Do I ever directly raise my arm? Before dealing with this question we must make clear that the corresponding affirmation is to be taken as a way of rejecting one interpretation of the question, ‘In doing or by doing what do I raise my arm?’ On the interpretation of the question I have in mind the appropriate reply, if the question were not rejected, would be, ‘I raise my arm in or by doing something internal’. The way we are employing (...) the phrase ‘doing something internal’ will, I think, become clear when we consider candidates for the description ‘doing something internal’. But it is important to remember that to affirm that I directly raise my arm is to reject the question, ‘In doing or by doing what do I raise my arm?’ on our interpretation of the question. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:31 Hunie on Intuitive and Demonstrative Inference This paper is divided into four sections. The first section deals with Hume's attempt to resolve a dilemma concerning the objects of intuitive and demonstrative inference. In the second section I try to show that his resolution of the dilemma is hard to reconcile with his phenomenalist doctrine of the origin of ideas. In the third section I examine tne meaning of (...) "intuition" in Hume. Finally, in the fourth section I compare his view of mathematical inference with his view of causal inference, a kind of inference to which he tends to assimilate the former. What are the objects of intuitive and demonstrative inference in Hume supposed to be? In the Treatise they are co-extensive with four kinds of philosophical relations resemblance, contrariety, degrees in quality and proportions in quantity or numbers. The distinguishing characteristic of the group, according to Hume, is that they all depend entirely on the ideas which we compare together. Tne example he gives is that of a triangle 2 whose three angles are equal to two right ones. And this presumably is at the same time an example of a relation of proportion in quantity or numbers. Needless to say, what cries out for explanation here, apart from the notion of comparison with which we shall deal later, is the phrase "depend entirely upon the ideas." Hume himself does not provide the explanation. Consequently, a certain amount of speculation becomes inevitable. One fairly plausible although, as we shall see, not entirely satisfactory interpretation of the phrase in question would associate it with a thesis concerning the reducibility of relations between exemplars of properties to relations between the properties themselves. Thus it may 32 be argued that the equality holding between the three angles of a triangle and two right angles is reducible to an equality holding between certain of their properties. The properties would be the 180° that each set of angles exemplifies. Indirect evidence for this interpretation is provided by Hume's account of the relations of contiguity and distance, species presumably of relations of time and place, which do not, according to him, depend upon the ideas wnich are compared together. Indeed, these relations may be changed by "an alteration of their place, without any change on the objects themselves or on their 3 ideas." "The place" in its turn "depends on a hundred 4 different accidents which cannot be foreseen by the mind." Leaving aside Hume's failure or refusal to draw a clear distinction here between ideas and objects which probably has to do with his belated realization that only the latter have places and are contiguous to or distant from one another, one notes his insistence that an object's place is not an essential property of the object. For his use of the word "accident" in the above-quoted passage has very little to do with its ordinary use and everything to do with its logical one where it is contrasted with "essential." Furthermore, the sentence immediately preceding the one containing that passage gives some indication of what Hume takes its logical use to be : A determinate property is an accidental one if loss of that property does not affect the object's identity or, as he would put it, the object itself. Nor is the accidental nature of the property anything but reinforced by its dependence logical or otherwise upon other accidental properties which like all such properties require an appeal to observation and induction in order to determine whether they are exemplified by that object. The loss of an essential property, on the other hand, would affect the object's identity because such properties are contained in the very definition of the object. And it suffices to understand the definition - Hume's foreseeing by the 33 7 mind comes in here - in order to determine that the property is exemplified by the object. How does this account provide indirect evidence for our interpretation of Hume? The answer is relatively straightforward. According to that interpretation, relations which depend entirely on the ideas which we compare together are tnose where relations between exemplars of properties are reducible to relations between... (shrink)

J'entreprends de défendre la conception leibnizienne de la liberté de la volonté selon laquelle on peut être libre sans que l'on n'ait le pouvoir causal de choisir autrement que l'on ne fait. La liberté d'indifférence en revanche est irrecevable et sort d'une analyse erronée de ce que c'est un pouvoir de décider hic et nunc. Un tel pouvoir est indiscernable d'avec la décision même. Par conséquent un recours à la liberté d'indifférence préconisé entre autres par Duns Scotus est à la (...) fois superflu et aporétique. (shrink)

J'essaie de montrer que chez Leibniz l'existence d'un monde qui ne soit pas le meilleur des mondes possibles est elle-même possible. Une telle possibilité au demeurant s'avère compatible avec l'affirmation de ce même Leibniz selon laquelle Dieu ne créerait aucun monde, a moins qu'il n'y eût le meilleur des mondes possibles. Car, il est logiquement possible, pas plus, que, vu la nature du pouvoir, tout choix de Dieu en ce sens diffère de ce qui se réalise.

Descartes se contredit-il en alléguant d'une part que certains choix d'un être fini sont face à l'évidence inéluctable et en alléguant d'autre part que l'indifférence absolue est une condition nécessaire de tout choix? Notre réponse est négative. En même temps il faut admettre, selon nous, que la méthode dont Descartes se sert pour s'échapper à la contradiction n'en amène qu'une autre.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:47. Hausman on Certainty and Necessity in Hume Professor Hausman in the course of a painstaking and often illuminating examination of my paper "Hume on Intuitive and Demonstrative Inference" fortunately has occasion to make some positive suggestions of his own regarding the best way to interpret Hume's philosophy. One of the most interesting and provocative of these suggestions is that we should discount Hume's claim to have found an (...) impression of reflection which is at the same time one of necessity. Rather, we should regard the impression of reflection in question as one of certainty. Such a manner of proceeding would, moreover, in Hausman' s view have the advantage öf explaining why we all believe that causal connections are necessary when in fact they are not. For the same impression of certainty, as Hausman envisages it, will be generated by both the cognitive act of comparing two relata wherein genuine necessity is reflected and the determination of an idea by a preceding impression wherein causal inference consists and wherein genuine necessity plays no role. But how can Hausman be so sure that they will be the same? For he insists that the cognitive act of comparing two relata is radically different from the determination of an idea by a preceding impression. Why then should we expect that observation of the two should generate comparable feelings of certainty? And if they do not generate comparable feelings of certainty what is the purpose served by postulating them? Moreover, I use the term "postulating" advisedly: by Hausman' s own admission there is little or no textual evidence for their presence in Hume's theory of causal inference. Hausman' s purpose would be no worse served - at least incoherence would be avoided - by emphasizing what a cognitive act of comparing two relata and a determination of an idea by a preceding impression have in common as opposed to what distinguishes them. They have, moreover, more in 48. common than he seems to think. For, while the one requires reflection according to Hume and the other does not, they 2 both involve a determination of the mind. Nor is Hume's use of the concept of intuition in connection with the former incompatible with such a determination, as Hausman seems to think. On the contrary, it implies it. For intuition as Hume understands it seems to pertain to immediate inference. And such inferences consist as far as he is concerned in determinations of the mind to move from one 3 idea to a second one. Indeed, it is just the supposed infallibility of such determinations that allows him to distinguish them from the more haphazard principles of as4 sociation. A cognitive act of comparing two relata and a determination of an idea by a preceding impression are sufficiently alike, then, to explain why we all believe that causal connections are necessary when in fact they are not. This does not mean, of course, that necessity need reside in such a cognitive act of comparing. As a matter cf fact, as we shall see in a moment, this is not the view that Hume usually takes of the matter. But a cognitive act of comparing, as we shall also see in a moment, is close enough to the area in which necessity does reside to allow Hume to explain in the manner indicated how our mistaken belief about causal connections arises. Hausman' s comparable feelings of certainty are not required. Nor has Occam's razor finished cutting. More specifically, the idea of real necessity of which Hausman speaks could have, as far as I can see, no role to play in Hume's philosophy which is not already played by the cognitive act of comparing two relata. There is, moreover, no such idea anymore than there is any idea of causal necessity. The "idea of entities in a particular sort of relation" presumably like resemblance will not do. For resemblance is not necessity. And to say as Hausman does that "it is because we can read off a resemblance, say, that we pronounce the relationship necessary" is to state a problem, not to 49.??. 6 solve it. What then is the solution? It seems... (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to show that we should dispense with the concept of immediate awareness, when it takes for its object the existence and nature of our sensations and images.The question of whether we are immediately aware of the existence and nature of our sensations and images cannot be answered in a reasonable manner unless we have a firm grip on the concept of immediate awareness. Philosophers who have employed it have usually employed it in such a (...) way that the word “immediate” in the corresponding phrase “immediate awareness” describes both the nature of the awareness and how it came to have that nature. When it describes the nature of the awareness “immediate” means “incorrigible”. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Berkeley and Scepticism: A Fatal Dalliance Robert A. Imlay This article is divided into three sections. In the first section I try to show how Berkeley inadvertently commits himself to scepticism or subjectivism by employing against the representational realist an argument that seeks to identify all sensible quaUties regardless of degree with pleasure or pain viewed as feeling states. An appeal to the act-object distinction as a (...) way of avoiding this result is shown to be futile because ofthe purely grammatical nature ofthat distinction. Berkeley must, ifhe can do so consistently, radically change course and attack the alleged identity head-on. In view of that I try to show more clearly in the second section why the sceptic or subjectivist—and Berkeleyhimself—are convinced that the identity forces itselfupon us. At the same time I try to explain why even a representationaUsm that agrees to identify heat, for example, with felt heat but clings to something unfelt like heat qua heat to be found in the fire is no answer to these philosophers. If it were, admittedly, the identity would not have to be attacked head-on. Against this form of representational readism an appeal is once more made to the purely grammatical nature of the act-object distinction which in our view Ues behind Berkeley's anti-representationalist Ukeness principle. In the third section, attacking the identity head-on I try to show the identification of heat and pain, to continue with that example, assumes that all differences between the two would have to be transparent to consciousness. And that is already to assume what needs to be proved, namely, that there is no epistemologically opaque, mind-independent heat ofthe fire. Unfortunately, this Une ofattack is notopen toBerkeley, because hehas otherarguments designedto show that there is, indeed, no mind-independent heat of the fire. If, on the other hand, he rejected the transparency of consciousness, he would run the risk—as he is fully aware—of allowing in scepticism or subjectivism through another door. Finally, Berkeley's attempt to avoid scepticism or subjectivism by making sensible qualities objects ofperception is seen to run afoul ofthe purely grammatical nature of the act-object relation, the subject with which this paper more or less began. Volume XVIII Number 2 501 ROBERT A. IMLAY One tried but perhaps not always true way of dealing with the philosophical sceptic or subjectivist is to give her all the rope that she requires in order to hang herself. This is the way of Descartes in the first and the beginningofthe secondMeditation where sceptical doubt, indeed denial, pushed to its limit, is supposed to demonstrate to the philosopher that he exists. It is, however, also the way ofBerkeley at least to the extent that he is prepared to employ a sceptical or subjectivist argument to arrive at a position that is supposed to be in the final analysis incompatible with scepticism or subjectivism. Such astrategyis, needless to say, not withoutits dangers. Indeed, it is because ofthem thatjust such a strategy, ifit could succeed, would constitute areal epistemic tourdeforce. The most obvious and pressing danger is that by unabashedly employing a sceptical or subjectivist argument one inevitably becomes committed to scepticism or subjectivism oneself. Nor is that danger to be averted merely by quaUfying the argument in question in such a way that it loses its sceptical or subjectivist bite. For at least in the case of Berkeley and the particular argument of his that we have in mind, it can lose that bite only by ceasing to be itself. By the same token it will leave intact or at least play no role in the dismantling of a position that on further analysis is supposed to be not only compatible with scepticism or subjectivism but, ifBerkeley is right, ultimately vindicates it. The argument is the one in which Berkeley insists on the identity, regardless ofdegree, ofall the sensible qualities—heat and cold, sweet and bitter, for example—with either pleasure or pain viewed as feeling states in order to put them in the mind along with the latter.1 This argument is essentially a sceptical or subjectivist one and, if he were to abandon it... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:51. HOW NOT TO REFUTE HUME'S THEORY OF CAUSALITY: A REPLY TO GRAY Mr. Robert Gray's alleged refutation of Hume's theory of causality does not strike me as being in reality conclusive. The essential element in his alleged refutation, if I have understood it correctly, is that when two billiard balls strike one another and stop - a paradigm of cause and effect - the striking and the (...) stopping constitute one event as opposed to two. They occupy, as a result, one and the same time, a state of affairs inconsistent with the Humean view that the cause immediately precedes the effect. But, surely, they would, if they are the same event, occupy by parity of reasoning one and the same position. For Hume's theory of space and time, as Gray describes it, implies that there is a one-to-one mapping between positions and times. If, therefore, their being the same event implies that they occupy one and the same time, it would also imply that they occupy one and the same position. And if they occupy the same position, they are not spatially contiguous, a state of affairs inconsistent with the Humean view that the cause is spatially contiguous to the effect. A Humean solution in both cases seems clear. It is to allow that the striking and stopping of the billiard balls are the same event and to seek its cause in their moving towards one another, i.e. to seek it in billiard ball A's being at A, and billiard ball B's being at B,, where both A, and B, are spatially contiguous with and immediately precede the striking and stopping of the respective billiard balls B and A. Gray resists this solution, but only because he is implicitly committed to the anti-Humean view that one and the same event can occupy two different positions at one and the same time. As a result, where A designates the 52. position where billiard ball A strikes billiard ball B and stops it and B designates the position where billiard ball B strikes billiard ball A and stops it - this being simply a re-descriptiön in Gray's view of what happens in the single event of two billiard balls striking one another and stopping - he holds that A is different from B. If A is different from B, then by relocating the cause of billiard ball A's stopping at B, we have sacrificed the spatial contiguity of cause and effect. For B will intervene between position B,, that of the cause, and A, that of the effect. And the same will hold with obvious adjustments when we relocate the cause of billiard ball B's stopping at A,. Fortunately, however, Hume need only reply that A is one and the same as B. Indeed, if he is to be consistent with his theory of space and time, this must be his reply. This reply, moreover, is necessary to Hume's explanation of how the reciprocal striking of billiard ball A and billiard ball B can exist in the first place. Such a phenomenon requires a point of contact, a point common to a part of both billiard balls. This point of contact, it should be clear, is provided by the point designated by both A and B. Robert A. Imlay University of Toronto "A Refutation of Hume's Theory of Causality," Hume Studies, Vol. II (1976), pp. 76-85.... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:51. HOW NOT TO REFUTE HUME'S THEORY OF CAUSALITY: A REPLY TO GRAY Mr. Robert Gray's alleged refutation of Hume's theory of causality does not strike me as being in reality conclusive. The essential element in his alleged refutation, if I have understood it correctly, is that when two billiard balls strike one another and stop - a paradigm of cause and effect - the striking and the (...) stopping constitute one event as opposed to two. They occupy, as a result, one and the same time, a state of affairs inconsistent with the Humean view that the cause immediately precedes the effect. But, surely, they would, if they are the same event, occupy by parity of reasoning one and the same position. For Hume's theory of space and time, as Gray describes it, implies that there is a one-to-one mapping between positions and times. If, therefore, their being the same event implies that they occupy one and the same time, it would also imply that they occupy one and the same position. And if they occupy the same position, they are not spatially contiguous, a state of affairs inconsistent with the Humean view that the cause is spatially contiguous to the effect. A Humean solution in both cases seems clear. It is to allow that the striking and stopping of the billiard balls are the same event and to seek its cause in their moving towards one another, i.e. to seek it in billiard ball A's being at A, and billiard ball B's being at B,, where both A, and B, are spatially contiguous with and immediately precede the striking and stopping of the respective billiard balls B and A. Gray resists this solution, but only because he is implicitly committed to the anti-Humean view that one and the same event can occupy two different positions at one and the same time. As a result, where A designates the 52. position where billiard ball A strikes billiard ball B and stops it and B designates the position where billiard ball B strikes billiard ball A and stops it - this being simply a re-descriptiön in Gray's view of what happens in the single event of two billiard balls striking one another and stopping - he holds that A is different from B. If A is different from B, then by relocating the cause of billiard ball A's stopping at B, we have sacrificed the spatial contiguity of cause and effect. For B will intervene between position B,, that of the cause, and A, that of the effect. And the same will hold with obvious adjustments when we relocate the cause of billiard ball B's stopping at A,. Fortunately, however, Hume need only reply that A is one and the same as B. Indeed, if he is to be consistent with his theory of space and time, this must be his reply. This reply, moreover, is necessary to Hume's explanation of how the reciprocal striking of billiard ball A and billiard ball B can exist in the first place. Such a phenomenon requires a point of contact, a point common to a part of both billiard balls. This point of contact, it should be clear, is provided by the point designated by both A and B. Robert A. Imlay University of Toronto "A Refutation of Hume's Theory of Causality," Hume Studies, Vol. II (1976), pp. 76-85.... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:John Davis, Teacher: A Recollection I first met John Davis in the late fifties when I was doing a two-year M.A. in philosophy at Western. John taught a graduate course in symboliclogic. It was both a philosophy course and across-listed course in the foundation ofmathematics. There was, as a result, a mixture of philosophy and mathematics students in the course. My most vivid memory ofJohn was ofan amazingly energetic (...) and enthusiastic teacher who was anything but indifferent to his subject matter and to his students. I, if I may introduce a personal note, suffered from an extreme form of math anxiety—I couldn't even understand a truth-table. John was always extremely patient with me and it is thanks to him that I managed to scrape through. Another vivid memory was of a man with a kind of Moorean passion for getting it right. When he didn't understand something, he let us know it. He was constitutionally incapable of intellectual pretence. I took away from my time with him the idea that philosophy was extremely difficult; but ifone worked very hard, it was possible to get the right answer. And no relativist he, John was profoundly convinced that there was a right answer to get. Robert A. lmlay... (shrink)

L'argument de Descartes selon lequel son essence s'identifie avec sa pensée s'expose à la critique destructrice de Leibniz. En même temps l'interprétation de l'argument donnée par Arnauld s'avère défectueuse. Car elle repose sur l'hypothèse que Descartes doutait des idées claires et distinctes qui sont présentés à l'esprit. En fait Descartes ne doutait jamais de telles idées en de telles circonstances. Et ce n'est qu'après que l'hypothèse du malin génie lui permettait de douter de l'identité de son essence et de sa (...) pensée. A ce moment-là, d'ailleurs, il était prêt à admettre la possibilité que celle-là soit complètement différente de celle-ci. Mais l'interprétation d'Arnauld ne lui permet point de comprendre une telle possibilité. (shrink)

Ich versuche zu beweisen, daß Descartesי Dualismus, nach welchem der Leib und die Seele radikal voneinander getrennt sind, ihn zwingt, seinem natürlichen Sträuben zum Trotz einige Denkmöglichkeiten, die sich aus der Annahme des Wahnsinns ableiten lassen, ernst zu nehmen. Der Cartesischen Auffassung des Wahnsinns nach hegt der Wahnsinnige vor allem Zweifel, ob seine Gliedmaßen ihm gehören. Dieser Zweifel wird durch den Dualismus des Philosophen gerechtfertigt. Derselbe Mensch kann außerdem zweifeln, ob ihm irgendein Leib gehöre; auch dieser Zweifel ist durch den (...) in Frage stehenden Dualismus des Descartes gerechtfertigt. (shrink)

Do I ever directly raise my arm? Before dealing with this question we must make clear that the corresponding affirmation is to be taken as a way of rejecting one interpretation of the question, ‘In doing or by doing what do I raise my arm?’ On the interpretation of the question I have in mind the appropriate reply, if the question were not rejected, would be, ‘I raise my arm in or by doing something internal’. The way we are employing (...) the phrase ‘doing something internal’ will, I think, become clear when we consider candidates for the description ‘doing something internal’. But it is important to remember that to affirm that I directly raise my arm is to reject the question, ‘In doing or by doing what do I raise my arm?’ on our interpretation of the question. (shrink)

I try to show that Descartes criterion of truth is neither viciously circular nor does it, alternatively, commit him to an infinite hierarchy of criteria. As a result, he is able to resolve the age-old "problem of the criterion" as it was known both to the Greek sceptics and Montaigne. Beyssade's interpretation of Descartes' criterion, on the other hand, is inconsistent with its being a criterion at all and has disastrous consequences for the rest of Descartes' philosophy.

Nous examinons le "je pense, donc je suis" de Descartes. Après avoir rejeté une objection de Russell et une autre de Hintikka nous essayons d'approfondir le rapport épistémologique qui subsiste entre "je pense, donc je suis" et "pour penser il faut être".

This article begins with certain specific objections to Descartes two proofs of the existence of God to be found in the Meditations. I‚ then‚ try to show that the certesian system is‚ nonetheless‚ not committed to solipsism. For the hypothetical doubt which renders the latter attractive‚ not to say compelling, is in the final analysis unacceptable even to a clear-headed cartesian. One is‚ as a result‚ justified in affirming without reservation the probable existence of the material world.

D'habitude on n'attribue qu'une hypothèse du malin génie à Descartes. Malheureusement un tel procédé explique mal un passage crucial de la troisième Méditation où le philosophe semble traiter les simples vérités mathématiques et le "Cogito" de la même manière. Par contre si l'on songe que Descartes a révisé l'hypothèse du malin génie en face de la vérité et la certitude du "Cogito" on est en mesure de rendre compte du passage en question. De plus on est en mesure d'apprécier les (...) vraies limites du scepticisme qu'affiche Descartes dans la première Méditation. (shrink)

Descartes' dream hypothesis, despite what he sometimes says himself, is supposed to inspire genuine existential doubt regarding the material world. Furthermore the hypothesis resists the criterion of coherence by means of which Descartes finally distinguishes dreaming from waking. The dream hypothesis turns out, nonetheless, to be untenable. What is more its untenability is apparent from a close analysis of the very example of a dream described in the first Meditation.

Cet article est divisé en quatre parties. Dans la première je cherche à prouver que la distinction cartésienne entre l'âme et le corps repose sur une base strictement objective, à savoir sur la transparence du doute et la possibilité de représentation du corps. Dans la seconde partie, je tente de montrer comment le doute qui suffit à prouver mon existence selon Descartes, doit se transformer, en raison meme de sa soi-disant transparence, en un etat nécessaire de cette meme existence. Dans (...) la troisiéme partie la transparence du doute sera rejetée en depit de Descartes. Enf in dans la quatriéme, je recommande le dualisme aristotélicien méprisé par Descartes, et qui trouve son expression dans la phrase: „l'Phomme est un animal raisonnable.“ „Und sodann untersuchte ich aufmerksam, was ich denn bin, und sah, daß ich mir einbilden üann, dafl ich keinen Körper habe und daß es keine Welt noch einen Ort gibt, an dem ich mich befinde, daß ich mir deshalb aber nicht einbilden kann, daß ich nicht bin, ganz im Gegenteil sah ich, daß gerade daraus, daß ich mir bewuflt bin, an der Wahrheit der anderen Dinge zu zweifeln, ganz evident und gewifl folgt, daß ich bin, und daß ich auf der anderen Seite, wenn ich aufhoren würde zu denken, auch keinen Grund mehr fur die Uberzeugung hatte, dafi ich bin, selbst wenn alles iibrige, was ich mir jemals vorgestellt habe, wahr ware. Daraus erkannte ich, daß ich eine Substanz bin, deren ganzes Wesen und deren Natur nur darin besteht, zu denken, und die zu ihrem Sein keines Ortes bedarf noch von irgendeinem materiellen Ding abhängt, so daß dieses Ich, d. h. die Seele, durch die ich das bin, was ich bin, völlig verschieden ist vom Körper . . . und daß sie selbst, wenn er nicht ware, doch nicht aufhörte, alles das zu sein, was sie ist.“¹. (shrink)

J'essaie de montrer qu'il y a incompatibilité entre la liberté d'indifférence positive chez Descartes d'une part et la liberté de spontanéité chez ce même Descartes de l'autre part. Celuici à mon avis devrait, ne serait-ce que pour des raisons d'ordre systématique, trancher en faveur de la liberté de spontanéité. En même temps je plaide pour une interprétation pragmatique et non pas sémantique du pronom tel que le sous-entend . Finalement, j'essaie de défendre une forme limitée du volontarisme épistémologique que prône (...) Descartes. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:121. HUME'S Of Scepticism with regard to reason: A STUDY IN CONTRASTING THEMES.* This paper attempts to describe the complex dialectical interplay among the contrasting rational, sceptical and naturalist elements which appear in Section I, Part IV of Book I of Hume's Treatise of Human Nature. At the same time we shall try to show that, contrary to Hume's own evaluation of that section, it is the sceptical element, (...) in which the unreliability of reason is supposedly demonstrated, as opposed to the naturalist element, in which its unreliability is supposed to remain hidden from us, that deserves to triumph. With these two goals in mind and in order to make it easier for the reader to follow the inevitable twists and turns of the dialectic, we have divided the paper into two three-sectioned parts. The first part bears the title "Reason and Scepticism", while the second part bears the title "Naturalism". The first section of Part I is concerned with proving that Hume's attempted reduction of all knowledge to probability is frustrated by his failure to explain how we can make mistakes in simple operations with small numbers. If so, the first phase of his sceptical assault against reason fails to dislodge her from her throne. If the second section is right, the second stage of the sceptical assault fares no better. For Hume's attempted reduction of all probabilities to zero is shown to rely on an unsatisfactory formula for calculating the probabilities in question. In the third section an effort is made to show that the attempted reduction of the second section, i_f it had been a success instead of a failure, would have destroyed reason but left scepticism intact. *I should like to thank Howard Sobel for his penetrating and unsparing criticism of an earlier version of this paper. 122. Hume's conviction, on the other hand, that the flawed reduction in question is unflawed and destroys both leads to a prolonged discussion, initiated in the first section of Part II, of his naturalism. Indeed, this theme dominates the rest of the paper. Thus it deserves a part to itself. If we are correct in the first section of Part II, Hume's naturalism is best interpreted as a doctrine of instincts relying for its doctrinal status upon a failure to accept the conclusion of the sceptical argument directed against reason. But, as we try to bring out in the second section, the specific psychological inability with which Hume could in the final analysis give substance to this failure of acceptance is left without any causal foundation. Finally, in the third section that inability is seen to run afoul of reason as Hume himself understands it. And note is taken of the fact that reason so understood and the sceptical argument directed against reason that Hume adopts for his own both commit him willy-nilly to rejecting for good or ill one standard definition of knowledge. Reason and Scepticism Nowhere are the rational elements in Hume's philosophy more in evidence, ironically enough, than in Section I, Part IV of Book I of the Treatise entitled Of Scepticism with regard to reason. For it is there we are told in the very first paragraph that in all demonstrative sciences the rules are certain and infallible. Our reason, moreover, must be consider ' d as a kind of cause, of which truth is the natural effect. (T180) In other words, reason, left to its own devices, would produce truth and, presumably, only truth. Anyone who steadfastly adheres to such principles will reject out of hand one kind of scepticism with regard 123. to reason. That is the kind which results from the alleged discovery that reason, left to its own devices, compels us to embrace one or more contradictions, an obvious form of 2 falsity. It is a kind of scepticism which Bayle cultivated so assiduously. And yet, despite the influence which Bayle 's writings exerted upon Hume, they never convinced him of the viability of this kind of scepticism. On the contrary, apart from some wavering in the Enquiry, he was as adamant as any Leibnizian rationalist that right reason3 ing leads only... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:121. HUME'S Of Scepticism with regard to reason: A STUDY IN CONTRASTING THEMES.* This paper attempts to describe the complex dialectical interplay among the contrasting rational, sceptical and naturalist elements which appear in Section I, Part IV of Book I of Hume's Treatise of Human Nature. At the same time we shall try to show that, contrary to Hume's own evaluation of that section, it is the sceptical element, (...) in which the unreliability of reason is supposedly demonstrated, as opposed to the naturalist element, in which its unreliability is supposed to remain hidden from us, that deserves to triumph. With these two goals in mind and in order to make it easier for the reader to follow the inevitable twists and turns of the dialectic, we have divided the paper into two three-sectioned parts. The first part bears the title "Reason and Scepticism", while the second part bears the title "Naturalism". The first section of Part I is concerned with proving that Hume's attempted reduction of all knowledge to probability is frustrated by his failure to explain how we can make mistakes in simple operations with small numbers. If so, the first phase of his sceptical assault against reason fails to dislodge her from her throne. If the second section is right, the second stage of the sceptical assault fares no better. For Hume's attempted reduction of all probabilities to zero is shown to rely on an unsatisfactory formula for calculating the probabilities in question. In the third section an effort is made to show that the attempted reduction of the second section, i_f it had been a success instead of a failure, would have destroyed reason but left scepticism intact. *I should like to thank Howard Sobel for his penetrating and unsparing criticism of an earlier version of this paper. 122. Hume's conviction, on the other hand, that the flawed reduction in question is unflawed and destroys both leads to a prolonged discussion, initiated in the first section of Part II, of his naturalism. Indeed, this theme dominates the rest of the paper. Thus it deserves a part to itself. If we are correct in the first section of Part II, Hume's naturalism is best interpreted as a doctrine of instincts relying for its doctrinal status upon a failure to accept the conclusion of the sceptical argument directed against reason. But, as we try to bring out in the second section, the specific psychological inability with which Hume could in the final analysis give substance to this failure of acceptance is left without any causal foundation. Finally, in the third section that inability is seen to run afoul of reason as Hume himself understands it. And note is taken of the fact that reason so understood and the sceptical argument directed against reason that Hume adopts for his own both commit him willy-nilly to rejecting for good or ill one standard definition of knowledge. Reason and Scepticism Nowhere are the rational elements in Hume's philosophy more in evidence, ironically enough, than in Section I, Part IV of Book I of the Treatise entitled Of Scepticism with regard to reason. For it is there we are told in the very first paragraph that in all demonstrative sciences the rules are certain and infallible. Our reason, moreover, must be consider ' d as a kind of cause, of which truth is the natural effect. (T180) In other words, reason, left to its own devices, would produce truth and, presumably, only truth. Anyone who steadfastly adheres to such principles will reject out of hand one kind of scepticism with regard 123. to reason. That is the kind which results from the alleged discovery that reason, left to its own devices, compels us to embrace one or more contradictions, an obvious form of 2 falsity. It is a kind of scepticism which Bayle cultivated so assiduously. And yet, despite the influence which Bayle 's writings exerted upon Hume, they never convinced him of the viability of this kind of scepticism. On the contrary, apart from some wavering in the Enquiry, he was as adamant as any Leibnizian rationalist that right reason3 ing leads only... (shrink)

J'attaque de front la notion d'un être nécessaire qui de par sa nécessité rend raison de sa propre existence. Une telle notion est entachée d'aporie. En plus elle confond la nécessité formelle, voire métaphysique avec la puissance réelle à un tel point qu'elle pousse Leibniz bel et bien vers le spinozisme. Le rejet d'une telle notion mène de sa part inéluctablement à une régression à l'infini de raisons raisonnantes d'où, bien entendu, Dieu est exclu, bien qu'il soutienne par son intellect (...) une telle régression en tant que celle-ci s'avère nécessaire. (shrink)

J'essaie à travers la distinction de Quine entre l'emploi notionnel et celui relationnel du quantificateur existentiel de fournir un modèle de la possibilité abstraite de choisir autrement que Ton ne fait et la possibilité réelle d'un tel choix. Leibniz affirme la première possibilité et rejette la seconde.

Der Aufsatz ist in drei Teile gegliedert. Im ersten versuche ich Descartes gegen den Vorwurf, sein Beweis für die Existenz eines wahrhaftigen Gottes sei zirkelhaft, zu verteidigen. Im zweiten suche ich ihn zu verteidigen gegen den Vorwurf, die Beweise seien, wenn auch nicht zirkulär, so doch bezweifelbar, und zwar dann, wenn man nicht auf die Voraussetzungen achte, aus denen die Konklusion nach Descartes' Meinung folge. Das heißt jedoch nicht, daß ich keine Vorbehalte gegen einige Folgerungen der Cartesischen Erkenntnistheorie hege. Ein (...) derartiger Vorbehalt gegen eine derartige Folgerung ist im dritten Teil des Aufsatzes vorgebracht. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to criticize sayward's contention that "p, But I believe not-P" cannot be used to make an assertion. It is not only not clear what sayward takes an assertion to be but the most he can be said to have shown is that a dishonest truth claim cannot be an honest assertion. In order to show that "p but I believe not-P" cannot be used to make an honest truth claim he is forced to make (...) the assumption that "i believe that I believe not-P" entails "i believe not-P.". (shrink)

J'essaie de montrer que Descartes a mal interprété sa propre doctrine de la creation divine des vérités éternelles. Par conséquent il se croit obligé de ne concéder aux vérités eternelle qui ne touchent pas à la toute-puissance de Dieu qu'une nécessité qui depend en quelque sorte de l'esprit humain. D'ou une distinction entre celles-ci et des verités éternelles qui peuvent à juste titre réclamer une indépendance absolue devient pour le moins attirante, même si une telle distinction n'est guére compatible avec (...) le conceptualisme anti-platonicien de Descartes. II s'avére plus généralement que la certitude qui selon Descartes est le propre des vérités mathématiques éleméntaires rendrait le scepticisme mathemarique inacceptable. Il ne reste qu'a chercher les causes d'un scepticisme manifestement irrationel dans lequel Descartes s'embourbe, notamment dans la cinquiéme Méditation. (shrink)

I seek to show that the skeptical argument from error turns crucially on the following assumption: because Bill1 with the same degree of evidence as Bill2 failed merely by virtue of John's1 absence to know that John1 would be at the party, then Bill2 must have got things right by coincidence if he got them right at all, as to the actual attendance of John2. And so he does not have knowledge. But the conclusion that coincidence entered here is a (...) non-sequitur. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:119. HUME'S CONDITIONS FOR' CAUSATION: FURTHER TO GRAY AND IMLAY As part of his second proof of the existence of God, Descartes in Meditations III argues a causal premise derived from the nature of time. He argues it follows from the nature of time "that, in order to be conserved in each moment in which it endures, a substance has need of the same power and action as (...) would be necessary to produce and create it anew, supposing it did not yet exist; so that the light of nature shows us clearly that the distinction between creation and conservation is solely a distinction of reason." The nature of time to which he refers allows only a finite divisibility into durationless moments, each of which is entirely independent of every other. In the ultimate analysis, nothing true of one moment is deducible from what is true of any other, even what happens to be eternally true. The doctrine of the creation of the eternal verities is of a piece with this conception of time, and following with it from the conception of the divinity as sheer omnipotence, points to Hume's view that experience is the only guide to the world. It would seem to be Descartes' view, that nothing at a given time can stand in the necessary relation it must have to be a cause of something at another time; or, only something outside time can be a cause, for whose operation things in time can serve as but occasions. To what extent this dialectic in fact led to later occasionalist views is an historical question we need not consider. My only suggestion here concerns Hume's réponse to the occasionalists. With all but psychological necessity eliminated from his analysis of causation, Hume effectively argues the familiar case that occasional causes are the only causes by arguing the finite divisibility of time. In the literature only Laporte has held that for Descartes time is infinitely divisible and in this sense continuous. The separability of the parts of time, he 120. thought, suffice for their independence and contingency. But if time is continuous, its parts are inseparable; as Gueroult correctly observes, by discontinuity is meant con2 tingence, independence and separability. In addition, if a moment had duration, light would not be propagated instant aneously, thus according to Descartes upsetting his entire 3 physics. Gueroult maintains, rather, that Descartes' view of time is determined by his view of motion. Whatever the historical and logical priorities, there clearly is a connection between the above and what Bergson called the cinematographic conception of motion as a succession of static objects. It is a conception that precludes events as such. Motion occurs only in time, never at the moment, and occurs as a result of the re-creation of matter with regularly differing spatial relations. Due to metaphysical consideration expressed in theological terms, especially with reference to the immutability and simplicity of divine ways, this recreation of matter is constrained in certain ways, some of which we pick out as conditions for what was later called occasional causation. Put very simply, only what is constantly conjoined can stand in this relation; and that there should be instances of constant conjunction follows from the metaphysical considerations. With Hume's elimination of these metaphysical considerations, the status of the conditions, which he takes over as conditions for causation simpliciter, becomes problematic. But a recent challenge to Hume's program is still more problematic. The contention is that there is a case in which Hume's conditions necessary fo constant conjunction cannot all be satisfied. Even worse, i is a case in which his analysis ought to be conspicuously successful, viz. collision, which Hume like Descartes con4 ceives in cinematographic terms. The aim of this paper is to show that Hume's analysis stands against the challenge. Consider the following diagram which illustrates the positions (A3, A_...) of two balls (x,y) at successive moments (t_, t.,...)· 121. A3 A2 A1 A B -B1 B2 B3 fc0 T T T ©© © G®©T©T h fc3 fc4 fc5 H Robert Gray's thesis is that in at least one case of causation, collision which results in... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:119. HUME'S CONDITIONS FOR' CAUSATION: FURTHER TO GRAY AND IMLAY As part of his second proof of the existence of God, Descartes in Meditations III argues a causal premise derived from the nature of time. He argues it follows from the nature of time "that, in order to be conserved in each moment in which it endures, a substance has need of the same power and action as (...) would be necessary to produce and create it anew, supposing it did not yet exist; so that the light of nature shows us clearly that the distinction between creation and conservation is solely a distinction of reason." The nature of time to which he refers allows only a finite divisibility into durationless moments, each of which is entirely independent of every other. In the ultimate analysis, nothing true of one moment is deducible from what is true of any other, even what happens to be eternally true. The doctrine of the creation of the eternal verities is of a piece with this conception of time, and following with it from the conception of the divinity as sheer omnipotence, points to Hume's view that experience is the only guide to the world. It would seem to be Descartes' view, that nothing at a given time can stand in the necessary relation it must have to be a cause of something at another time; or, only something outside time can be a cause, for whose operation things in time can serve as but occasions. To what extent this dialectic in fact led to later occasionalist views is an historical question we need not consider. My only suggestion here concerns Hume's réponse to the occasionalists. With all but psychological necessity eliminated from his analysis of causation, Hume effectively argues the familiar case that occasional causes are the only causes by arguing the finite divisibility of time. In the literature only Laporte has held that for Descartes time is infinitely divisible and in this sense continuous. The separability of the parts of time, he 120. thought, suffice for their independence and contingency. But if time is continuous, its parts are inseparable; as Gueroult correctly observes, by discontinuity is meant con2 tingence, independence and separability. In addition, if a moment had duration, light would not be propagated instant aneously, thus according to Descartes upsetting his entire 3 physics. Gueroult maintains, rather, that Descartes' view of time is determined by his view of motion. Whatever the historical and logical priorities, there clearly is a connection between the above and what Bergson called the cinematographic conception of motion as a succession of static objects. It is a conception that precludes events as such. Motion occurs only in time, never at the moment, and occurs as a result of the re-creation of matter with regularly differing spatial relations. Due to metaphysical consideration expressed in theological terms, especially with reference to the immutability and simplicity of divine ways, this recreation of matter is constrained in certain ways, some of which we pick out as conditions for what was later called occasional causation. Put very simply, only what is constantly conjoined can stand in this relation; and that there should be instances of constant conjunction follows from the metaphysical considerations. With Hume's elimination of these metaphysical considerations, the status of the conditions, which he takes over as conditions for causation simpliciter, becomes problematic. But a recent challenge to Hume's program is still more problematic. The contention is that there is a case in which Hume's conditions necessary fo constant conjunction cannot all be satisfied. Even worse, i is a case in which his analysis ought to be conspicuously successful, viz. collision, which Hume like Descartes con4 ceives in cinematographic terms. The aim of this paper is to show that Hume's analysis stands against the challenge. Consider the following diagram which illustrates the positions (A3, A_...) of two balls (x,y) at successive moments (t_, t.,...)· 121. A3 A2 A1 A B -B1 B2 B3 fc0 T T T ©© © G®©T©T h fc3 fc4 fc5 H Robert Gray's thesis is that in at least one case of causation, collision which results in... (shrink)

Winner of the 1975 National Book Award, this brilliant and widely acclaimed book is a powerful philosophical challenge to the most widely held political and social positions of our age--liberal, socialist, and conservative.