This paper starts with an analysis of the maker’s knowledge principle as one of the main characteristics of Modern epistemology. We start by showing that maker’s knowledge can be understood in two ways: 1) a negative sense, as a way of establishing limits to human knowledge: we can only know what we create; and 2) a positive sense, as legitimizing human knowledge: we effectively know what we create. We proceed then to examine the roots of the maker’s knowledge principle in (...) the context of the transition from Greek philosophy to early Christian thought, seeing Philo of Alexandria as perhaps the first to formulate an early version of the principle. We conclude that it is the Christian conception of God as creator that makes possible a redefinition of the relation between knowing and creating, opening the way to the Modern formulation of the principle. (shrink)

This paper starts with an analysis of the maker’s knowledge principle as one of the main characteristics of Modern epistemology. We start by showing that maker’s knowledge can be understood in two ways: 1) a negative sense, as a way of establishing limits to human knowledge: we can only know what we create; and 2) a positive sense, as legitimizing human knowledge: we effectively know what we create. We proceed then to examine the roots of the maker’s knowledge principle in (...) the context of the transition from Greek philosophy to early Christian thought, seeing Philo of Alexandria as perhaps the first to formulate an early version of the principle. We conclude that it is the Christian conception of God as creator that makes possible a redefinition of the relation between knowing and creating, opening the way to the Modern formulation of the principle. (shrink)

Embora a noção de crença e sua relação com a ação sejam bastante discutidas na literatura sobre o ceticismo, a descrença e as mudanças de crenças são pouco examinadas, apesar de bastante relevantes para a análise das crenças. Em que condições mudamos de crenças, abandonamos crenças anteriores e adotamos novas crenças? Examinaremos dois exemplos significativos e muito influentes na tradição que podem nos esclarecer quanto a isso: Agostinho e Martinho Lutero.

The objective of this paper is to analyze the appeal to the notion of the light of the soul as a commonplace in theories of knowledge from the Renaissance to early 18th century philosophy, showing that language will only become a central subject for philosophy with the progressive criticism of the powers of the intellect, especially intuitive thought.

The objective of this paper is to analyze the appeal to the notion of the light of the soul as a commonplace in theories of knowledge from the Renaissance to early 18th century philosophy, showing that language will only become a central subject for philosophy with the progressive criticism of the powers of the intellect, especially intuitive thought.

O descobrimento do Novo Mundo é um dos fatores fundamentais de ruptura com a tradição, na inauguração do pensamento moderno. A descoberta de povos no novo continente com culturas radicalmente diferentes da europeia leva a um questionamento cético sobre a universalidade da natureza humana, o que denominamos "argumento antropológico". Montaigne é o mais importante pensador deste contexto a discutir esta questão nos Ensaios. Examinamos aqui alguns dos aspectos centrais de sua reflexão a este respeito. The Discovery of the New World (...) is one of the central causes of the breakdown with tradition that opens the way to modern thought. The first contact of the Europeans with the native peoples of the New World shows radically different cultures giving rise to doubts about the universality of human nature, what might be called an "anthropological argument" in a skeptic sense. Michel de Montaigne is the major philosopher in this context to discuss these issues in his Essays and I shall examine some of the more relevant aspects of this discussion. (shrink)

A interpretação da crítica de Peirce ao método da dúvida de Descartes tem sido objeto de grande interesse entre os especialistas na filosofia peirciana. Tentarei avaliar as críticas de Peirce ao método da dúvida de um ponto de vista da possibilidade de uma filosofia cética, tentando argumentar que esta não depende da dúvida cartesiana. Procurarei mostrar também que na filosofia de Peirce encontramos elementos que o aproximam mais do dúvida cartesiana do que pode inicialmente parecer.

This book shows that at the beginning of modern thought the revival of ancient skepticism challenged the powers of the intellect in making knowledge possible, opening the way to the consideration of language as an alternative to mental representation, thus leading to an early linguistic turn.

OLIVEIRA, R. R. (2013). Pólis e Nómos: o problema da lei no pensamento grego. São Paulo: Editora Loyola.

The article aims to revisit the relationship between inequality and education, a theme that accompanies education in modern societies. Despite access to data on inequality in society and education, as well as many analyzes of the origins and trends that provoke real social apartheids one has the impression that the metaphor of the labyrinth, common in Latin American literature, applies to education. The article is divided in two parts. The first seeks to situate the theme of inequality as a problem (...) of education and for education, with a brief reference to classic works and the identification of some pedagogical places that can serve to perpetuate inequality or resist it. The second part, based on thoughts from the beginning of the second half of the last century, revolves around the question of whether we are facing yet another unfinished revolution in Latin America. Two themes are discussed: updating the notion of awareness and the pedagogical nuances of concepts such as liberation, social exclusion and coloniality. In the conclusion, Paulo Freire’s centrality is emphasized to understand the relationship between inequality and education, and to create untested feasibilities in education and through education to promote a less unequal and more just society. Keywords: Inequality. Democracy. Awareness. Liberation. coloniality. (shrink)

Sortition, i.e. random appointment for public duty, has been employed by societies throughout the years as a firewall designated to prevent illegitimate interference between parties in a legal case and agents of the legal system. In judicial systems of modern western countries, random procedures are mainly employed to select the jury, the court and/or the judge in charge of judging a legal case. Therefore, these random procedures play an important role in the course of a case, and should comply with (...) some principles, such as transparency and complete auditability. Nevertheless, these principles are neglected by random procedures in some judicial systems, which are performed in secrecy and are not auditable by the involved parties. The assignment of cases in the Brazilian Supreme Court is an example of such a procedure, for it is performed using procedures unknown to the parties involved in the judicial cases. This article presents a review of how sortition has been historically employed by societies and discusses how Mathematical Statistics may be applied to random procedures of the judicial system, as it has been applied for almost a century on clinical trials, for example. A statistical model for assessing randomness in case assignment is proposed and applied to the Brazilian Supreme Court. As final remarks, guidelines for the development of good randomization procedures are outlined. (shrink)

Este artigo objetiva pensar como o ensino da filosofia pode produzir processos de transformação nos modos de vida ocasionando experiências de pensamento que ultrapassam o bom senso e o senso comum e problematizam o próprio pensamento no sentido de abri-lo à criação de outros modos de pensar e de agir. A partir da experiência do pensamento deflagrada pelo encontro da filosofia com a educação se desprende um movimento do pensar que afeta a vida de seus ensinantes e aprendentes abrindo-lhes possibilidades (...) de mudanças em seus modos habituais de compreender e se relacionar com a diversidade do mundo, tornando a filosofia um vetor de mutação e uma prática de resistência não apenas dentro, mas também fora da escola. (shrink)

This paper aims to show the centrality of the Ilokano indigenous term Nakem (will) as a hermeneutical key to ontological and ethnoreligious musing. It probes the echoes of the sacred in indigenous belief systems and practices as appropriating Christian religiosity. It attempts to rediscover the inherent echoes of the transcendent Nakem (Divine Will) in day-to-day Ilokano life as its epiphany. This paper focuses on the Christian religion but is mindful of the other indigenous expressions of believing in a transcendent God. (...) It interprets the binding force that keeps the phrase “thy will be done” (matungpal koma ti nakemmo) as a fitting description of faith in Ilokano contemporary life. (shrink)

Nietzsche est mort et c'est à nous à le faire vivre. Cet usage du texte n'est pas un retour à ce que Deleuze professait superbement : pour ce dernier, faire un enfant dans le dos (de Kant, de Bergson, voire de Nietzsche, même si Deleuze affirmait qu'avec ce dernier c'était l'inverse), c'était à la fois utiliser l'auteur pour lui faire dire ce qu'il n'avait explicitement pas dit, mais qui pouvait présenter un intérêt spéculatif, et, en même temps, dissimuler cet écart. (...) De fait, Deleuze disait "nous" ou "on", amalgamant ainsi sous le même pronom le commenté et le commentateur. Danilo Bilate, au contraire, revendique l'écart et le souligne tout au long de sa démonstration, rappelant ainsi sans cesse au lecteur que, s'il veut faire un enfant à Nietzsche, et si l'on nous permet de filer scabreusement la métaphore, c'est par-devant! Du même coup, là où Deleuze méprisait ouvertement toute philologie (jusqu'à ne pas même préciser les traductions utilisées), Danilo Bilate accorde à la terminologie nietzschéenne la plus grande attention. On interroge les textes pour ce qu'ils disent – car ils disent tout de même quelque chose par eux-mêmes si on veut bien les écouter. L'enfant qu'il s'agit de faire à Nietzsche en les écoutant est une éthique. Bertrand Binoche. (shrink)

Metaphorical statements surprise us as literal falsehoods, but the interpretation reveals a special motive for the figurative use of the language. Donald Davidson objects to nonliteral meaning: “to suppose a metaphor can be effective only by conveying a coded message is like thinking a joke or a dream makes some statement which a clever interpreter can restate in plain prose.” Taking this remark as my starting point I analyze interpretative strategies for metaphors, jokes, riddles and counterfactual conditionals – all of (...) them involve an initial incongruity and most of them require a certain blending of two different domains. I suggest that the ability to interpret metaphors is based on our ability to apprehend a special cognitive content associated with metaphors. (shrink)

God's character remains one of the big mysteries in Supernatural. We certainly see God's impact on the world, and occasionally, we're told he has miraculously interceded on behalf of the Winchesters or Castiel. Spinoza said, ”The knowledge of evil is an inadequate knowledge.“ But after concluding that God exists, Spinoza concludes that evil does not. Ironically, while many thought of Spinoza as the Devil, he denied the Devil's existence. As Supernatural illustrates, loving relationships don't need to be mutually beneficial; one (...) person may even risk his life to save another person he loves. Often philosophical, the ending scene may hold the key to understanding God in Supernatural. The Philosopher John Locke argued that the idea of redemption could be arrived at in principle by the same sort of reasoning that arrives at the idea of God. (shrink)

This paper is about the alethic aspect of epistemic rationality. The most common approaches to this aspect are either normative (what a reasoner ought to/may believe?) or evaluative (how rational is a reasoner?), where the evaluative approaches are usually comparative (one reasoner is assessed compared to another). These approaches often present problems with blindspots. For example, ought a reasoner to believe a currently true blindspot? Is she permitted to? Consequently, these approaches often fail in describing a situation of alethic maximality, (...) where a reasoner fulfills all the alethic norms and could be used as a standard of rationality (as they are, in fact, used in some of these approaches). I propose a function α, which accepts a set of beliefs as inputand returns a numeric alethic value. Then I use this function to define a notion of alethic maximality that is satisfiable by finite reasoners (reasoners with cognitive limitations) and does not present problems with blindspots. Function α may also be used in alethic norms and evaluation methods (comparative and non-comparative) that may be applied to finite reasoners and do not present problems with blindspots. A result of this investigation isthat the project of providing purely alethic norms is defective. The use of function α also sheds light on important epistemological issues, such as the lottery and the preface paradoxes, and the principles of clutter avoidance and reflection. (shrink)

Bayesian epistemologists support the norms of probabilism and conditionalization using Dutch book and accuracy arguments. These arguments assume that rationality requires agents to maximize practical or epistemic value in every doxastic state, which is evaluated from a subjective point of view (e.g., the agent’s expectancy of value). The accuracy arguments also presuppose that agents are opinionated. The goal of this paper is to discuss the assumptions of these arguments, including the measure of epistemic value. I have designed AI agents based (...) on the Bayesian model and a nonmonotonic framework and tested how they achieve practical and epistemic value in conditions in which an alternative set of assumptions holds. In one of the tested conditions, the nonmonotonic agent, which is not opinionated and fulfills neither probabilism nor conditionalization, outperforms the Bayesian in the measure of epistemic value that I argue for in the paper (α-value). I discuss the consequences of these results for the epistemology of rationality. (shrink)