This paper presents a general framework for philosophical counseling founded upon the distinction between philosophical discourse and philosophy as a lived experience. Clients enter counseling, usually, philosophically unsophisticated, but with a set of perspectives and a predicament. I outline the two general processes of philosophical counseling that address such a reported predicament.The first process---critique---involves a critical examination of the client’s philosophical perspectives, as they are related to the reported predicament. Through the use of the Socratic method, the counselor attempts to (...) examine the relation, meaning, implications, etc., of such perspectives. This, I argue, leads to a destabilization of the client, where previously unquestioned beliefs and values become doubtful. As such, a second process---creation---is needed in order to overcome the destabilization of the initial process. For this process to succeed, I argue, philosophical counseling must avoid the problem of suggestion by not relying on any first-order philosophical assumptions. (shrink)

According to insight-oriented psychotherapies, the change clients undergo during therapy results from insights gained into the "true" nature of the self, which entail greater self-knowledge and self-understanding. In this paper, I question such claims through a critical examination of the epistemological and metaphysical values underlying such forms of therapy. I claim that such psychotherapeutic practices are engaged in a process that subtly "absorbs" clients into the therapist's philosophical framework which is characterized by a certain problematic conception of subjectivity, knowledge, and (...) reality. Through mechanisms which are intrinsic to the therapeutic encounter, such as suggestion and power, such therapies construct and reconfigure clients along the lines of socially accepted norms and values. Consequently, insight-oriented psychotherapy results in a deceptive form of social control. (shrink)

This work is about the deceptive nature of psychotherapy. In particular, it is about those therapies that claim to provide the client with insight and self-knowledge when in practice they are a means of social control absorbing clients into socially acceptable norms. Through a philosophical analysis of key concepts such as knowledge, insight, and subjectivity, and through an examination of mechanisms intrinsic to psychotherapeutic practice, such as power, interpretation, and suggestion, this monograph unveils how psychotherapy deludes clients into believing they (...) have discovered their true self. Rather than gaining self-knowledge and insight into their true or core self, clients are subtly reconstructed and reconfigured along prevailing social values. Furthermore, the very epistemological and metaphysical world-view clients are deceived into believing is highly suspect and founded upon a fascistic understanding of knowledge. As an alternative to such domination, psychotherapy needs to reconstruct itself along Nietzschean-Deleuzian lines where the focus is on multiple identities, difference, and creativity. Rather than focusing on an analysis of past memories to alleviate symptoms such as anxiety or depression, therapeutic intervention should aim for a non-repressive conception of self-knowledge and insight based upon a creative future and not a regretful past. This entails a different understanding of knowledge and reality that is not based on subjugating the world to what we know about it, but on immersing ourselves within reality in all of its concrete richness. And such an approach is preferable not because it is "true" but because it is more liberating. (shrink)

According to insight-oriented psychotherapies, the change clients undergo during therapy results from insights gained into the "true" nature of the self, which entail greater self-knowledge and self-understanding. In this paper, I question such claims through a critical examination of the epistemological and metaphysical values underlying such forms of therapy. I claim that such psychotherapeutic practices are engaged in a process that subtly "absorbs" clients into the therapist's philosophical framework which is characterized by a certain problematic conception of subjectivity, knowledge, and (...) reality. Through mechanisms which are intrinsic to the therapeutic encounter, such as suggestion and power, such therapies construct and reconfigure clients along the lines of socially accepted norms and values. Consequently, insight-oriented psychotherapy results in a deceptive form of social control. (shrink)

This work is about the deceptive nature of psychotherapy. In particular, it is about those therapies that claim to provide the client with insight and self-knowledge when in practice they are a means of social control absorbing clients into socially acceptable norms. Through a philosophical analysis of key concepts such as knowledge, insight, and subjectivity, and through an examination of mechanisms intrinsic to psychotherapeutic practice, such as power, interpretation, and suggestion, this monograph unveils how psychotherapy deludes clients into believing they (...) have discovered their true self. Rather than gaining self-knowledge and insight into their true or core self, clients are subtly reconstructed and reconfigured along prevailing social values. Furthermore, the very epistemological and metaphysical world-view clients are deceived into believing is highly suspect and founded upon a fascistic understanding of knowledge. As an alternative to such domination, psychotherapy needs to reconstruct itself along Nietzschean-Deleuzian lines where the focus is on multiple identities, difference, and creativity. Rather than focusing on an analysis of past memories to alleviate symptoms such as anxiety or depression, therapeutic intervention should aim for a non-repressive conception of self-knowledge and insight based upon a creative future and not a regretful past. This entails a different understanding of knowledge and reality that is not based on subjugating the world to what we know about it, but on immersing ourselves within reality in all of its concrete richness. And such an approach is preferable not because it is “true” but because it is more liberating. (shrink)

Este artículo tiene como objetivo presentar un manuscrito conservado en la biblioteca de la Universidad de Bengasi (Libia) que contiene el Kitāb al-Ǧawhara fī nasab al-nabī ṣallā Allāh ʽalayhi wa-sallam wa-aṣḥābihi al-ʽašara por Abū ʽAbd Allāh Muḥammad b. Abī Bakr b. ʽAbd Allāh b. Mūsà al-Anṣārī al-Barrī al-Tilimsānī (596/1200-681/1282). Aunque ha sido mencionado en algunas publicaciones, no llamó la atención de los especialistas de la historia cultural de al-Andalus. Debido a la situación actual de la institución de conservación, no ha (...) sido posible ver ni ofrecer reproducciones. Aun así, como se cedió una fotografía para un catálogo, el último folio resultó muy útil. Se hace constar claramente el origen de la obra, que fue copiada en Menorca por su propio autor en el año 645/1248. Además, se puede observar que fue ofrecido como regalo a Saʽīd b. Ḥakam al-Qurašī, el gobernador de la isla, que fundó una biblioteca cuya riqueza fue celebrada por los autores medievales. En el estado actual del conocimiento, se trata precisamente del quinto manuscrito identificado, encontrándose hoy los otros cuatro en la Real Biblioteca del Monasterio de San Lorenzo de El Escorial. La historia del manuscrito permanece oscura, aunque se puede dar por establecido que reapareció en Libia a mediados del siglo XIX, siendo entonces propiedad de Muḥammad b. ʽAlī al-Sanūsī, fundador de la poderosa ṭarīqa al-Sanūsiyya. (shrink)

This paper asks how perception becomes racializing and seeks the means for its critical interruption. My aim is not only to understand the recalcitrant and limitative temporal structure of racializing habits of seeing, but also to uncover the possibilities within perception for a critical awareness and destabilization of this structure. Reading Henri Bergson and Maurice Merleau-Ponty in dialogue with Frantz Fanon, Iris Marion Young and race-critical feminism, I locate in hesitation the phenomenological moment where habits of seeing can be internally (...) fractured. Hesitation, I claim, makes visible the exclusionary logic of racializing and objectifying perception, countering its affective closure and opening it to critical transformation. (shrink)

Islamic ethics; Muslims; conduct of life.

Los estudios modernos sobre derecho islámico han puesto de relieve la necesidad de estudiar los procedimientos jurídicos en el Islam y el papel desempeñado por la práctica judicial en su formación. Se considera en general que, en el período temprano, los cadíes disponían de mayor libertad en lo relativo a testigos y métodos para establecer pruebas. Posteriormente y de forma gradual el sistema se volvió más rígido y restrictivo. En relación a este desarrollo, los investigadores han propuesto distintas fechas, que (...) van desde la segunda mitad del siglo VII hasta el siglo VIII e incluso hasta el siglo XI. Estos investigadores han tratado la doctrina de al-yamīn ma‛ al-šàhid como una excepción dentro del procedimiento establecido por la šarī‛a que, según ellos, se basaba estricta y mecánicamente en la doctrina de los dos testigos. Para dichos investigadores, la doctrina de al-yamīn ma‛ al-šàhid surgió bajo la influencia de determinadas locadidades o bien por influencia judía. Este artículo propone que esa doctrina debió de surgir en el contexto del período de la guerra civil, cuando las cuestiones sobre qiṣāṣ, qawad, qasāma y ḥakam fueron discutidas con frecuencia en relación con el Corán y la sunna común y cuando se sintió la necesidad de reformar la institución del ḥakam. Sobre la base de afirmaciones dispersas de ulemas que vivieron en fechas cercanas a ese período, afirmaciones que se ven confirmadas por los comentarios de Wakī‛, se concluye que Mu‛āwiya fue quien introdujo ese método para reformar la institución del ḥakam. La práctica judicial de esta doctrina también confirma que estaba demasiado difundida como para poder considerarla una práctica medinense o una práctica local, tal y como pretenden algunos juristas clásicos, los tradicionistas y algunos investigadores modernos. (shrink)

Prophets, Pre-Islamic; conduct of life; early works to 1800.

Faylasū al-ʻArab: al-Kindī -- al-Muʻallim al-thānī: al-Fārābī -- al-Shāʻir al-ḥakīm: al-Mutanabbī -- Baṭalīmūs al-ʻArab: Ibn al-Haytham -- Shaykh al-Islām: Ibn Taymīyah.

International Institute of Islamic Thought; Islam; essence, genius, nature; history.

There is no doubt that custard apple diseases are among the important reasons that destroy the Custard Apple plant and its agricultural crops. This leads to obvious damage to these plants and they become inedible. Discovering these diseases is a good step to provide the appropriate and correct treatment. Determining the treatment with high accuracy depends on the method used to correctly diagnose the disease, expert systems can greatly help in avoiding damage to these plants. The expert system correctly diagnoses (...) Custard Apple disease to make it easier for farmers to find the right treatment based on the appropriate diagnosis. Objectives: A specialized syllable language system was established for the diagnosis of Custard Apple plant disease. (shrink)

This chapter argues that Fanon works to interrupt specular and spectacular renderings of suffering and colonial violence. The touch that Fanon advocates is neither optimal grip, violent grasp, nor uniform pressure, nor can it be predicted in advance. His writing touches colonial wounds; by palpating these wounds and dwelling in them, it resuscitates colonial wounds as feelings that are flesh, and does not leave them behind as if their scar tissue was merely a numb object of the past. Fanon seems (...) to reiterate Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological discovery in Ideas II that the hand that touches the surface of a table, as it moves across it, also feels itself touched. Fanon’s aim is not simply to calculate the destructive effects of colonization, against arguments for its partial “civilizing” benefits. (shrink)