In this chapter probability and confirmation theory are used to investigate the problem of evil, concentrating on whether a theist should consider our ignorance of a good reason for God to permit evil to support a non-religious alternative over a typical theist's beliefs. It is argued that according to Likelihoodism, our ignorance of a good reason does not favor a competing hypothesis over the religious view that there is an incomprehensible good reason for God to permit evil. Bayesian accounts of (...) comparative confirmation, which are alternatives to Likelihoodism, have the same result. Furthermore, according to both Likelihoodism and Bayesian accounts of contrastive confirmation, our ignorance of a good reason for God to permit evil may actually support typical religious beliefs over the alternative hypotheses. (shrink)

No Abstract Alvin Plantinga's free will defense is based on the idea of transworld depravity. Plantinga claims that if an essence suffers from transworld depravity, then it is not possible for God to actualize a world in which the instantiation of that essence only does what is right. If every essence suffers from transworld depravity, then it is not possible for God to actualize a world in which there is moral good but no moral evil. I begin by describing possible (...) worlds that imply it is impossible for every essence to suffer from transworld depravity. I then show how to modify the concept of transworld depravity to avoid this problem, and to allow for the possibility that every essence suffers from transworld depravity. This new formulation of transworld depravity has an interesting consequence, and this leads to an alternative free will defense that is not based on the concept of transworld depravity. I introduce the concept of an unobtainable world, and use this to develop an alternative version of the free will defense that is preferable to one based on the concept of transworld depravity. (shrink)

This paper discusses Simpson's paradox and the problem of positive relevance in probabilistic causality. It is argued that Cartwright's solution to Simpson's paradox fails because it ignores one crucial form of the paradox. After clarifying different forms of the paradox, it is shown that any adequate solution to the paradox must allow a cause to be both a negative cause and a positive cause of..

Alvin Plantinga's free will defense is based on the idea of transworld depravity. Plantinga claims that if every essence suffers from transworld depravity, then it is not possible for God to actualize a world in which there is moral good but no moral evil. I describe possible worlds that imply it is impossible for every essence to suffer from transworld depravity. I then show how to modify the concept of transworld depravity to avoid this problem, and formulate an alternative free (...) will defense that is based on the concept of unobtainable worlds instead of transworld depravity. (shrink)

In a recent article Ian Hacking argues that there can be cases where no probabilities may correctly be ascribed to individual members of a population, while probabilities are correctly ascribable to the population as a whole. In this paper a simple artificial coin-flipping model for such probabilities, not 'grounded from below' is constructed. The inferences licensed by this model and a consequence of the model for the theory of statistical tests is explored.

tionals, which means that he knows what actions would be necessary for him to perform in order to bring about a certain outcome. Because he is omnipotent, he can do whatever action is necessary to bring about a certain outcome that he desires. His benevolence implies that he will want to actualize the best possible world, or at least a world containing no evil. Given this scenario it is argued..

In this chapter, I investigate two recent arguments by Michael Tooley that begin with some facts about evil and conclude that the probability of God existing is low or extremely low. Tooley's first argument fails because it relies on a very controversial assumption about unknown rightmaking and wrongmaking properties. Tooley's second argument makes use of some ideas about formal inductive logic and logical probability that Carnap developed, but this argument fails because it applies Carnap's ideas in ways that conflict with (...) our inductive intuitions. Thus, Tooley's arguments depend on very controversial assumptions that should be rejected. (shrink)

Recent discussion of the problem of evil has centered around what is known as the probabilistic or evidential argument from evil. According to this argument the evil in our world is evidence against the existence of God, even though evil is logically consistent with God’s existing. Based on this it is claimed it is irrational to believe one of the traditional theistic religions, unless there is overwhelming positive evidence to counter this negative evidence. One of the most important and widely (...) discussed versions of this argument is due to Paul Draper.1 In this paper I will look at Draper’s argument and argue that he has made a simple fundamental error; as a result his argument is irrelevant to most theists. After discussing this error in Draper’s argument, I will discuss probabilistic arguments from evil from the perspective of confirmation theory. The error in Draper’s argument is easily made and could occur in any probabilistic argument from evil; looking at confirmation theory and probabilistic arguments from evil will provide insight into reasoning about evil and belief in God. (shrink)

George Schlesinger has recently presented a reply to Hume’s argument concerning miracles. Schlesinger argues that probability theory and some simple assumptions about miracles show that testimony for a miracle increases the probability of God existing; furthermore this testimony can raise the probability of God existing enough that it is rational to believe that God exists. I argue that one of the assumptions that Schlesinger makes is false, and that the justification Schlesinger gives for it does not succeed. Thus I claim (...) Schlesinger’s reply to Hume fails. (shrink)

In this paper I wish to argue that counterfactual analyses of causation are inadequate. I believe the counterfactuals that are involved in counterfactual analyses of causation are often false, and thus the theories do not provide an adequate account of causation. This is demonstrated by the presentation of a counterexample to the counterfactual analyses of causation. I then present a unified theory of causation that is based upon probability and counterfactuals. This theory accounts for both deterministic and indeterministic causation, and (...) is not subject to many of the traditional problems facing theories of causation. (shrink)

A recent discussion of Hume’s argument concerning the rationality of accepting a belief that a miracle has occurred is given by J. L. Mackie in The Miracle of Theism. Mackie believes that Hume’s argument is essentially correct, although he attempts to clarify and strengthen it. Any version of Hume’s argument depends upon one’s conception of miracles and laws of nature; I will argue that Mackie commits a simple logical error and that given his conception of laws of nature and miracles (...) there is no reason to reject rational belief in miracles. (shrink)

This paper investigates the justification of certain beliefs central to scientific realism. Some have claimed that the underdetermination of a theory by empirical evidence implies that belief in the truth of the theory and in the existence of the corresponding unobservable entities is unjustified. It is argued that the justification of certain realist beliefs is similar to the justification of our perceptual beliefs. Neither are justified by argument from more basic beliefs, and their underdetermination by the evidence does not affect (...) their justification. (shrink)

If one compares various skeptical arguments about our perceptual beliefs with arguments against scientific realism one immediately notices important similarities. Skeptical arguments about perceptual beliefs are often based on the premise that all of our perceptual beliefs could be wrong. Our experience is consistent with many different states of affairs; some familiar examples are hallucination, an evil demon, and brains in a vat. Thus it is claimed we have no reason to believe that the perceptual beliefs we normally form are (...) true and alternative beliefs are false.One of the most powerful arguments against scientific realism is based on the claim that our data underdetermines our theory. There exist empirically equivalent theories, which means that there is no observation that could lead us to accept one and reject the other. Each member of a class of empirically equivalent theories will be equally supported by the evidence. (shrink)

Charles Chihara has presented a problem he claims Bayesian confirmation theory cannot handle. Chihara gives examples in which he claims the change in belief cannot be construced as conditionalizing on new evidence. These are situations in which the agent suddenly thinks of new possibilities. I propose a solution that incorporates the important ideas of Bayesian theory. In particular, I present a principle which shows that the change of belief in Chihara's example is due to simple conditionalization.

Although the doctrines of theism are rich enough to support a distinctively theistic conception of probability, historically there has been little discussion of probability from a theistic perspective. In this article I investigate how a theist might view epistemic probability. A unique conception of probability naturally follows from ideas central to theism, and it is argued that this conception of probability avoids many problems associated with other interpretations of probability.

Philosophers generally use the idea of necessity in two ways. One way of looking at necessity is to construe it as a sentential operator. Necessity would operate on sentences in much the same way that the sentential operator of..

It is reasonable to take Kierkegaard and Plantinga as presenting very different approaches to the rationality of adopting religious beliefs. Kierkegaard says Christian doctrines are absurd, and Plantinga argues that the existence of God is part of the deliverances of reason. I argue that in spite of these apparent differences, Kierkegaard and Plantinga agree on some foundational epistemological issues. I begin by exploring the topic of radical conversion, as discussed by van Fraassen. I use the notion of radical conversion as (...) a tool, to focus our investigation and illuminate the agreements between Kierkegaard and Plantinga. Because of the role of passions and affections in epistemology, we will see that Kierkegaard and Plantinga share a basic epistemological outlook. (shrink)

It is reasonable to take Kierkegaard and Plantinga as presenting very different approaches to the rationality of adopting religious beliefs. Kierkegaard says Christian doctrines are absurd, and Plantinga argues that the existence of God is part of the deliverances of reason. I argue that in spite of these apparent differences, Kierkegaard and Plantinga agree on some foundational epistemological issues. I begin by exploring the topic of radical conversion, as discussed by van Fraassen. I use the notion of radical conversion as (...) a tool, to focus our investigation and illuminate the agreements between Kierkegaard and Plantinga. Because of the role of passions and affections in epistemology, we will see that Kierkegaard and Plantinga share a basic epistemological outlook. (shrink)

This paper investigates the differences between two conceptions of causation which are claimed to amount for causation in indeterministic situations. Recent analyses of indeterministic causation have been based upon mark transmission, and upon probability relations. Both types of analyses were proposed by Reichenbach, who claimed that they were extensionally equivalent. I demonstrate that they are not equivalent, and discuss some implications of this for models of scientific explanation.

Theories of scientific explanation have taken different forms, but many philosophers are adopting models of explanation in which causation plays a central role. The intuition behind this idea is that we explain the occurrence of an event by displaying its causal history, or by listing its causes. As natural as this may seem, problems arise when we attempt to use this model of explanation with a system that is indeterministic. If we want to give a causal explanation of an event (...) that is not causally determined, then we need a theory of causation which allows for causation in indeterministic systems. (shrink)

In this article I investigate Rowe's recent probabilistic argument from evil. By using muddy Venn diagrams to present his argument, we see that although his argument is fallacious, it can be modified in a way that strengthens it considerably. I then discuss the recent exchange between Rowe and Plantinga over this argument. Although Rowe's argument is not an argument from degenerate evidence as Plantinga claimed, it is problematic because it is an argument from partitioned evidence. I conclude by discussing the (...) modified argument and the epistemic framework Rowe is assuming in his argument. (shrink)

In The Miracle of Theism Mackie attempts to defend Hume's argument concerning the rationality of accepting a miracle on the basis of testimony. He does this by first offering a precise account of what miracles and laws of nature are, and then by claiming that this implies that any evidence for a law of nature is also evidence against the miracle occurring. I argue that Mackie has committed a simple logical fallacy. Given Mackie's account of miracles and laws of nature, (...) it does not follow that our evidence for natural laws makes it unlikely that a miracle occurred. (shrink)

With A Defense of Hume on Miracles Robert Fogelin enters the recent discussion on Hume’s treatment of miracles. In this short book Fogelin begins by presenting his interpretation of Hume’s argument concerning miracles. The second chapter is a lengthy treatment of recent work by David Johnson and John Earman, and the third short chapter is a discussion of the relation of Hume’s view on miracles to his broader philosophy. There are also two appendices and the text of “Of Miracles.”.

With A Defense of Hume on Miracles Robert Fogelin enters the recent discussion on Hume’s treatment of miracles. In this short book Fogelin begins by presenting his interpretation of Hume’s argument concerning miracles. The second chapter is a lengthy treatment of recent work by David Johnson and John Earman, and the third short chapter is a discussion of the relation of Hume’s view on miracles to his broader philosophy. There are also two appendices and the text of “Of Miracles.”.

Überblick über die theologische briefliteratur der frühscholastik.-Die theologischen Briefe Walters von Mortagne.-Die theologischen Briefe Hugos von St. Viktor.-Die theologischen Briefe Richards von St. Viktor.

Anstelle einer Einleitung: ein Thema und eine Sichtweise desselben -- Analytische Philsophie zwischen Sprache, Logik und Mathematik -- Die analytische Philosophie und das Phänomenon der Komplementarität -- Kant, Bolzano und Peirce: die Unterschedung des Analytischen und Synthetischen, oder: von der Erkenntnistheorie zur Semantik und Zeichentheorie -- Ernst Cassirer und die Entwicklung von Analyse und Synthese seit Descartes und Leibniz -- Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) -- Die naturalisierte Erkenntnistheorie zwischen Wiener Kries und Pragmatismus: Willard Van Orward [sic] Quine -- Richard Rorty: (...) der Spiegel der Natur -- Die analytische Philosophie, der Mensch, die Kunst und das Denken der Maschinen. (shrink)

Joshua Daniel offers a reconstruction of the influence of Josiah Royce and George Herbert Mead on H. Richard Niebuhr to counter predominate strains in Christian ethics that overemphasize the role of socialization in moral formation at the expense of acknowledging the agency of individuals and their importance in preventing communities from turning in on themselves or becoming static. Daniel characterizes the driving worry of postliberal Christian ethics as “the accommodation of Christian communities to prevailing social forces and norms, which (...) is understood to radically undermine the churches’ existence and mission”. The primary accusation against these prevailing social norms is individualism. The modern... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Intersection of Heidegger's Philosophy and His Politics as Reflected in the Views of His Contemporaries at the University of FreiburgRichard DetschThere has been so much speculation in the last ten years or more about the reasons for and the extent of Heidegger's involvement in the Nazi movement that another attempt to come to grips with this important problem might seem superfluous. Amidst the weighty arguments advanced in what (...) has become a multitude of treatises and tomes, however, there has thus far been little interest in dealing with Heidegger's simple statement in his Spiegel interview that he was moved by the "confusion of opinions... from 22 parties... to adopt a political stance that was national and above all social."1 If we suspend our suspicion for the moment that Heidegger is here again manipulating the facts to fit his postwar predicament, as has been amply demonstrated [End Page 407] regarding other details, and examine the evidence we will find that there are indeed indications of the predominance of Heidegger's social concerns with respect to the political situation of the early '30s as well as of his leaning toward an authoritarian form of government an inclination shared, to be sure, by a significantly large number of his compatriots, academic and otherwise. There is one approach in particular toward answering the question of why Heidegger became a Nazi which the present attempt hopes to put in question: the emphasis on his abandonment of his Christian religious origins. The following statement by Theodore Kisiel expresses this line of reasoning most succinctly: "It will take a decade, but it will be not just an anti-Catholic, nor an anti-Christian, but the full-blown anti-religious attitude of the German Geist ripened from German Idealism that sweeps Heidegger into National Socialism, with all the romantic fervor of another religious conversion."2 John Caputo argues, based on the work of Kisiel and van Buren, that the Heidegger of the early twenties was drawing from two "equiprimordial" sources, "the Aristotelian and the Christian." "It was only in the 1930's, in the period of Heidegger's active political engagement with National Socialism, that the twofold root of the tradition was pruned to a single root... a Great Greek beginning from which everything Jewish and Christian, everything Roman, Latin, and Romance, was to be excluded as fallen, derivative, distortive, and inauthentic."3 This shift in perspective, this rejection by Heidegger of earlier Christian impulses in his work led to "fatal" lapses in the ethical realm: "... by leaving behind Kierkegaard and Luther... and by treating Aristotle as a fading echo of the primordially early Greek, Heidegger left the question of Being in a state of utter mystification about ethico-political matters, about the matter of our concrete responsibilities to one another."4 David Farrell Krell makes this lack of respect for and attention to the "other" the centerpiece of an entire study attempting to show Heidegger's propensity for the inhuman ideology of Nazism.5 These arguments derive perhaps from the rhetorical question posed by the Freiburg historian Hugo Ott in 1988: "Didn't this pseudo-religious expectation of salvation [through the mission of the Führer] conceal a monstrous hubris, wasn't the thinking of Heidegger in its radically contained, i.e., in its elementary [End Page 408] simplicity really a surrogate for the Christian view of life thrown overboard?"6 The problem with all such arguments is that "the Christian view of life" did not prevent others of a background similar to Heidegger's from an enthusiastic acceptance of Nazism without an abandonment of their religious faith. In this regard, let the case of Engelbert Krebs, Heidegger's one-time friend and mentor, the Jesuit priest who officiated at his marriage ceremony, serve as an example. Ott deals with Krebs fairly extensively in his Heidegger biography, stressing Krebs's chagrin when Heidegger turned his back on the Catholic Church, but fails to mention at all the enthusiasm for the Nazi movement that Krebs shared with his former friend.During his tenure as dean of the Theological Faculty at the University of Freiburg, Krebs delivered an address in a university lecture... (shrink)

Richard Otte (1985) has recently criticized the resolution of Simpson's paradox given by Nancy Cartwright (1979). He argues that there are difficulties with the version of the theory of probabilistic causality that Cartwright has developed, and that there is a way in which Simpson's paradox can arise that Cartwright's theory cannot handle. And Otte develops his own theory of probabilistic causality. I defend Cartwright's solution, and I argue that there are difficulties with the theory of probabilistic causality (...) that Otte proposes. (shrink)

How language works — its functions, mechanisms, and limitations — matters to the early moderns as much as it does to contemporary philosophers. Many of the moderns make reflection on language central to their philosophical projects, both as a tool for explaining human cognition and as a weapon to be used against competing views. Even in philosophers for whom language is less central, we can find important connections between their views on language and their other philosophical commitments.

In 1985, Swiss legal philosopher Walter Ott visited Herbert Hart in Oxford and made this record of their meeting, which casts novel light on some of Hart’s ideas. Ott engaged Hart in a fresh encounter with the legal philosophy of Gustav Radbruch, particularly Hart’s and Radbruch’s reasons for a minimum content of justice in law. They also discussed the grudge informer, state responsibility under laws of an earlier régime, and questions of the definition and falsifiability of legal theories. Hart surprisingly (...) reported Hans Kelsen as stating, when they had met at Berkeley in 1961, that Hume (and not Kant, and certainly not Wittgenstein) was the greatest philosopher who had ever lived. The translation is accompanied with annotations explaining references, assumptions and contexts. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Classical Tradition Descartes: Minds as Captains, Bodies as Ships Rejecting Descartes: Ships Passing in the Night.