Derk Pereboom and Gregg Caruso argue that humans are never morally responsible for their actions and take that thesis as a starting point for a project whose ultimate goal is the reform of responsibility practices, which include expressions of praise, blame, and the institution of legal punishment. This paper shares the skeptical concern that current responsibility practices can be suboptimal and in need of change, but argues that a non-skeptical pursuit of those changes is viable and more promising. The main (...) lines of the argument are developed by assessing the prospects of implementing one of the changes favored within the skeptical project (namely, the reduction of punishment severity) in light of how human moral psychology works. An original vignette experiment (N = 180; participants from Facebook groups related to Brazilian universities) asked participants to recommend sentences for a fictitious criminal after considering alternatives to regular punishment that varied in their effectiveness to prevent reoffending. The results suggest that people can become less punitive even if they continue to believe in moral responsibility and free will. The paper further argues that reforming responsibility practices is more likely to occur without the endorsement of skepticism. (shrink)

People have disagreed on the significance of Libet-style experiments for discussions about free will. In what specifically concerns free will in a libertarian sense, some argue that Libet-style experiments pose a threat to its existence by providing support to the claim that decisions are determined by unconscious brain events. Others disagree by claiming that determinism, in a sense that conflicts with libertarian free will, cannot be established by sciences other than fundamental physics. This paper rejects both positions. First, it is (...) argued that neuroscience and psychology could in principle provide support for milder deterministic claims that would also conflict with libertarian free will. Second, it is argued that Libet-style experiments—due to some of their peculiar features, ones that need not be shared by neuroscience as a whole—currently do not support such less demanding deterministic claims. The general result is that neuroscience and psychology could in principle... (shrink)

Derk Pereboom and Gregg Caruso argue that humans are never morally responsible for their actions and take that thesis as a starting point for a project whose ultimate goal is the reform of responsibility practices, which include expressions of praise, blame, and the institution of legal punishment. This paper shares the skeptical concern that current responsibility practices can be suboptimal and in need of change, but argues that a non-skeptical pursuit of those changes is viable and more promising. The main (...) lines of the argument are developed by assessing the prospects of implementing one of the changes favored within the skeptical project (namely, the reduction of punishment severity) in light of how human moral psychology works. An original vignette experiment (N = 180; participants from Facebook groups related to Brazilian universities) asked participants to recommend sentences for a fictitious criminal after considering alternatives to regular punishment that varied in their effectiveness to prevent reoffending. The results suggest that people can become less punitive even if they continue to believe in moral responsibility and free will. The paper further argues that reforming responsibility practices is more likely to occur without the endorsement of skepticism. (shrink)

In a previous paper, I argued that neuroscience and psychology could in principle undermine libertarian free will by providing support for a subset of what I called “statements of local determination.” I also argued that Libet-style experiments have not so far supported statements of that sort. In a commentary to the paper, Adina Roskies and Eddy Nahmias accept the claim about Libet-style experiments, but reject the claim about the possibilities of neuroscience. Here, I explain why I still disagree with their (...) conclusion, despite being sympathetic to a lot of what they say in support of it. (shrink)

Judging a person as morally responsible involves believing that certain responses (such as punishment, reward, or expressions of blame or praise) can be justifiably directed at the person. This paper develops an account of the evolution of moral responsibility judgment that adopts Michael Tomasello’s two-step theory of the evolution of morality and borrows also from Christopher Boehm’s work. The main hypothesis defended is that moral responsibility judgment originally evolved as an adaptation that enabled groups of cooperative individuals to hold free (...) riders responsible more safely by acting in a coordinated way. (shrink)

Free will skepticism is the view that people never truly deserve to be praised, blamed, or punished for what they do. One challenge free will skeptics face is to explain how criminality could be dealt with given their skepticism. This paper critically examines the prospects of implementing legal changes concerning crime and punishment derived from the free will skeptical views developed by Derk Pereboom and Gregg Caruso. One central aspect of the changes their views require is a concern for reducing (...) the severity of current forms of punishment. The paper considers two strategies for pursuing such a reduction. By taking into account evidence from the psychology of belief in free will and desire to punish, it is argued that a strategy aiming at a reduction of people’s natural desire to punish criminals can be successful if capable of providing alternatives to current forms of punishment satisfying three properties: they must be less harmful than current forms of punishment, more effective in preventing crime, and incompatible with current forms of punishment. (shrink)

This paper focuses on Gilberto Gomes’ work on free will. In a series of contributions that have had a significant impact on the respective literature, Gomes developed a conception about free will and argued that its existence is consistent with recent scientific findings, specially in neuroscience. In this paper, I object to a claim of Gomes about his conception of free will, namely the claim that it is a compatibilist conception. I seek to show that Gomes does not use the (...) term ‘compatibilism’ as it is usual in the contemporary literature on free will, i.e., as the thesis that free will can exist even if determinism is true. Moreover, the conception of free will Gomes proposes actually has an incompatibilist commitment. I argue that, more than a mere terminological point, acknowledging the incompatibilist aspect of Gomes’ view motivates important questions about the details of the view and helps to reveal a limitation of his defense of the existence of free will. [Este artigo tem como tema o trabalho de Gilberto Gomes sobre o livre-arbítrio. Em uma série de contribuições que tiveram um impacto significativo na respectiva literatura, Gomes elaborou uma concepção sobre o livre-arbítrio e argumentou que sua existência é consistente com descobertas científicas recentes, especialmente na neurociência. Neste artigo, questiono uma afirmação de Gomes sobre sua concepção sobre o livre-arbítrio, a saber, que se trata de uma concepção compatibilista. Busco mostrar que Gomes não usa o termo ‘compatibilismo’ como é habitual na literatura contemporânea sobre o livre-arbítrio, isto é, como a tese segundo a qual o livre-arbítrio pode existir ainda que o determinismo seja verdadeiro. Ademais, a concepção sobre o livre-arbítrio desenvolvida por Gomes tem, efetivamente, um compromisso incompatibilista. Argumento que, mais do que uma mera elucidação terminológica, reconhecer o elemento incompatibilista presente na proposta de Gomes suscita questões importantes sobre os detalhes da proposta e também ajuda a reconhecer uma limitação de sua defesa da existência do livre-arbítrio.]. (shrink)

In the last few decades, the literature on moral responsibility has been increasingly populated by scientific studies. Studies in neuroscience and psychology, in particular, have been claimed to be relevant for discussions about moral responsibility in a number of ways. And at the same time, there is not yet a systematic understanding of the sort of questions a science of moral responsibility is supposed to answer. This paper is an attempt to move toward such an understanding. I discuss three models (...) for framing scientific questions relevant to an investigation of moral responsibility. The favored model—the Enhancement model—proposes that a science of moral responsibility has two descriptive tasks. First, science can describe the causes and effects of the many sorts of responses that constitute the human practices of moral responsibility, such as praise, blame, and punishment. And, second, science can describe how modifications aiming at the improvement of such practices can be achieved. Relatively to the other models to be considered, the Enhancement model is broader in scope and less tied to the traditional philosophical agenda on moral responsibility. (shrink)

Este artigo reconstrói os argumentos de Donald Davidson (1970) em favor de sua teoria do monismo anômalo e revisa as principais críticas que recebeu. Essa teoria é amplamente rejeitada atualmente e, dadas as inúmeras críticas recebidas, é razoável concluir que qualquer tentativa de reabilitação tem um longo caminho pela frente. A diversidade dessas críticas sugere que não há consenso sobre por que exatamente o monismo anômalo fracassa, embora as dificuldades pareçam convergir sobre a justificação e possibilidade da tese monista, e (...) não sobre a anomalia do mental. (shrink)

Resumo: Em décadas recentes, a investigação filosófica sobre a responsabilidade moral e o livre-arbítrio, que por muito tempo foi vista como um empreendimento principalmente teórico, passou a também incluir preocupações de tipo mais prático. Essa mudança é bem ilustrada pela proposta cética desenvolvida por autores como Derk Pereboom e Gregg Caruso. Seus trabalhos não apenas negam que sejamos agentes livres e moralmente responsáveis (em um sentido específico dos termos em questão), mas também defendem reformas na maneira como a responsabilização é (...) efetivada em nossas relações interpessoais e, especialmente, no sistema penal. Este artigo examina as implicações práticas do ceticismo de Pereboom e Caruso, principalmente no que diz respeito à sua implementabilidade. Argumento que o núcleo propriamente cético da proposta é inviável para seres humanos com a psicologia moral que temos, mas que, apesar disso, alguns elementos da proposta são compatíveis com uma proposta não-cética focada no aperfeiçoamento das práticas punitivas. Abstract: In recent decades, the philosophical investigation of moral responsibility and free will, which for a long time was seen as a mostly theoretical enterprise, became also the place of more practically oriented concerns. The skeptical view developed by Derk Pereboom and Gregg Caruso is a good illustration of the change. In their work, they not just deny that we are free and morally responsible agents (in a specific sense of the relevant terms) but also propose the reform of responsibility practices as they figure in our interpersonal relations and, especially, in the criminal justice system. This paper examines the practical implications of Pereboom and Caruso’s skepticism, particularly in what concerns its likelihood of being implemented. I argue that the strictly skeptical core of their proposal is not viable for human beings with a moral psychology like ours, but that some elements are nonetheless consistent with a non-skeptical view focused on the improvement of punitive practices. (shrink)

Diana Pérez (2005) criticizes Davidson’s argument for the thesis that there is no thought without language, and offers an alternative defense of that thesis on the basis of empirical studies on developmental psychology. In this comment I argue that more recent studies do not seem to affect Davidson’s argument in the way Pérez suggests, and that her alternative defense of the thesis that there is no thought without language is insufficient. At the end, I offer a sketch of how a (...) weaker and more tenable version of the argument could be articulated. (shrink)

Tradução de correspondências trocadas entre Descartes e Elisabeth no ano de 1643, nas quais discutem a tese cartesiana da alma como imaterial e inextensa.

[Note: articles 1-5 are in English; Intro, Discussion, and Conclusion are in Portuguese.] Responsibility practices that are part of our daily lives involve, among other things, standards about how one should praise, blame, or punish people for their actions, as well as particular acts that follow those standards to a greater or lesser extent. A classical question in philosophy asks whether human beings can actually be morally responsible for what they do. This dissertation argues that addressing this classical question is (...) insufficient if one wants the investigation of moral responsibility to serve the goal of improving ordinary responsibility practices. As an alternative, I offer directions for an interdisciplinary investigation that I take to be in a better position to promote that goal. My argument is developed in five articles and a discussion section. The first four articles describe limitations of skeptical views, which deny the existence of moral responsibility. The first article assesses a skeptical argument based on results from neuroscience that intends to show that there is no free will. I argue that a premise in the argument—which says that choices are determined by events in the brain—is not supported by the available results. The second article argues that, despite the fact that existent results do not show that choices are determined by brain events, further studies in neuroscience could in principle do that. The third article begins the discussion of limitations that concern the implementability of some of the changes in responsibility practices recommended in skeptical approaches. Specifically, I describe challenges that attempts to reduce the severity of legal punishment are likely to face due to psychological facts about belief in free will and desire to punish. The forth article presents results from an original experiment that sought to test a hypothesis about the workings of belief in free will and the desire to punish, namely the hypothesis that the desire to punish causally affects beliefs about free will. Results failed to support the hypothesis. Finally, the fifth article presents what I call the enhancement model, i.e., a proposal about how to structure an interdisciplinary investigation that can promote the enhancement of ordinary responsibility practices. The final discussion section shows how the enhancement model overcomes some of the limitations of recent discussions about the existence of moral responsibility, which includes not just the skeptical views considered in earlier articles, but also views that affirm the existence of moral responsibility and free will. The central claim of this dissertation, therefore, is that the investigation of moral responsibility can be rearranged so as to further the goal of improving ordinary responsibility practices. (shrink)

Diana Pérez criticizes Davidson’s argument for the thesis that there is no thought without language, and offers an alternative defense of that thesis on the basis of empirical studies on developmental psychology. In this comment I argue that more recent studies do not seem to affect Davidson’s argument in the way Pérez suggests, and that her alternative defense of the thesis that there is no thought without language is insufficient. At the end, I offer a sketch of how a weaker (...) and more tenable version of the argument could be articulated. (shrink)

Qual é a relação entre uma razão e uma ação quando a razão explica a ação, dando a razão do agente para fazer o que fez? Podemos chamar tais explicações de racionalizações, e dizer que a razão racionaliza a ação. Neste artigo quero defender a posição antiga — e de senso comum — de que a racionalização é uma espécie de explicação causal b. A defesa sem dúvida exige alguma reelaboração, mas não parece necessário abandonar a posição, como muitos autores (...) recentes insistem. (shrink)

Esta coletânea explora o papel desempenhado pelas emoções na teorização em ética e metaética. Inclui capítulos escritos por pesquisadores do Brasil e de outros países.

Marcelo Fischborn discusses the significance of neuroscience for debates about free will. Although he concedes that, to date, Libet-style experiments have failed to threaten “libertarian free will”, he argues that, in principle, neuroscience and psychology could do so by supporting local determinism. We argue that, in principle, Libet-style experiments cannot succeed in disproving or even establishing serious doubt about libertarian free will. First, we contend that “local determination”, as Fischborn outlines it, is not a coherent concept. Moreover, (...) determinism is unlikely to be established by neuroscience in any form that should trouble compatibilists or libertarians—that is, anyone who thinks we might have free will. We conclude that, in principle, neuroscience will not be able undermine libertarian free will and explain why these conclusions support a coherent compatibilist notion of causal sourcehood. (shrink)

While agreeing with Fischborn’s (2018) contention that, according to one traditional definition of compatibilism, my position should be classified as that of a libertarian incompatibilist, I argue here for a different view of compatibilism. This view involves, on the one hand, local probabilistic causation of decisions (rather than universal strict determinism) and, on the other, free will conceived as involving decisions generated by a decision-making process carried out by the brain, which consciously contemplates different alternatives and could in principle (...) have been different from what it was, implying that the agent could in normal conditions have done otherwise in the same circumstances. After discussing different views of causation (including determinism) and of free will, I make a revision of some passages from my earlier work, quoted by Fischborn. I conclude that what is crucial in the question of (in)compatibilism is the (in)compatibility between freedom of decisions and natural causation of human actions. According to this looser and, I argue, more pertinent view of compatibilism, I maintain my previous classification of my position on the matter as compatibilist. (shrink)

While agreeing with Fischborn’s (2018) contention that, according to one traditional definition of compatibilism, my position should be classified as that of a libertarian incompatibilist, I argue here for a different view of compatibilism. This view involves, on the one hand, local probabilistic causation of decisions (rather than universal strict determinism) and, on the other, free will conceived as involving decisions generated by a decision-making process carried out by the brain, which consciously contemplates different alternatives and could in principle (...) have been different from what it was, implying that the agent could in normal conditions have done otherwise in the same circumstances. After discussing different views of causation (including determinism) and of free will, I make a revision of some passages from my earlier work, quoted by Fischborn. I conclude that what is crucial in the question of (in)compatibilism is the (in)compatibility between freedom of decisions and natural causation of human actions. According to this looser and, I argue, more pertinent view of compatibilism, I maintain my previous classification of my position on the matter as compatibilist. (shrink)

Gianni Vattimo associates “mystic” and metaphysics. The “forgetting of the being” would be coextensive to the abandonment (Gelassenheit) or to the mystic “losing oneself” (Versenkung) in the absolute. Based on this, the article analyzes the relevance and the possibility of the vattimiana hermeneutics referring to (Verwindung) “the mystic” to surpass it. The perspective of the hermeneutic ethics of Vattimo defends that the history of modernity, in its nihilism and secularization, keeps traces of the history of the salvation inaugurated by the (...) Jewish-Christian perspective. The “mystical losing oneself” contradicts the Pauline experience of the preparation of parusía. Based on Heidegger, the Italian philosopher defends that, considering the imminent parusía, the authenticity of the temporal experience to the Pauline Christian, meant going through, with faith, the present tribulation in the caducity of the historical contingency, hindering the mystical Versenkung and its respective evasion in the daily efforts. In favor of this persistence/effort, it is glimpsed cáritas, inaugurated by the kénosis in the East, as the optimum authenticity criterion for a contemporary spirituality; because cáritas would imply, in its opposition to the implicit violence of the absolute fundamentals, the recognition of the bond between the spiritual and the nihilist and secularized East. (shrink)

O artigo preconiza a relevância pedagógica da filosofia da não-significação de Albert Camus, especialmente em O Mito de Sísifo. O eixo argumentativo segue a última frase deste livro: “É preciso imaginar Sísifo feliz”. A certeza da existência e a estranheza de se inserir num cenário de catástrofe, sem esperança, suscita em estudantes, especialmente da rede pública, um “sentimento da absurdidade”, mas esse estado não há de ser visto como maldição. A liberdade paradoxalmente advém quando se assume o absurdo como meio (...) de se afirmar a vida, contra os suicídios físico e filosófico, tornando Sísifo o “herói absurdo”. Camus atribui ao pensamento de Søren Kierkegaard a proposta do suicídio filosófico como sacrifício do intelecto pelo salto kiekegaardiano da fé porque ele entende a felicidade encontrada na vida eterna como uma superação e cura da doença mortal do desespero. O esforço dialético de autorreflexão da consciência entre o finito e o infinito faz da resignação infinita uma preparação para o salto da fé. Para nosso autor, porém, o pior mal é não ter sofrido desespero, pois é a partir dele que imaginativamente o absurdo, como potência existencial, transfigura-se numa “revolta metafísica” — uma posição a ser desenvolvida no processo de ensino-aprendizagem em Filosofia. Palavras-chave: Albert Camus. Absurdo. Imaginação. Ensino de Filosofia. (shrink)

This paper is an attempt to implement Gilles Deleuze's theory of the series and the event, and the related function of the empty square (as formulated primarily in The Logic of Sense), in relation to the geopolitical regime comprising ‘Israel proper’ and the system of occupation in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The purpose of this exercise is to help establish a practical access to Deleuze's philosophies, and to offer a clinical account of the Israeli occupation of the (...) Palestinian territories. (shrink)

Michel Foucault is one of the most preeminent theorists of power, yet the relationship between his militant activities and his analysis of power remains unclear. The book explores this relationship to explain the development of Foucault's thinking about power. Using newly translated and unpublished materials, it examines what led Foucault to take on the question of power in the early 1970s and subsequently refine his thinking, working through different models (war and government) and modalities (sovereign, disciplinary, biopolitical, pastoral and governmental). (...) Looking at Foucault's political trajectory, from his involvement with the prisoner support movement and Solidarity to his controversial engagement with the Iranian revolution, the book shows the militant underpinning of his interest in the question of power and its various shifts and mutations. This thorough account, which includes the first translation of a report edited by Foucault on prison conditions, will provide students in contemporary political theory with a better understanding of Foucault's thinking about power and of the interplay between political activities and theoretical productions. (shrink)

Novo livro do autor do best-seller A simples beleza do inesperado, vencedor do Jabuti. O caldeirão é onde se misturam ingredientes visando sua transmutação. É o laboratório onde buscamos alguma forma de transcendência, o portal que nos transporta a uma nova realidade. Em O caldeirão azul, Marcelo Gleiser reúne ensaios provenientes de sua reflexão sobre as questões que considera mais relevantes para o momento atual: nossa relação com o planeta e suas criaturas, com os membros da sociedade em que (...) vivemos, e com a tecnologia, que está transformando quem somos e como nos relacionamos. O tema que conecta todos os textos é a visão da ciência como produto da nossa capacidade de nos maravilhar com o mundo toda vez que nos engajamos com o mistério da criação. Na sua essência, encontramos o mesmo ímpeto que move o espírito religioso: como lidar com nossas questões existenciais mais profundas, nossa origem, nossa vida, nossa morte. Nesta obra, Gleiser nos lembra que a ciência, aliada à nossa busca por respostas e nosso fascínio pelo mistério que nos cerca, pode ser usada tanto como ponte para um mundo melhor, como para construir a pior distopia imaginável. E nos convida a refletir – e decidir – sobre o futuro que queremos para nós, respeitando as diferenças de cada um e estando abertos para aprender com os que pensam de outras formas. (shrink)

O livro almeja ser representativo nos principais debates contemporâneos, oferecendo uma visão panorâmica sobre o campo na atualidade e permitindo-se aprofundar em algumas discussões selecionadas.O ambiente não pode ser reduzido ao “meio ambiente”, à natureza não humana. Ele não é meramente algo que “nos envolve”, um envoltório: o ambiente somos também nós, seres humanos, histórica e culturalmente situados. Quanto aos territórios, eles se estabelecem em íntima conexão com os ambientes em suas dimensões paisagística e material, quer sejam os processos geoecológicos, (...) quer sejam as formas e as dinâmicas socialmente produzidas. Analisar os territórios significa examinar como, a cada momento, os ambientes, seus recursos e significados são disputados e viram objeto de conflitos.O público-alvo principal são os estudantes dos últimos anos da graduação, além daqueles em nível de pós-graduação, de todas as áreas que lidam com problemas e conflitos ambientais. Afora os pesquisadores iniciantes e os jovens universitários em geral, porém, podemos presumir que profissionais experientes também poderão tirar proveito do material de diversos capítulos. É razoável, por fim, nutrir a expectativa de que muito do que este livro contém possa (retro)alimentar o ativismo ambiental crítico e a prática de combater as iniquidades e as distorções que se acumulam em nossas sociedades, principalmente as muitas situações de flagrante injustiça ambiental. (shrink)

From Fall 2016 to Fall 2019 Marcelo Gleiser conducted a series of nine public dialogues between eminent scientists and humanists on challenging topics and ideas whose very definitions and meanings are disputed. Sponsored by the Institute for Cross-Disciplinary Engagement at Dartmouth College, founded by Gleiser, these events were held in theaters and universities across the US and immediately followed by workshops, open to the public, at which attendees could converse directly with participants. Great Minds Don't Think Alike collects edited (...) versions of these discussions, which set an example, in a time when public discourse is seriously threatened, of how people can engage in a fruitful exchange of ideas even when they strongly disagree. The cast of characters is stellar: David Chalmers and Antonio Damasio on consciousness, Sean Carroll and Alan Wallace on reality, Patricia Churchland and Jill Tarter on the future of intelligence, Rebecca Goldstein and Alan Lightman on faith, Jimena Canales and Paul Davies on time, Ed Boyden and Mark O'Connell on transhumanism, Elizabeth Kolbert and Siddhartha Mukherjee on immortality, and Jeremy DeSilva, David Grinspoon, and Tasneem Zehra Husain on being human. (shrink)

From Fall 2016 to Fall 2019 Marcelo Gleiser conducted a series of nine public dialogues between eminent scientists and humanists on challenging topics and ideas whose very definitions and meanings are disputed. Sponsored by the Institute for Cross-Disciplinary Engagement at Dartmouth College, founded by Gleiser, these events were held in theaters and universities across the US and immediately followed by workshops, open to the public, at which attendees could converse directly with participants. Great Minds Don't Think Alike collects edited (...) versions of these discussions, which set an example, in a time when public discourse is seriously threatened, of how people can engage in a fruitful exchange of ideas even when they strongly disagree. The cast of characters is stellar: David Chalmers and Antonio Damasio on consciousness, Sean Carroll and Alan Wallace on reality, Patricia Churchland and Jill Tarter on the future of intelligence, Rebecca Goldstein and Alan Lightman on faith, Jimena Canales and Paul Davies on time, Ed Boyden and Mark O'Connell on transhumanism, Elizabeth Kolbert and Siddhartha Mukherjee on immortality, and Jeremy DeSilva, David Grinspoon, and Tasneem Zehra Husain on being human. (shrink)

L'œuvre de Michel Foucault est inclassable car elle traverse des domaines très variés (philosophie, sociologie, histoire, anthropologie, criminologie, médecine, psychologie, linguistique, droit, etc.). Foucault n'est pas un sociologue au sens classique du terme. Il existe une sociologie puissante et novatrice chez lui. Mais laquelle? À quoi peut-elle servir aujourd'hui? En quoi est-elle utile pour théoriser les problèmes sociaux? Quels sont ses avantages et ses inconvénients? Quel type de « raisonnement sociologique » se dégage de son œuvre et quelles sont ses (...) limites? Voilà les interrogations qui guident l'analyse de l'ensemble des travaux de Foucault dans cet ouvrage. En suivant l'évolution historique de ses recherches ainsi que les retournements stimulants de sa pensée, Foucault Sociologue s'organise en neuf chapitres qui suivent l'évolution théorique, méthodologique et chronologique des thématiques foucaldiennes. Marcelo Otero est professeur titulaire au Département de sociologie de l'Université du Québec à Montréal (UQAM), chercheur au Centre de recherche de Montréal sur les inégalités sociales, les discriminations et les pratiques alternatives de citoyenneté (CREMIS), au groupe sur le médicament comme objet social (MÉOS) et à l'Institut Santé et Société (ISS). Ses recherches portent sur les nouveaux problèmes de santé mentale et les problèmes sociaux complexes."--Quatrième de couverture. (shrink)

The subject of this book is the social and political meaning of constitutional texts to the detriment of their legal concretization. Focusing on the discrepancy between the hypertrophically symbolic function of constitutions and their insufficient legal concretization, it offers a critical counterpoint to constitutional theory that treats constitutional texts as a panacea to solving political, legal, and social problems. In contrast to the premises of Niklas Luhmann's systems theory regarding law and constitution in world's society, symbolic constitutionalization is approached here (...) in both a comprehensive and far-reaching perspective. Chapter 1 sets out the debate about symbolic legislation. Chapter 2 explains the notion of symbolic constitutionalization as a problem embracing the whole legal system. Chapter 3 approaches the issue in terms of allopoiesis of law, characterizing it primarily as a problem in peripheral modernity and referring to the Brazilian experience. The final chapter discusses the tendency to a symbolic constitutionalization of world society in the scope of a paradoxical peripheralization of the centre. (shrink)

No cinema brasileiro recente, o diálogo entre o documentário e a ficção tem merecido destaque, com produções de baixo orçamento e ideias originais. É o caso de Santiago (João Moreira Salles, 2007) e Viajo Porque Preciso, Volto Porque Te Amo (Marcelo Gomes, Karim Aïnouz, 2009), filmes que trabalham esse diálogo de forma sutil e diegética, ressignificando imagens de um arquivo próprio, pessoal.

Modern societies often claim to be democracies in order to enjoy greater legitimacy. Still, to understand the concept of democracy and how to justify it, the definition of it as self-determined is not sufficient. A complex understanding has to take into account ideas of rule of law as well as human rights. Sometimes these three concepts compete with each other - particularly in societies with a pluralistic approach to what "the good life" should be, such as societies which are made (...) up of distinct cultural backgrounds. This book presents a concept of democracy that encompasses at the same time the ideas of rule of law, human rights and self-determination. It contains the main lectures of the XXVI World Congress of Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy, hosted by the Internationale Vereinigung fur Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie at the Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (Brazil) in July 2013. (shrink)

The book provides an overview of how international law is today constructed through diverse macro and microprocesses that expand its traditional subjects and sources, with the attribution of sovereign capacity and power to the international plane (moving the international toward the national). Simultaneously, national laws approximate laws of other nations (moving among nations or moving the national toward the international), and new sources of legal norms emerge, independent of states and international organisations. This expansion occurs in many subject areas, with (...) specific structures: commercial, environmental, human rights, humanitarian, financial, criminal, and labor law contribute to the formation of postnational law with different modes of functioning, different actors, and different sources of law that should be understood as a new complexity of law. (shrink)

Whilst he was writing De principatibus, was Machiavelli really as out of touch with the Florentine politico-institutional world as his letter of December 1513 claims? Who read Il principe prior to its publication, and how? Why did the philosopher Agostino Nifo, one of the major proponents of Renaissance Averroism, plagiarize it? To what extent is the Machiavellian "principato civile" comprehensible only by way of its Medicean and Florentine affiliation? Did the young Lorenzo de' Medici's political programme seek to eliminate the (...) Roman church? What politicocultural stance is hidden behind certain political terms from the humanist tradition that Machiavelli revisited in Il principe? To what extent was the Machiavellian relationship between animality and humanity, simulation and dissimulation, influenced by Leonardo da Vinci's ceuvre? And, finally, what are the questions that remain open in Il principe? This compilation offers some possible answers to these questions, thus providing new critical tools for the study of Niccolo Machiavelli's Il principe -- Back cover. (shrink)