The use of genetic testing and neuroscientific evidence in legal trials raises several issues. Often their interpretation is controversial: the same evidence can be used to sustain both the prosecution’s and defense’s argument. A recent Italian case confirms such concerns and stresses other relevant related questions.

Increasing geographical mobility and international travel augment the ease and speed by which infectious diseases can spread across large distances. It is therefore incumbent upon each state to ensure that immunisation programmes are effective and that herd immunity is achieved. Across Europe, a range of immunisation policies exist: compulsion, the offer of financial incentives to parents or healthcare professionals, social and professional pressure, or simply the dissemination of clear information and advice. Until recently, immunisation against particular communicable diseases was compulsory (...) in Italy. The Italian National Vaccination Plan paved the way for regions to suspend the sanctions associated with compulsory vaccinations for children when certain criteria are met—for example when immunisation coverage is high and when effective monitoring/surveillance systems are in place—and thus marked a milestone in the move from compulsory to voluntary immunisation. The forthcoming NVP for 2008–10 confirms the liberal approach to vaccination in Italy as it entrusts to the regions responsibility for the achievement and maintenance of herd immunity. This paper reviews the arguments for and against compulsory and voluntary immunisation in relation to the Italian NVP and in the context of the diverse immunisation policies that exist across Europe. It concludes with cautious support for the NVP and an associated shift from compulsory to voluntary immunisation in Italy, and draws similarities between issues concerning regional variation in immunisation policy in Italy and national variation in immunisation policy across Europe and beyond. (shrink)

As a result of the coronavirus (COVID‐19) pandemic, health professionals are faced with situations they have not previously encountered and are being forced to make difficult ethical decisions. As the first group to experience challenges of caring for patients with coronavirus, Chinese nurses endure heartbreak and face stressful moral dilemmas. In this opinion piece, we examine three related critical questions: Whether society has the right to require health professionals to risk their lives caring for patients; whether health professionals have the (...) right to refuse to care for patients during the coronavirus pandemic; and what obligations there are to protect health professionals? Value of care, community expectations, legal obligations, professional and codes of practice may compel health professionals to put themselves at risks in emergency situations. The bioethical principles of autonomy, justice, beneficence and non‐maleficence, as well as public health ethics, guide nurses to justify their decisions as to whether they are entitled to refuse to treat COVID‐19 patients during the pandemic. We hope that the open discussion would support the international society in addressing similar ethical challenges in their respective situations during this public health crisis. (shrink)

Interferon stimulated gene 15 (ISG15) encodes a ubiquitin‐like protein that is highly induced upon activation of interferon signaling and cytoplasmic DNA sensing pathways. As part of the innate immune system ISG15 acts to inhibit viral replication and particle release via the covalent conjugation to both viral and host proteins. Unlike ubiquitin, unconjugated ISG15 also functions as an intracellular and extra‐cellular signaling molecule to modulate the immune response. Several recent studies have shown ISG15 to also function in a diverse array of (...) cellular processes and pathways outside of the innate immune response. This review explores the role of ISG15 in maintaining genome stability, particularly during DNA replication, and how this relates to cancer biology. It puts forth the hypothesis that ISG15, along with DNA sensors, function within a DNA replication fork surveillance pathway to help maintain genome stability. (shrink)

“Probably Peirce’s best-known works are the first two articles in a series of six that originally were collectively entitled Illustrations of the Logic of Science and published in Popular Science Monthly from November 1877 through August 1878. The first is entitled ‘The Fixation of Belief’ and the second is entitled ‘How to Make Our Ideas Clear.’ In the first of these papers Peirce defended, in a manner consistent with not accepting naive realism, the superiority of the scientific method over other (...) methods of overcoming doubt and ‘fixing belief.’” — Robert Burch, “Charles Sanders Peirce,” entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2021 revision) -/- “Pragmatist epistemologies often explore how we can carry out inquiries in a self-controlled and fruitful way. (Where much analytic epistemology centres around the concept of knowledge, considered as an idealised end-point of human thought, pragmatist epistemology centres around the concept of inquiry, considered as the process of knowledge-seeking and how we can improve it.) So pragmatists often provide rich accounts of the capacities or virtues that we must possess in order to inquire well, and the rules or guiding principles that we should adopt. A canonical account is Peirce’s classic early paper ‘The Fixation of Belief‘. Here Peirce states that inquiry is a struggle to replace doubt with “settled belief“, and that the only method of inquiry that can make sense of the fact that at least some of us are disturbed by inconsistent beliefs, and will subsequently reflect upon which methods of fixing belief are correct is the Method of Science, which draws on the Pragmatic Maxim described above. This contrasts with three other methods of fixing belief: i) refusing to consider evidence contrary to one’s favored beliefs (the Method of Tenacity), ii) accepting an institution’s dictates (the Method of Authority), iii) developing the most rationally coherent or elegant-seeming belief-set (the A Priori Method).“ — Catherine Legg, “Pragmatism,” entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2021 revision). (shrink)

According to most accounts of trust, you can only trust other people (or groups of people). To trust is to think that another has goodwill, or something to that effect. I sketch a different form of trust: the unquestioning attitude. What it is to trust, in this sense, is to settle one’s mind about something, to stop questioning it. To trust is to rely on a resource while suspending deliberation over its reliability. Trust lowers the barrier of monitoring, challenging, checking, (...) and questioning. Trust sets up open pipelines between yourself and parts of the external world. Trust permits external resources to have a similar relationship to one as one’s internal cognitive faculties. This creates efficiency, but at the price of exquisite vulnerability. We must trust in this way because we are cognitively limited beings in a cognitively overwhelming world. Crucially, we can hold the unquestioning attitude towards objects and technologies. When I trust my climbing rope, I stop worrying about its reliability. When I trust my online calendaring system, I simply go to the events indicated, without question. But, one might worry, how could one ever hold such a normatively loaded attitude as trust towards mere objects? How could it ever make sense to feel betrayed by an object? Trust is our engine for expanding and outsourcing our agency — for binding external processes into our practical selves. Thus, we can be betrayed by our smartphones in the same way that we can be betrayed by our memory. When we trust, we try to make something a part of our agency, and we are betrayed when our part lets us down. To unquestioningly trust something is to let it in—to attempt to bring it inside one’s practical functioning. This suggests a new form of gullibility: agential gullibility, which occurs when agents too hastily and carelessly integrate external resources into their own agency. (shrink)

After three proceedings in which neuroscience was a relevant factor for the final verdict in Italian courts, for the first time a recent case puts in question the legal relevance of neuroscientific evidence. This decision deserves international attention in its underlining that the uncertainty still affecting neuroscientific knowledge can have a significant impact on the law. It urges the consideration of such uncertainty and the development of a shared management of it.

Alzheimer’s disease is a very common, progressive and still incurable disease. Future possibilities for its cure lie in the promotion of research that will increase our knowledge of the disorder’s causes and lead to the discovery of effective remedies. Such research will necessarily involve individuals suffering from Alzheimer’s disease. This raises the controversial issue of whether patients with Alzheimer’s disease are competent to give their consent for research participation.

Value capture occurs when an agent’s values are rich and subtle; they enter a social environment that presents simplified — typically quantified — versions of those values; and those simplified articulations come to dominate their practical reasoning. Examples include becoming motivated by FitBit’s step counts, Twitter Likes and Re-tweets, citation rates, ranked lists of best schools, and Grade Point Averages. We are vulnerable to value capture because of the competitive advantage that such crisp and clear expressions of value have in (...) our private reasoning and our public justification. There is, however, a price. In value capture, we take a central component of our autonomy — our ongoing deliberation over the exact articulation of our values — and we outsource it. And the metrics to which we outsource usually engineered for the interests of some external force, like a large-scale institution’s interest in cross-contextual comprehensibility and quick aggregability. That outsourcing cuts off one of the key benefits to personal deliberation. In value capture, we no longer adjust our values and their articulations in light of own rich experience of the world. Our values should often be carefully tailored to our particular selves or our small-scale communities, but in value capture, we buy our values off the rack. In some cases – like decreasing CO2 emissions – the costs of non-tailored values are outweighed by the benefit of precise collective coordination. In other cases, like in our aesthetic lives, they are not. This suggests that we should want different values suited to different scales. We should want value federalism. Some values are perhaps best pursued at the largest-scale level, others at smaller scales. The problem occurs when we exhibit an excess preference for the largest-scale values – when we consistently let the universal metrics swamp our quieter interests. (shrink)

The importance of epistemic values in science is universally recognized, whereas the role of non-epistemic values is sometimes considered disputable. It has often been argued that non-epistemic values are more relevant in applied sciences, where the goals are often practical and not merely scientific. In this paper, we present a case study concerning earthquake engineering. So far, the philosophical literature has considered various branches of engineering, but very rarely earthquake engineering. We claim that the assessment of seismic hazard models is (...) sensitive to both epistemic and non-epistemic values. In particular, we argue that the selection and evaluation of these models are justified by epistemic values, even if they may be contingently influenced by non-epistemic values. By contrast, the aggregation of different models into an ensemble is justified by non-epistemic values, even if epistemic values may play an instrumental role in the attainment of these non-epistemic values. A careful consideration of the different epistemic and non-epistemic values at play in the choice of seismic hazard models is thus practically important when alternative models are available and there is uncertainty in the scientific community about which model should be used. (shrink)

Public health emergencies such as pandemics can put health systems in a position where they need to ration medical equipment and interventions because the resources available are not sufficient to meet demand. In public health management, the fair allocation of resources is a permanent and cross-sector issue since resources, and especially economic resources, are not infinite. During the COVID-19 pandemic resources need to be allocated under conditions of extreme urgency and uncertainty. One very problematic aspect has concerned intensive care medicine (...) and age discrimination has been among the most hotly discussed issues, as age has been touted as a probable criterion for selection. In this paper we analyse some documents originating from scientific societies and medical associations, mainly related to EU sphere and available in English, French, Spanish and Italian, concerning the criteria for admission to the intensive care units. We highlights how, in most of these documents, it is explicitly stated that “age itself” is not a criterion for patient selection. Our conclusion is that these criteria should be defined in advance of a crisis situation and be grounded in clinical indicators. Establishing “cut-off” policies with regard to criteria such as age or chronic disability is definitely an unjustifiable form of discrimination even in the context of a public health emergency. (shrink)

La disolución de la noción de sujeto, que atraviesa el siglo XX, ampliamente conseguida hoy, ha hecho necesario, para una parte del pensamiento contemporáneo, impulsar la interrogación reconstructiva hasta su dispositivo preformativo originario: la persona. Merleau-Ponty se sitúa con pleno derecho en este espacio teórico, elaborando una reflexión que, superando tal noción, desplaza la mirada hacia el nivel impersonal y anónima, infra-corporal y pre-individual, más acá de la persona, al cual ésta permanece indisolublemente vinculada. Una reflexión que, por lo tanto, (...) rompiendo al mismo tiempo los bordes del perímetro fenomenológico, no sólo corta de raíz las categorías tradicionales de «yo» e «individuo», de «cuerpo propio» y «subjetividad constituyente», sino que implica una apertura a una nueva antropología y a preguntas tan urgentes como penetrantes a propósito de los derechos humanos.  . (shrink)

Goldberg notes that the relationship is a component of Conflicts of Interests. Networks of relationships and the simultaneous presence of several interests are not negative per se but become so when they generate a conflict that undermines impartiality. The solution to the problem of COIs, therefore, cannot be to abolish relationships and the interests that they necessarily express but rather to verify whether those relationships are such as to unduly affect an individual’s judgement. The evolution of an Italian legislation about (...) COIs is eloquent in this regard. (shrink)

The present narrative review addresses issues concerning the defining criteria and conceptual underpinnings of pain catastrophizing. To date, the concept of pain catastrophizing has been extensively used in many clinical and experimental contexts and it is considered as one of the most important psychological correlate of pain chronicity and disability. Although its extensive use, we are still facing important problems related to its defining criteria and conceptual understanding. At present, there is no general theoretical agreement of what catastrophizing really is. (...) The lack of a consensus on its definition and conceptual issues has important consequences on the choice of the pain management approaches, defining and identifying problems, and promoting novel research. Clinical and research work in absence of a common theoretical ground is often trivial. It is very surprising that clinical and experimental work has grown extensively in the past years, without a common ground in the form of a clear definition of pain catastrophizing and overview of its conceptual basis. Improving the efficacy and efficiency of pan catastrophizing related treatments requires an understanding of the theoretical construct. So far, most interventions have only demonstrated modest effects in reducing pain catastrophizing. Therefore, clarifying the construct may be an important precursor for developing more targeted and effective interventions, thereby easing some of the burden related to this aspect of pain. In our review, we have extracted and de-constructed common elements that emerge from different theoretical models with the aim to understand the concept of catastrophizing, which components can be modulated by psychological interventions, and the general role in pain processing. The analysis of the literature has indicated essential key elements to explain pain catastrophizing: emotional regulation, catastrophic worry, rumination, behavioral inhibition and behavioral activation systems, and interoceptive sensitivity. The present paper attempts to integrate these key elements with the aim to re-compose and unify the concept within a modern biopsychosocial interpretation of catastrophizing. (shrink)

Recent conversation has blurred two very different social epistemic phenomena: echo chambers and epistemic bubbles. Members of epistemic bubbles merely lack exposure to relevant information and arguments. Members of echo chambers, on the other hand, have been brought to systematically distrust all outside sources. In epistemic bubbles, other voices are not heard; in echo chambers, other voices are actively undermined. It is crucial to keep these phenomena distinct. First, echo chambers can explain the post-truth phenomena in a way that epistemic (...) bubbles cannot. Second, each type of structure requires a distinct intervention. Mere exposure to evidence can shatter an epistemic bubble, but may actually reinforce an echo chamber. Finally, echo chambers are much harder to escape. Once in their grip, an agent may act with epistemic virtue, but social context will pervert those actions. Escape from an echo chamber may require a radical rebooting of one's belief system. (shrink)

Increases in international travel and migratory flows have enabled infectious diseases to emerge and spread more rapidly than ever before. Hence, it is increasingly easy for local infectious diseases to become global infectious diseases (GIDs). National governments must be able to react quickly and effectively to GIDs, whether naturally occurring or intentionally instigated by bioterrorism. According to the World Health Organisation, global partnerships are necessary to gather the most up-to-date information and to mobilize resources to tackle GIDs when necessary. Communicable (...) disease control also depends upon national public health laws and policies. The containment of an infectious disease typically involves detection, notification, quarantine and isolation of actual or suspected cases; the protection and monitoring of those not infected; and possibly even treatment. Some measures are clearly contentious and raise conflicts between individual and societal interests. In Europe national policies against infectious diseases are very heterogeneous. Some countries have a more communitarian approach to public health ethics, in which the interests of individual and society are more closely intertwined and interdependent, while others take a more liberal approach and give priority to individual freedoms in communicable disease control. This paper provides an overview of the different policies around communicable disease control that exist across a select number of countries across Europe. It then proposes ethical arguments to be considered in the making of public health laws, mostly concerning their effectiveness for public health protection. (shrink)

PurposeThe aim of this paper is to assess the complex issue of responsibility in clinical practice. The paper focuses mainly on the relationship between personal- and medical-professional responsibility of practitioners and clinical guidelines.MethodsAfter a theoretical review of the different definitions of responsibility in selected bioethical and biojuridical literature, two recent juridical proceedings concerning medical responsibility from Italian Courts are discussed. Subsequently, a theoretical analysis of the definition of clinical practice guidelines is proposed in order to show their feasibility to assess (...) personal- and medical-professional responsibility.ResultsThe definitions of responsibility and the two Italian cases show the theoretical and practical difficulties of shared assessments of both personal-professional and medical-professional responsibility in clinical practice. Clinical practice guidelines cannot be assumed as an objective code of action stating exactly a rule of conduct in all situations, but as a tool suggesting how to decide what to do in different conditions.ConclusionsResponsibility in clinical practice is such a complex issue to deserve a special ethical assessment. The clinician’s personal-professional responsibility cannot be replaced or reduced by clinical practice guidelines, because medicine is as such a relationship focused on the expertize of practitioners. Nonetheless, a shared approach to different clinical conditions is needed in order to avoid a relativist outcome and protect patients’ and even clinicians’ rights. Formal guidelines (that describe not exactly what to do but how to decide what to do) are proposed as potential useful tool to achieve this aim. (shrink)

The American Journal of Bioethics, Volume 12, Issue 1, Page 37-38, January 2012.