In psycho-clinical research the notion of spirituality acquires a semantic plurality. This equivocal and ambiguous connotation that characterizes this term represents an obstacle to the epistemic and methodological validity of research designs, recognized as the threat to construct validity. In order to overcome this difficulty, we introduce, from Dietrich von Hildebrand's phenomenology, the notions of intentionality and transcendence insofar as these are capable of accounting for the specific element of the spiritual-religious phenomenon and discriminating it from the other phenomena or (...) variables that may be included under the notion of spirituality. This conceptual elucidation task allows evaluating the legitimacy of the variable selection process and establishing why they are or are not representatives of the phenomenon of spiritual-religious experience. (shrink)

Los críticos que han interpretado el pensamiento de Feyerabend como un relativismo radical no hacen justicia a su intencionalidad, y se muestran incapaces de comprender la unidad de su obra, en particular, su abandono posterior de los ideales relativistas. Se busca distinguir las diversas posiciones de Feyerabend frente al relativismo y exponer su reducción al absurdo de las nociones de la ciencia propias del positivismo lógico y del racionalismo crítico. Así mismo, se plantea cómo Feyerabend, ante la ausencia de un (...) criterio para discernir la tarea científica, postula un relativismo, pero, al final de su vida, busca elaborar una metafísica de la abundancia que supere las coordenadas de aquel. Critics who have interpreted Feyerabend's work as radical relativism do not do justice to his intentions and do not understand the unity of his work, in particular, his later abandonment of relativist ideals. This article seeks to distinguish the diverse Feyerabend's positions regarding relativism and exposes his reduction to absurdity of the ideas of science belonging to logical positivism and critical rationalism. It also addresses the way in which Feyerabend postulated relativism when faced with the absence of criteria to discern the scientific task. It argues, however, that at the end of his life Feyerabend seeked to construct a metaphysics of abundance in order to surpass relativism. (shrink)

Resumen: El discurso de la economía ha transitado por una tensión entre pertenecer a una Ciencia Social y presentar rasgos prototípicos de una Ciencia Básica. Ahora bien, evidenciar esta hibridez desafía a los investigadores del lenguaje, sobre todo si estos textos son parte de la formación de un economista. Particularmente, el Informe de Política Monetaria no ha sido estudiado desde el punto de vista lingüístico, por lo que se busca observar, en un corpus de 45 textos, si el género IPOM (...) evidencia dicha tensión discursiva de la disciplina. Para lograr ese objetivo, se ha optado por una metodología basada en dos dimensiones: Contexto de Producción y Organización Retórico-Funcional. Tras el análisis, los hallazgos del corpus IPOM-2013 integradamente muestran que el género IPOM efectivamente evidencia dicha tensión con rasgos más características de la CB como es el uso de recursos matemáticos y, por otro lado, rasgos de la CS, asociados a la modalización del discurso en su macromovida central.: The discourse of economy has gone by a constant tension between belonging to a Social Science and present prototypical features of a Basic Science. However, evidence this hybridity poses a challenge for researchers of language, especially if these texts are part of the training of an economist. In particular, the Monetary Policy Report has not been studied from the linguistic point of view. In this context, this research search to answer the question whether the gender IPOM evidences such discursive tension of the discipline. To achieve this objective, it has opted for a methodology based on 2 dimensions: Production Context and Rhetorical-Functional Organization. After the analysis, the findings Integrally shows that the IPOM genre effectively demonstrates this tension with features more characteristic of the BS such as the use of mathematical resources and, on the other hand, SC traits, mainly associated to the modalization of the discourse in its central macromove. (shrink)

Los críticos que han interpretado el pensamiento de Feyerabend como un relativismo radical no hacen justicia a su intencionalidad, y se muestran incapaces de comprender la unidad de su obra, en particular, su abandono posterior de los ideales relativis-tas. Se busca distinguir las diversas posiciones de Feyerabend frente al relativismo y exponer su reducción al absurdo de las nociones de la ciencia propias del positivis-mo lógico y del racionalismo crítico. Así mismo, se plantea cómo Feyerabend, ante la ausencia de un (...) criterio para discernir la tarea científica, postula un relativismo, pero, al final de su vida, busca elaborar una metafísica de la abundancia que supere las coordenadas de aquel. (shrink)

Los diseños experimentales adoptados en las ciencias empíricas traducen y seleccionan exteriorizaciones fenoménicas, de modo tal que ellas constituyan ciertas formas de percepción y posibilidades de comprobación que proceden del "objeto" mismo. En un nivel meta-teórico, podríamos identificar en tales diseños reduccionismos que facilitan toda suerte de simplificaciones epistémicas y metodológicas a costa, de eliminar cosas que necesitan ser entendidas y que son parte de una imagen completa del fenómeno que estudiamos. Por reduccionismo entendemos el proceso de simplificación y operatividad (...) que exige un diseño experimental. Pues bien, tanto Ortega y Gasset como Paul Karl Feyerabend denuncian las consecuencias y absurdos que se siguen de las diversas modalidades de reduccionismos para la misma ciencia. No es novedad en absoluto reconocer en Ortega y Gasset un auténtico filósofo de la ciencia ni mucho menos encontrar afinidades con los grandes representantes de este campo disciplinar. En este trabajo analizaremos como las lecturas orteguianas de esta problemática, así como su propuesta, corre en líneas paralelas a las denuncias de Feyerabend. (shrink)

La inconmensurabilidad ha ocasionado innumerables controversias y debates. En estos parece ser unánime la interpretación de tal doctrina como una objeción contra la objetividad, el realismo y el progreso científico. Ahora bien, este marco hermenéutico es estrecho para poder comprender la intención de Paul Feyerabend al formular su doctrina de la inconmensurabilidad. Pues este no pretendió cuestionar nunca dichas nociones en cuanto tales sino únicamente mostrar cuán vano resulta ser el intento del neo-positivismo y del racionalismo popperiano por definirlas. En (...) un sentido positivo sostenemos que la inconmensurabilidad en Paul Feyerabend impide o evita retomar, a la hora de definir aquellas nociones, las dialécticas propias del positivismo lógico o del racionalismo crítico. Nuestra intención en este trabajo es exponer su tesis de la inconmensurabilidad como un cuestionamiento a un modo particular de concebir la racionalidad científica y sus consecuentes nociones de objetividad, progreso y realismo científico. (shrink)

El artículo ofrece un análisis exploratorio respecto a los límites y obstáculos que presentan los reduccionismos metodológicos en la investigación psicoclínica respecto a la espiritualidad. Por reduccionismo metodológico se entiende el proceso de simplificación y operatividad que exige el mismo diseño experimental adoptado en la investigación psicoclínica. El trabajo se limita a señalar un absurdo que se sigue de la misma implementación de ciertos recortes metodológicos: a saber, aquel diseño metodológico que debería garantizar el abordaje racional de los fenómenos espirituales (...) y religiosos opera muchas veces como facilitador de comprensiones erróneas e incompletas del fenómeno. En este sentido quizás podamos repensar estos diseños de la investigación psicoclínica incorporando o atendiendo en sus formulaciones teóricas al bagaje cognoscitivo de las tradiciones teológicas y espirituales –elementos y principios aparentemente ajenos a la racionalidad científica–. Pues ellas pueden significar un camino posible para que las demostraciones científicas de la salud mental adquieran mayor fuerza explicativa. (shrink)

The theology as enabler of a more human science Paul Karl Feyerabend conceives religion as a possible way to infuse meaning and humanity to the science. He asserts that when it has taken place historically a unity between science and religion, science has been able to transcend values of utility and efficiency. This happens because the religion confers meaning to scientific results within an image of the world that involves the person as a whole. In this context, the Viennese invites (...) to establish a dialogue with the science of ancient Greece in order to know more about more human ways of doing science and to be able to judge in perspective the achievements of scientific materialism. Our objective in this work will be to attend to this invitation of Viennese studying the relation that exists between mathematics and theology in the Ptolemaic writings. We believe that the Alexandrian is an emblematic case of this communion between science and theology and –in this sense– allows us to rethink contemporary science as a cognitive task more attentive to the human and existential implications of its theories and models. (shrink)

Entre los estudios críticos que existen en torno a la obra de Paul Feyerabend predominan aquellos que subrayan una discontinuidad radical entre la versión temprana y tardía de su pensamiento. Todo ello contribuye a que dispongamos de una visión fragmentada e incompleta de un pensador que evoluciono hasta el 1994, año de su fallecimiento. Nuestro propósito es ofrecer una explicación de su itinerario intelectual de tal modo que quedé patente su continuidad en la clave de sus críticas contra los falsos (...) absolutos erigidos por el positivismo lógico y el racionalismo científico. Mostraremos las diversas cuestiones que Feyerabend aborda en las distintas épocas de su vida pero, al mismo tiempo, subrayaremos la unidad o coherencia lógica que existe en su revisión crítica de la racionalidad científica. Nos preocuparemos por entender las razones por las cuales nuestro filósofo de la ciencia va trasladando sus distintos focos de discusión o crítica. A common element in studies of Paul Karl Feyerabend is the distinction between five periods in his work. John Preston sees a radical discontinuity between the early and late versions of Feyerabend’s thought. All of this contributes our having a fragmented and incomplete view of a thinker who continued to evolve until 1994, the year of his death. We aim to provide an explanation of his intellectual journey that shows the evident continuity and unity of his thought. We will discuss the various issues he addressed in the different periods of his life, but at the same time we will emphasize the unity or logical coherence among them. Our aim is to understand the reasons why the philosopher of science changed his distinct foci of discussion and criticism. (shrink)

Words change meaning, usually in unpredictable ways. But some words’ meanings are revised intentionally. Revisionary projects are normally put forward in the service of some purpose – some serve specific goals of inquiry, and others serve ethical, political or social aims. Revisionist projects can ameliorate meanings, but they can also pervert. In this paper, I want to draw attention to the dangers of meaning perversions, and argue that the self-declared goodness of a revisionist project doesn’t suffice to avoid meaning perversions. (...) The road to Hell, or to horrors on Earth, is paved with good intentions. Finally and more importantly, I want to demarcate what meaning perversions are. This, I hope, can help us assess the moral and political legitimacy of revisionary projects. (shrink)

Concepts stand at the centre of human cognition. We use concepts in categorizing objects and events in the world, in reasoning and action, and in social interaction. It is therefore not surprising that the study of concepts constitutes a central area of research in philosophy and psychology, yet only recently have the two disciplines developed greater interaction. Recent experiments in psychology that test the role of concepts in categorizing and reasoning have found a great deal of variation, across individuals and (...) cultures, in categorization behaviour. Meanwhile, philosophers of language and mind have investigated the semantic properties of concepts, and how concepts are related to linguistic meaning and linguistic communication. A key motivation behind this was the idea that concepts must be shared across individuals and cultures. With the dawn of experimental philosophy, the proposal that the experimental data from psychology lacks relevance to semantics is increasingly difficult to defend. -/- This volume brings together leading psychologists and philosophers to advance the interdisciplinary debate on the role of concepts in categorizing and reasoning, the relationship between concepts and linguistic meaning and communication, the challenges conceptual variation poses to communication, and the social and political effects of conceptual change. (shrink)

Kaplan (1999) argued that a different dimension of expressive meaning (“use-conditional”, as opposed to truth-conditional) is required to characterize the meaning of pejoratives, including slurs and racial epithets. Elaborating on this, writers have argued that the expressive meaning of pejoratives and slurs is either a conventional implicature (Potts 2007) or a presupposition (Macià 2002 and 2014, Schlenker 2007, Cepollaro and Stojanovic 2016). We argue that an expressive presuppositional theory accounts well for the data, but that expressive presuppositions are not just (...) propositions to be added to a common ground. We hold that expressives, including pejoratives and slurs, make requirements on a contextual record governed by sui generis norms specific to affective attitudes and their expressions. (shrink)

An implicit ambiguity in the field of prediction-based decision-making concerns the relation between the concepts of prediction and decision. Much of the literature in the field tends to blur the boundaries between the two concepts and often simply refers to ‘fair prediction’. In this paper, we point out that a differentiation of these concepts is helpful when trying to implement algorithmic fairness. Even if fairness properties are related to the features of the used prediction model, what is more properly called (...) ‘fair’ or ‘unfair’ is a decision system, not a prediction model. This is because fairness is about the consequences on human lives, created by a decision, not by a prediction. In this paper, we clarify the distinction between the concepts of prediction and decision and show the different ways in which these two elements influence the final fairness properties of a prediction-based decision system. As well as discussing this relationship both from a conceptual and a practical point of view, we propose a framework that enables a better understanding and reasoning of the conceptual logic of creating fairness in prediction-based decision-making. In our framework, we specify different roles, namely the ‘prediction-modeler’ and the ‘decision-maker,’ and the information required from each of them for being able to implement fairness of the system. Our framework allows for deriving distinct responsibilities for both roles and discussing some insights related to ethical and legal requirements. Our contribution is twofold. First, we offer a new perspective shifting the focus from an abstract concept of algorithmic fairness to the concrete context-dependent nature of algorithmic decision-making, where different actors exist, can have different goals, and may act independently. In addition, we provide a conceptual framework that can help structure prediction-based decision problems with respect to fairness issues, identify responsibilities, and implement fairness governance mechanisms in real-world scenarios. (shrink)

Abstract David Sobel (2001) objects to Bernard Williams's internalism, the view that an agent has a reason to perform an action only if she has some motive that will be served by performing that action. Sobel is an unusual challenger in that he endorses neo-Humean subjectivism, ?the view that it is the agent's subjective motivational set that makes it the case that an agent does or does not have a reason to φ? (219). Sobel's objection in fact arises from this (...) very commitment. Internalism, he says, is incompatible with the best subjectivist accounts of reasons for action?accounts that suggest that there are what he calls fragile reasons and perhaps also superfragile ones, both of which allegedly provide for counterexamples to internalism. I argue that such reasons do not in fact threaten internalism. I then briefly explore whether internalism is vulnerable to a related charge?that it commits the conditional fallacy. (shrink)

Children’s future-oriented cognition has become a well-established area of research over the last decade. Future-oriented cognition encompasses a range of processes, including those involved in conceiving the future, imagining and preparing for future events, and making decisions that will affect how the future unfolds. We consider recent empirical advances in the study of such processes by outlining key findings that have yielded a clearer picture of how future thinking emerges and changes over childhood. Our interest in future thinking stems from (...) a broader interest in temporal cognition, and we argue that a consideration of developmental changes in how children understand and represent time itself provides a valuable framework in which to study future-oriented cognition. (shrink)

Collective Action, Philosophy and Law brings together two important strands of philosophical analysis. It combines general philosophical inquiry into collective agency with analyses of specific questions about plural entities and activities in the legal domain. These are issues of growing interest in areas of philosophy like action theory and social ontology, as well as in philosophy of law. The book contains thirteen original chapters written by an international team of leading philosophers and legal theorists, and is divided into four clear (...) parts: The nature of law and of legislative intention Practical reasoning and duties Causality, blameworthiness, and responsibility Citizens, states, and institutions. These sections cut across, and build on, different accounts to advance the debate on classical and new issues in collective agency. Each part also features legal-philosophical analyses that draw on general accounts of collective agency to cast new light on the law, descriptive as well as normatively. Collective Action, Philosophy and Law is the first major interdisciplinary and multi-authored work bridging legal and philosophical approaches to collective agency. As such, it is essential reading for students and researchers of philosophy of law, ethics, political philosophy, jurisprudence, and legal theory. (shrink)

Our understanding of what it means to be a parent is shaped by our biological, social, legal, and moral concepts of parenthood. This book combines traditional philosophical methods with research in the broader social sciences and humanities to explore the dilemmas which challenge our understanding of parenthood today.

Civility is often treated as an essential virtue in liberal democracies that promise to protect diversity as well as active disagreement in the public sphere. Yet the fear that our tolerant society faces a crisis of incivility is gaining ground. Politicians and public intellectuals call for "more civility" as the solution--but is civility really a virtue? Or is it something more sinister--a covert demand for conformity that silences dissent? Mere Civility sheds light on this tension in contemporary political theory and (...) practice by examining similar appeals to civility in early modern debates about religious toleration. In seventeenth-century England, figures as different as Roger Williams, Thomas Hobbes, and John Locke could agree that some restraint on the wars of words and "persecution of the tongue" between sectarians would be required; and yet, they recognized that the prosecution of incivility was often difficult to distinguish from persecution.--. (shrink)

An account of the development of temporal understanding is proposed which links such understanding with the development of episodic memory. We distinguish between different ways of representing time in terms of the kinds of temporal frameworks they involve. Distinctions are made between frameworks that are perspectival or nonperspectival and those that represent recurrent sequences or particular times. Even primitive temporal understanding integrates both perspectival and nonperspectival components. However, since early frameworks are event-based and localized, they are not yet sufficient for (...) episodic memory in that they do not enable the child to think of events as having occurred at particular points in time. We describe the emergence of new kinds of frameworks in terms of the development of temporal decentering. Two levels of temporal decentering are distinguished, with the higher level involving an appreciation of how event representations depend on one's temporal perspective. (shrink)

This is the second of two volumes which together provide a comprehensive look at the rich and colorful history of higher education exchange between the United States and the countries of the Middle East. Twenty-first century developments, and the current scope and character of higher education exchange between America and the Middle East are explored in this new book.

Higher education exchange between America and the Middle East is a comparatively recent development, but the colorful history of circumstances and events that preceded the relationship is ancient and deep. Here, Brawner explores the multifarious and intriguing story from antiquity to the end of the twentieth century.

Post-secularism is the fundamental evidence of the end of modernity. Modernity, as sleeping reason in Francisco Goya's painting, realizes that, although it thought that it was awake, it was producing monsters. We try to analyze post-secular philosophy from the point of view of Russian religious thought. We believe that such philosophers as Vladimir Soloviev, Pavel Florensky, Sergey Bulgakov, Nikolai Berdyaev, Georges Florovsky, and Semen Frank may be helpful for understanding and overcoming post-secular order. Their unique views on the relations between (...) religion and philosophy, science, and social life are apparently missing in the current Western debates. It seems to us that Russian religious philosophy becomes surprisingly up-to-date and attractive in the contemporary world. We hope that the present volume will be a significant step forward in the inclusion of the heritage of Russian religious philosophy in contemporary debates. (shrink)

A new model of the development of temporal concepts is described that assumes that there are substantial changes in how children think about time in the early years. It is argued that there is a shift from understanding time in an event-dependent way to an event-independent understanding of time. Early in development, very young children are unable to think about locations in time independently of the events that occur at those locations. It is only with development that children begin to (...) have a proper grasp of the distinction between past, present, and future, and represent time as linear and unidirectional. The model assumes that although children aged 2 to 3 years may categorize events differently depending on whether they lie in the past or the future, they may not be able to understand that whether an event is in the past or future is something that changes as time passes and varies with temporal perspective. Around 4 to 5 years, children understand how causality operates in time, and can grasp the systematic relations that obtain between different locations in time, which provides the basis for acquiring the conventional clock and calendar system. (shrink)

The idea that one can 'soak up' someone else's mood or sense the tension in a room is familiar - as in 'negative energy'. This ability to borrow or share states of mind is now pathologized, as the author shows in relation to affective transfer in psychiatric clinics.

Logical pluralism is the view that there is more than one right logic. A particular version of the view, what is sometimes called domain-specific logical pluralism, has it that the right logic and connectives depend somehow on the domain of use, or context of use, or the linguistic framework. This type of view has a problem with cross-framework communication, though: it seems that all such communication turns into merely verbal disputes. If two people approach the same domain with different logics (...) as their guide, then they may be using different connectives, and hence talking past each other. In this situation, if we think we are having a conversation about “¬A\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\lnot A$$\end{document}”, but are using different “¬\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\lnot $$\end{document}”s, then we are not really talking about the same thing. The communication problem prevents legitimate disagreements about logic, which is a bad result. In this paper I articulate a possible solution to this problem, without giving up pluralism, which requires adopting a notion of metalinguistic negotiation, and allows people to communicate and disagree across domains/contexts/frameworks. (shrink)

Cet article étudie les remaniements produits au sein d’un couple lorsque l’un des partenaires reçoit le diagnostic d’une maladie neuromusculaire, des années après leur rencontre. Il s’appuie sur l’étude de cas d’un couple exploré à travers l’utilisation de deux outils : une médiation, « le jeu de l’oie », proposée au couple, suivie d’un entretien individuel avec chaque partenaire. La maladie peut renforcer le pacte inconscient du couple, mais aussi ébranler ses fondations et entraîner une crise laissant chaque partenaire face (...) à sa propre souffrance. Cette crise peut apparaître à distance du diagnostic, notamment au moment de l’apparition des symptômes invalidants du partenaire atteint. Le psychologue clinicien, au sein des consultations médicales spécialisées, joue un rôle crucial pour identifier les situations à risque et œuvrer pour que le couple du patient soit aussi « pris en soin » et que les partenaires, comme les patients, soient entendus dans ce qu’ils vivent face à l’expérience de la maladie pour au moins en limiter les effets. (shrink)

Soul on the Couch is premised on the belief that discourse about the soul and discourse from the couch can inform, and not simply ignore, one another.

This compelling collection illuminates new models and metaphors taken from the contemporary sciences and philosophical thought to revitalize and re-contextualize psychoanalysis for the 21st century. The exploration of quantum mechanics, chaos and complexity theory, epigenetics, and neuropsychoanalysis provides the reader with new layers of meaning and understanding that in turn lead to an enrichening of psychoanalytic theory and a deepening of experience in the consulting office. The intersection of psychoanalysis, contemporary sciences, and philosophy leads the reader to new worlds that (...) can transform the lens from which one views the psychoanalytic process. Written for psychoanalysts and psychotherapists, as well as scholars of psychoanalysis that are interested in the intersection of psychoanalysis, contemporary science and philosophy, Enriching Psychoanalysis with Contemporary Science and Philosophy expands the focus and meaning of current psychoanalytic theory and practice. (shrink)

What cognitive abilities underpin the use of tools, and how are tools and their properties represented or understood by tool-users? Does the study of tool use provide us with a unique or distinctive source of information about the causal cognition of tool-users? -/- Tool use is a topic of major interest to all those interested in animal cognition, because it implies that the animal has knowledge of the relationship between objects and their effects. There are countless examples of animals developing (...) tools to achieve some goal-chimps sharpening sticks to use as spears, bonobos using sticks to fish for termites, and New Caledonian crows developing complex tools to extracts insects from logs. Studies of tool use have been used to examine an exceptionally wide range of aspects of cognition, such as planning, problem-solving and insight, naive physics, social relationship between action and perception. A key debate in recent research on animal cognition concerns the level of cognitive sophistication that is implied by animal tool use, and developmental psychologists have been addressing related questions regarding the processes through which children acquire the ability to use tools. In neuropsychology, patterns of impairments in tool use due to brain damage, and studies of neural changes associated with tool use, have also led to debates about the different types of cognitive abilities that might underpin tool use, and about how tool use may change the way space or the body is represented. -/- Tool Use and Causal Cognition provides a new interdisciplinary perspective on these issues with contributions from leading psychologists studying tool use and philosophers providing new analyses of the nature of causal understanding A ground-breaking volume which covers several disciplines, this volume will be of interest to psychologists, including animal researchers and developmental psychologists as well as philosophers, and neuroscientists. (shrink)

Prince Evgenii Trubetskoi, one of Russia’s great philosophers, exemplified what was best in the Russian religious-philosophical tradition. His lifelong pursuit was “integral knowledge.” This ideal affirmed that faith was integral to reason and that inner experience, and not just external sensory experience, offered truthful testimony to the nature of reality—precisely contrary to the reductive positivism and scientism of Trubetskoi’s day and ours. Following Vladimir Soloviev he developed the concept of Bogochelovechestvo —the free human realization of the divine principle in ourselves (...) and in the world —and found in it the very meaning of life. Trubetskoi strikingly combined religious philosophy with an unwavering commitment to the main principles of liberalism: human dignity, freedom of conscience, the rule of law, and human perfectibility. He worked tirelessly for a liberal, constitutional Russia. This is the first book in English devoted to Evgenii Trubetskoi’s life and thought. It includes a comprehensive introduction, six chapters on his religious-philosophical worldview, and six chapters on an area of religious studies that he inspired—the philosophy of the icon. (shrink)

Although the concept of food sovereignty is rooted in International Peasant Movements across the global south, activists have recently called for the adoption of this framework among low-income communities of color in the urban United States. This paper investigates on-the-ground processes through which food sovereignty articulates with the work of food justice and community food security activists in Oakland, California, and Seattle, Washington. In Oakland, we analyze a farmers market that seeks to connect black farmers to low-income consumers. In Seattle, (...) we attend to the experiences of displaced immigrant farmers from Latin America and their efforts to address their food needs following migration. In both cases, we find that US based projects were constrained by broader forces of neoliberalism that remained unrecognized by local activists. In Oakland, despite a desire to create a local food system led by marginalized African Americans, emphasis on providing green jobs in agriculture led activists to take a market-based approach that kept local food out of the economic grasp of food-insecure neighborhood residents. In Seattle, the marginalization of the immense agroecological knowledge of Latino/an immigrant farmers rendered local food projects less inclusive and capable of transformative change. Taken together, these very different cases suggest that a shift towards food sovereignty necessitates a broad acknowledgement of and resistance to neoliberalism. (shrink)

We are logical pluralists who hold that the right logic is dependent on the domain of investigation; different logics for different mathematical theories. The purpose of this article is to explore the ramifications for our pluralism concerning normativity. Is there any normative role for logic, once we give up its universality? We discuss Florian Steingerger’s “Frege and Carnap on the Normativity of Logic” as a source for possible types of normativity, and then turn to our own proposal, which postulates that (...) various logics are constitutive for thought within particular practices, but none are constitutive for thought as such. (shrink)