It is demonstrated how Kripke models for intuitionistic predicate logic can be applied in order to prove classical theorems. As examples proofs of the independence of the axiom of constructibility, of the omitting types theorem and of Shelah's ultrapower theorem are sketched.

A game for testing the equivalence of Kripke models with respect to finitary and infinitary intuitionistic predicate logic is introduced and applied to discuss a concept of categoricity for intuitionistic theories.

In this paper some parts of the model theory for logics based on generalised Kripke semantics are developed. Löwenheim-Skolem theorems and some applications of ultraproduct constructions for generalised Kripke models with variable universe are investigated using similar theorems of the model theory for classical logic. The results are generalizations of the theorems of [4].

Trust is generally held to have three different dimensions or aspects: a behavioral aspect, a cognitive aspect, and an affective aspect. While t here is hardly any disagreement about trusting behavior, there is some disagreement as to which of the two other aspects is more fundamental. After presenting some of the main ideas concerning the concept of trust as used in the analysis of social cooperation. I will argue that affective aspects of trust must be included in any adequate account (...) of the role of trust in social dilemma situations involving multiple equilibria. Cooperation in such situations requires coordination even though information on what another player might do is not available. A trusting person can handle such problems of cooperation by framing the situation in a way that goes beyond cognitive trust and solves what I shall call the problem of normative consent. I will conclude with some remarks ab out the design of institutions that foster trustful cooperation, especially in the context of the Internet. (shrink)

The two main challenges of the theory of conceptual content presented by Robert Brandom in Making It Explicit are to account for a referential dimension of conceptual content and to account for the objectivity of conceptual norms. Brandom tries to meet both these challenges in chapter 8 of his book. I argue that the accounts presented there can only be understood if seen against the background of Brandom's theory of communication developed in chapter 7. This theory is motivated by the (...) well-known problem that semantic holism threatens the possibility of communication because it has the consequence that words mean different things in different mouths. Brandom offers a solution to this problem in terms of what he calls recurrence commitments. I show that chapter 8 of Making It Explicit should be understood as arguing that a practice that includes acknowledging interpersonal recurrence commitments institutes both conceptual contents with a referential dimension and objective conceptual norms. I close by raising the objection that Brandom's argument can only show that conceptual norms are communally shared and not that they are objective. I propose an emendation of this argument, having recourse to a practice Brandom refers to as rational rectification in his new book Between Saying and Doing. (shrink)

It is quite strange that a work whose author apparently deliberately avoided the term “human dignity” is today known under the title “Oration on the Dignity of Man”. In my contribution, I examine the extent to which the famous tract of Pico della Mirandola can be linked to the history of human dignity. This raises the fundamental question of what human dignity (for Pico) actually means. Pico’s famous text appears primarily as an ode to man’s capacity for transformation, which his (...) freedom grants him. The image of the chameleon used by Pico - which is idiosyncratic in the context of his time - highlights this. His concern is a freedom of philosophising that does not impose any prohibitions on thinking even when dealing with other religions and thus seems radical for Pico’s time. (shrink)

Morality, resp. moral communication, undergoes substantial changes when it is computer‐mediated, i.e. cyberspace provides a different moral infrastructure. Firstly, there are different conditions regarding the transaction costs that frame the relation between moral motivation and the expectation of the success of a moral act. Secondly, there is the transformation of ownership and property, which are the basic content of moral actions and communications. The personal accountability of one’s and somebody else’s own is altered; a special ethic of virtual ownership is (...) developing, which finds its expression in the manifold production of public goods in virtual networks. This development is reflected in the dialectics of digital commons and anti‐commons. Thirdly, there is the ludic structure of cyberspace. The medial conditions of cyberspace are analogous to the basic principles of play. Playing as a self‐motivated action is a reason for moral behaviour in cyberspace, especially for the production of public goods. (shrink)

Faced by the challenge of religious plurality, most philosophers of religion view pluralism and exclusivism as the most accepted and fully developed positions. The third alternative, the model of inclusivism, held especially within the Catholic tradition, has not received adequate attention in the debates in philosophy of religion, perhaps as it is based solely on theological grounds. In this essay I offer a philosophical defense of the position of religious inclusivism and give reasons why this position represents the most appropriate (...) position in the face of conflicting religious truth claims. (shrink)

In this paper, I approach the power of digital platforms by using the republican concept of domination. More specifically, I argue that the traditional, agent-relative interpretation of domination, in the case of digital domination, is best supplemented by a more radical version, on which republicans ought to give priority to structural elements. I show how radical republicanism draws attention to (1) the economic rationales and the socio-technical infrastructures that underlie and support digital platforms and to (2) the forms of influence (...) that are directed at cognitive dimensions, such as habituation and routinisation, which are particularly relevant for the power of digital platforms. These insights also imply that republicans have reason to favour a more structural response to digital platforms over more direct and individualised forms of control that fit with a ‘standard’ republican approach, such as securing exit options and requiring user consent. (shrink)

Trustful interaction serves the interests of those involved. Thus, one could reason that trust itself may be analyzed as part of rational, goaloriented action. In contrast, common sense tells us that trust is an emotion and is, therefore, independent of rational deliberation to some extent. I will argue that we are right in trusting our common sense. My argument is conceptual in nature, referring to the common distinction between trust and pure reliance. An emotional attitude may be understood as some (...) general pattern in the way the world or some part of the world is perceived by an individual. Trust may be characterized by such a pattern. I shall focus on two central features of a trusting attitude. First, trust involves a participant attitude (Strawson) toward the person being trusted. Second, a situation of trust is perceived by a trusting person as one in which shared values or norms motivate both his own actions as well as those of the person being trusted. As an emotional attitude, trust is, to some extent, independent of objective information. It determines what a trusting person will believe and how various outcomes are evaluated. Hence, trust is quite different from rational belief and the problem with trust is not adequately met in minimizing risk by supplying extensive information or some mechanism of sanctioning. Trust is an attitude that enables us to cope with risk in a certain way. If we want to promote trustful interaction, we must form our institutions in ways that allow individuals to experience their interest and values as shared and, thus, to develop a trusting attitude. (shrink)

I argue that close examination of Wittgenstein’s remarks on family resemblances shows that he is proposing a theory about the development of language over time. According to this theory, a concept is enlarged to a newly discovered object when it is similar to other objects falling under this concept. However, being empirical, theories of language-development cannot be regarded as philosophical positions. I therefore argue that Wittgenstein puts forward this theory only for therapeutical reasons. He thereby wants to bring the metaphysical (...) question “Why do we call all games ‘games’?” back to its everyday use. (shrink)

I argue that close examination of Wittgenstein’s remarks on family resemblances shows that he is proposing a theory about the development of language over time. According to this theory, a concept is enlarged to a newly discovered object when it is similar to other objects falling under this concept. However, being empirical, theories of language-development cannot be regarded as philosophical positions. I therefore argue that Wittgenstein puts forward this theory only for therapeutical reasons. He thereby wants to bring the metaphysical (...) question “Why do we call all games ‘games’?” back to its everyday use. (shrink)

Future state maximisation offers a clear departure from both fixed reactive systems and systems that learn models based on reactive experience. In this commentary, I argue that FSX is not ….

Esposito claims that current algorithms are divinatory. I agree with her, but for different reasons. Her point is that they are divinatory because they only use correlations, but current algorithms….

Naturalistic Descriptions and Normative-Intentional Interpretations Normative pragmatists about linguistic meaning such as Sellars and Brandom have to explain how norms can be implicit in practices described in purely naturalistic terms. The explanation of implicit norms usually offered in the literature commits pragmatists to equate actions with naturalistic events. Since this is an unacceptable consequence, I propose an alternative explanation of implicit norms that avoids this identification. To do so, one has to treat the normative-intentional concepts such as "norm", "action", "sanction", (...) "belief", "desire" as a holistic system, in the sense that one has to apply all of them to a given naturalistic practice simultaneously. This result might be taken to imply that the pragmatist strategy of explaining the content of assertions and beliefs in terms of norm-governed use is misguided because it presupposes that one can account for the concept "norm" independently of the concept "belief". I argue that this consequence does not follow. (shrink)

This paper addresses the question of how it is to be explained that an action or object X counts as Y. I argue that John Searle's notion of a constitutive rule should not be employed because it involves a confusion. Instead, I propose an explanatory framework containing the following three elements: 1) The X-action or object is involved in certain social practices. 2) These practices confer properties on the X-items, in addition to their physical properties. 3) In virtue of these (...) additional properties the X-items fall under the Y-concept. Moreover, I stress that the social practices mentioned under 1) look differently from case to case and involve various constellations of prescriptive rules and interpersonal patterns of intentions. To illustrate and corroborate these claims, I discuss several cases of socially constituted actions and objects, in particular, the case of money, where I reject Searle's claim that something counts as money in virtue of giving its owner the right to buy something. (shrink)

This paper seeks to contextualize Lycurgus' use of the historical example of King Codrus' self-sacrifice within Athenian social memory and public discourse. In doing so, it offers a solution to the puzzle of Lycurgus' calling Codrus one of the ἐπώνυμοι τῆς χώρας . I make the case that Codrus was one of the forty-two eponymous age-set heroes who played an important role in the Athenian military and socio-political system. I contend that devotion to the city's gods and heroes and knowledge (...) of their mythology were essential parts of the religious and ideological instruction of Athenian ephebes. Consequently, Lycurgus' citation of the Ephebic Oath, the self-sacrifices of King Codrus and the daughters of Erechtheus, as well as his repeated invocation of the city's gods and shrines, must be seen as integral elements of his indictment of Leocrates for cowardice and treason, behavior that is diametrically opposed to the hoplite ethos and religious devotion that were instilled into young ephebes. Lycurgus thus brings the jurors' memories of their own ephebate into the courtroom and taps into emotions and values that lie at the heart of Athenian collective identity. (shrink)

In this essay I examine Henry of Ghent’s views on our mind’s ability to think and to understand something, and to reflect on its own acts and their contents. Henry explains our acquisition of mental content as a sequence of receptive and productive stages. He identifies a general principle of cognitive presence: for an object to be actually intelligible it must be actually separated from matter and cognitively present to a thinker or cognizer. Sensible, material objects that cannot be immediately (...) present in this way must be represented via functional intermediaries in our cognitive capacities. The two main capacities of the mind are intellect and will, and in Henry’s view each of these mental powers has a reflexive ability. Henry discusses our intellect’s ability to reflect on its acts and their contents in his analysis of mental words. A complete mental word is the product of our inquiry into a thing’s essence. The inquiry is driven by our rational desire for complete cognition and based on intellect’s reflection on a first-order act and its conceptual content. This higher-order awareness of ourselves as cognitive agents enables us to assess the progression of our intellectual inquiry. Henry stresses that our natural cognitive powers are strengthened through divine exemplary standards, which continually correct the concepts we form and complete their structural resemblance with the objects of cognition in extramental reality. (shrink)

Long-term studies of whales, dolphins, and porpoises (the cetaceans) in nature abruptly began about 50 yr ago, preceded by several decades of terrestrial animal studies, often of charismatic large mammals. Fifty years ago, intensive whaling was still occurring, and arguments against whaling largely centered around impending extinctions due to over-hunting, not the idea that cetaceans should not be killed due to natural or inherent goodness. In the 1970s, several USA and other government agencies promulgated rules to help control pollution and (...) other insults to nature, often effective in the short term but not in stopping an overall decline in the health of nature. While there appeared a general societal awakening towards greater appreciation of nature and intrinsic animal rights, researchers largely stayed focused on their research, with little attention to using knowledge to increase ecosystem and animal health. Attitudes of direct scientific involvement in calling for environmental action have changed, as it is becoming increasingly (but not universally) appreciated that researchers who know the problems are well-suited to alert governments, industry, and society to them, and loudly call for action. I have no good answers for how to accomplish large-scale rapid reversals of environmental declines. One laudable action is to be an active vocal part of appropriate web-based conservation advocacy groups. Involving the young of all genders and races for a groundswell of support is likely most effective in generating a new world view of so much respect for nature that we radically alter our present ways of subjugating and diminishing it in the name of supposed human progress. Above all, we scientists must no longer dither with opinions on environmental problems and urgent needs for action; we must proclaim them intelligently, forcefully, and as broadly as possible. (shrink)

Jerkish speech on online platforms is at risk of being overlooked as a result of being comparatively insignificant next to the existence of explicit hate speech or other online harms. In this paper I approach online jerkish speech from a republican perspective. I discuss two ways in which republicans can account for jerkish speech. First, jerkish speech could amount to micro-domination, referring to instances of domination that are relatively inconsequential by themselves but problematic when considered in aggregate. Second, jerkish speech (...) can be considered an instantiation of systemic domination, where groups and members are structurally subordinated. I briefly discuss the role of regulatory bans on jerkish speech, before suggesting that Suzanne Whitten’s proposal for critical civility—as an appropriate answer to jerkish speech in online environments—might be too demanding. This might be alleviated by leveraging the role of online platforms. (shrink)

against Garve' constitute his reaction to the latter's remarks on Cicero's De Officiis . Two related criticisms of Kant's against Garve are discussed in brief in this paper. A closer look is then taken at Garve's claim that `Kantian morality destroys all incentives that can move human beings to act at all'. I argue that Kant and Garve rely on two different models of human action for their analyses of moral motivation; these models differ in what each takes to be (...) salient for the explanation of human action. I show that Samuel Clarke's analogy of physical explanation in the framework of Newtonianism (in his Discourse concerning the Unchangeable Obligations of Natural Religion ) usefully illuminates the difference between Kant and Garve in these respects. Key Words: Christian Garve • Kantian ethical theory • moral motivation • moral obligation • Samuel Clarke. (shrink)

The majority rule has caught much attention in recent debate about the aggregation of judgments. But its role in finding the truth is limited. A majority of expert judgments is not necessarily authoritative, even if all experts are equally competent, if they make their judgments independently of each other, and if all the judgments are based on the same source of (good) evidence. In this paper I demonstrate this limitation by presenting a simple counterexample and a related general result. I (...) pave the way for this argument by introducing a Bayesian model of evidence and expert judgment in order to give a precise account of the basic problem. (shrink)

Auf dem Wege zu einer aufgabenzentrierten Professionstheorie pädagogischen Handeins I. Die Verberuflichung des Erziehens ist historisch weitgehend abgeschlossen. In den modemen Industrie-und Dienstleistungsgesellschaften hat sich ein eigenständiger Sektor der institutionalisierten Erziehung ausdifferenziert, der mittlerweile zu einem der größten Teilsysteme der Gesellschaft geworden ist und immer größere Gruppen der Bevölkerung durch alle Lebensphasen hindurch erfaßt. In diesem Sektor ist eine Vielzahl von Berufen entstanden, zu der die Kindergärtnerin, die Lehrerin, die Sozialpädagogin, die Erziehungsberaterin, die Erwachsenenbildnerin und bald auch die Gerontagogin rechnet. (...) Sie decken ein weites Spektrum von erzieherischen Tätigkeiten ab und sind - gemessen an der Ausbildungsart und -dauer -auf ganz unterschiedlichen Qualifikationsniveaus angesiedelt: von der Erzieherin mit Fach schulausbildung über Fachhochschulabsolventinnen z. B. der Sozialpädagogik, über Lehrer verschiedener Schulstufen mit akademischer oder universitärer Ausbildung bis zu Diplom-Pädagoginnen mit und ohne Promotion. Sie alle erziehen - sei es der Absicht nach, sei es beiläufig oder verschämt. Unerledigt ist die Frage der Professionalisierung des Erziehens. Die Formulie rung und die Institutionalisierung pädagogischer Berufsbilder und ihre Legitimation durch entsprechende Zertifikate stellen keine Garantie für Professionalität dar. Dies gilt jedenfalls dann, wenn unter Professionalisierung nicht nur der historische Prozeß gemeint ist, in dem sich eine Gruppe von Berufen etablieren konnte, sondern auch die Ausbildung einer spezifischen Handlungskompetenz, die von der Struktur der professionellen Handlung erfordert wird. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Many temporal and modal logic languages can be regarded as subsets of first order logic, i.e. the semantics of a temporal logic formula is given as a first order condition on points of the underlying models (Kripke structures). Often the set of possible models is restricted to models which are trees. A temporal logic language is (first order) expressively complete, if for every first order condition for a node of a tree there exists an equivalent temporal formula which expresses (...) the same condition. In this paper expressive completeness of the temporal logic language with the set of operators U (until), S (since), and X k (k-next) is proved, and the result is extended to various other tree-like structures. (shrink)

While Rational Choice Theory (RC) may be understood as a theory of choice, which does not necessarily reflect actual deliberative processes, rule-following behavior is definitely based on a certain form of delibera- tion. This article aims at clarifying the relationship between the two. Being guided by instrumental rules, i.e., rules reducible to the maximiza- tion principle, is perfectly consistent with the fundamental behavioral assumptions of RC. But human individuals use other forms of rules in decision making, especially tie-breaking rules and (...) coordination rules. It is argued that within RC no satisfying account of such rule-following behav- ior can be given. In particular it is impossible to determine suitable pref- erence orderings such that coordinating may be understood as maximizing relative to these orderings. Still, once there is coordination, following a coordination rule may be perfectly consistent with the basic assumptions of RC. So there might be a more complex theory of action that incorpo- rates RC as well as a satisfying theory of rule-guided behavior. (shrink)

The doctrine is unquestionably Nietzsche’s most puzzling, and it has been interpreted in two distinguishable ways: as a cosmology or an ethical imperative. The cosmological basis of the doctrine can be found only in Nietzsche’s literary estate, the Nachlass, in notes not designated for publication. The normative import of the doctrine of eternal recurrence, on the other hand, finds articulation in virtually every work written by Nietzsche after 1881. It is of some importance to note in this connection that all (...) Nietzsche scholars have taken the cosmological formulation to be the clear one, mistakenly I believe, and have ignored the fact that Nietzsche himself suppressed it. (shrink)

This reading of Heidegger’s reading of the history of philosophy divides into three unequal parts. The first section glosses Heidegger’s construal of philosophy from Plato to Nietzsche as the metaphysics of presence, as ontotheology, as Being’s own historic destiny, a destiny of Seinsvergessenheit; and it glosses Heidegger’s construal from within the standard canons of historiography, from the perspective of today’s conventional wisdom. In brief and unsurprisingly, viewed from the strict constructionist standpoint—viewed as a “straight” reading of philosophy’s history—Heidegger’s interpretation cannot (...) stand. The fact that it is an historical misreading proves to be stunningly uninteresting, however, and fails to account for its influence. So an altogether different approach to Heidegger’s reading is proposed in the second section of this paper. Turning the historical tables, the tables of influence, Heidegger’s appropriation of the tradition, his deconstruction of it, is construed—in Bloom’s terms—as poetic misprision, as a strong misreading, one which responds to its own imperatives. The temptation to construe the straight reading /strong misreading distinction as like the “historical” vs. “philosophical” distinction in reading the history of philosophy is entertained briefly. It is later urged that we give up altogether the distinction in kind between historical and philosophical readings of the history of philosophy; for that distinction makes sense only if we accept the picture of philosophy as an enterprise whose business it is to confront a reasonably fixed list of issues within a timeless neutral matrix: To give up this picture is to give up the distinction at the same time. These two readings of Heidegger—strict constructionist straight reading and deconsructionist strong misreading—appear irreconcilable; so an attempt is made in section III to trope this difference in readings. Specifically, the incommensurability of the two perspectives, the two readings of philosophy’s history, is analyzed in terms of the difference between normal and abnormal discourse. Abnormal discourse, like Kuhn’s “revolutionary science,” may well be tomorrow’s normal discourse; but in exploring this suggestion further some important points of contrast between Kuhnian and Heideggerian readings emerge. In Kuhn’s reading of, for example, the history of science the question whether the normal science of the day is to be supplanted by the new paradigm may be decided by a complex gestalt-switch, a reorientation occasioned by anomalous cases, a reexamination of data hitherto ruled out by the discourse of the day. Kuhn’s “revolutionary” paradigms drive practitioners back upon data; but Heidegger’s metahistorical reading of the history of philosophy does not drive us back to data, back to the texts. This raises the question of the sense in which Heidegger’s abnormal discourse ever could become normal discourse, ever could function as a new paradigm. I conclude, with Rorty, that Heidegger’s metahistory of philosophy cannot be institutionalized as some abnormal discourse can and that, in consequence, Heideggerians who approach the history of philosophy as if he had found the key to unlock its mysteries—or its horrors, if you prefer—are confused about Heidegger’s discourse, confused about its possibilities in a way that he himself was not. (shrink)

Platon läßt in der Politeia seine Sokrates-Gestalt in Buch I und anderen früheren Büchern mit Voraussetzungen argumentieren, die für seine Beweisführung wesentlich sind, deren Berechtigung aber erst in einem späteren Zusammenhang erkennbar wird. Diese Antizipationen werden hier in Anlehnung an Ch.H. Kahn, der die von ihm beobachteten Bezüge zwischen früheren und späteren Büchern der Politeia "proleptic composition" genannt hat, als ‘proleptische Argumentation’ bezeichnet. Es läßt sich an der Konzeption der Gerechtigkeit erweisen, daß diese argumentativen Vorgriffe – so willkürlich sie an (...) Ort und Stelle erscheinen – Bestandteil eines planmäßigen Vorgehens sind, das im Rahmen des Dialogs an die Gesprächspartner angepaßt ist, aber durch seinen systematischen Aufbau einen über den Dialog hinausführenden Erkenntnisprozeß beim Leser anzustoßen vermag. (shrink)