What marks emergence as a metaphysically interesting idea is that many macro-level entities and their properties are ontologically and causally autonomous in relation to the micro-level entities and properties they depend on---or so argues Jessica Wilson in Metaphysical Emergence (2021). To do so, she adopts a “metaphysically highly neutral” (p. 32) approach to questions about powers, causation, properties, and laws. That is, while explaining what emergence is and arguing that there is indeed emergence in the natural world, she doesn’t restrict (...) her analyses and arguments to any specific metaphysical accounts of these concepts, and she doesn’t commit to any controversial theses about them. In this article, I assess Wilson’s project against this methodological ideal of metaphysical neutrality. (shrink)

According to a current trend in social ontology, by articulating claims of social construction in terms of metaphysical grounding, we can shed light on the metaphysics of social construction and understand deep truths about social identities like race and gender. Focusing on two recent accounts, I argue that this move from social construction to grounding has limitations. While there are intelligible grounding claims that can explain certain ideas in social ontology, such grounding claims add nothing to what we have learnt (...) from constructionists about race and gender. Although some applications of this grounding approach attempt to remedy this and offer detailed analyses of how social kinds are grounded, they yield results that are inconsistent with some very plausible views about social construction. Thus, if we want to illuminate the metaphysics of social construction, we must explore other alternatives. (shrink)

Epiphenomenalism denies some or all putative cases of mental causation. The view is widely taken to be absurd: if a theory can be shown to entail epiphenomenalism, many see that as a reductio of that theory. Opponents take epiphenomenalism to be absurd because they regard the view as undermining the evident agency we have in action and precluding substantial self-knowledge. In this paper, I defend epiphenomenalism against these objections, and thus against the negative dialectical role that the view plays in (...) philosophy of mind. I argue that nearly in all cases where a theory implies one kind of epiphenomenalism, it is an epiphenomenalism of a non-problematic kind, at least as far as issues about agency and self-knowledge are concerned. There is indeed a problematic version of epiphenomenalism, but that version is not relevant to the debates where its apparent absurdity is invoked. (shrink)

“Realization” is a technical term that is used by metaphysicians, philosophers of mind, and philosophers of science to denote some dependence relation that is thought to obtain between higher-level properties and lower-level properties. It is said that mental properties are realized by physical properties; functional and computational properties are realized by first-order properties that occupy certain causal/functional roles; dispositional properties are realized by categorical properties; so on and so forth. Given this wide usage of the term “realization”, it would be (...) right to think that there might be different dependence relations that this term denotes in different cases. Any relation that is aptly picked out by this term can be taken to be a realization relation. The aim of this state-of-the-field article is to introduce the central questions about the concept of realization, and provide formulations of a number of realization relations. In doing so, I identify some theoretical roles realization relations should play, and discuss some theories of realization in relation to these theoretical roles. (shrink)

Some claim that the notion of strong emergence as involving ontological or causal novelty makes no sense, on grounds that any purportedly strongly emergent features or associated powers 'collapse', one way or another, into the lower-level base features upon which they depend. Here we argue that there are several independently motivated and defensible means of preventing the collapse of strongly emergent features or powers into their lower-level bases, as directed against a conception of strongly emergent features as having fundamentally novel (...) powers. After introducing the project (Section 1), we motivate and present the powers-based account (Section 2); we then canvass the two main versions of the collapse objection, show how these apply to the powers-based account, and problematize certain strategies of response (Section 3); we then present and defend four better strategies of response (Section 4). (shrink)

According to one conception of strong emergence, strongly emergent properties are nomologically necessitated by their base properties and have novel causal powers relative to them. In this paper, I raise a difficulty for this conception of strong emergence, arguing that these two features are incompatible. Instead of presenting this as an objection to the friends of strong emergence, I argue that this indicates that there are distinct varieties of strong emergence: causal emergence and epiphenomenal emergence. I then explore the prospects (...) of emergentism with this distinction in the background. (shrink)

What is an epiphenomenal property? This question needs to be settled before we can decide whether higher-level properties are epiphenomenal or not. In this paper, I offer an account of what it is for a property to have some causal power. From this, I derive a characterisation of the notion of an epiphenomenal property. I then argue that physically realized higher-level properties are not epiphenomenal because laws of nature impose causal similarities on the bearers of such properties, and these similarities (...) figure as powers in the causal profiles of these properties. (shrink)

“Realization” and “emergence” are two concepts that are sometimes used to describe same or similar phenomena in philosophy of mind and the special sciences, where such phenomena involve the synchronic dependence of some higher-level states of affairs on the lower-level ones. According to a popular line of thought, higher-level properties that are invoked in the special sciences are realized by, and/or emergent from, lower-level, broadly physical, properties. So, these two concepts are taken to refer to relations between properties from different (...) levels where the lower-level ones somehow “bring about” the higher-level ones. However, for those who specialise in inter-level relations, there are important differences between these two concepts – especially if emergence is understood as strong emergence. The purpose of this chapter is to highlight these differences. (shrink)

This paper revisits some classic thought experiments in which experiences are detached from their characteristic causal roles, and explores what these thought experiments tell us about qualia epiphenomenalism, i.e., the view that qualia are epiphenomenal properties. It argues that qualia epiphenomenalism is true just in case it is possible for experiences of the same type to have entirely different causal powers. This is done with the help of new conceptual tools regarding the concept of an epiphenomenal property. One conclusion is (...) that it is not obvious if qualia epiphenomenalism is false; and it is also not obvious what should make us believe that it is false—or for that matter, true. Connections between qualia epiphenomenalism, physicalism, and non-physicalist property dualism are further explored. (shrink)

Abstract: Non-reductive physicalism is commonly understood as the view that mental properties are realized by physical properties. Here, I argue that the realization relation in question is a power inheritance relation: if a property P realizes a property Q, then the causal powers of Q are a subset of the causal powers of P. Whereas others have motivated this claim by appealing to its theoretical benefits, I argue that it is in fact entailed by two theses: (i) realization is a (...) same-subject necessitation relation; (ii) properties have their causal powers derivatively on the causal powers of their bearers. Although the power inheritance claim that is defended here has many opponents, I take it that the two theses that entail it are either plausible or widely assumed. (shrink)

In this paper, we make a case for the disjunctive view of phenomenal consciousness: consciousness is essentially disjunctive in being either physical or non-physical in the sense that it has both physical and non-physical possible instances. We motivate this view by showing that it undermines two well-known conceivability arguments in philosophy of mind: the zombie argument for anti-physicalism, and the anti-zombie argument for physicalism. By appealing to the disjunctive view, we argue that two hitherto unquestioned premises of these arguments are (...) false. Furthermore, making use of the resources of this view, we formulate distinct forms of both physicalism and anti-physicalism. On these formulations, it is easy to see how physicalists and anti-physicalists can accommodate the modal intuitions of their opponents regarding zombies and anti-zombies. We conclude that these formulations of physicalism and anti-physicalism are superior to their more traditional counterparts. (shrink)

The New Evil Demon Problem is meant to show that reliabilism about epistemic justification is incompatible with the intuitive idea that the external-world beliefs of a subject who is the victim of a Cartesian demon could be epistemically justified. Here, I present a new argument that such beliefs can be justified on reliabilism. Whereas others have argued for this conclusion by making some alterations in the formulation of reliabilism, I argue that, as far as the said problem is concerned, such (...) alterations are redundant. No reliabilist should fear the demon. (shrink)

The nomic view of dispositions holds that properties confer dispositions on their bearers with nomological necessity. The argument against nomic dispositions challenges the nomic view: if the nomic view is true, then objects don't have dispositions, but 'mimic' them. This paper presents an explication of disposition conferral which shows that the nomic view is not vulnerable to this objection.

According to contingentism, laws of nature hold contingently. An objection to contingentism is that it implies quidditism, and therefore inherits its implausible consequences. This paper argues that this objection is misguided. Understood one way, quidditism is not an implication of contingentism, hence even if it has implausible consequences, these are not relevant to contingentism. Understood another way, quidditism is implied by contingentism, but it is less clear if this version of quidditism has the same implausible consequences. Whatever the merits of (...) contingentism, the argument from anti-quidditism is not successful in showing that it is false. (shrink)

Mnemonic confabulation is an epistemic failure that involves memory error. In this paper, I examine an account of mnemonic confabulation offered by Sarah Robins in a number of works. In Robins’ framework, mnemonic cognitive states in general (e.g., remembering, misremembering) are individuated by three conditions: existence of the target event, matching of the representation and the target event, and an appropriate causal connection between the target event and its representation. Robins argues that when these three conditions are not met, the (...) cognitive state in question is an instance of mnemonic confabulation. Here, I argue that this is not true. There are mnemonic cognitive states which don’t meet any of these conditions, and they are not cases of mnemonic confabulation. On a more positive note, I argue that mnemonic confabulation requires it to be a failing on behalf of either the subject or her mnemonic system that these conditions are not met. (shrink)

I present an argument that propositional attitudes are not mental states. In a nutshell, the argument is that if propositional attitudes are mental states, then only minded beings could have them; but there are reasons to think that some non-minded beings could bear propositional attitudes. To illustrate this, I appeal to cases of genuine group intentionality. I argue that these are cases in which some group entities bear propositional attitudes, but they are not subjects of mental states. Although propositional attitudes (...) are not mental states, I propose that they are typically co-instantiated with mental states. In an attempt to explain this co-instantiation, I suggest that propositional attitudes of minded beings are typically realized by mental states. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The exclusion problem is meant to show that non-reductive physicalism leads to epiphenomenalism: if mental properties are not identical with physical properties, then they are not causally efficacious. Defenders of a difference-making account of causation suggest that the exclusion problem can be solved because mental properties can be difference-making causes of physical effects. Here, we focus on what we dub an incompatibilist implementation of this general strategy and argue against it from a non-reductive physicalist perspective. Specifically, we argue that (...) incompatibilism undermines either the non-reductionist or the physicalist aspirations of non-reductive physicalism. (shrink)

Non-reductive physicalists hold that mental properties are realized by physical properties. The realization relation is typically taken to be a metaphysical necessitation relation. Here, I explore how the metaphysical necessitation feature of realization can be explained by what is known as ‘the subset view’ of realization. The subset view holds that the causal powers that are associated with a realized property are a proper subset of the causal powers that are associated with the realizer property. I argue that the said (...) explanation of the metaphysical necessitation feature requires a careful treatment of the relationship between properties and causal powers. (shrink)

According to one-level physicalism, reality is exhausted by fundamental physical entities and properties. This position is sometimes defended on the basis of the truthmaker view of ontological commitment. Accordingly, physicalists can affirm higher-level truths without ontologically committing to any higher-level properties or states of affairs; fundamental physical states of affairs serve as truthmakers of all truths that have truthmakers, and a physicalist’s ontology should consist of nothing but the fundamental physical states of affairs and their constituents. In this paper, I (...) raise a problem for one-level physicalists who defend their views by appealing to the truthmaker view of ontological commitment. I argue that the truthmaker view faces certain puzzles the solutions of which clash with the main tenets of one-level physicalism. I conclude that either truthmaking is not a good guide to ontological commitment or one-level physicalism cannot be defended on the basis of the truthmaker view. (shrink)

In this thesis, I argue that physicalism should be understood to be the view that mental properties are realized by physical properties. In doing this, I explore what the realization relation might be. Since realization is the relation that should help us formulate physicalism, I suggest that the theoretical role of realization consists in explaining some of the things that physicalists wish to explain. These are: How are mental properties metaphysically necessitated by physical properties? How are mental properties causally efficacious? (...) A theory of realization should provide resources for answering these questions. Having identified the theoretical role of realization, I discuss several theories of realization, but then focus on the subset view of realization. According to the subset view, a property P realizes a property Q if and only if the causal powers of Q are a proper subset of the causal powers of P. I argue that the realization relation as it is formulated by the subset view is a promising candidate to play the theoretical role that I want realization to play. I then investigate how this theoretical role is occupied. In doing so, I provide a general metaphysical framework that the defenders of the subset view can appeal to. This framework specifies in what ways properties are related to their causal powers. Discussing some problems that the subset view faces, I propose my own version of the subset view. I argue that a property P realizes a property Q if and only if the causal powers of Q are a proper subset of the causal powers of P, and P is more fundamental than Q. Thanks to the requirement that a realized property is less fundamental than its realizers, two things that the original version of the subset view cannot explain are guaranteed: first, fundamental properties are not realized; second, arbitrary conjunctions of properties do not realize their conjuncts. By showing how a theory of realization can help us explain some of the things that physicalists typically wish to explain, I also show that a non-reductive variety of physicalism does not face the problems that it is commonly thought to face. (shrink)

© The Author 2017. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Analysis Trust. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: [email protected] fish propel their bodies under water in order to travel from one place to another, are they doing the same kind of thing that we do when we swim? If swimming is to be identified with exactly the kind of thing that we do when we swim, we should seriously consider the following question: Do fish swim? Believe (...) it or not, how you think about these questions is relevant to what you will make of this book’s central arguments against the multiple realization thesis in philosophy of mind. As Polger and Shapiro report, the conventional wisdom in philosophy of mind is that psychological kinds are multiply realized by different physical kinds; therefore, we shouldn’t expect to... (shrink)

_The Multiple Realization Book_By PolgerThomas W. and ShapiroLawrence A.Oxford University Press, 2016. xiv + 258 pp. £71.14 cloth, £18.99 paper.

One of the central limitations of sensory substitution devices (SSDs) is their inability to reproduce the non-sensory feelings that are normally associated with visual experiences, especially hedonic and aesthetic responses. This limitation is sometimes reported to cause SSD users frustration. To make matters worse, it is unclear that improvements in acuity, bandwidth, or training will resolve the issue. Yet, if SSDs are to actually reproduce visual experience in its fullness, it seems that the reproduction of non-sensory feelings will be of (...) some importance. We offer a novel solution. Researchers can produce hedonic and aesthetic responses by eliciting these feelings artificially, pairing distal objects that should be pleasurable to pleasurable stimulus outputs from the SSD. We outline two strategies for accomplishing this: first, by means of a prefixed, hardwired, association of pleasant distal objects to pleasant stimulus outputs from the SSD; second, by means of a flexible, feedback-based association which creates associations based on a subject-directed matching of distal objects to patterns of stimuli from the SSD which the subject takes to have the corresponding hedonic properties. We evaluate some problems with both strategies, and we argue that the feedback-based strategy is more promising. Researchers can use this strategy to help the blind, allowing them to take pleasure in the objects they perceive using SSDs. (shrink)

This report highlights and explores five questions that arose from the workshop on sensory substitution and augmentation at the British Academy, March 26th through 28th, 2013.

This is an excerpt from a report on the Sensory Substitution and Augmentation Conference at the British Academy in March of 2013. This portion of the report explores the question: Does sensory substitution generate perceptual or cognitive states?

This is an excerpt from a report on the Sensory Substitution and Augmentation Conference at the British Academy in March of 2013. This portion of the report explores the question: Can normal non-sensory feelings be generated through sensory substitution?

This is an excerpt from a report on the Sensory Substitution and Augmentation Conference at the British Academy in March of 2013. This portion of the report explores the question: What can sensory substitution tell us about perceptual learning?

This is an excerpt from a report on the Sensory Substitution and Augmentation Conference at the British Academy in March of 2013. This portion of the report explores the question: How does sensory substitution interact with the brain’s architecture?

This is an excerpt from a report on the Sensory Substitution and Augmentation Conference at the British Academy in March of 2013. This portion of the report explores the question: What are the limitations of sensory substitution.

In The Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel discusses how human beings have come to know things, including themselves. The Phenomenology of Spirit serves as an introduction to Hegel's philosophical system, which continues with logic, philosophy of nature, and ethical and political philosophy. Hegel tries to work out how our knowledge of particular things and the relations between them presupposes what he calls “force.” For Hegel, understanding force is like catching a thread or stumbling upon a road to what he calls “Absolute (...) Knowledge,” the understanding of Geist. Unlike gravity, in Star Wars the Force's influence is apparent in relations between living creatures. Stephen Houlgate's poignant interpretation of Hegel's Geist is useful for a social interpretation of the Force in Star Wars. Hegel's philosophy has brought us closer to Yoda, who has a deep understanding of reality thanks to his extensive knowledge of the Force and how it binds everything and everyone together. (shrink)

The author argues that in democracies a strong state and strong civil society are not mutually exclusive. Only a democratic, legitimate, and strong state can provide the environment for civil society activities to flourish; in return, only a strong and a participatory civil society can outline the reach of state strength vis-à-vis the society. The author discusses the need for civil society organizations to collaborate with policy-making institutions, in which they can negotiate policy concerns with ministers and officials while retaining (...) an independent distance from the state and the political parties. Further, the author argues that an environment as such would provide for the transformative capacity of human agency to manifest itself in full in a globalizing world. The author discusses how participatory state and civil society structures will enhance the role of the human agency in order to dissolve elite rule, especially in new democracies. (shrink)

Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus’un sonunda, kendisini anlayan okuyucunun, söylediklerinin saçma olduğunu göreceğini söyler. Eserin bu paradoksu eserle tanışan hemen her okuyucu için bir kafa karışıklığı vesilesidir. Eğer eserde dile getirilenler saçmaysa bunların saçma olduğu da dahil olmak üzere eserin dile getirdiklerini ciddiye almamak gerekir, eğer eser ciddiye alınacaksa söylenenlerin saçma olduğunu kabul etmek gerekir. Eserin bu paradoksunun nasıl ele alınması gerektiğine dair hatırı sayılır bir literatür vardır. Bu çalışmada, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus’taki bu paradoksun, saçmanın sağaltıcı işleviyle değerlendirildiğinde eseri anlamayı engellemeyeceği fikri savunulacaktır. (...) Bunun için öncelikle genel olarak Resim Kuramı’nın ana hatlarından söz ederek Wittgenstein için saçmanın ne olduğunu anlatacağım. Daha sonra, Wittgenstein için saçmanın işlevinin ne olduğuna dair iyi gerekçelendirildiğini düşündüğüm fikirlerden söz edeceğim. Son olarak, saçmaya işaret edebilmenin ancak saçma ile mümkün olduğunu, Wittgenstein’ın bu yolla yaygın bir yanılgıyı sağalttığını ve dolayısıyla saçmanın sağaltıcı bir işlevi olduğunu iddia edeceğim. (shrink)

This article aims to analyse state–bourgeoisie relations in the era of AKP-rule in Turkey, with a specific focus on the 2018 economic crisis. It will discuss the following question: How did the AKP regime position itself with respect to the interests of the first- and second-generation bourgeoisie? Especially after 2010, the AKP was criticised for carrying out an extra-economic intervention in the sphere of accumulation as well as providing benefits to the Islamic second-generation bourgeoisie. This article draws on a Marxist (...) conceptualisation of the state which underlines that the state’s autonomy from the economy is limited because its continued existence depends on the reproduction of accumulation, hence its need to intervene. However, the state cannot implement a unified interventionist strategy because it needs to maintain links with different groups of bourgeoisie as well as the proletariat. The article’s main argument is that the AKP struggled to balance the divergent interests of the first- and second-generation bourgeoisie and implemented policies that may be characterised as incoherent and contradictory. These contradictory policies also played an important role in the 2018 economic crisis. (shrink)

Bu çalışma İstanbul’da faaliyette bulunan motor-kuryelerin çalışma koşulları, ücret düzeyleri, yasal hakları, iş kazası ve meslek hastalıkları ve karşılaşılan ayrımcılıkların araştırılması amaçlanmıştır. Bu amaçla, 20 motor-kurye ile yarı yapılandırılmış mülakat tekniğiyle görüşmeler gerçekleştirilmiştir. Yapılan görüşmeler sonucunda, motor-kuryelik mesleğinde esnaf ve bordrolu olmak üzere ikili bir yapı oluştuğu; katılımcıların %68’i esnaf, %37’si ise bordrolu olarak çalıştığı görülmektedir. Bordrolu çalışan motor-kuryelerin ücretli izin hakkı bulunurken; esnaf kuryelerin tamamının ücretli izin haklarının olmadığı, %61’ inin ise sosyal güvenceye sahip olmadığı tespit edilmiştir. Katılımcıların %69’u (...) haftada 6 gün çalışırken, %31’i haftada 7 gün çalışmaktadır. Katılımcıların %16’ısı haftalık 45-66 saat arası, %84’ü 67 saat ve üstü çalışmaktadır. Motor-kuryelikte ücretin belirlenmesinde kıdem ya da niteliğin etkili olmadığı, dağıtılan paket sayısının ücreti belirlediği tespit edilmiştir. Bordrolu çalışanların 8.500 TL ile 12.750 TL aralığında ücret kazandıkları, esnaf kurye modelinde ise çoğunluğun 12.750 TL ile 17.000 TL aralığında ücret kazandıkları Esnaf kuryelerin bordrolu kuryelere göre daha fazla gelir elde ettiği görülse de bunun hem daha fazla çalışmadan hem de sigorta primlerinin ödenmemesinden kaynaklandığı sonucuna ulaşılmıştır. Hızlı ve sıcak teslimata ilişkin reklamların kuryelik mesleğinin insani yönünü ortadan kaldırdığı ve kuryelerde dışlanma hissi oluşturduğu tespit edilmiştir. Son olarak, motor-kuryelerin; trafikte, teslimat sırasında ya da sitelerde en az bir kere ayrımcılığa maruz kaldıklarını belirtmektedir. (shrink)

There is a close relationship between Ashʿarism and Ḥanbalism since the emergence of Ashʿarism. However, they often conflicted with each other as they approached to religious matters from different perspectives. These conflicts were not only limited to theological discussions but also turned into social conflicts, which occasionally resulted with deaths. First massive events occurred in 429/1038 in Baghdād between Ashʿarites and Ḥanbalities. When Niẓām al-Mulk was appointed as vizier, the conflicts reached a peak. The apparent reason of the conflicts was (...) the theological controversy between these two sects. However, the rise of Ashʿarism, which was usually against Ḥanbalism, was the main reason of the social conflicts. Supports of the Ashʿarite thought by the leading statesmen of the era such as Niẓām al-Mulk and Ayyūbid sultans, and accusations of some Ashʿarite preachers about Ḥanbalities relying on this political support were also among the factors that led to these conflicts. Nevertheless, even if any accusation was not made, it occurred that the members of both sects resorted to violence in case of criticisms about their beliefs. This shows that the most important reason of the conflicts was sectarian fanaticism.Summary: Ashʿarism is the name of the sect that was formed around the ideas of Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī. It is a continuation of Kullābism in terms of general thought system. Ashʿarism replaced Kullābism by the end of the 5th century of the Hijrah, and started to be called as an independent sect. It spread mostly among the Shāfiʿites and Mālikites in Iraq, Khurāsān, Damascus, Maghreb, and Yemen. When it was arrived to the last quarter of the 5th century, it became the common theological sect of most of Shāfiʿites and Mālikites. Bāqillānī (d. 403/1013), Ibn Fūrāk (d. 406/1015), and Abū Isḥāq al-Isfarāyīnī’s (d. 418/1027) efforts played an important role in rising of Ashʿarism in this period. In the following periods, contribution of the Seljuk vizier Niẓām al-Mulk (d. 485/1092) to Ashʿarism was massive by establishing the Niẓāmiyah Colleges to strengthen the Ashʿarites against the Hanafites in Khurāsān and against the Ḥanbalites in Baghdād. The Niẓāmiyah Colleges were donated by Niẓām al-Mulk to Shāfiʿite scholars for the mission of primarily limiting the influence Shīʿī thought. The condition of belonging to Shāfiʿites in waqfiyyah (endowment certificate) of the colleges provided some important advantages for Shāfiʿites and Ashʿarites. On the other hand, the Ayyūbids provided important contributions to Ashʿarites in the regions of Egypt, Damascus and Yemen. They worked for strengthening Ashʿarism during their ruling for two centuries. It was a state policy for the Ayyūbids to support Ashʿarism starting from the founder of the state, Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn al-Ayyūbī (d. 589/1193).This rapid rise of Ashʿarism led to a tense relationship between the Ashʿarites and the Ḥanbalites who became the most important representative of Aṣḥāb al-ḥadīth (people of the traditions of the Prophet) after the period of Miḥnah (period of religious persecution). Undoubtedly, the first respondents of these tense relations were Kullābite scholars. At the beginning of the 4th century of the Hijrah, Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī became the natural inheritor of the Ḥanbalite reaction to the Kullābites. He conflicted with the Ḥanbalites because of his different approach on the debate regarding creation of the Qur’ān. Ḥanbalite reactions to Imam al-Ashʿarī continued after his death. When he died in Baghdād in 324/935, officials buried him secretly as they worried about Ḥanbalite attacks against his funeral. Hence, after his burial some Ḥanbalites tried to destroy his tomb several times. After Ashʿarī died, the first social events between the Ashʿarites and the Ḥanbalites took place in Iṣfahān, one of the most important cities of West Khurāsān, in the end of the 4th century of the Hijrah. The debate started around the question of whether the letters of the Qur’ān were created or uncreated between the Ḥanbalite scholar Ibn Mandah (d. 395/1005) and Ashʿarite scholar Abū Nuʿaym al-Iṣfahānī (d. 430/1038). This debate led to prolonged events between the supporters of these scholars. Abū Nuʿaym, saved his life from various attacks and finally he had to leave Iṣfahān.The tense relationships between the Ashʿarites and the Ḥanbalites reached the peak in the 5th century of the Hijrah. Many events occurred in Baghdād during this century. The discussion on interpretation of the revealed attributes of Allah turned into conflict between the two sides from time to time. The Ashʿarite scholars accused the Ḥanbalites with tashbih (affirming Allah’s similarity to humanity) and tajseem (anthropomorphism) by pointing at Abū Yaʿlā al-Farrā’s work titled Ibṭāl al-taʾwīl al-ṣifāt. The ʿAbbāsid caliphs generally supported the Ḥanbalites in this debate. For example, when al-Qāim bi-Amr Allāh re-published the famous declaration known as the Qādirī Creed in 433/1042, he proclaimed that rejection of the Ḥanbalite approach on the issue of the revealed attributes of Allah would be regarded as a cause of blasphemy. The paper was read in a meeting where several scholars from various sects were present. It was signed firstly by Ashʿarite scholar Abū al-Ḥasan ʿAli ibn ʿUmar al-Qazwīnī (d. 442/1051). However, he was one who had criticized Ibṭāl al-taʾwīl al-ṣifāt in 429/1038, which caused conflicts in society at that time. This shift in his position is remarkable as it shows that the declaration was primarily response to him.In the middle of the 5th century of the Hijrah, Ashʿarite scholar al-Khatīb al-Baghdādī (d. 463/1071) became a victim of the tension between the Ashʿarites and Ḥanbalites. Khatīb had protection of vizier Ibn al-Muslima and under his protection he lectured on Hadith in the Mansur Mosque. However, after the death of the vizier, he was subjected to harassment of the Ḥanbalites because of some expressions in his work titled Tarīkh Baghdād. So much so that he began to worry about his life, thus he had to leave Baghdād and went to Damascus in 451/1059.The tense relations between the Ashʿarites and the Ḥanbalites reached the summit in the period of Niẓām al-Mulk who was the vizier of Seljuk Empire. In fact, some events resulted with deaths. For example, in the events of 469/1076, which lasted years, the Ḥanbalites attacked Ashʿarite scholar Abū Naṣr ibn ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Qushayrī (d. 514/1120) who accused them with tashbeeh and tajseem. As a result, around twenty people died during these events. The gradual rise of the Ashʿarite thought with the support of Niẓām al-Mulk and abusive discourses of some Ashʿarite scholars who relied on this support can be mentioned among the basic reasons of the events at that time.After the death of Niẓām al-Mulk in 485/1092, for a long time there was no serious event between the Ashʿarites and the Ḥanbalites. In the middle of the 6th/12th century, the relations started to become tense again in the regions of Egypt, Damascus, and Yemen under the Ayyūbid dynasty. In addition to these places, various events occurred in Khurāsān region, in cities such as Marw. Nevertheless, unlike some previous events, the current tensions were not against a whole sect but only targeted some individual scholars. Moreover, unlike the previous periods, oppressed and victimized people were mostly Ḥanbalite scholars this time. No serious events took place between two sects after this period. Therefore, it can be said that their struggle to dominate society led to the above-mentioned events. (shrink)

This study tries to show the relation between technê and the ethical sphere in the Ancient Greek through mythology and the philosophical literature. Both in mythology and in the philosophical framework the benefits of technê and the power provided by technê for humanity are emphasized. And technê is considered as competence increases the control of human beings in practical areas. However, the ambiguous character of the human experience related to technê and the morally problematic character of this field is also (...) pointed out in the literature. Because, if not controlled, technê has a potential to turn easily against humanity and to produce things that would harm human beings. At this point, ethical values have a crucial role in the control of technê. Technê as a type of knowledge which gives how to do things and how to control the environment but does not give why something is to be done and cannot give an ultimate goal should be subject to higher spheres in the philosophical framework. Therefore technê is subject to ethical and ultimately metaphysical sphere. (shrink)