This chapter contains sections titled: The Excellence of Exploiting Others The Ruler‐as‐Ruler Argument An Objection The Rulers‐in‐Our‐Cities Argument Further Reading.

This chapter contains sections titled: The Divine Sign Conversion to Wisdom Unremarkable Premise Further Reading.

This chapter contains sections titled: Advising Parents Perseverance Wisdom Interpretive Puzzle Further Reading.

This chapter contains sections titled: Teaching Excellence Socrates' Subtle Argument Protagoras Replies Protagoras's Ignorance Socrates is Extraordinary Further Reading.

This chapter contains sections titled: Bad Desire Ignorant Desire Knowledgeable Desire Further Reading.

This chapter contains sections titled: Homer The Subjectivity Objection Socrates Further Reading.

This chapter contains sections titled: Subordinated Actions Dramatic Images Nietzsche's Objection Timeless Life Further Reading.

This chapter contains sections titled: The Righteous Are Wise and Good The Righteous Are Happy Further Reading.

This chapter contains sections titled: Odysseus's Iron Soul Socrates' Wild Claim The Treasure Parable How Socrates Teaches the World The Incommensurable Objection Socrates Restates the Absurdity Augustine's Tormented Decision The Brute‐Desire Objection Further Reading.

This chapter contains sections titled: Scandal Explicit Doctrine Implicit Conclusion Objections Destiny Further Reading.

This chapter contains sections titled: Swan Song Hemlock Ultimate Disease Conclusion Further Reading.

This chapter contains sections titled: Life Defense Strategy Saving Word Changed Lives Further Reading.

This chapter contains sections titled: Stages of Life When Socrates Became Notorious Why Socrates Became Notorious Why Chaerephon Went to the Oracle When Chaerephon Went to the Oracle Conclusion Further Reading.

This chapter contains sections titled: From Lowest to Middle Level False‐Lead Pedagogy Meno's Slave The Laches The Euthyphro Interpretive Skepticism Further Reading.

This chapter contains sections titled: Five Relations Service to the Gods Jesus' Answer Euthyphro's Failure Socrates' Answer Further Reading.

This chapter contains sections titled: Five Socratic Themes Fairy Tale and Poem Further Reading.

In this study, George Rudebusch addresses whether Socrates was a hedonist--whether he believed pleasure to be the good. In attempting to locate Socrates' position on hedonism, Rudebusch examines the passages in Plato's early dialogues that are the most disputed on the topic. He maintains that Socrates identifies pleasant activity with virtuous activity, describing Socrates' hedonism as one of activity, not sensation. This analysis allows for Socrates to find both virtue and pleasure to be the good, thus solving (...) the textual puzzle and showing the power of Socratic argument in leading human beings toward the good. (shrink)

_Socrates_ presents a compelling case for some life-changing conclusions that follow from a close reading of Socrates' arguments. Offers a highly original study of Socrates and his thought, accessible to contemporary readers Argues that through studying Socrates we can learn practical wisdom to apply to our lives Lovingly crafted with humour, thought-experiments and literary references, and with close reading sof key Socratic arguments Aids readers with diagrams to make clear complex arguments.

Socrates argued that the unexamined life is not worth living. What this means is we are so ignorant that we are guilty of criminal negligence how to lead our lives, unless we do our due diligence by philosophising.

After defining dramatic prefiguration, I show how (1) the initial meeting between Polemarchus's party and the smaller group of Socrates and Glaucon prefigures the Republic's theme of how to install the philosophical element in its proper place as ruler in the soul; (2) the relay race of torches carried on horseback prefigures the theory of the soul as tripartite, containing reason, spirit, and appetite; and (3) the opening image of Socrates descending to the Piraeus prefigures the descent of the reasoning (...) element back from the forms to give birth to works of wisdom. (shrink)

A dilemma has stymied interpretations of the Stranger’s method of dividing kinds into subkinds in Plato’sSophistandStatesman. The dilemma assumes that the kinds are either extensions or intensions. Now kinds divide like extensions, not intensions. But extensions cannot explain the distinct identities of kinds that possess the very same members. We propose understanding a kind as like an animal body—the Stranger’s simile for division—possessing both an extension and an intension. We find textual support in the Stranger’s paradigmatic four steps for collecting (...) a subkind. (shrink)

One reason why Confucius is preeminent among Chinese philosophers is his teaching about ren 仁. Interpreters have said many different things about ren, yet two basic assumptions are pervasive: that ren is a virtue and that ren is benevolence. I argue that it is more respectful to the text of the Analects to discard both assumptions. Instead of virtue, ren is a priority in one's motives. Instead of benevolence, ren is humane courtesy.

I defend the argument in Plato's Lysis that true love is requited. I state the argument, the main objections, and my replies. I begin with a synopsis of the dialogue.

In the Protagoras, Socrates argues that all the virtues are the very same knowledge of human wellbeing so that virtue is all one. But elsewhere Socrates appears to endorse that the virtues-such as courage, temperance, and reverence-are different parts of a single whole. Ambiguity interpretations harmonize the conflicting texts by taking the virtue words to be equivocal, such as between theoretical and applied expertise, or between a power and its deeds. I argue that such interpretations have failed in their specifics (...) and in general, as I defend an alternative that takes into account Socrates' higher purpose in testing others, namely to show them their ignorance of virtue. (shrink)

Plato's "theaetetus" (187-200) raises puzzles about false belief. Frege's explanation of how an identity statement can be informative is often seen as a solution to socrates' puzzles. The strategy of frege's solution is to explain a "mistake" as a "mismatch". But it turns out that socrates' argument, In fact, Is aware of and rejects this strategy.

I look at (I) the problem of false speech which Plato faces, (II) the solution he gives in the Sophist, and (III) how that very solution is undermined by the argument of the Theaetetus. I conclude that we ought to see the account of the Theaetetus as overruling the account of the Sophist. On this alternative, Plato holds that false speech and thought really is impossible.

I describe an aporetic structure found in certain dialogues and explain the structure by showing how it serves, better than expository writing, the pedagogical goal of avoiding giving readers a false sense of knowledge in producing understanding of a philosophical account.

Intellectualism about human virtue is the thesis that virtue is knowledge. Virtue intellectualists may be eliminative or reductive. If eliminative, they will eliminate our conventional vocabulary of virtue words-'virtue', 'piety', 'courage', etc.-and speak only of knowledge or wisdom. If reductive, they will continue to use the conventional virtue words but understand each of them as denoting nothing but a kind of knowledge (as opposed to, say, a capacity of some other part of the soul than the intellect, such as the (...) will or the appetites). Virtue intellectualists may be pluralists or monists. If pluralist, they identify the virtues with distinct kinds of knowledge. If monist, they identify all the virtues with one and the same kind of knowledge. In a number of dialogues-including the Euthyphro, Apology, Charmides, Euthydemus, Laches, Lysis, Protagoras, and Republic I-Socrates gives arguments that support Reductive Monist Intellectualism (RMI) about human virtue. I disarm an influential objection to RMI as the correct interpretation of Socrates. (shrink)

The review argues that Plato makes a valid distinction between inferior hypothetical and superior unhypothetical methods. Given the distinction, the book confuses the hypothetical for unhypothetical dialectic.

The argument used by Socrates to refute the thesis that piety is what all the gods love is one of the most well known in the history of philosophy. Yet some fundamental points of interpretation have gone unnoticed. I will show that (i) the strategy of Socrates' argument refutes not only Euthyphro's theory of piety and such neighboring doctrines as cultural relativism and subjectivism, but nominalism in general; moreover, that (ii) the argument needs to assume much less than is generally (...) thought, and finally that (iii) while Socrates' argument, properly understood in its full force, appears to be inconsistent with the goal of his own inquiry, his own 'Platonic' position escapes the inconsistency. (shrink)

In 'Plato on Sense and Reference' (Mind,1985, pp. 526-37), I argued that Plato 'understood and rejected' a general strategy for explaining false belief, and that Frege's explanation of false belief was an instance of that general strategy. Michael Beaney ('Mistakes and Mismatches: A Reply to Rudebusch', Mind, 1987, pp. 95-8) replied that there is a feature of Frege's explanation that enables it to escape the argument. In this rejoinder I argue that Beaney's escape is not Fregean and that it (...) fails. (shrink)

The success of relativism as a solution to skeptical problems depends upon the relativist's object of knowledge being invulnerable to the same skeptical doubts which we might have about the undiscovered world. Naturally, therefore, a traditional Platonic response is to argue that the relativist's selected object of knowledge cannot be known apart from knowledge of the undiscovered world. This indeed is the Platonic thesis of this article, as it applies to tradition. I begin by giving a philosophical analysis of tradition.

At Philebus 23c4-26d10 Socrates makes a division into three kinds: Unbounded (apeiron), Bound (peras), and Mix (meikton). I review problems for the main interpretations of Unbounded and Mix and review kinds of scales defined in abstract measurement theory. Then I take 23c4-26d10 speech by speech, interpreting the Unbounded as a kind containing partial scales, Bound as the kind containing the relations and quantities needed to turn partial scales into appropriate ratio scales, and Mix as the kind containing ratio scales appropriate (...) for the good things that come to be in the world. (shrink)

AUGUSTINE WISHED TO DEFEND AND MAKE AS INTELLIGIBLE AS POSSIBLE THE CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY. I SHOW HOW AUGUSTINE WORKS WITH AN ARISTOTELIAN MODEL OF PREDICATION, DERIVES AN INCOMPLETENESS RESULT WITHIN THE STANDARD FORMS OF PREDICATION, AND ACCEPTS, WITH SOME QUALIFICATION, A NONSTANDARD FORM OF PREDICATION USED BY ARISTOTLE FOR PREDICATING PRIMARY SUBSTANCE OF MATTER.

This paper defends Socrates' argument that death is one of two things against standard objections.

Paul Hoffman (in “Kripke on Private Language”, Philosophical Studies 47, 1985, 23-28) argues that Kripke’s Wittgenstein fails in his solution to his own sceptical paradox. I argue that Hoffman fails to see the importance for Kripke’s Wittgenstein of the distinction between agreement in fact and judged agreement. Hoffman is right that no solution to the sceptical paradox can be based on agreement in fact, but the solution of Kripke’s Wittgenstein depends upon judged agreement. An interpretation is given: by ‘judged agreement’ (...) Kripke’s Wittgenstein does not mean understanding oneself to judge agreement but having a feeling of agreement. On this interpretation Hoffman’s argument fails. (shrink)

Paul Hoffman argues that Kripke’s Wittgenstein fails in his solution to his own sceptical paradox. I argue that Hoffman fails to see the importance for Kripke’s Wittgenstein of the distinction between agreement in fact and judged agreement. Hoffman is right that no solution to the sceptical paradox can be based on agreement in fact, but the solution of Kripke’s Wittgenstein depends upon judged agreement. An interpretation is given: by ‘judged agreement’ Kripke’s Wittgenstein does not mean understanding oneself to judge agreement (...) but having a feeling of agreement. On this interpretation Hoffman’s argument fails. (shrink)

Paul Hoffman argues that Kripke’s Wittgenstein fails in his solution to his own sceptical paradox. I argue that Hoffman fails to see the importance for Kripke’s Wittgenstein of the distinction between agreement in fact and judged agreement. Hoffman is right that no solution to the sceptical paradox can be based on agreement in fact, but the solution of Kripke’s Wittgenstein depends upon judged agreement. An interpretation is given: by ‘judged agreement’ Kripke’s Wittgenstein does not mean understanding oneself to judge agreement (...) but having a feeling of agreement. On this interpretation Hoffman’s argument fails. (shrink)

Selon la description de Platon, Socrate est devenu célèbre après avoir « changé de direction et examiné les paroles du dieu », c’est-à-dire après avoir mis à l’épreuve l’oracle selon lequel il n’existe aucun homme plus sage que lui. Une telle description soulève plus d’une question. En effet, quelle direction Socrate avait-il adoptée avant de tester l’oracle de Delphes? Qu’avait-il donc fait pour inciter Chéréphon à s’enquérir auprès de l’oracle s’il existait un homme plus sage que lui? Sans aucun doute, (...) avant même de consulter l’oracle, Chéréphon devait être convaincu du caractère extraordinaire de Socrate. Toutefois, selon le témoignage de Socrate dans l’Apologie, ce n’est qu’après avoir été mis au fait des paroles de l’oracle qu’il a enfin atteint la grande notoriété que nous lui connaissons. Le témoignage contenu dans l’Apologie apparaît donc comme contradictoire. Je propose une solution à ce casse-tête en distinguant trois moments dans la vie philosophique de Socrate. Tout d’abord, je montre comment, durant la première étape de sa vie, Socrate tient des conversations qui, à défaut de le rendre célèbre, donnent à Chéréphon un motif suffisant pour consulter l’oracle de Delphes. Je distingue ensuite deux étapes ultérieures, caractérisées par des actions différentes : la période durant laquelle Socrate essaie de résoudre l’énigme et celle durant laquelle il l’a résolue. (shrink)

The sentence setting the stage for the philosophical investigation within the Philebus is, naively translated, “He says that to enjoy is good.” Instead of the predicate adjective “good,” most interpreters prefer to translate with a definite description, “the good,” with consequences that affect the interpretation of the dialogue as a whole. Part one defends the naïve translation, both in the context of Socrates’ first seven speeches and viewing the dialogue as a whole. Part two considers and rejects the reasons given (...) against the naïve translation on the basis of grammar, idiosyncratic Platonic style, immediate context, and later restatements. (shrink)