the view I develop, genes turn out to be the producers and consumers of regulatory or developmental information, rather than entities encoding such information. This finding has consequences that link up with a broader debate in the philosophy of biology concerning inheritance systems. I take this to be one form of theoretical payoff that results from applying the signaling games framework to genes. (shrink)

Kritische beschouwingen over wijsgerig-ethische kwesties.

INTERVENTION AND REFLECTION: BASIC ISSUES IN BIOETHICS, 10th Edition offers students a compelling introduction to biomedical ethics by combining riveting human stories with clear explanations of cutting edge scientific research. A collaboration between a nationally-acclaimed bioethicist and a seasoned journalist, this textbook continues to be the most widely used bioethics textbook on the market. Each chapter includes crisp summaries of the relevant ethical theories as well as classic and contemporary articles on the most pressing topics in the field. This edition (...) features new chapters on "Medicine in a Pluralistic Society" and the "Challenge of Global Bioethics. The accessible presentation of the conceptual debate and human dimension of today's biomedical ethics captivates and engages students, whether they are philosophy, nursing or medical majors or have no philosophical or scientific training. (shrink)

Scientific realism is a doctrine that was both in and out of fashion several times during the twentieth century. I begin by noting three presuppositions of a succinct characterization of scientific realism offered initially by the foremost critic in the latter part of the century, Bas van Fraassen. The first presupposition is that there is a fundamental distinction to be made between what is “empirical” and what is “theoretical”. The second presupposition is that a genuine scientific realism is committed to (...) their being “a literally true story of what the world is like”. The third presupposition is that there are methods for justifying a belief in the empirical adequacy of a theory which do not also suffice to justify beliefs in its literal truth. Each of these presuppositions raises a number of problems, some of which are quite old and others rather newer. In each case, I briefly review some of the old problems and then elaborate the newer problems. (shrink)

Julia Driver has argued that there is a class of virtues that are compatible with or even require that an agent be ignorant in some respect. In this paper I argue for an alternative conception of the relationship between ignorance and virtue. The dispositions constitutive of virtue must include sensitivity to human limitations and fallibility. In this way the virtues accommodate ignorance, rather than require or promote it. I develop my account by considering two virtues in particular: tolerance (the paradigm (...) for my account) and modesty (which Driver employs as the paradigm for her account). Although several philosophers have offered alternatives to Driver's account of modesty and others have discussed tolerance as a moral virtue, an adequate account of the role of ignorance in the specification of the virtues generally has yet to be provided. I believe that similarities between the two virtues are instructive for defining that role. (shrink)