I argue that there has been inadequate attention to and questioning of the dominance and normativity of whiteness in the cultural construction of bioethics in the United States. Therefore we risk reproducing white privilege and white supremacy in its theory, method, and practices. To make my argument, I define whiteness and trace its broader social and legal history in the United States. I then begin to mark whiteness in U.S. bioethics, recasting Renee Fox's sociological marking of its American-ness as an (...) important initial marking of its whiteness/WASP ethos. Furthermore, I consider the attempts of social scientists to highlight sociocultural diversity as a corrective in U.S. bioethics. I argue that because they fail to problematize white dominance and normativity and the white-other dualism when they describe the standpoints of African-American, Asian-American, and Native-American others, their work merely inoculates difference and creates or maintains minoritized spaces. Accordingly, the dominant white center of mainstream U.S. bioethics must be problematized and displaced for diversity research to make a difference. In conclusion, I give several examples of how we might advance the recommended endeavor of exploring our own ethnicity, class, and other social positioning and norms operating in U.S. bioethics, briefly highlighting "white talk" as one challenge. (shrink)

This volume brings together contributors from a wide variety of disciplines to take a critical, empirical look at bioethics around the globe, examining how it ...

Ethical reasoning and decision-making may be thought of as 9professional skills9, and in this sense are as relevant to efficient clinical practice as the biomedical and clinical sciences are to the diagnosis of a patient9s problem. Despite this, however, undergraduate medical programmes in ethics tend to focus on the teaching of bioethical theories, concepts and/or prominent ethical issues such as IVF and euthanasia, rather than the use of such ethics knowledge (theories, principles, concepts, rules) to clinical practice. Not surprisingly, many (...) students and clinicians experience considerable difficulty in using what they know about ethics to help them make competent ethical decisions in their day-to-day clinical practice. This paper describes the development of a seminar programme for teaching senior medical students a more systematic approach to ethical reasoning and analysis and clinical decision-making. (shrink)

Some claim that “global health is public health” but most regard global health as a new field, rapidly emerging mostly at North American academic institutions . The term was first incorporated into University of California, San Francisco’s Institute for Global Health in 1999 and UCSF also inaugurated the first North American master of science in global health in 2009. Global health is commonly acknowledged to have historical precedents in tropical medicine and international health. All three fields are regarded as having (...) some overlapping and some distinctive features . One overlapping feature of all three is retaining traces of European and/or North American conquest, imperialism, and colonialism that create a legacy of ongoing ethical challenges for global health . One touted distinctive feature of global health is its .. (shrink)

Recent law and ethics literature has been inundated with recommendations of the "best interests" criterion as the appropriate guide for neonatal and maternal-fetal decision-making. Increasingly, however, its adequacy is being questioned. In Chapter 1, I survey the arguments of "best interests" defenders and critics and suggest one problem is that the "best interests" criterion has yet to be subjected to a systematic conceptual and ethical analysis. In Chapter 2, therefore, I conduct such an analysis to evaluate more systematically its appropriateness (...) as a decision-making guide in neonatal and maternal-fetal medicine, concluding that the "best interests" criterion cannot assist us in seeing and addressing all that is at stake in neonatal and maternal-fetal decision-making because it excludes any consideration of the "interdependent" and other interests of family members. Therefore, I suggest that an ethical criterion or set of criteria which can explicitly consider and adequately balance the interests of infants or fetuses and family members would be a more helpful guide for neonatal and maternal-fetal decision-making. ;In Chapters 3-7, I attempt to move beyond the "best interests" criterion, drawing on fieldwork I conducted in the United States, Sweden, and India to point out some conceptual and normative gaps to be addressed in the development of a more adequate guide for neonatal and maternal-fetal decision-making. In Chapter 3, I describe this fieldwork and explain its purpose as illustrating the clinical ethical strategies employed in these countries to balance the interests of various parties in actual decision-making. In Chapters 4-6, I describe these strategies. Finally, in Chapter 7, I point out some conceptual and normative gaps in these decision-making strategies, noting that these gaps have also been unaddressed by the "best interests" critics reviewed in Chapters 1 and 2. I suggest that we must address these gaps to develop theoretical structures that will enable us to explicitly consider and adequately balance the "interdependent" and other interests of infants or fetuses, their family members, and even society in neonatal and maternal-fetal decision-making. (shrink)

We identify the ways the policies of leading international bioethics journals limit the participation of researchers working in the resource-constrained settings of low- and middle-income countries in the development of the field of bioethics. Lack of access to essential scholarly resources makes it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for many LMIC bioethicists to learn from, meaningfully engage in, and further contribute to the global bioethics discourse. Underrepresentation of LMIC perspectives in leading journals sustains the hegemony of Western bioethics, limits the (...) presentation of diverse moral visions of life, health, and medicine, and undermines aspirations to create a truly “global” bioethics. Limited attention to this problem indicates a lack of empathy and moral imagination on the part of bioethicists in high-income countries, raises questions about the ethics of bioethics, and highlights the urgent need to find ways to remedy this social injustice. (shrink)

(2001). Whose History? Whose Future? Expanding the Exploration of Lived Experience in Ethics Consultation to Include Empirical Patient and Family and Community-Based Research. The American Journal of Bioethics: Vol. 1, No. 4, pp. 1-3.

How do bioethics gatekeepers located in wealthy nations treat bioethics workers from developing countries? Can the policies of leading international bioethics journals—based on a concern for profit that effectively restricts access for most researchers from developing countries—be ethically justified? We examined these policies focusing on the way they influence the ability of researchers in resource-poor countries to participate in the development of the field of bioethics. Eight of the fourteen leading bioethics journals are published by three transnational publishing houses, all (...) of which are based in wealthy nations. None of these eight journals participates in the Health InterNetwork Access to Research Initiative of the World Health Organization, a program that provides free or very low-cost online access to the major journals by researchers in developing countries. Lack of access to these essential resources makes it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for bioethicists in developing countries to learn from, and engage in, the global bioethics dialogue. Thus, exclusionary practices of leading bioethics journals sustain the hegemony of Western bioethics, raising serious questions about professed aspirations to create a truly “global” bioethics. This phenomenon indicates lack of empathy and moral imagination of bioethicists in developed countries, raises serious questions about the ethics of bioethics, and highlights the urgent need for creative solutions to remedy this social injustice. (shrink)

Who are the gatekeepers in bioethics? Does editorial bias or institutional racism exist in leading bioethics journals? We analyzed the composition of the editorial boards of 14 leading bioethics journals by country. Categorizing these countries according to their Human Development Index (HDI), we discovered that approximately 95 percent of editorial board members are based in (very) high-HDI countries, less than 4 percent are from medium-HDI countries, and fewer than 1.5 percent are from low-HDI countries. Eight out of 14 leading bioethics (...) journals have no editorial board members from a medium- or low-HDI country. Eleven bioethics journals have no board members from low-HDI countries. This severe underrepresentation of bioethics scholars from developing countries on editorial boards suggests that bioethics may be affected by institutional racism, raising significant questions about the ethics of bioethics in a global context. (shrink)

The American Journal of Bioethics, Volume 12, Issue 5, Page 44-45, May 2012.

Although pragmatism and phenomenology have both contributed significantly to the genealogy of so-called “4E” – embodied, embedded, enactive and extended – cognition, there is benefit to be had from a systematic comparative study of these roots. As existing 4E cognition literature has tended to emphasise one or the other tradition, issues remain to be addressed concerning their commonalities – and possible incompatibilities. We begin by exploring pragmatism and phenomenology’s shared focus on contesting intellectualism, and its key assumption of mindedness as (...) representation. We then outline distinctive insights from both traditions regarding the nature and role of habits, in order to put forward a habit-based epistemology as an alternative to the Cartesian idea-based epistemology that has dominated modern philosophy. We pay particular attention to the work of classical pragmatist C.S. Peirce, arguing that his semiotics, which analyses sign-use as habit, shows how theorists of embodied cognition can break a certain false dichotomy between embodiment and logical or intellectual structure which has prevented them from fully theorising propositional knowledge. In this way, our work both augments and challenges the Dewey/Merleau-Ponty connection that has been much more extensively explored by the field. (shrink)

This paper argues that we can acknowledge the existence of moral truths and moral progress without being committed to moral realism. Rather than defending this claim through the more familiar route of the attempted analysis of the ontological commitments of moral claims, I show how moral belief change for the better shares certain features with theoretical progress in the natural sciences. Proponents of the better theory are able to convince their peers that it is formally and empirically superior to its (...) rivals, and the better theory may be promoted to the status of the truth. Yet there is no 'decision-procedure' for ethics any more than there is for molecular biology. The betterness of true theories can be grasped through what I term 'undirectional narratives' of progress. And while there are true moral claims and perhaps numerous moral truths yet to be discovered, we should reject currently popular forms of moral realism with bivalence. Some moral claims lend themselves to the construction of fully reversible, bi-directional narratives and are likely neither true nor false. (shrink)

In this chapter, it is described and assessed how political scientists use rational choice theories to offer causal explanations. We observe that the ways in which rational choice theories are considered to be successful in political science differs, depending on the explanandum in question. Political scientists use empirical variants of rational choice theories to explain the political behavior of individual agents and analytical variants to explain the behavior of collective actors. Both variants are used for distinct explananda, which ask for (...) different modes of explanation that raise in turn different explanatory demands toward rational choice theories. We argue that when political scientists discuss the explanatory usefulness of rational choice theories, they should assess them in light of the demands they are supposed to meet. This would enable a more nuanced and problem-oriented appraisal of rational choice theories in political science. (shrink)

I argue that trustworthiness is an epistemic desideratum. It does not reduce to justified or reliable true belief, but figures in the reason why justified or reliable true beliefs are often valuable. Such beliefs can be precarious. If a belief's being justified requires that the evidence be just as we take it to be, then if we are off even by a little, the belief is unwarranted. Similarly for reliability. Although it satisfies the definition of knowledge, such a belief is (...) not trustworthy. We ought not use it as a basis for inference or action and ought not give others to believe it. The trustworthiness of a belief, I urge, depends on its being backed by reasons—considerations that other members of the appropriate epistemic community cannot reasonably reject. Trustworthiness is intersubjective. It both depends on and contributes to the evolving cognitive values of an epistemic community. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Catherine Malabou : “Unbind Me” Judith Butler : What Kind of Shape Is Hegel's Body in? Catherine Malabou : What Is Shaping the Body? Judith Butler : A Chiasm between Us, but No Chasm.

This paper contrasts the scholastic realisms of David Armstrong and Charles Peirce. It is argued that the so-called 'problem of universals' is not a problem in pure ontology (concerning whether universals exist) as Armstrong construes it. Rather, it pertains to which predicates should be applied where, issues which Armstrong sets aside under the label of 'semantics', and which from a Peircean perspective encompass even fundamentals of scientific methodology. It is argued that Peirce's scholastic realism not only presents a more nuanced (...) ontology (distinguishing existence and reality) but also illuminates why scholastic realism is a position worth fighting for. (shrink)

At the University of Newcastle, health law and ethics is taught and assessed in each year of the five-year curriculum. However, the critical question for assessment remains: 'Does teaching ethics have a measurable effect on the clinical activity of medical students who have had such courses?' Those responsible for teaching confront this question each year they sit down to construct their assessment tools. Should they assess what the student knows? Should they assess the student's moral reasoning, that is, what decisions (...) the student makes, and, how these decisions are justified, or should they assess what the student actually does when dealing with patients in the clinical setting, and how he or she does it? From 1982 to 1991, assessment at Newcastle was primarily aimed at determining the quality of the students' ethics knowledge base. This paper describes the strengths and limitations of a purely knowledge-based method of evaluation and why in 1992, we are now attempting to redefine and assess, what we call 'clinical ethical competence' in terms of how students actually apply this knowledge base in a controlled clinical context. (shrink)

Ethical reasoning and decision-making may be thought of as 'professional skills', and in this sense are as relevant to efficient clinical practice as the biomedical and clinical sciences are to the diagnosis of a patient's problem. Despite this, however, undergraduate medical programmes in ethics tend to focus on the teaching of bioethical theories, concepts and/or prominent ethical issues such as IVF and euthanasia, rather than the use of such ethics knowledge (theories, principles, concepts, rules) to clinical practice. Not surprisingly, many (...) students and clinicians experience considerable difficulty in using what they know about ethics to help them make competent ethical decisions in their day-to-day clinical practice. This paper describes the development of a seminar programme for teaching senior medical students a more systematic approach to ethical reasoning and analysis and clinical decision-making. (shrink)

Metaethics from a First Person Standpoint addresses in a novel format the major topics and themes of contemporary metaethics, the study of the analysis of moral thought and judgement. Metathetics is less concerned with what practices are right or wrong than with what we mean by 'right' and 'wrong.' Looking at a wide spectrum of topics including moral language, realism and anti-realism, reasons and motives, relativism, and moral progress, this book engages students and general readers in order to enhance their (...) understanding of morality and moral discourse as cultural practices. Catherine Wilson innovatively employs a first-person narrator to report step-by-step an individual's reflections, beginning from a position of radical scepticism, on the possibility of objective moral knowledge. The reader is invited to follow along with this reasoning, and to challenge or agree with each major point. Incrementally, the narrator is led to certain definite conclusions about 'oughts' and norms in connection with self-interest, prudence, social norms, and finally morality. Scepticism is overcome, and the narrator arrives at a good understanding of how moral knowledge and moral progress are possible, though frequently long in coming. Accessibly written, Metaethics from a First Person Standpoint presupposes no prior training in philosophy and is a must-read for philosophers, students and general readers interested in gaining a better understanding of morality as a personal philosophical quest."--Publisher's website. (shrink)

This paper addresses some apparent philosophical tensions between realism and enactivism by means of Charles Peirce’s pragmatism. Enactivism’s Mind-Life Continuity thesis has been taken to commit it to some form of anti-realist ‘world-construction’ which has been considered controversial. Accordingly, a new realist enactivism is proposed by Zahidi (_Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences,_ _13_(3), 461–475, 2014 ), drawing on Ian Hacking’s ‘entity realism’, which places subjects in worlds comprised of the things that they can successfully manipulate. We review this attempt, and (...) argue that whilst Zahidi rightly urges enactivists towards ‘internal realism’, he cannot sustain a non-negotiable aspect of realism that is crucial for scientific progress – the claim that multiple subjects inhabit _the same world_. We explore Peirce’s pragmatism as an alternative solution, foregrounding his distinction between existence and reality, and his inquiry-based account of cognition. These theoretical innovations, we argue, fruitfully generalize Zahidi’s _manipulation-based_ enactivist realism to a richer, _inquiry-based_ enactivist realism. We explore how this realism’s pan-species monism about truth encourages and supports the investigation of non-human animal cognition, and conclude by considering some implications of our discussion for long-standing realism debates within pragmatism. (shrink)

Virtues and Virtue Education in Theory and Practice explores questions about the locality versus the universality of virtues from a number of theoretical and practical perspectives. Written by leading international scholars in the field, it considers the relevance of these debates for the practice of virtue and character education. This volume brings together experts from education, philosophy, and psychology to consider how different disciplines might learn from each other and how insights from theory and practice can be integrated. It shows (...) that questions about virtue relativity or universality have not only theoretical significance but also important practical ramifications. The chapters explore different complexities of virtue ethics and different approaches to nurturing virtue and beyond, questioning how well virtues travel across geographical and cultural borders. By examining the philosophical literature and making links between theory and practice in an original way, the book offers scholarly research-informed suggestions for practice. It will be of great interest to researchers and academics and students in educational philosophy, character education, ethics, and psychology. (shrink)

Théologiens et philosophes chrétiens ont souvent minimisé, voire occulté, la dimension d'amour du judaïsme en l'assimilant à un pur légalisme. Cette thèse imprègne encore les mentalités modernes, fussent-elles déchristianisées. Ce livre n'est toutefois pas apologétique ; il se propose d'aborder la gravité de l'amour dans la philosophie et la spiritualité juives sans s'adapter au cadre théorique chrétien. Les penseurs juifs ont en effet profondément médité eux-mêmes la complexité théologique, spirituelle, morale et émotionnelle de l'amour. Le choix des questions abordées relève (...) de leur caractère impérieux face aux simplifications outrancières qui s'imposent de nos jours en matière de religion. La référence à des philosophes de périodes historiques différentes et à de grands commentateurs spirituels permet de poursuivre le dialogue avec eux et non de le clore. Il ne s'agit pas d'élaborer une thèse définitive sur l'amour de Dieu et du prochain dans le judaïsme, mais de se demander ce que sa gravité – son poids, son centre – signifie pour ceux qui désirent en témoigner. (shrink)

"Articulating a fresh vision for teaching, one that focuses on ensuring justice, believing people, and believing in people, this how-to offers evidence-based insights and draws from the author's own rich experiences as a professor to provide practical tips for reshaping syllabi, assessing student performance, and creating trust and belonging in the classroom"-Provided by publisher.

Modern scholars hold Bacon's philosophical works, Novum Organum, Advancement of Learning, and The New Atlantis, as his greatest achievements. Bowen's story reveals a man whose genius it was not to immerse himself in the rigor of scientific experimentation, but to realize what questions science should ask, and thereby reach beyond the status quo and appeal to the wider imagination of his generation. In his writings, Bacon challenged established social and religious orders, raised questions about the mind/body relation and the role (...) of dreams, and foresaw the development of the modern research university. It is Bacon's legacy to have gone beyond his age and, out of pure intuition, anticipate the concerns of future generations. (shrink)

Comment parler des deux bords d'une vie humaine, d'une vie unique par sa naissance et par sa mort? La clarté fragile de cette vie provient-elle du néant avant d'y retourner? Ou bien, pour ceux qui lui prêtent attention, se laisse-t-elle percevoir et penser comme la trace furtive d'une autre lumière? Les sociétés modernes éludent ces questions, voire les caricaturent, alors même que la mort violente, donnée en spectacle intrusif et quotidien, sidère la pensée à leur propos. Réfléchir à la naissance (...) et à la mort, en suivant divers fils - surtout ceux tissés par la tradition hébraïque - fait pourtant découvrir une nouvelle urgence dans l'amour de la vie. Certains y pressentent leur vérité intime et ultime. (shrink)

Quelle est l'intention de Platon lorsqu'il fait de Socrate un virtuose de l'étymologie dans le Cratyle? Préciser les rapports entre la " science des lettres " qui se constitue en son siècle et la nouvelle théorie des Idées qu'il élabore. Socrate s'entretient avec le jeune Hermogène puis avec l'énigmatique Cratyle des rapports entre les mots et les choses. La rectitude des noms est-elle affaire de convention, ainsi que le soutient Hermogène? Ou s'agit-il d'un accord " naturel ", comme le prétend (...) Cratyle? Découvre-t-on cet accord par science ou par inspiration? Au terme du débat, après avoir mis à l'épreuve toutes les ressources de la " science des lettres ", Socrate propose une nouvelle théorie du nom, instrument faillible construit pour faire voir la réalité en la minant. Il dessine aussi un ordre des priorités : il faut d'abord connaître les êtres, puis les noms. " Savoir comment il faut apprendre ou découvrir les êtres, peut-être est-ce là trop lourde tâche pour toi et moi! C'est déjà beau de reconnaître qu'il ne faut pas partir des noms. ". (shrink)