In response to earlier papers in Informal Logic by Robert Fogelin and Andrew Lugg, this paper explores the issue of whether disagreement could ever be so deep that it defied rational resolution. Contra Lugg, I agree with Fogelin that such unresolvable disagreement is possible and, contra Fogelin, I suggest that the focus of such disagreement can be quite Iimited-a single proposition rather than a whole system of beliefs. I also suggest that emphasising arguing as a human practice rather than arguments (...) as a structure of propositions is unhelpful to consideration of these issues. (shrink)

This book is aimed at those studying for entry into the various professions where ethical questions are commonly faced such as teaching or social work.

Winston Nesbitt has argued that the usual examples appealed to as supporting the view that killing is no worse than letting die are misleading in that the comparison cases are not set up properly to tap our intuitions. Making various adjustments to the cases he judges killing to be intuitively worse than letting die and suggests that such a result is meta‐ethically appropriate to one view of the point of ethics. I contest each of these claims.

Winston Nesbitt has argued that the usual examples appealed to as supporting the view that killing is no worse than letting die are misleading in that the comparison cases are not set up properly to tap our intuitions. Making various adjustments to the cases he judges killing to be intuitively worse than letting die and suggests that such a result is meta‐ethically appropriate to one view of the point of ethics. I contest each of these claims.

SummaryNone of the above should be viewed as a defence of the particular version of OOE currently popular. I have not advanced any proposals concerning what particular ends might be of such importance that they legitimately override her prima facie right to control the contents of her mind. I have suggested that an internal tension exists within CCE as sketched by Forster but even ‘empowerment’ was not assumed by me to successfully meet the onus; my point was merely that it (...) was to be more plausibly construed as an argument for a compulsory, outcome‐driven, rather than for a free, interest‐driven, curriculum. Whether it is right for Janey to be overruled or not is a matter for continuing discussion, a discussion that OOE challenges us to have. It is, however, a prospective dialogue that is pre‐empted by any assumption that, just because CCE is prevalent in primary schools, the task is to protect it from OOE's predatory threat. For all that Forster has provided argument to the contrary, OOE may be a reform; the enemy might not be ‘a narrow vision of the national good’ but a narrow conception of Janey's good; perhaps there are things more important about portions of learning than that Janey finds them to have ‘personal significance’. (shrink)

First published in 1998, this book is an investigation of the possibility of articulating a coherent thesis of truth relativism within first, a host correspondence theory of truth and second, a host coherence theory of truth. The type of relativism addressed in the book is what is sometimes called 'framework relativism' - that where truth is relativised to a framework of belief or conceptual scheme. A further restraint is that a global relativistic thesis is sought - one which is relativistic (...) about all truths. The book does not set itself the task of defending relativism but just that of seeking a coherent articulation of it. (shrink)

SummaryNone of the above should be viewed as a defence of the particular version of OOE currently popular. I have not advanced any proposals concerning what particular ends might be of such importance that they legitimately override her prima facie right to control the contents of her mind. I have suggested that an internal tension exists within CCE as sketched by Forster but even ‘empowerment’ was not assumed by me to successfully meet the onus; my point was merely that it (...) was to be more plausibly construed as an argument for a compulsory, outcome‐driven, rather than for a free, interest‐driven, curriculum. Whether it is right for Janey to be overruled or not is a matter for continuing discussion, a discussion that OOE challenges us to have. It is, however, a prospective dialogue that is pre‐empted by any assumption that, just because CCE is prevalent in primary schools, the task is to protect it from OOE's predatory threat. For all that Forster has provided argument to the contrary, OOE may be a reform; the enemy might not be ‘a narrow vision of the national good’ but a narrow conception of Janey's good; perhaps there are things more important about portions of learning than that Janey finds them to have ‘personal significance’. (shrink)

In a recent paper in this journal, Jim Garrison (1997) opines that a Deweyan social constructivism ought to be embraced by science educators in preference to the subjectivist variety espoused by Ernst von Glasersfeld as it '. . . retains all [of the latter's] virtues and does not get caught up in its confusions' (p. 543), In this response, I argue that key elements of Garrison's complaints are misguided and that his preferred Deweyan social constructivism is a theoretical framework without (...) apparent superiority and with enough flaws that it is best eschewed by science educators (and metascientists, generally). © 2000 Kluwer Academic Publishers. (shrink)

In a previous article in _Philosophia, I claim that one can be a metaphysical relativist without being a truth relativist. One premise my argument for this claim relies on is (R2) truth relativism is inconsistent with the deflationary theory of truth. Peter Davson-Galle criticizes my argument for (R2), and also argues directly for the falsity of (R2). I try to show that Davson-Galle's effort to undermine (R2) founders due to his blurring the distinction between a (...) taxonomy or classification system on the one hand, and on the other, a conceptual framework in the sense use by truth relativists. (shrink)

In his book, The Justification of Scientific Change, Carl Kordig claims that the radical meaning variance view of Feyerabend and others becomes ensnared in a self-referential paradox. The accusation fails because it rests upon a confusion of that view with its "counterparts" in other linguistic/theoretical contexts.

In his Quaestiones supra librum De Caelo et Mundo which are preserved in the manuscripts Vienna, Dominikanerkonvent 150/120, fols. 47ra-68va and Paris, Bibliothèque Mazarine 3493, fols. 95ra-136rb, Peter of Auvergne deals with the question of whether there is one world or whether there can be many worlds 24). Peter raises this question because Aristotle refutes the existence and possibility of a plurality of worlds in De Caelo I, 8-9. I shall first discuss the three sets of questions on (...) De Caelo attributed to Peter of Auvergne . In the second section I shall present the answers of authoritative ancient and medieval scholars on the problem of whether a plurality of worlds exists or is possible . Finally I shall examine Peter’s question and indicate its probable sources. (shrink)

Several medieval commentators on De caelo II, 7 investigate the question of whether local motion causes heat. I analyse the theories of Averroes, Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, Peter of Auvergne, John of Jandun, John Buridan and Nicole Oresme and two anonymous theories. Although all of these authors agree that local motion generates heat, each of them presents his own explanation of the heating effect of motion. Averroes, Thomas Aquinas, John of Jandun and John Buridan argue that motion is (...) the per se cause of heat. Their explanations of the heating effect of motion are based on metaphysical considerations such as the relation between a subject and its characteristics or perfections and the causal order in a genus. Albert the Great, Peter of Auvergne, Nicole Oresme and the anonymous commentators, on the contrary, defend the thesis that motion is the accidental cause of heat. Their explanations refer to physical processes caused by motion. (shrink)