Interesting observations and problems emerge as the author pursues a complete calculus of an adverbial logic. Author Bartsch establishes a total of 18 adverbial subcategories and proposes an equal number of logico-semantic basic constructions in a predicate logical notation to explain them. The logico-semantic basic constructions bring out certain aspects of adverbial semantics, insofar as they can be specified by predicate logical means. However, for a logical and linguistic analysis of adverbials to be complete, sentence semantic analysis - provided (...) it is carried out in a clear-cut manner with clear paraphrasing criteria, unambiguous notation and complete interpretation rules - must be supplemented by and combined with 'word semantics' and syntax in a more elaborate way. The topic of adverbial semantics is a complicated and rewarding field, and this book contains enough suggestions, challenging hypotheses and stimulating observations, so that anybody directly concerned with the study of adverbials will want to have a look. (shrink)

This study of the workings of neural networks in perception and understanding of situations and simple sentences shows that, and how, distributed conceptual constituents are bound together in episodes within an interactive/dynamic architecture of sensorial and pre-motor maps, and maps of conceptual indicators (semantic memory) and individuating indicators (historical, episodic memory). Activation circuits between these maps make sensorial and pre-motor fields in the brain function as episodic maps creating representations, which are expressions in consciousness. It is argued that all consciousness (...) is episodic, consisting of situational or linguistic representations, and that the mind is the whole of all conscious manifestations of the brain. Thought occurs only in the form of linguistic or image representations. The book also discusses the role of consciousness in the relationship between causal and denotational semantics, and its role for the possibility of representations and rules. Four recent controversies in consciousness research are discussed and decided along this model of consciousness: • Is consciousness an internal or external monitoring device of brain states? • Do all conscious states involve thought and judgement? • Are there different kinds of consciousness? • Do we have a one-on-one correspondence between certain brain states and conscious states. The book discusses also the role of consciousness in the relationship between causal and denotational semantics, and its role for the possibility of representations and rules. (Series A). (shrink)

Presented in this book is a theory of concept formation and understanding that does not make use of a notion of an innate mental language as a means of concept representation. Instead, experimental concepts are treated semantically as stabilising structuring of growing sets of data, which are sets of experienced satisfaction situations for expressions, and theoretical concepts are based on coherent sets of general sentences held true. There are two kinds of structures to be established: general concepts by means of (...) similarity sets under perspectives and historical concepts. This gives rise to a theory of understanding new situations and expressions by integrating new data into established sets of data salva stability, or by extending the conceptual structure in a metaphorical or metonymical way. The theory provides a way to understand what identity between propositional attitudes amounts to, especially how people can have more or less the same belief. (shrink)

In this paper I shall compare two models of concept formation, both inspired by basic convictions of philosophical empiricism. The first, the connectionist model, will be exemplified by Kohonen maps, and the second will be my own dynamic theory of concept formation. Both can be understood in probabilistic terms, both use a notion of convergence or stabilization in modelling how concepts are built up. Both admit destabilization of concepts and conceptual change. Both do not use a notion of representation in (...) some pregiven language, such as a language of thought or some logical language. Representation in a formal language only plays a role on the meta-level, namely within the theory about concept formation. (shrink)

mechanism" is frequently encountered in the social science literature, but there is considerable confusion about the exact meaning of the term. The article begins by addressing the main conceptual issues. Use of this term is the hallmark of an approach that is critical of the explanatory deficits of correlational analysis and of the covering-law model, advocating instead the causal reconstruction of the processes that account for given macro-phenomena. The term "social mechanisms" should be used to refer to recurrent processes generating (...) a specific kind of outcome. Explanation of social macro-phenomena by mechanisms typically involves causal regression to lower-level elements, as stipulated by methodological individualism. While there exist a good many mechanism models to explain emergent effects of collective behavior, we lack a similarly systematic treatment of generative mechanisms in which institutions and specific kinds of structural configurations play the decisive role. Key Words: causal regression • correlational analysis • emergent effects • micro-macro processes • social mechanisms • structural determinants. (shrink)

This collection of essays by well-known scholars of Seneca focuses on the multifaceted ways in which Seneca, as philosopher, politician, poet and Roman senator, engaged with the question of ethical selfhood. The contributors explore the main cruces of Senecan scholarship, such as whether Seneca's treatment of the self is original in its historical context; whether Seneca's Stoicism can be reconciled with the pull of rhetorical and literary self-expression; and how Seneca claims to teach psychic self-integration. Most importantly, the contributors debate (...) to what degree, if at all, the absence of a technically articulated concept of selfhood should cause us to hesitate in seeking a distinctively Senecan self - one that stands out not only for the 'intensity of its relations to self', as Foucault famously put it, but also for the way in which those relations to self are couched. (shrink)

Hauptbeschreibung Hinter den Anderen erscheint unser Ich immer schon als Schattenbild aller Möglichkeiten Seit jeher ist sich der Mensch in seiner Bösartigkeit und Güte ein Rätsel, dem Philosophen mit Moral und Tugend beizukommen versucht haben. Dabei ist der scharfe Blick auf das tatsächliche Verhalten von Menschen nicht verlorengegangen. Die Aufklärung am Beginn unserer Moderne versuchte eine Balance zwischen einem realistischen Menschenbild und einer zukunftsweisenden Perspektive zu finden, die das Zusammenleben durch Staat und Recht für alle verträglich machen sollte. D.

This paper explores the phenomenon of meta-emotions. Meta-emotions are emotions people have about their own emotions. We analyze the intentional structure of meta-emotions and show how psychological findings support our account. Acknowledgement of meta-emotions can elucidate a number of important issues in the philosophy of mind and, more specifically, the philosophy and psychology of emotions. Among them are (allegedly) ambivalent or paradoxical emotions, emotional communication, emotional self-regulation, privileged access failure for repressed emotions, and survivor guilt.

The epistemological problems of unification of two distinct theories are discussed. An approach related to the work of Soviet authors (Stepin, Podgoretzky and Smorodinsky) is used and developed. The notion of ‘crossbred objects’—theoretical objects with contradictory properties which are part of the domain of application of two independent theories—is introduced which helps to describe the dynamics of revolutionary theory change. The occurrence of the cross-contradiction of two theories is reconstructed and the reductionistic and the synthetic means of its elimination are (...) proposed. The results of the methodological analysis are applied to the paradox of equivalence. (shrink)

Martin Heidegger und Hans Jantzen gehören zu den wichtigsten Vertretern der Philosophie und Kunstgeschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts. Seit den 1920er bis Ende der 1960er Jahre kritisierten sie vorherrschende, naturwissenschaftlich geprägte Auffassungen des Raums und entwickelten einen neuartigen Begriff. Dieser sogenannte künstlerische Raum sei ein freies Zusammenspiel von materiellen und immateriellen Bestandteilen, das als solches erst in der Wahrnehmung real wird. Die Autorin arbeitet dieses Verständnis heraus und stellt es in einen geistes- und zeitgeschichtlichen Kontext. Neben der Bedeutung der Bestandteile und (...) der Grenze für die Gestalt und die Wirkung des Raums kommt der des Lichts sowie Jantzens Diaphanie-Begriff besondere Aufmerksamkeit zu. Für die erörterte Raumbeschaffenheit werden Anhaltspunkte in der gotischen Kathedrale und in Werken der Bronzezeit, Dorik, Ottonik und Moderne sowie von Kindern und Laien festgestellt. Im Anschluss an zeitgenössische Theorien ergeben sich Übereinstimmungen mit dem Konzept des geopolitischen Groß-raums und einer erdbezogenen Ästhetik. Vor dem Hintergrund des Kunst- und Sprachbegriffs der Epoche wird abschließend Heideggers und Jantzens Ansicht untersucht, alle Kunst sei sprachlich, sowie inwiefern sich diese Sprachlichkeit räumlich manifestiert. Die Zusammenführung von Jantzens Analyse ottonischer Wortbilder mit Heideggers Auslegung moderner Dichtung und Bildkunst zeigt, dass deren Raumbegriff unabhängig von politischen Bezügen bestehen kann. „Bei diesem Buch handelt es sich fraglos um eine kunsthistorisch und philosophisch bedeutsame Untersuchung.“. (shrink)

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE Vol. 5, number 1, Autumn 1991, pp. 79-87. R.M. Nugayev. -/- The fundamental laws of physics can tell the truth. -/- Abstract. Nancy Cartwright’s arguments in favour of phenomenological laws and against fundamental ones are discussed. Her criticisms of the standard cjvering-law account are extended using Vyacheslav Stepin’s analysis of the structure of fundamental theories. It is argued that Cartwright’s thesis 9that the laws of physics lie) is too radical to accept. A model (...) of theory change is proposed which demonstrates how the fundamental laws of physics can, in fact, be confronted with experience. -/- . (shrink)

Looking out of the window of a speeding car, receiving photographs of Earth from outer space, watching the flickering images of the TV screen, scrolling through a text, zooming in on a location in Google Earth, or sending images via mobile ...