For quite some time there has been a collective perception of a moral crisis in post- Mao China. This perception is informed by standards held by members of Chinese society rather than by standards outside of it. In this article, the author attempts to lay the groundwork for a philosophical analysis of this moral crisis. He first explains why it is appropriate to speak of a moral crisis and then examines the structure of the crisis. This examination is partly conceptual (...) and partly causal. The conceptual section of the article discusses terms frequently used in connection with the crisis and introduces some terms and distinctions of the author’s own for further clarity. The causal section traces the moral crisis to a crisis of identification with moral authority or exemplars, the latter crisis in turn containing important clues to the structure of self and agency in Chinese moral culture. (shrink)

In this book, Jiwei Ci explores the dual nature of justice, in an attempt to make unitary sense of key features of justice reflected in its close relation to ...

: The Confucian relational concept of the person has been proposed as an epistemically more cogent and ethically more attractive alternative to that of liberal individualism. Two arguments are raised against this proposal without defending liberal individualism. Ethically, Confucianism is vitiated by certain unattractive features that cannot be removed without reducing the Confucian relational concept of the person to an abstract and not very helpful notion of human relatedness. Epistemically, Confucianism commits the essentialist fallacy of treating its own concept of (...) human relations as reflecting the nature of things. In view of these limitations, the Confucian relational concept of the person does not provide a viable framework for dealing with social issues including bioethics. (shrink)

I am extremely grateful to the three commentators for their instructive and challenging criticisms and for giving me the opportunity to make my position more plausible and, where it is bound to remain controversial, clearer than it is in my book.1 In doing so, I will sometimes be concerned simply to clear up what I consider to be misunderstandings on the part of my commentators, in full awareness that my own lack of clarity or emphasis may well have contributed to (...) them. This I take to be worthwhile in its own right, but especially for the sake of locating more precisely the issues where real disagreement exists and facilitating useful engagement on these issues. As the line between these tasks is seldom sharp... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Legitimacy, Performance, and Political Realism:Response to Ben CrossJiwei Ci (bio)Ben Cross raises important issues in his article and provides a much appreciated occasion for me to join the discussion. He targets his trenchant critique at what he calls Weberian sources of legitimacy, treating my view as a distinctive variation on the Weberian account. I am not sure that the issues on which we differ are most economically framed by (...) drawing Weber so prominently into the debate. Since Cross has already framed the issues in this way, however, I think I can best contribute to the exchange by accepting his terms of reference wherever appropriate and trying to work as fruitfully as possible within them. I will respectfully not take up any of the issues raised in the fourth section of the article, because Cross's use of the notion of civic agency there is so far removed from mine as to leave little room for productive engagement.As Cross notes, Weber identifies three distinct sources of legitimacy (or three types of authority): legality, the traditional, and the charismatic. This, however, is only a typology of specific sources and an incomplete one at that, for it does not cover the two sources that I happen to find most relevant in Democracy in China.1 The teleological legitimacy much discussed in chapter 1 of my book does not come under any of Weber's ideal types and seems to constitute another, distinct ideal type. Nor is the democratic legitimacy based on popular sovereignty that is proposed in chapter 3 as an alternative to teleological legitimacy quite the same as legal authority. It is thus easy to see that—and why—I do not avail myself of what Cross calls the Weberian sources of legitimacy. As a matter of fact, I do not [End Page 149] regard Weber's tripartite classification, regardless of whether it is exhaustive, as the conceptual core of his idea of legitimacy.Cross moves closer to that core when he notes the difference between the type of motive (i.e., non-expedient) that the three Weberian sources of legitimacy are supposed to have in common and the motive of pure expediency. This difference is important because, as Weber puts it in a well-known statement quoted by Cross, "Purely material interests and calculations of advantages as the basis of solidarity between the chief and his administrative staff result, in this as in other connexions, in a relatively unstable situation." Based on Weber's concern with the lack of stability characteristic of relations of pure expediency, Cross is then able to speak of a "Weber-inspired rejection of performance legitimacy." This conclusion, if not exactly mistaken, is nevertheless reached without adequately bringing out the issues involved.Take a close look at the passage in Economy and Society from which the above quote is taken:Purely material interests and calculations of advantages as the basis of solidarity between the chief and his administrative staff result, in this as in other connexions, in a relatively unstable situation. Normally other elements, affectual and ideal, supplement such interests. In certain exceptional cases the former alone may be decisive. In everyday life these relationships, like others, are governed by custom and material calculation of advantage. But custom, personal advantage, and purely affectual or ideal motives of solidarity do not form a sufficiently reliable basis for a given domination. In addition there is normally a further element, the belief in legitimacy.2Here it becomes clear that Weber, even in emphasizing the indispensable role of belief in legitimacy, argues his case much more cautiously and subtly than Cross gives one to understand. To begin with we see Weber take the trouble to stress "purely." We then find three qualifications in a row before Weber allows himself to conclude, as an empirical observation, that "custom, personal advantage, purely affectual or ideal motives of solidarity, do not form a sufficiently reliable basis for a given domination," from which he is apparently compelled to draw the inference that "there is normally a further element, the belief in legitimacy." In an earlier section of Economy and Society Weber makes similar allowances for the empirical proximity of motives... (shrink)

Joseph Chan and Sungmoon Kim take me to task for my understanding and uses of Tocqueville, and because of the resemblance they claim to see between one of my major arguments and modernization theory. I think their charges are mistaken or misplaced. Chan and Kim reject my claims that China is already, in a meaningful sense and to a substantial degree, a democratic society, and that, unless such a society is matched by political democratization, a major legitimation crisis is almost (...) inevitable in the foreseeable future. I try to show that they are wrong in their assessment of the state of Chinese society and in their dismissal of the crisis tendencies that only timely democratization can help avert. Chan and Kim completely misconstrue what my prudential argument for democracy in China means, and what it does not, and I explain why. Finally, I reaffirm, over Chan’s objections, the view that the fundamental choice regarding political legitimacy in China today lies between the Mandate of Heaven and democracy, given the demise of communism, and I restate this view in terms of the concept of sovereignty. (shrink)

The human rights discourse is vitiated by its tendency to reification, a tendency manifest in an ideologically motivated failure to take the reasons for human rights seriously. When a set of rights fall short, in range or strength, of the reasons adduced for them, any claim to the universality and priority of the rights in question is open to the charge of falsification and reification. Such a claim invites immanent critique insofar as a human rights discourse fails to take its (...) own reasons seriously by working out a set of rights commensurate with them. Further critique is necessary if the human rights concept as such can be shown to be incapable of living up to the best reasons for human rights, in the shape, the author argues, of agency-based reasons. These kinds of critique, especially the latter, can serve as an antidote to the reifying tendency of the human rights discourse. (shrink)

Many of the things we do in social and political philosophy, whether normative or critical, presuppose some understanding and evaluation of agency. To have a clear idea of our normative or critical enterprise, the underlying account of agency needs spelling out. This article begins with a descriptive account: human agency consists in power (or causal efficacy) organized as subjectivity (or selfhood), and such organization takes place through attributions of power informed by values. Some such descriptive account is useful for understanding (...) and comparing forms of agency. But as we move beyond it to construct an evaluative account of agency, we face problems that are symptomatic of our social and political condition. While quantitative assessment of agency does not work, qualitative assessment seems out of place in our modern world of pluralism and yet is unavoidable for those who, like Habermas, take issue with such phenomena as colonization of the lifeworld. © 2011 Metaphilosophy LLC and Blackwell Publishing Ltd. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: Idealism and the Reconciliation of the Cheng‐Zhu and Lu‐Wang Schools Substance and Application in the Philosophy of Culture Strengthening Confucianism with Western Philosophy Conversion to Materialism Further Reading.

International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume 25, Issue 2, Page 179-190, June 2011.

(2003). REVIEW ARTICLE: From modest realism to a democratic conception of science. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science: Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 301-307.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reply to Jiwei CiBen Cross (bio)I am very grateful to Jiwei Ci for his thoughtful and considerate response to my article. I think my understanding of Weber, legitimacy, political realism, and Ci's own work has benefited greatly as a result.I. What's the Problem with Performance Legitimacy?Ci and I both accept that legitimacy is best understood in terms of Weber's "descriptively de jure legitimacy." Put simply, we both (...) think that a state is legitimate if and only if a large enough number of its constituents think it is legitimate. According to this view, therefore, a source of legitimacy is any type of belief—or narrative, as many political realists tend to prefer—that constituents take to give them sufficient reason for regarding the state as legitimate.On the surface, understanding legitimacy in this way seems open to the possibility of a very wide variety of sources of legitimacy. All that matters is whether the source of legitimacy can persuade people to regard the state as legitimate. Weber's study of legitimacy focuses on three particular sources: [End Page 165] legal, traditional, and charismatic. However, as Ci (2024, pp. 149–150) rightly points out, Weber can allow for other sources of legitimacy as well, provided that they have the requisite persuasive power.1The question that Ci and I are interested in here is whether the state's good performance can be a viable source of legitimacy. In my view, it might be possible for a government to secure its legitimacy in this fashion if two conditions are met:(1). the state can reliably maintain good performance—or at least can reliably convince its constituents that it maintains good performance.(2). the state has a sufficiently large constituency of people who possess a shared interest that is served by good performance.I previously expressed doubts about whether the second condition can be reliably met (Cross 2024, pp. 139–143). Hence, I am somewhat skeptical about the possibility of performance legitimacy, but this skepticism does not stem from a categorical distinction between performance and legitimacy. Nor does this skepticism stem from doubts about the ability of any state to maintain good performance. Rather, it stems from doubts about whether the existence of a shared interest is a reliable basis for identifying the constituency of legitimacy.Ci, on the other hand, does think that good performance and legitimacy are categorically distinct, albeit interrelated. He holds that good performance can enhance an existing source of legitimacy. He also holds that it can offer some compensation for the absence of an existing source of legitimacy. However, he denies that good performance can ever count as a source of legitimacy in its own right. Furthermore, Ci's arguments for this claim, as I understand them, are not reducible to the further claim that it is unlikely that any state can reliably sustain the kind of unwaveringly good performance that reliably serves the shared interests of its constituency. That is, although he appears highly skeptical of the state's capacity to satisfy (1) and (2), this skepticism is not, strictly speaking, essential to his arguments.Our main disagreement, then, concerns the correct basis for skepticism about performance legitimacy. Although I think it would be fair to say that Ci's skepticism is stronger and more general than my own, this appears to stem from our different reasons for this skepticism. In what follows, I will try to briefly summarize Ci's objections to performance legitimacy and the extent of my disagreements with them.II. The Genealogical ArgumentI previously suggested that Ci's distinction between performance-enhancing legitimacy and performance that ameliorates a lack of legitimacy may be a distinction without a difference (Cross 2024, pp. 132–135). What reason do rulers have to prefer the former to the latter? [End Page 166]Ci's response helpfully clarifies what he takes to be at stake in this distinction. Legitimacy, he argues, is meant to provide a justification specifically for the state's monopoly of violence. As Ci rightly notes, I did not address the significance of this point. I did not distinguish between a justification for the state's monopoly of... (shrink)

Jiwei Ci’s Democracy in China: The Coming Crisis presents an extraordinarily rich set of ideas regarding the important subject of the prospect of democracy in China. The book argues that it is in the interest of the Chinese Communist Party to immediately begin to prepare China for democracy, as that is the only way to save the party and China from imminent crises of legitimacy, governance, and stability. Drawing upon Tocqueville’s discussion of equality of conditions in America, Ci argues (...) that as China has already more or less become a society of equality of conditions, it already has a democratic society, which will inevitably exert enormous pressures for political democratization, thereby creating serious legitimacy and stability crises for the regime. In my view, Ci overstates the relevance of Tocqueville’s America for China, and his claim that there is a democratic society in China is disputable. In grounding his case for democracy in China, Ci also appeals to a larger species of argument—the argument from social circumstances to political regime, of which Tocqueville’s argument is an example. This is the argument that once a kind of society has become entrenched and is no longer amenable to a political regime’s effort to remake it, it is the political regime that must make itself fit the state of society. I argue that this argument is also problematic. (shrink)

Drawing on both a managerial discipline perspective and an information intermediary perspective, we explore how media coverage of a firm’s controlling shareholder influences firm valuation in corporate China. Using 366 listed family firms in China from 2003 to 2006, we find that firms in which controlling shareholders receive more neutral media reports enjoy higher valuation, whereas negative media reports on controlling shareholders impose adverse effects on firm valuation. Interestingly, favorable media coverage of the controlling shareholders does not enhance firm value. (...) Further analyses reveal that ownership structure and audit quality moderate the relationship between media coverage and firm valuation. Our study complements the emerging literature on the monitoring role of the media on the stock markets. (shrink)

本书将审美理论与社会学理论结合起来,论述了审美与社会的相关变迁,审美的社会功能,审美冲突及其整合的社会机制、审美个性、审美价值的界定.

In an experiment on markets for services, we find that consumers are likely to stick to default tariffs and achieve suboptimal outcomes. We find that inattention to the task of choosing a better tariff is likely to be a substantial problem in addition to any task and tariff complexity effect. The institutional setup on which we primarily model our experiment is the UK electricity and gas markets, and our conclusion is that the new measures by the UK regulator Ofgem to (...) improve consumer outcomes are likely to be of limited impact. (shrink)

Many of the things we do in social and political philosophy, whether normative or critical, presuppose some understanding and evaluation of agency. To have a clear idea of our normative or critical enterprise, the underlying account of agency needs spelling out. This article begins with a descriptive account: human agency consists in power (or causal efficacy) organized as subjectivity (or selfhood), and such organization takes place through attributions of power informed by values. Some such descriptive account is useful for understanding (...) and comparing forms of agency. But as we move beyond it to construct an evaluative account of agency, we face problems that are symptomatic of our social and political condition. While quantitative assessment of agency does not work, qualitative assessment seems out of place in our modern world of pluralism and yet is unavoidable for those who, like Habermas, take issue with such phenomena as colonization of the lifeworld. (shrink)

Correct Grammar is an easy to use, powerful and inexpensive grammar checker suitable for IBM personal computers and compatibles. It installs in minutes, is readily customized, and is designed to work with all major word processor programs such as WordPerfect, WordStar and Microsoft Works. It will also process ASCII files. I highly recommend Correct Grammar. It is a fine program.

EndNote is a reference database and bibliography maker for the IBM and compatibles. It is an extremely useful and versatile program and is a must for anyone who does a large amount of scientific writing. It eliminates the drudgery of typing the same references over and over, whether it be for a grant application, a series of submitted manuscripts, or a resubmission of a manuscript to a journal with a different reference format.