Immanuel Kant's work continues to be a main focus of attention in almost all areas of philosophy. The significance of Kant's work for the so-called continental philosophy cannot be exaggerated, although work in this area is relatively scant. The book includes eight chapters, a substantial introduction and a postscript, all newly written by an international cast of well-known authors. Each chapter focuses on particular aspects of a fundamental problem in Kant's and post-Kantian philosophy, the problem of the relation between the (...) world and transcendence. Chapters fall thematically into three parts: sensibility, nature and religion. Each part starts with a more interpretative chapter focusing on Kant's relevant work, and continues with comparative chapters which stage dialogues between Kant and post-Kantian philosophers, including Martin Heidegger, Hannah Arendt, Jean-François Lyotard, Luce Irigaray and Jacques Derrida. A special feature of this volume is the engagement of each chapter with the work of the late British philosopher Gary Banham. The Postscript offers a subtle and erudite analysis of his intellectual trajectory, philosophy and mode of working. The volume is dedicated to his memory. (shrink)

The past three decades have witnessed the emergence, at the forefront of political thought, of several Kantian theories. Both the critical reaction to consequentialism inspired by Rawlsian constructivism and the universalism of more recent theories informed by Habermasian discourse ethics trace their main sources of inspiration back to Kant's writings. Yet much of what is Kantian in contemporary theory is formulated with more or less strict caveats concerning Kant's metaphysics. These range from radical claims that theories of justice must be (...) political, not metaphysical, to more cautious calls for replacing Kant's metaphysics with a more modest ontology, for instance, one informed by the relatively recent linguistic turn in philosophy. The volume will consist of thirteen state-of-the-art essays which explore the relationship between politics and metaphysics in Kant and Kantian political philosophy. All essays will be published for the first time in this volume and will be preceded by an Introduction from the editors. Given the current "legitimation crisis" of modern liberal democracies, the purpose of the collection as a whole is to revisit the question concerning the role of metaphysics in moral and political philosophy and to suggest new perspectives on the question of legitimation. (shrink)

The Kantian Mind is an outstanding guide and reference source to Kant's thought and essential reading for all students and scholars of Kant and contemporary Kantian thought.

The introduction summarizes the main arguments formulated in the six papers of this special issue on Constitutivism and Kantian Constructivism in Ethical Theory. We highlight the unifying theme addressed in the essays, i.e., the question of whether constitutivism is able to fulfill the promise of providing an account of normativity starting from relatively slender assumptions, including the avoidance of realist presuppositions.

This volume of new essays provides a comprehensive and structured examination of Kant's justification of norms, a crucial but neglected theme in Kantian practical philosophy.

One of the few points of consensus in the Kantian literature is that Kant’s Moral Law is binding universally and unconditionally. Hence, the Moral Law is binding for all human agents (universally) irrespective of the agents’ particular interests (unconditionally). Whether or not we intend to act on the Moral Law, this is the law we ought to follow. Beyond this point of consensus, however, even the most important details are matters of controversy. What exactly does the Moral Law require of (...) us? What, if anything, grounds its bindingness? In particular, does Kant argue that the Moral Law is binding because it is ‘self-legislated’? What is the relation between the Moral Law (supreme principle of morality) and substantive moral laws such as the law that we ought to promote the happiness of others? What does Kant mean by his claim that the will has autonomy? In the four articles discussed in this special issue, Kleingeld proposes novel answers to these questions. This introduction presents the articles and brings to the fore the larger theme tying them all together. (shrink)

Constitutivism aims to justify substantial normative standards as constitutive of practical reason. In this way, it can defend the constructivist commitment to avoiding realism and anti-realism in normative disciplines. This metaphysical debate is the perspective from which the nature of the constitutivist justification is usually discussed. In this paper, I focus on a related, but distinct, debate. My concern will not be whether the substantial normative claims asserted by the constructivist have some elements, which are not constructed, but real, given (...) independently from us; instead, my concern will be more narrowly epistemic – whether those claims can be derived from premises, which are normatively less substantial than the normative conclusions themselves. I focus on Korsgaard’s transcendental articulation of the constitutivist argument. I conclude that more work would need to be done, in order for this argument to function as intended. (shrink)

In his early writings, Kant regarded the autonomy of the will as the supreme principle of morality, as well as the sole principle of all moral laws and of the duties conforming to them. Nevertheless, this impressively sounding principle gradually disappeared from the later Kant’s texts, and there is not much in the literature to explain why. Pauline Kleingeld’s purpose, in the two articles I consider here, is to address this lacuna and to show that there are good philosophical reasons (...) for this principle’s gradual disappearance from the Kantian framework. One of my aims, in this paper, is to formulate and argue for several reservations about Kleingeld’s argument; however, even if these reservations turn out to be apposite, my claim is not that Kant did not actually abandon the Principle of Autonomy; instead, I argue that, even if Kleingeld were right and Kant had abandoned the Principle of Autonomy, he would still not have needed to. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Kant-Studien Jahrgang: 107 Heft: 1 Seiten: 2-33.

The Kantian Mind is an outstanding guide and reference source to Kant's thought and essential reading for all students and scholars of Kant and contemporary Kantian thought.

For several decades, theorists interested in Kant’s discussion of welfare have puzzled over Kant’s position on the issue of the redistribution of goods in society. They have done this both in order to clarify his position and as a source of inspiration for current conceptual problems faced by contemporary political philosophers who attempt to reconcile the ideal of equal freedom with the asymmetric interference necessary for redistribution and social provision. In this paper, I start with Kant’s brief discussion of welfare (...) in Rechtslehre and I identify four claims that Kant clearly asserts as characteristic for his view. I then outline five main interpretative directions in the literature, I evaluate and rank them. The most accurate view of Kant’s justification of welfare, which I call the “genuinely Kantian” position is, however, unable to explain the nature of the duty of welfare that it asserts. By going back to Kant’s text, I suggest one solution. This solution, together with some further questions, can be seen as initiating a new interpretative direction in the literature. (shrink)

The traditionalist interpretation of Kant's idealism reads his Critical philosophy as a version of traditional idealism, à la Berkeley. By contrast, a revolutionary account of Kant will assert the threefold distinction between states of mind, external objects of the world and things in themselves, and will reject the attempt to reduce external objects to states of mind. In this paper, I argue that, while Caird's interpretation is clearly not traditionalist, nor is it obviously revolutionary: he is critical of Kant's threefold (...) distinction, although he fully acknowledges Kant's attempt to uphold this distinction. While arguing for this claim, the paper will examine several classical objections to Kant's Critical philosophy, including the view that things in themselves should be rejected and that Kant's system lacks the unity necessary to account for the variety of distinctions he introduces, including the distinction between phenomena and noumena. (shrink)

In spite of its dominance, there are well-known problems with Rawls’s method of reflective equilibrium (MRE), as a method of justification in meta-ethics. One issue in particular has preoccupied commentators, namely, the capacity of this method to provide a convincing account of the objectivity of our moral beliefs. Call this the Lack-of-Objectivity Charge. One aim of this article is to examine the charge within the context of Rawls’s later philosophy, and I claim that the lack-of-objectivity charge remains unanswered. A second (...) aim of this article is to examine the extent to which, despite Rawls’s express intention to avoid reliance on Kant’s moral philosophy, supplementing Rawls’s political constructivism with some Kantian elements, in particular Kant’s idea of a universal principle of right, not only addresses some of the issues raised by the lack-of-objectivity charge, but also does so without compromising the ability of the Rawlsian account to accommodate the pluralism of conceptions of the good, which he takes to be a fact of modern democracies. I argue for a revised justificatory methodology, which combines Rawls’s MRE and Kant’s Critical Method. (shrink)

In his recent book,The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics, Adrian W. Moore takes Kant to play a crucial role in the evolution of modern philosophy; yet, for him, Kant’s metaphysics is ultimately and profoundly unsatisfactory. In this article, I examine several of Moore’s objections and provide replies. My claim is that Moore’s reading points to fundamental issues, yet these are not issues of Kant’s transcendental idealism, but of the traditional idealism his view has often been taken to represent.

This is the first edited collection comparing the philosophies of Kant and Sartre, an area which has received considerable attention of late. Including 10 newly written comparative essays and an introduction, focusing on metaphysics, metaethics and metaphilosophy; chapters are written by an international cast of authors specialising in the topic.

The secular interpretation of Kant is widespread and Kant is viewed as the most prestigious founding father of liberal secularism. At the same time, however, commentators note that Kant’s position on secularism is in fact much more complex, and some go as far as to talk about an ambiguous secularism in his work. This paper defends a refined version of the secular interpretation. According to this refined version, Kant can offer a limited, political secularism on the basis of a simple (...) argument which focuses on the distinct epistemic statuses of political and religious claims; however, the paper argues, a more general secularism is unwarranted on the basis of the same argument. If my argument is correct, then it will account at least in part for the plurality of interpretations. Moreover, any further attempt to show that Kant’s relation to secularism is ambiguous or dismissive should take into consideration the argument from epistemic grounds presented here. (shrink)

An easily recognizable feature of Sartre’s phenomenological existentialism is his conception of freedom. According to a popular interpretation, we are absolutely free, not only from factual constraints, but also free to create and pursue our own values. In this respect, Sartre appears to continue in a radical direction the Kantian project of making room for freedom in a world colonized by scientific determinism and dogmatic moralism. This chapter challenges the popular reading. It argues that Sartre extends the implications of Kant’s (...) conception of freedom, especially concerning the constraining character of imperatives and principles; yet he acknowledges the need for some limitation on a legitimate account of freedom. This limitation is given by the higher-order values expressed by our free actions. (shrink)

The question of whether desert depends on institutions or institutions on desert continues to divide politicians and political theorists, particularly in disputes over the justification of the welfare state. Even though it is a significant question with direct relevance for issues of economic justice, little has been done so far to evaluate the various positions in dispute and to make explicit the concepts involved. In this paper, I first present the main senses in which the concepts of desert, dependence and (...) institution are used by different desert theorists and I argue that conflicting claims concerning desert's pre/institutional nature may turn out to be compatible and similar claims, inconsistent, when the senses of these concepts are made explicit. Secondly, I identify the senses of 'desert', 'dependence' and 'institution' which are most appropriate for the debate. Thirdly, I argue that, from the perspective of this conceptual framework, it is not possible to decide whether or not desert depends on institutions, unless the framework is supplemented by a more precise specification of the concept of institution. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is threefold. First, I critically examine two dominant Kantian views of practical justification and argue that they cannot provide an appropriate account of the normative force of moral and political principles. Secondly, as the main reason for these unsuccessful attempts, I identify a certain interpretation of Kant's account of practical judgement. Finally, I point to some of the differences between this interpretation and Kant's own claims on practical judgement, in order to suggest an alternative approach; (...) I also note the tension between slogans, like ‘political, not metaphysical” or ‘we must stay philosophically on the surface’, on the one hand, and, on the other, the appeal this alternative approach must make to some elements of Kant's metaphysics. (shrink)

This book challenges the standard view of the relationship between Kant's and Sartre's practical philosophies, making a case for regarding Kant as one of Sartre's most significant predecessors. By using an original comparative methodology, the book identifies several fundamental theses of Sartre's practical philosophy despite the common reading of Sartre as a philosopher without a practical philosophy. Furthermore, the book shows that Sartre's practical philosophy proves to be closer to Kant than dominant contemporary Kantian theories are. Starting from the similarities (...) between Kant and Sartre, the book uncovers the project of a critical ethics which is philosophically more compelling than dominant contemporary Kantian theories. (shrink)

Durante décadas, los teóricos interesados en la discusión de Kant sobre el bienestar han estudiado la postura de Kant sobre la cuestión de la redistribución de bienes en la sociedad. Lo han hecho tanto para aclarar su postura como para una fuente de inspiración para problemas conceptuales actuales, frente a filósofos políticos contemporáneos que intentan reconciliar el ideal de la libertad igualitaria con la necesaria interferencia asimétrica para la redistribución y la provisión social. En este artículo, comienzo por la breve (...) discusión kantiana sobre el estado del bienestar en la Doctrina del derecho e identifico cuatro premisas que Kant afirmó con claridad como características de su postura. Posteriormente, propongo las cinco vías interpretativas principales en la interpretación de la obra de Kant, las evalúo y las ordeno. La interpretación más acertada de la justificación kantiana del bienestar, que llamo la postura “genuinamente kantiana” no llega a explicar, sin embargo, la naturaleza del deber del bienestar que propone. Propongo una solución, retrotrayéndome en los textos kantianos, que unida a otras consideraciones y cuestiones, se puede entender como el punto de partida de una nueva vía de interpretar este tema. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is threefold. First, I critically examine two dominant Kantian views of practical justification and argue that they cannot provide an appropriate account of the normative force of moral and political principles. Secondly, as the main reason for these unsuccessful attempts, I identify a certain interpretation of Kant's account of practical judgement. Finally, I point to some of the differences between this interpretation and Kant's own claims on practical judgement, in order to suggest an alternative approach; (...) I also note the tension between slogans, like ‘political, not meta – physical’ or ‘we must stay philosophically on the surface’, on the one hand, and, on the other, the appeal this alternative approach must make to some elements of Kant's metaphysics. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is threefold. First, I critically examine two dominant Kantian views of practical justification and argue that they cannot provide an appropriate account of the normative force of moral and political principles. Secondly, as the main reason for these unsuccessful attempts, I identify a certain interpretation of Kant's account of practical judgement. Finally, I point to some of the differences between this interpretation and Kant's own claims on practical judgement, in order to suggest an alternative approach; (...) I also note the tension between slogans, like ‘political, not meta – physical’ or ‘we must stay philosophically on the surface’, on the one hand, and, on the other, the appeal this alternative approach must make to some elements of Kant's metaphysics. (shrink)

This work examines concept of sincerity in politics and international relations in order to discuss what we should expect of politicians, within what parameters should they work, and how their decisions and actions could be made consistent with morality. The collection features an international cast of authors who specialize in the topic of sincerity in politics and international relations. Each chapter will be focused on a contemporary issue in politics and international relations, including corruption, public hypocrisy, cynicism, trust, security, policy (...) formulation and decision-making, political apology, public reason, denial and self-deception,and will argue against the background of a Kantian view of sincerity as unconditional. Focusing on sincerity bearing on political actions, practices, and institutions at national and international level, the collection will include an introduction by the editors that will serve to place the contributions in the context of ongoing contemporary debates on sincerity in politics and international theory. Offering a significant comprehensive outlook on the practical limits of sincerity in political affairs, this work will be of great interest to students and scholars alike. (shrink)

John Horton’s work has been particularly influential in debates on specific topics related to toleration, political obligation, modus vivendi and political realism. More recently, he has synthesised these views in the form of a distinctive position in political philosophy, a position that has the potential to question much of the received wisdom in the field. The papers of this special issue engage with some of the most fundamental issues of Horton’s account, more exactly, the related issues of toleration and modus (...) vivendi, Horton’s account of associative obligations, with a focus on the methodological assumptions which underpin his position more generally, and the metaphysical presuppositions of his account, in particular, the presupposition of contingency. I offer brief presentations of the papers in the special issue and of the ways they link with each other. In the discussion of the papers by Forst, Newey, Jones, Weale and Mendus, the emphasis will be on those arguments which question Horton’s position. Horton’s paper will then be presented with a focus on possible responses to these challenges. I will conclude with several remarks on an unexpected continuity between Horton’s realist view and a view realists usually criticise as idealising, namely, John Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness. (shrink)

Kant and Sartre are two of the most significant figures in modern philosophy, and yet there has, until very recently, been little comparative research undertaken on them. Despite dealing with many shared philosophical issues, they have traditionally been taken to be too opposed to each other to render any search for possible parallels between their works a useful enterprise. Indeed, Sartre is often taken to be one of Kant’s most vocal critics in the literature, and as rather indebted to other (...) major figures, such as Husserl and Heidegger. As a consequence, often, where comparative analysis has been done upon Kant and Sartre, the emphasis has been on their differences, rather than on their similarities. However, as recent research has begun to show, the story is not that straightforward and there is much to be explored with regard to parallels between Kant and Sartre. Baiasu has characterised Sartre’s relation to Kant as one of an “anxiety of influence” – Sartre desires to explicitly distance himself from Kant, but this obscures some deeper underlying parallels between them1. Such parallels can form a foundation for productive dialogue, more widely, between the schools of Kantian “Critical philosophy” and existentialism2. (shrink)

Although Kant’s legacy for the subsequent continental tradition is widely acknowledged, studies dedicated to this complex and multifaceted relation are not as widespread. Kant and the Continental T...

Name der Zeitschrift: Kant-Studien Jahrgang: 108 Heft: 3 Seiten: 487-493.