The paper's thesis is that dialogue is not an adequate model for all types of argument. The position of Walton is taken as the contrary view. The paper provides a set of descriptions of dialogues in which arguments feature in the order of the increasing complexity of the argument presentation at each turn of the dialogue, and argues that when arguments of great complexity are traded, the exchanges between arguers are turns of a dialogue only in an extended or metaphorical (...) sense. It argues that many of the properties of engaged back-and-forth exchanges of paradigmatic argument dialogues are not found in ‘solo’ arguments, and that at least some of the norms appropriate to the former type of argument, such as some of the pragma-dialectical rules of van Eemeren and Grootendorst's model, do not apply to the latter. (shrink)

Do not define argument by its use to persuade. for other uses of arguments exist. An argument is a proposition and a reason for it. and argumentation is an interchange involving two or more parties resulting in the assertion of one or more arguments coupled with anticipated or actual critical responses. A logically good argument has grounds adeq uate for the purposes at hand (true, probable, plausible, acceptable to the audience) and the grounds provide adequate support for the conclusion. The (...) norms for good logic in arguments are different from the norms for the good use of arguments. (shrink)

The question, “What norms are appropriate for the evaluation of the probative merits of visual arguments?” underlies the investigation of this paper. The notions of argument and of multimodal visual argument employed in the study are explained. Then four multimodal visual arguments are analyzed and their probative merits assessed. It turns out to be possible to judge these qualities using the same criteria that apply to verbally expressed arguments. Since the sample is small and not claimed to be representative, this (...) finding can at best be regarded as suggestive for the probative assessment of multimodal visual arguments in general. (shrink)

This article challenges the view that rhetoric, dialectic and logic are three perspectives on argument, relating respectively to its process, its procedure, and its product. It also questions the view that rhetorical arguments represent a distinctive type. It suggests that, as related to argument, rhetoric is the theory of arguments in speeches, dialectics the theory of arguments in conversations, and logic the theory of good reasoning in each.

In this overview article, we first explain what we take informal logic to be, discussing misconceptions and distinguishing our conception of it from competing ones; second, we briefly catalogue recent informal logic research, under 14 headings; third, we suggest four broad areas of problems and questions for future research; fourth, we describe current scholarly resources for informal logic; fifth, we discuss three implications of informal logic for philosophy in particular, and take note ofpractical consequences of a more general sort.

Built in the centre of Copenhagen, and noted for its equestrian stairway, the Rundetaarn, was intended as an astronomical observatory. Part of a complex of buildings that once included a university library, it affords expansive views of the city in every direction, towering above what surrounds it. The metaphor of the towering figure, who sees what others might not, whose vantage point allows him to visualize how things fit together, and who has an earned-stature of respect and authority, fits another (...) Danish stalwart, Hans Vilhelm Hansen, whose contributions to the fields of informal logic and argument theory have earned the gratitude of his colleagues, and inspired this collection of essays, written to express the appreciation of its authors and of the many, many colleagues they represent. (shrink)

In Jonathan Adler argued that conductive arguments, as they are commonly characterized, are impossible—that no such argument can exist. This striking contention threatens to undermine a topic of argumentation theory originated by Trudy Govier based on Carl Wellman and revisited by the papers in “Conductive argument, An overlooked type of defeasible reasoning”. I here argue that Adler’s dismissal of conductive arguments relies on a misreading of the term ‘non-conclusive’ used in the characterization of this type of reasoning and argument, and (...) that as a result, his refutation fails. However, Adler’s critique raises other questions about conductive arguments that have to be answered. (shrink)

Premissary relevance is a property of arguments understood as speech act complexes. It is explicable in terms of the idea of a premise's lending support to a conclusion. Premissary relevance is a function of premises belonging to a set which authoritatively warrants an inference to a conclusion. An authoritative inference warrant will have associated with it a conditional proposition which is true— that is to say, which can be justified. The study of the Aristotelian doctrine of topoi or argument schemes (...) may contribute to the task of identifying authoritative warrants. (shrink)

I argue that argumentation is not to be identified with (attempted) rational persuasion, because although rational persuasion appears to consist of arguments, some uses of arguments are not attempts at rational persuasion. However, the use of arguments in argumentative communication to try to persuade is one kind of attempt at rational persuasion. What makes it rational is that its informing ideal is to persuade on the basis of adequate grounds, grounds that make it reasonable and rational to accept the claim (...) at issue. (shrink)

In “Are conductive arguments possible?” Jonathan Adler argued that conductive argu-ments are not possible because they are committed to two incompatible propositions: C is reached without nullifying the counter-considerations; C is accepted is true, which issues in belief, so C is detached from these premises. This paper offers an analysis and an assessment of Adler’s case for his thesis.

Even with Kientpointer's and Walton's valuable work, we do not yet have a complete theory of argument schemes. A complete theory of argument schemes should contain at least the following: its theoretical motivation, the denotation of "argument" or "ar gumentation" used in the theory, an analysis of the concept of an argument scheme, a theory of classification of argument schemes, a solution to the problem of identifying which scheme is correct, and an account of the grounds of the normativity or (...) normat ive argument schemes. The paper will supply these elements, worked out as fully as space permits. (shrink)

By Maurice A. Finocchiaro Studies in Logic, Logic and Argumentation, Vol. 42. London: College Publications, 2013. Pp. vii, 1-279. ISBN 978-1-84890-097-4. UK£12 US$17.10 CDN$21.12.

Informal logic began in the 1970s as a critique of then-current theoretical assumptions in the teaching of argument analysis and evaluation in philosophy departments in the U.S. and Canada. The last 35 years have seen significant developments in informal logic and critical thinking theory. The paper is a pilot study of the influence of these advances in theory on what is taught in courses on argument analysis and critical thinking in U.S. and Canadian philosophy departments. Its finding, provisional and much-qualified, (...) is that the theoretical developments and refinements have had limited impact on instruction in leading philosophy departments. (shrink)

In this paper I review a number of Govier’s criticisms of the standard view of logic at the time she was developing her views about the nature of logic as it applies to the critique of arguments in natural language and the development of ways to teach skills in such critique. I argue that the concept of informal logic has emerged at least in part from those criticisms and Govier’s positive alternatives.

Are there any logical norms for argument evaluation besides soundness and inductive strength? The paper will look at several concepts or models introduced over the years, including those of Wisdom, Toulmin, Wellman, Rescher, defeasible reasoning proponents and Walton to consider whether there is common ground among them that supplies an alternative to deductive validity and inductive strength.

This paper argues for the importance of the distinction between internal and external negation over expressions for belief. The common fallacy is to confuse statement like (1) and (2): (1) John believes that the school is not closed on Tuesday; (2) John does not believe that the school is closed on Tuesday. The fallacy has ramifications in teaching, reasoning, and argumentation. Analysis of the fallacy and suggestions for teaching are offered.

This paper’s thesis is that the fallacies should not be taught to undergraduates. Besides some bad influences, this is not only because doing so steals time more valuably spent elsewhere, but also because the field is now so complex (overlapping concepts, theories and disciplines), that we lack knowledgeable instructors and sophisticated students. The study of theories involving fallacies, however, remains viable.

This paper is a commentary on the articles by William Rehg and Robert Asen in this issue of Informal Logic. It compares the subject matter of the two papers, offers an interpretation of and commentary on each paper separately, then discusses their overlapping problematic: the importance of public sphere argumentation.

The Editors thank Ken Peacock for his assistance.

These letters between Irving Copi and Anthony Blair exchanged in 1981 are of poss ible interest for the history of informal logic.

The Editors thank Ken Peacock for his assistance.