This paper explores analyzing criminal responsibility from the Humean position that blame is for character traits. If untoward acts indicate undesirable character traits, then the agent is blameworthy; if they do not, then the actor is not blameworthy — he has an excuse. A distinctive feature of this approach is that that voluntariness of acts is irrelevant to determining blameworthiness.This analysis is then applied to a variety of issues in criminal law. Mens supports inferences to character traits, and the Humean (...) approach provides a reason for rejeting strict criminal liability. The Humean approach also helps resolve a number of issues about attempts, such as punishment for impossible attempts and the defense of abandonment. It also supports the broad outlines of the defense of mistake and provides a third alternative in the Wooton-Hart debate over punishment and treatment. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:HUME ON BLAME AND EXCUSE17. Hume's account of blame and excuse differs in fundamental respects from many contemporary ones. Many contemporary views, ultimately derived from the Kantian dictum that 'ought' implies 'can', base excuses on the nonvoluntary character of an action. For example, H. L. A. Hart argues that the basic requirements for responsibility are that a person have the capacity and a fair opportunity to do what is (...) required. A person is to be excused for an action if he lacked either the capacity or opportunity to do what was required. As these are conditions for an action being voluntary in a suitably narrow sense, Hart primarily bases excuses on the nonvoluntary character of actions. Likewise, Richard Brandt's view, which in many respects is similar to Hume's, requires that the manifestation of a character trait be subject to a high degree of voluntary control before blame.2 is appropriate. Hume, however, explicitly denies that either a character trait or its manifestation in conduct need be subject to voluntary control for blame to be appropriate. The nonvoluntary character of an action does not necessarily excuse one from blame. Hume makes four key claims about blame and excuse. (1) The ultimate objects of praise and blame are mental qualities, not actions. (2) Actions are considered only as signs of mental qualities. (3) The possession and expression of these mental qualities may be appropriate objects of praise or blame even if they are nonvoluntary. (4) Persons have excuses if their actions do not indicate enduring mental qualities. These points need to be substantiated and explained. The first two claims may be considered together. That Hume holds mental qualities are the ultimate objects of praise and blame and that actions are considered only as signs of mental qualities is indisputable. 18. 'Tis evident, that when we praise any actions, we regard only the motives that produced them, and consider the actions as signs or indications of certain principles in the mind and temper. The external performance has no merit. We must look within to find the moral quality. This we cannot do directly; and therefore fix our attention on actions, as on external signs. But these actions are still considered as signs; and the ultimate object of our praise and approbation is the motive, that produced them. For present purposes, only two points need be noted about this passage. First, it clearly states that the ultimate objects of praise and, as he indicates in his following 4 paragraph, blame are always mental qualities. The expression mental qualities is vague, perhaps deliberately so. Sometimes Hume uses the term motive instead. By 'motive' he does not intend any passing desire or further intention which one may have in acting, e.g., embarrassing others. For Hume, some motives are not even dispositions to act. Second, actions or external performances have no merit. They are only signs of mental qualities. Even if the concept of an action includes more than the external behavior, such as the intention, it does not include motives or desires. A difference in intention may entail a difference in action, but a difference in motive does not. The same action may be performed from different motives. Hence, actions are not logically connected with the objects of praise and blame. Hume's claim that actions themselves have no merit, it might be objected, is incorrect. People do constantly evaluate actions. If they did not, then actions would not be considered untoward and a basis for attributing blame. However, Hume does not deny that actions may be evaluated in some way or other, only that they alone have merit or are appropriate objects of praise and blame. Actions may be evaluated without reference to mental qualities, for example, as right or wrong, useful or unuseful. Hume is 19. chiefly concerned with evaluating actions as virtuous or vicious. The terms virtuous and vicious as applied to actions involve an element of praise and blame, whereas the terms right and wrong, at least in most of their uses, do not. Thus, Hume is not denying that actions alone may have merit in the sense of value or utility. Rather, he is denying that actions... (shrink)

An ideal rule-Utilitarian theory is presented which incorporates some of the advantages of those based on accepted rules. The theory attempts to maximize welfare for a society of imperfect men. First an ideal moral code is explicated. Second a principle of a practical moral code is explicated which in effect prohibits violating rules of an ideal moral code except when general conformity to an ideal rule would have bad consequences.

In “Ideals and the Concept of Morality,” John T. Granrose criticizes R. M. Hare’s theory of morals for not providing good and sufficient reasons for rejecting the ideals of fanatics, e.g., Nazis and other racists. He then attempts to do what Hare admittedly failed to do by developing an argument based on a material or social concept of morality. Granrose claims that his argument “wins by default! In the absence of a rational counterargument by the fanatic, the issue is settled”. (...) In this discussion I shall not be concerned with Granrose’s strictures about Hare’s theory. Instead, I shall show that Granrose does not win by default for the fanatic has a rational counterargument. For convenience, I shall confine my discussion to racism as a form of fanaticism. (shrink)

A continuing issue of contract law is what purported contracts should be legally enforced. This article considers what principles rational persons would want courts to use in enforcing commitments in a society in which they expected to live. By reviewing the promise, economic value, and reasonable expectations approaches, the principles of freedom of transfer, enforceable commitments, and collective good are developed. Then, less general principles of consideration, past benefits, reliance, gratuitous commitments, and contract modification are presented. These latter principles specify (...) the more general principle of legally enforceable commitments. The resulting set of principles provide the basic outlines of legally enforceable commitments that would be acceptable to rational persons living in a contemporary, industrialized Western common-law society. (shrink)

This work presents, interprets, and largely defends the legal philosophy of H.L.A. Hart, except for his account of causation. Hart is considered by many persons to be the most important English writer on jurisprudence in the 20th century. The book considers his general theory of law, his theory of rights and of the enforcement of morality, and his analysis of the conditions of legal resposibility and the justification of punishment.

Shue's aim is to show that a set of economic rights are as basic as civil and political rights to security and to some forms of liberty. Rights are taken to provide the rational basis for a justified demand that the actual enjoyment of a substance be guaranteed against standard threats. Security rights are to physical security, and subsistence rights are to minimal economic security--adequate food, clothing, shelter, etc. Shue's strategy is to show that the same structure of argument which (...) supports security rights as basic also supports subsistence rights. Security rights are basic, not because they are intrinsically satisfying, but because without physical security no other rights can be enjoyed. Similarly, Shue argues, one cannot enjoy other rights without food, health, etc. A similar analysis is given of rights to political participation and freedom of movement. (shrink)

Shue's aim is to show that a set of economic rights are as basic as civil and political rights to security and to some forms of liberty. Rights are taken to provide the rational basis for a justified demand that the actual enjoyment of a substance be guaranteed against standard threats. Security rights are to physical security, and subsistence rights are to minimal economic security--adequate food, clothing, shelter, etc. Shue's strategy is to show that the same structure of argument which (...) supports security rights as basic also supports subsistence rights. Security rights are basic, not because they are intrinsically satisfying, but because without physical security no other rights can be enjoyed. Similarly, Shue argues, one cannot enjoy other rights without food, health, etc. A similar analysis is given of rights to political participation and freedom of movement. (shrink)