John Rawls's form of constructivism can easily be ramped up into a fullblown metaethics. In this chapter, the author explores an alternative interpretive framework, which basically inverts the roles that the construction of the original position and the reliance on reflective equilibrium play in Rawls's argument. The author sketches out the basic contours of Rawls's thinking if we treat constructivism as his method for theory construction and reflective equilibrium as his metaethics. Metaethics is clearly a part of moral philosophy outside (...) of moral theory. At every major turn in the articulation of Rawls's theory there is a new or more developed account of reflective equilibrium and in particular its justificatory role in the theory. Giving one's argument a form that allows it to more easily appeal to a particular audience, is the job of rhetoric. So it turns out that constructivism is not a metaethical position, but a rhetorical strategy. (shrink)

Anthony Simon Laden explores the kind of reasoning we engage in when we live together: when we are responsive to others and neither commanding nor deferring to them. He argues for a new, social picture of the activity of reasoning, in which reasoning is a species of conversation--social, ongoing, and governed by a set of characteristic norms.

Over the past twenty-five years debate surrounding cultural diversity has become one of the most active areas of contemporary political theory and philosophy. The impact of taking cultural diversity seriously in modern political societies has led to challenges to the dominance of liberal theory and to a more serious engagement of political theory with actual political struggles. This 2007 volume of essays by leading political theorists reviews the development of multiculturalism, surveys the major approaches, addresses the critical questions posed and (...) highlights directions in research. Multiculturalism and Political Theory provides an overview for both students and researchers. (shrink)

In Legitimate Differences, Georgia Warnke argues that we can make important progress in resolving a number of seemingly intractable political debates about various contested social issues if we stop viewing them as debates between defenders of different moral principles, and start seeing them as debates among defenders of different interpretations of the same set of moral principles. Competing interpretations of literary texts can differ and disagree and yet all be legitimate. Thus, if debates about social policy questions turn out to (...) be merely debates about how to interpret moral principles, Warnke claims, then it will be possible for citizens on different sides of these issues to recognize the legitimacy of the positions of their opponents. Through extensive discussions of the public debates in the U.S. about abortion, surrogacy, affirmative action, and pornography, she argues that taking such an interpretive turn will allow us to appreciate that it is possible for many sides in such debates to be defending legitimate positions. (shrink)

The book’s argument divides into three parts. In the first, Wellman sets out an account of legal rights, and then uses it to work out an account of nonlegal institutional rights and noninstitutional moral rights. The second focuses on the question of whether various alleged right-holders are possible right-holders. The third then turns to conflicts of both rights and duties, and argues, on the basis of the conclusions of the first two parts, that although some conflicts between rights are real, (...) many supposed conflicts can be dissolved once we recognize that one of the rights is unreal or is limited in some way. Because most of the controversial argumentative work is done in the first two sections, I will focus on them. (shrink)

Theories of rational choice focus on the question of how to choose what to do. They are, that is, concerned with the selection of one among a set of possible actions. Furthermore, they tell us how to make such a choice rationally. They accomplish this aspect of their task by telling us how to choose ‘in order to achieve our aims as well as possible.’Theories of reasonable deliberation, as I describe them in this paper, analyze a different domain of reasoning (...) in the service of action. First, their subject matter is the deliberation that leads to action, rather than the final selection of the action itself. Second, they ask about the intrinsic character of a deliberative path, rather than its likely outcome. That is, they are theories of the reasonableness of deliberation, rather than its rationality. To see the distinctiveness of this theoretical domain, it helps to approach it by backing away from the domain of rational choice theories one step at a time. (shrink)

Theories of rational choice focus on the question of how to choose what to do. They are, that is, concerned with the selection of one among a set of possible actions. Furthermore, they tell us how to make such a choice rationally. They accomplish this aspect of their task by telling us how to choose ‘in order to achieve our aims as well as possible.’Theories of reasonable deliberation, as I describe them in this paper, analyze a different domain of reasoning (...) in the service of action. First, their subject matter is the deliberation that leads to action, rather than the final selection of the action itself. Second, they ask about the intrinsic character of a deliberative path, rather than its likely outcome. That is, they are theories of the reasonableness of deliberation, rather than its rationality. To see the distinctiveness of this theoretical domain, it helps to approach it by backing away from the domain of rational choice theories one step at a time. (shrink)

The author argues that the distinctive aspects of political liberalism have historical roots in the republican tradition that is often described as “neo-roman,” and recently given articulation in the work of Q. Skinner and P. Pettit. The primary task of this paper will be to layout these correlations, to provide, as it were, a mapping between the vocabulary of the neo-roman theory and that of political liberalism. By tracing the genealogy of political liberalism, the author argues that we ought to (...) rethink the history, the vocabulary, and conceptual framework of contemporary political philosophy. In particular, seeing political liberalism as a form of republican theory as well as a form of liberal theory changes how we understand it: it brings out certain distinctive features of the structure of the view that are often overlooked, such as its stress on certain civic duties and its conception of freedom as a freedom of the city. If leading republican and liberal thinkers turn out to have much in common, then we will have to rethink also our intellectual geography: we will have to sketch in some land-bridges between the continents. (shrink)

Amartya Sen describes John Rawls?s ?justice as fairness? as ?transcendental institutionalism? and develops his realization-focused approach in contrast. But Rawls is no transcendental institutionalist, and Sen?s construal of their opposition occludes a third, relation-based position and a valuable and practical form of ideal theory. What Sen calls transcendental institutionalism and realization-focused comparative theory each treat justice as something to bring about, a problem for experts. A third position treats justice in terms of how we relate to one another rather than (...) of achievement. This position, called ?justice as reciprocity,? is consistent with Rawls?s ?justice as fairness? and Sen?s normative aspirations, and might form the basis of new and fruitful dialogue between them. By treating justice as a question of how we relate to one another, and treating relation-based ideals as the basis of respectful behavioral constraints (rather than of ends to pursue), ?justice as reciprocity? grounds an everyday form of just democratic citizenship. (shrink)

The dissertation develops and defends a form of liberalism it calls "deliberative liberalism." The aim of developing this form of liberalism is to show how liberal theory can be sensitive to the importance people place on particular aspects of their practical identities. In particular, the dissertation answers four criticisms of liberalism. Catharine MacKinnon and Michel Foucault claim that liberalism is incapable of attending to the role power plays in constructing our identities, and is thus insensitive to forms of opression tied (...) to those identities. Charles Taylor and James Tully claim that liberalism fails to recognize adequately the depth and breadth of human diversity, and thus winds up exerting normative pressures on liberal citizens. ;Deliberative liberalism revolves around a conception of political philosophy which it takes from the work of Rousseau, Hegel, and John Rawls: that political philosophy should determine the conditions under which otherwise diverse people can come to form a shared will about essential political matters. Deliberative liberalism does this through the articulation of an ideal of reasonable political deliberation conceived as the exchange of public reasons among citizens. This ideal rests on an intersubjective account of reasons, in which the authority of reasons derives from aspects of the practical identities of the reasoners. This central ideal is then supplemented by two principles which prevent the ideal from misfiring. The reciprocity of constructive power principle works to prevent people from imposing particular identities on others. The non-burdensomeness of citizenship principle ensures that the exchange of public reasons serves as a means of recognizing citizens' diverse non-political identities and not effacing them. In the conclusion, connections are drawn between deliberative liberalism and Rawls's "political liberalism.". (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Demands for Equality Demands for Recognition Demands for Self‐Determination Shifting the Grounds of Liberalism Notes.

Standard discussions of prudence treat it as requiring time-slice management. That this is the standard view of prudence can be seen by its presence in two seemingly opposed positions on prudence, those of Thomas Nagel and Derek Parfit. I argue that this kind of view fails to properly appreciate the difficulty with being prudent, treating imprudence as a kind of theoretical mistake. I then offer a characterization of prudence as integrity, the holding together of disparate but temporally extended parts of (...) the self in a manner that makes the act of reasoning possible. (shrink)

review of Laden's *Reasoning: a social picture* praising the aim and expressing puzzlement at the details,.

Rawls criticizes utilitarianism for not taking the distinction between persons seriously, and suggests that his own theory: justice as fairness, does. I argue that justice as fairness aims to take the distinction seriously at four levels, ranging from the content of its principles to its conception of political philosophy, and that doing so at each stage is of fundamental importance in working out the basis of a conception of justice for a democratic society. Understanding Rawls’s theory in this way points (...) to a clearer understanding of how to go on doing political philosophy after Rawls. (shrink)

The practice of Ontography deployed by OOO, clarified and expanded in this essay, produces a highly productive framework for analyzing Salvador Dalí’s ontological project between 1928 and 1935. Through the careful analysis of paintings and original texts from this period, we establish the antecedents for Dalí’s theorization of Surrealist objects in Cubism and Italian Metaphysical art, which we collectively refer to as ‘Ontographic art,’ drawing parallels with the tenets of Graham Harman’s and Ian Bogost’s object-oriented philosophical programmes. We respond to (...) the question raised by Roger Rothman concerning Object-Oriented Idealism in Dalí’s work by showing pivotal changes to Dalí’s ontological outlook, from Idealism to Realism, across the aforementioned period, positing the Ontographic intentionality of Dalí’s ontological project in Surrealist art. (shrink)

This comment on Alessandro Ferrara’s Democratic Horizon raises questions about his development of ‘conjectural reasoning’ and the democratic virtue of openness as responses to what he calls ‘hyperpluralism’. In order to probe these questions, the article offers an alternative reading of these ideas.

This study was designed to test three competing hypotheses (impaired configural processing; impaired Theory of Mind; atypical amygdala functioning) to explain the basic facial expression recognition profile of adults with autism spectrum disorders (ASD). In Experiment 1 the Ekman and Friesen (1976) series were presented upright and inverted. Individuals with ASD were significantly less accurate than controls at recognising upright facial expressions of fear, sadness and disgust and their pattern of errors suggested some configural processing difficulties. Impaired recognition of inverted (...) facial expressions suggested some additional difficulties processing the facial features. Unexpectedly, the clinical group misidentified fear as anger. In Experiment 2 feature processing of facial expressions was investigated by presenting stimuli in a piecemeal fashion, starting with either just the eyes or the mouth. Individuals with ASD were impaired at recognising fear from the eyes and disgust from the mouth; they also confused fearful eyes as being angry. The findings are discussed in terms of the three competing hypotheses tested. (shrink)