Three points that are implicit in Dixon et al.'s paradigm-challenging paper serve to make prejudice potent. First, prejudice reflects understandings of social identity usthem that are shared within particular groups. Second, these understandings are actively promoted by leaders who represent and advance in-group identity. Third, prejudice is identified in out-groups, not in-groups.

BackgroundAustralian health and medical research funders support substantial research efforts, and incentives within grant funding schemes influence researcher behaviour. We aimed to determine to what extent Australian health and medical funders incentivise responsible research practices.MethodsWe conducted an audit of instructions from research grant and fellowship schemes. Eight national research grants and fellowships were purposively sampled to select schemes that awarded the largest amount of funds. The funding scheme instructions were assessed against 9 criteria to determine to what extent they incentivised (...) these responsible research and reporting practices: publicly register study protocols before starting data collection, register analysis protocols before starting data analysis, make study data openly available, make analysis code openly available, make research materials openly available, discourage use of publication metrics, conduct quality research, collaborate with a statistician, and adhere to other responsible research practices. Each criterion was answered using one of the following responses: “Instructed”, “Encouraged”, or “No mention”.ResultsAcross the 8 schemes from 5 funders, applicants were instructed or encouraged to address a median of 4 of the 9 criteria. Three criteria received no mention in any scheme. Importantly, most incentives did not seem strong as applicants were only instructed to register study protocols, discourage use of publication metrics and conduct quality research. Other criteria were encouraged but were not required.ConclusionsFunders could strengthen the incentives for responsible research practices by requiring grant and fellowship applicants to implement these practices in their proposals. Administering institutions could be required to implement these practices to be eligible for funding. Strongly rewarding researchers for implementing robust research practices could lead to sustained improvements in the quality of health and medical research. (shrink)

A who's who of Sartre scholars contribute to a collection of multidisciplinary perspectives from sociology, religion, and bioethics, on a hitherto neglected area of Sartre's philosophy.

Introduction to Kristeva -- Horror/basic concepts: the abject and its varieties -- Horror/specifying the circumstances -- Strangers/basic concepts: strangers without and within -- Strangers/expansions: the stranger's story -- Love/basic concepts -- Love/basic concepts the text of society and history -- Love/ Expansions: Old and new discourses -- The text of society and history -- Women and social change.

The issue of genetic inheritance, and particularly the contradictory rights of donors, recipients and donor offspring as to the disclosure of donor identities, is ethically complicated. Donors, donor offspring and parents of donor offspring may appeal to individual rights for confidentiality or disclosure within legal systems based on liberal rights discourse. This paper explores the ethical issues of non-disclosure of genetic inheritance by contrasting two principle models used to articulate the problem—liberal and communitarian ethical models. It argues that whilst the (...) latter provides a more constructive avenue to providing an ethics for donation than the competing and contradictory positions represented in a liberal rights approach, it raises issues of ethical judgement and authority that remain problematic. This ethical discussion is supported by a field study, funded by the Wellcome Trust, exploring the perceptions and experiences of recipients of donor sperm and their partners towards donor anonymity. The field study provides the empirical basis of an argument for making ethical judgements on the grounds of the community good rather than individual rights, that nevertheless recognises that both are inherently problematic. (shrink)

A novel introduction to Jean-Paul Sartre’s existentialist phenomenology. Draws parallels between Sartre’s work and the work of Wittgenstein Stresses continuities rather than conflict between Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, and between Sartre and post-structuralist/post-modernist thinkers, thus corroborating ‘new Sartre’ readings Exhibits the influence of Gestalt psychology in Sartre’s descriptions of the life-world Forms part of the _Blackwell Great Minds_ series, which outlines the views of the great western thinkers and captures the relevance of these figures to the way we think and live (...) today. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: Reading Wittgenstein Wittgenstein and Waismann Further Directions: History of Philosophy Envoi: AWittgensteinian Reading of Wittgenstein?

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Background: Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy Sartre's Account of Action Some Wider Background Assessment: Internal Relations Assessment: Human Beings and the Human World References.

Abstract An understanding of Descartes? concept of ?confusion? is important both for making sense of his epistemological enterprise and for grasping his doctrine of the union of mind and body. An analysis of Descartes? notion of confusion is offered which is grounded in the (more or less controversial) theses that confused thoughts are thoughts, that confusion is confusion by a thinker of one thought with another, and that confusion both can and should be avoided or ?undone?. This analysis takes its (...) rise from his contrast between ?confused? and ?distinct? : it exhibits confusion as a failure to distinguish between meanings of systematically ambiguous expressions. This failure is sometimes due to ?bad intellectual habits? which in his view ought to be broken, sometimes to ?nature? (where the confusion is in general beneficial to our welfare). Paradigmatically these are expressions which refer ambiguously to substances (i.e. mind and body) which are ?really distinct?. Moreover, his ?disambiguations? indicate a central but neglected aspect of his aim in philosophizing: he can be seen as engaged in a moral project of ?philosophical therapy? (shrink)

Noonan's arguments against methodological solipsism ("methodological solipsism," "philosophical studies" 4, 1981) assumes that mental states are individuated by (russellian) content; this assumption entails that narrowness and wideness are intrinsic to mental states. I propose an alternative "extrinsic" reading of methodological solipsism, According to which narrowness and wideness are modes of attribution of mental states, And thus reject the doctrine of individuation by russellian content. Noonan's arguments fail against this version of methodological solipsism.

Consistent with the complexity of the temporally regulated processes that must occur for growth and development of higher eukaryotes, it is now apparent that transcription is regulated by the formation of multi‐component complexes that assemble on the promoters of genes. These complexes can include (in addition to the five or more general transcription factors and RNA polymerase II) DNA‐binding proteins, transcriptional activators, coactivators, adaptors and various accessory proteins. The best studied example of a complex that includes a transcriptional adaptor, accessory (...) proteins and a DNA‐binding protein is that involving the herpes simplex virus VP16 protein. Evidence suggests that the adenovirus E1a protein and the cellular Sp1 and CTF/NF1 transcription factors also function through adaptors or coactivators. Each additional component of the transcription complex provides the cell with another point at which to exert control of gene expression. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A Prayer for the BabyKatherine J. GoldWe didn’t talk much about religion in medical school. Rightly so, it seemed to me at the time. I didn’t know how or why it would fit in to my patient care other than respecting patients who used their faith as a coping strategy. I was not at all religious and didn’t like the thought of talking about such things with patients. And (...) in my clinical experiences, it rarely came up.When I got to my last year of school, I signed up to work for a month with an obstetrician–gynecologist in her outpatient clinic. I don’t recall how I met her but remember she was respected for her outpatient teaching so it seemed like it would be a good experience to work with her. (I’ll refer to her by a fictional name here.)“Call me Maria,” she told new patients, enveloping them in a warm, supportive style. They did, and I adjusted to her caring approach, shadowing her as we saw patients during pregnancy, those with abnormal uterine bleeding, patients with pelvic pain, others needing pelvic surgeries. It was an odd experience for me, six months pregnant myself, to be seeing other patients during their own pregnancies.One day, about a week in to my rotation, a couple came in together for an appointment two weeks after an early miscarriage. I watched Dr. Copeland (as a student I just couldn’t call my attending by her first name) give them a hug and we sat down. She asked how they were doing and they shared their story, tears flowing as the mother recounted her emotions over the last week and support from their friends. I had the impression that they attended the same church as Dr. Copeland from their conversation. At the end of the visit everyone stood up.“Shall we pray?” Dr. Copeland asked, and they all took hands. I edged back, away from their small circle, uncertain what to do. I had never seen prayer in medical practice and certainly not initiated by the doctor. Not being religious myself, I felt uncomfortable. I didn’t know the protocol. This was not a setting where I knew what to do. So I leaned [End Page 200] quietly against the wall, trying to be unobtrusive, feeling my baby kicking while I watched. All of them bowed their heads and Dr. Copeland said a brief prayer. I watched the mother as her shoulders relaxed. They said “amen” and squeezed hands and hugged one last time. I thought about that interaction for weeks afterwards. I was uncomfortable, but clearly the patients were not. If there were a role for religion in medicine, I reflected, this might be a place for it. It had been accepted by the family without hesitation, so somehow Dr. Copeland knew it would be alright. It had been used in a healing way.There were several other visits where Dr. Copeland prayed with patients. Sometimes she seemed to know them from her church; at other times, I wasn’t sure. But there never seemed to be a misstep—patients never seemed surprised or awkward with her approach. Did they choose her because of shared beliefs? Did she have a reputation of using faith in her practice and patients selected her for this reason? I wasn’t sure. But it was always the same. They would bow their heads and pray. I would stand back a little uncertainly, but the patients were always grateful and appreciative, thanking Maria by her first name as they left.As I spent more time with her, I looked for other ways that faith might impact Dr. Copeland’s practice and asked questions when I thought there might be relevance. I knew from others that she was opposed to abortion, though I never heard her talk about it openly and I was unsure how this might be manifest in her practice. I watched her prescribe birth control (I knew some religious physicians who did not). I watched her send a patient with a second trimester fetal death to the hospital to be induced for delivery. I wondered if someone... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 10.1 (2003) 23-24 [Access article in PDF] Did You Hurt Yourself? Katherine Morris PEOPLE WITH BORDERLINE PERSONALITY DISORDER (BPD) frequently deliberately injure themselves, to the extent that "the diagnosis [BPD] rightly comes to mind whenever recurrent self-destructive behaviors are encountered" (Gunderson, 2001, 54) quoted by (Potter, 2003, 1). How are we to understand this puzzling and disturbing behavior?Situating her approach to this question within (...) a general framework that sees the body as a "text" that requires "interpretation," Potter deliberately avoids answering this question in the way we might expect. It is doubtful, she argues, that every act of self-injury has a meaning, and a fortiori doubtful that every such act has the same meaning. Her discussion includes a section, informed by medical anthropology, in which she attempts to distinguish pathological self-injury of the sort that occurs with BPD from such culturally acceptable (or at least culturally understood or tolerated) body modifications, such as tattooing, scarification, and body piercing. It also includes a section in which it is suggested that the meaning of some self-injurious behavior may indicate cultural rather than individual pathologies (e.g., the "commodification" and "objectification" of women's bodies in Western culture). The principal issue for her, however, is how a clinician is to work out the meaning of a particular individual's self-injuring behavior when it does indeed have an individual meaning, and the prerequisite for doing so, she argues, is the cultivation of a virtue she terms giving uptake.The general tenor of her argument seems to me to be admirable: the issues are dealt with subtly and with ethical, anthropological, and philosophical sensitivity. There are nonetheless a number of questions I want to raise. The Framework It is of course fashionable in certain quarters these days to speak of the body as a text. One might, however, wonder to what extent this metaphor is illuminating. After all, texts, one might think, are by definition linguistic; yet part of the point here is precisely to move away from the narrow "speech-act" focus of "traditional philosophical analyses of communication" (Potter 2003, 1-16).The point of the metaphor according to Potter is to "suggest that the body, like other mediums of communication, must be interpreted and that its meanings are not given or inevitable" (Potter 2003, 2). Again, however, this invokes a number of fashionable but questionable ideas: an easy reliance on the difficult idea that "how we experience the world is shaped by our conceptual scheme" (Potter 2003, 3), a structuralist account of signification (Potter 2003, 3), and the concomitant notion that all communication involves interpretation, indeed that the listener (or observer) "relies on linguistic and other conventions [End Page 23] to infer meaning" (Potter 2003, 4). As a general account of communication this seems to me to be wildly off the mark: we very seldom interpret others' words, we very seldom "infer their meaning." The supposition that we always do is the direct consequence of the externalizing of the relation between "signifier" and "signified" that constitutes the heart of structuralist linguistics. 1Now, it may well be that the sort of self-injuring behavior that is the focus of Potter's essay precisely does require interpretation. Insofar as it is expressive behavior (and again Potter is right to question whether it is necessarily always such), it seems to be importantly different, in just these respects, from many other forms of expressive behavior. In the first place, it is different (in just these respects) from the culturally tolerated forms of body modifications discussed in section 2; for members of the culture in which body piercing or tattooing is acceptable or tolerated, such behavior is understood without the need for interpretation. In the second place, it is different in just these respects from natural expressions (e.g., moaning as an expression of pain). And in the third, it is different in just these respects from the expression of thoughts in (at least nonmetaphorical) language (which, one might add, is all the more reason not to think of the body as a... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 9.3 (2002) 281-283 [Access article in PDF] This Is Not Here Katherine Morris How, if at all, are we to characterize psychiatric patients' (and others') descriptions of so-called depersonalization experiences? What exactly are they saying when they say, for example, "I have no self" or "I feel as if I don't belong to my own body" or "Nothing seems real"? Filip and Susanna Radovic (...) attempt to use a combination of conceptual and phenomenological analysis to answer this question. The importance of this, they suggest, is to enable a better definition of the depersonalization syndrome, better classification of symptoms as belonging or not belonging to this syndrome, and better theories of the relevant psychopathological processes.Their conceptual analysis focuses on ambiguities in the words unreal and feel, because "It feels unreal" is a characteristic expression of a depersonalization experience, and on the "as-if" element of these descriptions, because patients will often say "It feels as if everything is unreal." The phenomenological analysis consists in fleshing out some of these senses. These analyses are supplemented with a helpful table and a discussion section distinguishing expressions of depersonalization experiences from similar-sounding expressions from everyday life; for example, "existential reflections" on the one hand, and exclamations like "Did I win? I cannot believe it, it feels so unreal!" on the other. But I focus here on the analyses. Unreal and Feels So, first, they claim that the word unreal has at least three different uses: (1) "nonexistent", (2) "artificial, fake, or made up," and (3) "failing to satisfy some important criterion of the kind in question," which they also express as "not normal" or "unusual," and even "unfamiliar."Already this analysis seems to me to go importantly awry. As Austin famously argued, the word real has multiple senses, including the ones picked out here. 1 But, as he also argued, real, precisely, does not always contrast with unreal; hence an ambiguity in the word real does not imply an ambiguity in the word unreal. An artificial diamond is, indeed, not a real diamond (sense [2])—but it is not an unreal diamond! 2 Again, a friend who does not help you in your hour of need is a "false friend," that is, "not a real friend" (sense [3])—but he is not an unreal friend. Finally, they are surely wrong to equate the false friend's "failure to satisfy some important criterion of friendship" with his being "abnormal" or "unusual" (a fortiori "unfamiliar"). Someone who is "not a real friend" or "not a true friend" is not an unusual or an unfamiliar (sort of) friend!What of their analysis of the ambiguity in feels? (a) Sometimes, they imply, feels means roughly "is believed to be."" (b) At other times, it refers to a specific type of quasi-sensory experience. 3 Thus, I suppose, if I say "I feel ill," I may either mean that I believe myself to be ill or that I am experiencing some characteristic feeling like nausea or dizziness. Hence, feels unreal may either mean "is believed to be unreal" or characterize a specific type of experience.But, as they note, the (alleged) treble ambiguity in unreal means that feels unreal in sense (a) is itself trebly ambiguous, and they suggest that all [End Page 281] three senses may be relevant to characterizing depersonalization experiences. They primarily focus on sense (a3). The thought, as far as I understand it, is that just as a "real friend" is one who helps you in your hour of need, so a "real self" is (inter alia) one that experiences itself as an agent or author of its actions, and a "real world" one full of life and engaging. Thus to say that your self "feels unreal" in sense (a3) is to say that in not experiencing your self as agent or author you recognize that "real selves" do so, and to say that the world "feels unreal" is to say that in experiencing it as lifeless and unengaging you recognize that "real worlds" are not so experienced.So far, so good. But they... (shrink)

This is a collection of the key articles written by renowned Wittgenstein scholar, G.P. Baker, on Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, published posthumously. Following Baker’s death in 2002, the volume has been edited by collaborator and partner, Katherine Morris. Contains articles previously only available in other languages, and one previously unpublished paper. Completely distinct from the widely-known work Baker did with P.M.S. Hacker in the Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations.

This is a collection of the key articles written by renowned Wittgenstein scholar, G.P. Baker, on Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, published posthumously. Following Baker’s death in 2002, the volume has been edited by collaborator and partner, Katherine Morris. Contains articles previously only available in other languages, and one previously unpublished paper. Completely distinct from the widely-known work Baker did with P.M.S. Hacker in the Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations.

Philosophers are wont to say that certain concepts, e.g., the concept of pain, exhibit ‘first/third-person asymmetry’, whereas others, e.g., the concept of injury, do not. The question I wish to address here concerns the status of such claims. They are commonly seen as nothing more than summary reports of how the relevant words are ordinarily used: as statements of ‘grammatical fact’. I want to argue against this view of their status.

Philosophers are wont to say that certain concepts, e.g., the concept of pain, exhibit ‘first/third-person asymmetry’, whereas others, e.g., the concept of injury, do not. The question I wish to address here concerns the status of such claims. They are commonly seen as nothing more than summary reports of how the relevant words are ordinarily used: as statements of ‘grammatical fact’. I want to argue against this view of their status.

Volume 27, Issue 1, February 2019, Page 115-119.

Rethinking Existentialism, by WebberJonathan. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. Pp. 229.

Was Descartes a Cartesian Dualist? In this controversial study, Gordon Baker and Katherine J. Morris argue that, despite the general consensus within philosophy, Descartes was neither a proponent of dualism nor guilty of the many crimes of which he has been accused by twentieth century philosophers. In lively and engaging prose, Baker and Morris present a radical revision of the ways in which Descartes' work has been interpreted. Descartes emerges with both his historical importance assured and his philosophical importance (...) redeemed. (shrink)

The approach to incidental research fndings in children emerges by considering the child-parent relationship and balancing divergent interests and preferences. Incidental fndings with clear and proximate clinical importance should be disclosed to both. We recommend that particularly sensitive or private information should be disclosed to the adolescent frst, while particularly serious information should frst be disclosed to the parent. These approaches allow the researcher to form an alliance with one party prior to engaging the other. However, unlike clinical settings, where (...) there may be presumptive expectations of confdentiality about sharing information within the family, in most research settings it is reasonable to plan to disclose such information to both parties. It is important to communicate this plan during the informed consent process separately to adolescents to avoid enrolling adolescents when sensitive incidental fndings such as pregnancy and drug use may be detected. The approach to incidental fndings without clear and proximate beneft is challenging. Researchers should plan more limited disclosure of such incidental fndings for pediatric participants than for adult participants. (shrink)

Incidental research findings, as defined in this symposium’s consensus paper, are unexpected findings discovered in the course of research but “beyond the aims of the study.” These include findings generated by research methodology, such as imaging or genetic analysis, findings related to clinical screening for inclusion or exclusion, or direct observations of physical abnormalities or behavior. Decisions about managing incidental research findings involve important ethical considerations regarding a researcher’s obligations to provide care, minimize harms, and respect research participants’ wishes. When (...) the research participant is a child, the triadic relationship between the researcher, child participant, and parent makes these considerations more complicated. (shrink)

Margery Kempe and her Book studied in both literary and historical context.