Der Kinder- und Jugendgesundheitssurvey soll repräsentative, gültige Daten und Erkenntnisse zur gesundheitlichen Situation von Kindern und Jugendlichen in Deutschland als entscheidende Voraussetzung für die Bewertung und die Verbesserung von deren gesundheitlicher Lage schaffen. Forschung und insbesondere Blutentnahmen an nichteinwilligungsfähigen Personen erfordern eine profunde ethische und rechtliche Überprüfung. Der Beitrag befasst sich damit, welche medizinethischen Empfehlungen und welche rechtlichen Grundsätze in Deutschland für die Bewertung relevant sind. Nach geltendem deutschen Recht können Eltern zu Blutentnahmen bei ihren Kindern nur zustimmen, wenn diese (...) in deren individuellem gesundheitlichen Interesse liegen. Ein „gruppenspezifischer Nutzen“, wie er von Medizinethikern national und international als Voraussetzung für ethische Akzeptabilität (bei minimalem Risiko der Untersuchungen) ebenfalls für sinnvoll und wichtig angesehen wird, und der in dem geplanten Survey in jedem Falle gegeben wäre, genügt deutschen Rechtsansprüchen nicht. Im Pretest hat sich der potenzielle individuelle Nutzen der Blutentnahmen bestätigt: Viele Kinder hatten biochemisch nachweisbare Gesundheitsrisiken (z. B. verborgener Nährstoffmangel, allergische Sensibilisierung, Hinweise auf Impflücken oder langfristige Gesundheitsrisiken), die ohne Blutuntersuchung nicht feststellbar gewesen wären. Bei über 90% der Kinder waren nach schriftlicher Einwilligung der Eltern und Jugendlichen sowie informeller Zustimmung der Kinder, die in jedem einzelnen Falle berücksichtigt wurde, Blutentnahmen möglich. Nach der Befragung einer Unterstichprobe ist die Akzeptanz insgesamt gut. (shrink)

Der Kinder- und Jugendgesundheitssurvey soll repräsentative, gültige Daten und Erkenntnisse zur gesundheitlichen Situation von Kindern und Jugendlichen in Deutschland als entscheidende Voraussetzung für die Bewertung und die Verbesserung von deren gesundheitlicher Lage schaffen. Forschung und insbesondere Blutentnahmen an nichteinwilligungsfähigen Personen erfordern eine profunde ethische und rechtliche Überprüfung. Der Beitrag befasst sich damit, welche medizinethischen Empfehlungen und welche rechtlichen Grundsätze in Deutschland für die Bewertung relevant sind. Nach geltendem deutschen Recht können Eltern zu Blutentnahmen bei ihren Kindern nur zustimmen, wenn diese (...) in deren individuellem gesundheitlichen Interesse liegen. Ein „gruppenspezifischer Nutzen“, wie er von Medizinethikern national und international als Voraussetzung für ethische Akzeptabilität (bei minimalem Risiko der Untersuchungen) ebenfalls für sinnvoll und wichtig angesehen wird, und der in dem geplanten Survey in jedem Falle gegeben wäre, genügt deutschen Rechtsansprüchen nicht. Im Pretest hat sich der potenzielle individuelle Nutzen der Blutentnahmen bestätigt: Viele Kinder hatten biochemisch nachweisbare Gesundheitsrisiken (z. B. verborgener Nährstoffmangel, allergische Sensibilisierung, Hinweise auf Impflücken oder langfristige Gesundheitsrisiken), die ohne Blutuntersuchung nicht feststellbar gewesen wären. Bei über 90% der Kinder waren nach schriftlicher Einwilligung der Eltern und Jugendlichen sowie informeller Zustimmung der Kinder, die in jedem einzelnen Falle berücksichtigt wurde, Blutentnahmen möglich. Nach der Befragung einer Unterstichprobe ist die Akzeptanz insgesamt gut. (shrink)

This paper sketches an emotion-aware model of environmental ethics education. The proposal draws on insights from feminists scholars, moral sentimentalism, as well as work in the pedagogy of discomfort traditions. It identifies and defends four core elements of climate change ethic, noting how they shed new light on the aims and challenges of environmental ethics education.

Moral anxiety is the unease that we experience in the face of a novel or difficult moral decision, an unease that helps us recognize the significance of the issue we face and engages epistemic behaviors aimed at helping us work through it (reflection, information gathering, etc.). But recent discussions in philosophy raise questions about the value of moral anxiety (do we really do better when we’re anxious?); and work in cognitive science challenges its psychological plausibility (is there really such an (...) emotion?). Drawing on Kant and Kantians, I develop a model of moral anxiety (or ‘conscience’ in Kant’s terminology) that highlights both its empirical credentials and its distinctive value. Kant, it turns out, was an early—and sophisticated—dual-process theorist. (shrink)

Written in political exile during the Second World War and first published in 1945, Karl Popper's The Open Society and Its Enemiesis one of the most influential books of the twentieth century. Hailed by Bertrand Russell as a 'vigorous and profound defence of democracy', its now legendary attack on the philosophies of Plato, Hegel and Marx exposed the dangers inherent in centrally planned political systems. Popper's highly accessible style, his erudite and lucid explanations of the thought of great philosophers (...) and the recent resurgence of totalitarian regimes around the world are just three of the reasons for the enduring popularity of The Open Society and Its Enemies, and for why it demands to be read both today and in years to come. This is the second of two volumes of The Open Society and Its Enemies. (shrink)

Karl Raimund Poppers (1902-1994) Hauptwerk, die Logik der Forschung (1934), gilt als Grundlagenwerk des kritischen Rationalismus. Der kritische Rationalismus zeigt, warum unser Wissen fehlbar ist und versteht den Erkenntnisfortschritt als Resultat von Hypothesenbildung und -widerlegung. Der Sammelband orientiert sich an der Gliederung der Logik der Forschung. Seine Beiträge kommentieren die jeweiligen Themen nach aktueller Forschungslage.

The articles of the Convention of Human Rights and Biomedicine connect any medical intervention with the »informed consent« of the patient out of respect to Human Dignity by physicians as weil as for treatments and research projects. Nevertheless it becomes apparent that the observation of this principle looses its significance for patients who are incapacitated because of temporal or permanent incompetance to represent their own interests or who are too young to do so. In these cases other attributes of Human (...) Dignity and their observation have to replace the »informed consent«. For inclusion of patients who can't give their consent in clinical studies the MRK formulated strict conditions which exceed the legal prerequisites in Germany. Here clearly the investigation has to benefit each patient directly. The MRK widens this condition to investigations which may not benefit the patient himself, but serve a group of patients with the same illness or solve problems related to the desease. The deciding bodies will have to inform themselves very carefully not only about the facts for urgent research with incapacitated patients, but also must define terms like »no direct benefit « before German Law will allow adaptation to and ratification of the MRK. (shrink)

Karl Jaspers gehört zu den Ziehvätern der Psychopathologie, einer der Grundlagenwissenschaften der Psychiatrie. In diesem Zusammenhang wird gemeinhin auf sein systematisches Lehrbuch verwiesen, die Allgemeine Psychopathologie von 1913. Die wesentlichen Züge seiner Methodologie und den Gegenstand der neuen Wissenschaft fixierte Jaspers jedoch schon in den hier versammelten Arbeiten, die zwischen 1909 und 1913 erschienen: Seine Kritik am dominanten Reduktionismus und an der damals noch jungen Psychoanalyse sind in diesen Texten bereits gültig formuliert, ebenso - und nicht zuletzt - die (...) Dichotomie zwischen Erklären und Verstehen. Neben der Dissertation “Heimweh und Verbrechen” enthält der vorliegende Band unter anderem den bahnbrechenden und wirkungsvollen Aufsatz “Die phänomenologische Forschungsrichtung in der Psychiatrie” sowie die bis heute kontrovers diskutierte Abhandlung “Kausale und 'verständliche' Zusammenhänge zwischen Schicksal und Psychose bei der Dementia praecox (Schizophrenie)”. Der Kommentar verortet die einzelnen Beiträge sowohl im wissenschaftshistorischen als auch im werkgeschichtlichen Kontext. (Quelle: buchhandel.de). (shrink)

Described by the philosopher A.J. Ayer as a work of 'great originality and power', this book revolutionized contemporary thinking on science and knowledge. Ideas such as the now legendary doctrine of 'falsificationism' electrified the scientific community, influencing even working scientists, as well as post-war philosophy. This astonishing work ranks alongside _The Open Society and Its Enemies_ as one of Popper's most enduring books and contains insights and arguments that demand to be read to this day.

This book is about the various forms of anxiety—some familiar, some not—that color and shape our lives. The objective is two-fold. The first aim is to deepen our understanding of what anxiety is. The second aim is to re-orient thinking about the role of emotions in moral psychology and ethical theory. Here I argue that the current focus on backward looking moral emotions like guilt and shame leaves us with a picture that is badly incomplete. To get a better understanding (...) of emotions’ place in the moral and evaluative domains, we must take note of the important role that forward looking emotions—anxiety in particular—play in moral thought and action. (shrink)

A familiar feature of moral life is the distinctive anxiety that we feel in the face of a moral dilemma or moral conflict. Situations like these require us to take stands on controversial issues. But because we are unsure that we will make the correct decision, anxiety ensues. Despite the pervasiveness of this phenomenon, surprisingly little work has been done either to characterize this “ moral anxiety” or to explain the role that it plays in our moral lives. This paper (...) aims to address this deficiency by developing an empirically informed account of what moral anxiety is and what it does. (shrink)

First published in French, Marx's The Poverty of Philosophy (1847) was composed during his years in Brussels, when he was developing his economic views and, through confrontations with the chief leaders of the working-class movement, establishing his intellectual standing. In this classic work, which laid the foundation of ideas later developed in Capital, Marx polemicized against then premier French socialist, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon. Proudhon wanted to unite the best features of such contraries as competition and monopoly. He hoped to save the (...) good features of economic institutions while eliminating the bad. Marx, however, declared that no equilibrium was possible between the antagonisms in any given economic system. Social structures were transient historical forms determined by the productive forces: "The handmill gives you society with the feudal lord; the stream mill, society with the industrial capitalist.". (shrink)

Emotions have long been of interest to philosophers and have deep historical roots going back to the Ancients. They have also become one of the most exciting areas of current research in philosophy, the cognitive sciences, and beyond. -/- This book explains the philosophy of the emotions, structuring the investigation around seven fundamental questions: What are emotions? Are emotions natural kinds? Do animals have emotions? Are emotions epistemically valuable? Are emotions the foundation for value and morality? Are emotions the basis (...) for responsibility? Do emotions make us better people? -/- In the course of exploring these questions, the book also discusses cutting-edge empirical research on emotion, feminist approaches to emotions and their value, and methodological questions on how to theorize about the emotions. The book also contains in-depth discussions of specific emotions like compassion, disgust, anxiety, and curiosity. It also highlights emerging trends in emotion research. (shrink)

Emotion plays an important role in securing social stability. But while emotions like fear, anger, and guilt have received much attention in this context, little work has been done to understand the role that anxiety plays. That’s unfortunate. I argue that a particular form of anxiety—what I call ‘practical anxiety’—plays an important, but as of yet unrecognized, role in norm-based social regulation. More specifically, it provides a valuable form of metacognition, one that contributes to social stability by helping individuals negotiate (...) the challenges that come from having to act in the face of unclear norms. (shrink)

Is disgust morally valuable? The answer to that question turns, in large part, on what we can do to shape disgust for the better. But this cultivation question has received surprisingly little attention in philosophical debates. To address this deficiency, this article examines empirical work on disgust and emotion regulation. This research reveals that while we can exert some control over how we experience disgust, there’s little we can do to substantively change it at a more fundamental level. These empirical (...) insights have revisionary implications both for debates about disgust’s moral value and for our understanding of agency and moral development more generally. (shrink)

Negative emotions are often thought to lack value—they’re pernicious, inherently unpleasant, and inconsistent with human virtue. Taking anxiety as a case study, I argue that this assessment is mistaken. I begin with an account of what anxiety is: a response to uncertainty about a possible threat or challenge that brings thoughts about one’s predicament (‘I’m worried,’ ‘What should I do?’), negatively valenced feelings of concern, and a motivational tendency toward caution regarding the potential threat one faces. Given this account of (...) what anxiety is, I show it can be instrumentally valuable: in sensitizing us to uncertainty and prompting caution and risk assessment efforts, it’s an emotion that can help us better recognize and respond to uncertain threats and challenges. But anxiety can also be aretaically valuable—that is, it’s an emotion that can contribute positively to one’s character. For instance, your anxiety about how best to care for your aging mother not only prompts helpful brainstorming about what you should do, but also reflect well on you—your unease demonstrates both an admirable sensitivity and emotional attunement to what’s at stake. (shrink)

This book explores the main stages and key concepts in the development of Kant's critical philosophy, from the early 1760s to the 1790s. Karl Ameriks provides a detailed and concise account of the main ways in which the later critical works provide a plausible defense of the conception of humanity's fundamental end that Kant turned to after reading Rousseau in the 1760s. Separate essays are devoted to each of the three Critiques, as well as to earlier notes and lectures (...) and several of Kant's later writings on history and religion. A final section devotes three chapters to post-Kantian developments in German Romanticism, accounts of tragedy up through Nietzsche, and contemporary philosophy. The theme of an elliptical path is shown to be relevant to these writers as well as to many aspects of Kant's own life and work. The topics of the book include fundamental issues in epistemology and metaphysics, with a new defense of the Amerik's 'moderate' interpretation of transcendental idealism. (shrink)

A recent skeptical challenge denies deliberation is essential to virtuous agency: what looks like genuine deliberation is just a post hoc rationalization of a decision already made by automatic mechanisms (Haidt 2001; Doris 2015). Annas’s account of virtue seems well-equipped to respond: by modeling virtue on skills, she can agree that virtuous actions are deliberation-free while insisting that their development requires significant thought. But Annas’s proposal is flawed: it over-intellectualizes deliberation’s developmental role and under-intellectualizes its significance once virtue is acquired. (...) Doing better requires paying attention to a distinctive form of anxiety—one that functions to engage deliberation in the face of decisions that automatic mechanisms alone cannot resolve. (shrink)

This chapter suggests how certain problematic claims of pantheism might be made more intelligible. It shows, first, that some pantheistic God-talk is comparable to talk involving mass terms; treating “God” as a mass term affords us a way of understanding, for example, how parts can seemingly be identified with the wholes of which they are the parts, as per the claim that “God is everything and everything is God”. This chapter then goes on to describe a contemporary variant of panpsychism, (...) a variant speculatively predicated on the affinity between intentional states and causal dispositions. This allows for a conception of the world as God’s brain, cashed out in terms of a “panintentionalism” that admits of various organizational possibilities for causal dispositional states, comparable to the organization of intentional states in human brains. (shrink)

A growing body of work argues that we should reform problematic emotions like anxiety, anger, and shame: doing this will allow us to better harness the contributions that these emotions can make to our agency and wellbeing. But feminist philosophers worry that prescriptions to correct these inappropriate emotions will only further marginalize women, minorities, and other members of subordinated groups. While much in these debates turns on empirical questions about how we can change problematic emotion norms for the better, to (...) date, little has been done by either side to assess how we might do this, much less in ways that are responsive to the feminists’ worries. Drawing on research in cognitive science, this paper argues that though the feminists’ worries are real, the leading proposals for remedying them are inadequate. It then develops an alternative strategy for reshaping problematic emotion norms—one that’s sensitive to the feminists’ concerns. (shrink)

The aim of this collection is to show how work in the analytic philosophical tradition can shed light on the nature, value, and experience of anxiety. Contrary to widespread assumptions, anxiety is not best understood as a mental disorder, or an intrinsically debilitating state, but rather as an often valuable affective state which heightens our sensitivity to potential threats and challenges. As the contributions in this volume demonstrate, learning about anxiety can be relevant for debates, not only in the philosophy (...) of emotion, but also in epistemology, value theory, and the philosophy of psychopathology. In this introductory article, we also show that there is still much to discover about the relevance that anxiety may have for moral action, self-understanding, and mental health. (shrink)

According to psychological constructivism, emotions result from projecting folk emotion concepts onto felt affective episodes (e.g., Barrett 2017, LeDoux 2015). Moreover, while constructivists acknowledge there’s a biological dimension to emotion, they deny that emotions are (or involve) affect programs. So they also deny that emotions are natural kinds. However, the essential role constructivism gives to felt experience and folk concepts leads to an account that’s extensionally inadequate and functionally inaccurate. Moreover, biologically-oriented proposals that reject these commitments are not similarly encumbered. (...) Recognizing this has two implications: biological mechanisms are more central to emotion than constructivism allows, and the conclusion that emotions aren’t natural kinds is premature. (shrink)

Researchers are increasingly trying to understand both the emotions that we experience in response to ecological crises like climate change and the ways in which these emotions might be valuable for our (psychical, psychological, and moral) wellbeing. However, much of the existing work on these issues has been hampered by conceptual and methodological difficulties. As a first step toward addressing these challenges, this review focuses on eco-anxiety. Analyzing a broad range of studies through the use of methods from philosophy, emotion (...) theory, and interdisciplinary environmental studies, the authors show how looking to work on anxiety in general can help researchers build better models of eco-anxiety in particular. The results of this work suggest that the label “eco-anxiety” may be best understood as referring to a family of distinct, but related, ecological emotions. The authors also find that a specific form of eco-anxiety, “practical eco-anxiety,” can be a deeply valuable emotional response to threats like climate change: when experienced at the right time and to the right extent, practical eco-anxiety not only reflects well on one’s moral character but can also help advance individual and planetary wellbeing. (shrink)

In this article I offer an opinionated overview of the central elements of Kant’s philosophical methodology during the critical period. I begin with a brief characterization of how Kant conceives of the aims of human inquiry – focusing on the idea that inquiry ideally aims at not just cognition (Erkenntnis), but also the more demanding cognitive achievements that Kant labels insight (Einsehen) and comprehension (Begreifen). Then I explore the implications of this picture for philosophy — emphasizing Kant’s distinction between critical (...) and doctrinal phases of philosophical inquiry, with the first of these playing both a negative and a positive role with respect to the second. Then, I will argue that this positive role is possible, according to Kant, only insofar as philosophy follows what I call a “capacities-first” methodology – that is, one that treats basic cognitive capacities (such as reason) and their self-conscious activities as fundamental (in both a cognitive sense and in an explanatory sense) for the sort of philosophy human beings are capable of. It is this methodology, I will argue, that allows Kant to introduce the first principles that philosophy in its doctrinal phase requires in a manner that is neither arbitrary nor (at least obviously) incompatible with Kant’s own critical restrictions on cognition. I conclude by discussing some of the implications of this methodological picture – including the methodological significance of self-consciousness and regressive or “transcendental” arguments, Kant’s distinction between analytic and synthetic methods in philosophy, and Kant’s conception of reason as autonomous. (shrink)

Recent work by emotion researchers indicates that emotions have a multi-level structure. Sophisticated sentimentalists should take note of this work—for it better enables them to defend a substantive role for emotion in moral cognition. Contra the rationalist criticisms of May 2018, emotions are not only able to carry morally relevant information but can also substantially influence moral judgment and reasoning.

Karl Pfeifer attempts to present a coherent view of panentheism that eschews Pickwickian senses of “in” and aligns itself with, and builds upon, familiar diagrammed portrayals of panentheism. The account is accordingly spatial-locative and moreover accepts the proposal of R.T. Mullins that absolute space and time be regarded as attributes of God. In addition, however, it argues that a substantive parthood relation between the world and God is required. Pfeifer’s preferred version of panpsychism, viz. panintentionalism, is thrown into the (...) mix as an optional add-on. On this account, God is conceived of as a “spiritual field” whose nature can be made more intelligible by regarding “God” as having a mass-noun sense in some contexts. Pfeifer closes with the suggestion that we look to topology and mereology for further development of the position outlined in his paper. (shrink)

Karl Hahn, Jahrgang 1937, war bis zu seiner Emeritierung im Jahr 2003 Professor für Politische Theorie und Ideengeschichte an der Westfälischen Wilhelms-Universität Münster. Hierbei hat er die Klassiker der abendländischen Geistesgeschichte nicht in einem kanonisch-schematischen Profil gelehrt, sondern die jeweiligen Themen und Theoreme mit lebensfüllender Leidenschaft vermittelt. Seine Vorlesungen und Seminare an der Universität zeugen, wie auch seine Vorträge und Tagungsbeiträge, von einem streitbaren Geist, der stets auch um die aktualisierende Bezugnahme bemüht war. Stets hat er pointiert Stellung bezogen, (...) auch gegen den Mainstream des Faches, das er kritisch hinterfragt hat. Ob Platon, Fichte oder auch Simone Weil: Bei Karl Hahn stehen philosophische Überlegungen für eine Suche nach der Vollendung des Daseins in seinen unendlich vielen und offenen Aussagemöglichkeiten. Hahns großes Lebensthema war und ist hierbei das tragische Element des menschlichen Wesens, dessen Kleinheit und Begrenztheit angesichts der großen Fragen der menschlichen Existenz. Das hat er seinen Studierenden mit auf den Weg gegeben. Und auch den Kolleginnen und Kollegen, die bereit waren, zuzuhören. Mit dem vorliegenden Band wird der Wissenschaftler zum Anlass seines 80. Geburtstages geehrt, der seine Verdienste nicht in der flüchtigen Wertschätzung des Feuilletons, sondern grundsätzlich im Diskurs der Seminarräume und Kongressveranstaltungen erworben hat. (shrink)

Kunsthandelaar Karl Stimm schenkt op een verfrissende manier aandacht aan beschouwingen over Archeologica & Oude kunst. Hij benoemt onder andere de bedreigingen van het cultureel erfgoed, het belang van metaaldetectoramateurs en de moeilijke tijden die zijn aangebroken voor verzamelaars. Met dit boek wil de auteur bruggen bouwen tussen wetenschappers, musea, verzamelaars en handelaren, erfgoedcommissies en de autoriteiten. Slaagt Stimm erin het onmogelijke te verwezenlijken? De vereenzelviging van object en mens."--Publisher information.

With respect to the topic of “powers and abilities,” most readers will associate David Hume with his multi-pronged critique of traditional attempts to make robust explanatory use of those notions in a philosophical or scientific context. But Hume’s own philosophy is also structured around the attribution to human beings of a variety of basic faculties or mental powers – such as the reason and the imagination, or the various powers involved in Hume’s account of im- pressions of reflection and the (...) passions. Indeed, there is a clear case to be made that, despite his deflationary account of our concept of power, Hume continues to treat certain basic powers or faculties as forming the explanatory bedrock for his new “science of man”. In this essay, I will discuss how this apparent conflict between the “critical” (if not outright skeptical) and “constructive” aspects of Hume’s discussion of powers and abilities is best resolved – with special attention to the question of how this illuminates Hume’s place in the development of early modern conceptions of the proper method for philosophy. (shrink)