Si pour Trendelenburg les catégories aristotéliciennes sont rattachées au discours, et ensuite par le biais des notions aux choses, il en va différemment pour une part non négligeable du commentarisme médiéval du treizième et du début du quatorzième siècle. Pour cette part, un présupposé réaliste est à l’œuvre : les catégories semblent d’abord ramener aux choses, puisque ce sont des choses. Dans cette optique, l’antique question de la détermination du skopos des Catégories, ou de leur enjeu, se réduit à une (...) question de délimitation de champs disciplinaires : si les catégories sont des choses, de quelle discipline relève la science catégoriale? Cet article se propose d’étudier la réponse-type apportée à cette question par cette tradition réaliste en prenant principalement appui sur les textes de Raoul le Breton. (shrink)

Le conflit des libertés constitue un problème redoutable pour toute théorie des droits fondamentaux, tant du point de vue de leur justification que de leur mise en œuvre. La théorie rawlsienne de la justice comme équité suggère une réponse originale, qui cherche à éviter tant la mise en balance des libertés que leur absolutisation rigide. Le système des libertés de base est strictement prioritaire par rapport à toute autre considération, mais les libertés elles-mêmes ne sont pas, prises individuellement, absolues : (...) elles doivent être ajustées les unes aux autres pour former un système cohérent, où les contradictions sont évitées. Elles ne sont toutefois pas négociables, car cet ajustement doit les réguler sans les restreindre. L’article reconstruit et évalue cette réponse au conflit des libertés. Il montre qu’elle n’est convaincante que si l’on renonce à l’exigence rawlsienne d’une priorité absolue du système des libertés. (shrink)

L’objection la plus ancienne et la plus redoutable à la démocratie fait valoir que le gouvernement par le peuple dessert le gouvernement pour le peuple. Les citoyens manquant pour la plupart de sagesse ou de compétence, le bien commun serait mieux assuré en confiant le pouvoir à un individu éclairé ou à une élite experte. Une réponse commune à cette objection concède la prémisse mais affirme la priorité au gouvernement par le peuple sur le gouvernement pour le peuple : le (...) droit égal à la participation devrait l’emporter sur la promotion de la compétence, même si celle-ci est requise par le bon gouvernement. La démocratie se trouve alors réduite à un ensemble de procédures équitables, traitant les citoyens en égaux ; elle ne se définit plus par la poursuite du bien commun. Il est toutefois une autre réponse à l’objection, qui évite cette dérive vers un procéduralisme étroit. Elle consiste à nier la prémisse et à affirmer la sagesse politique du peuple. Il n’est pas vrai que le gouvernement pour le peuple serait mieux assuré en confiant le pouvoir à un petit nombre de sages ou d’experts, fussent-ils les meilleurs parmi les citoyens. Cette thèse remarquable peut paraître improbable. Sa défense peut pourtant s’appuyer sur l’un des arguments les plus intrigants élaborés par la philosophie politique aristotélicienne, qui inspire et éclaire les controverses philosophiques contemporaines sur la valeur du régime démocratique : l’argument de la sagesse de la multitude. (shrink)

L’idéal démocratique est accusé d’être irréaliste. Le gouvernement du peuple par le peuple et pour le peuple serait une chimère dans les sociétés contemporaines. Il faudrait lui préférer les visées plus modestes associées à l’élection : un droit de vote égal et la satisfaction du plus grand nombre. La démocratie ne se laisse pourtant pas réduire à la compétition électorale. Les acteurs et les institutions politiques qui s’en réclament invoquent non seulement un marché, où rivalisent des intérêts privés, mais un (...) forum, où s’affrontent des visions adverses de la justice. Ils attendent de la délibération collective qu’elle serve l’autonomie politique et le bien commun, mais savent aussi qu’elle peut les menacer, lorsque la liberté, l’égalité ou la publicité lui font défaut. Cette enquête philosophique interroge la pertinence de l’idéal démocratique pour des sociétés complexes, dotées d’institutions représentatives et soumises à la communication de masse. Elle montre à quelles conditions cet idéal peut aujourd’hui orienter la critique et l’action. Les citoyens peuvent encore aspirer à se gouverner eux-mêmes, donc à délibérer en égaux. -/- The democratic ideal is accused of being unrealistic. Government of the people by the people and for the people would be a chimera in contemporary societies. The more modest aims associated with election should be preferred: equal suffrage and the satisfaction of the greatest number. But democracy cannot be reduced to electoral competition. The political actors and institutions that claim it invoke not only a market, where private interests compete, but also a forum, where opposing visions of justice confront each other. They expect collective deliberation to serve political autonomy and the common good, but they also know that it can threaten them when it lacks freedom, equality or publicity. This philosophical inquiry questions the relevance of the democratic ideal for complex societies with representative institutions and subject to mass communication. It shows under what conditions a deliberative understanding of this ideal can today orient criticism and action. Citizens can still aspire to govern themselves, hence to deliberate as equals. (shrink)

Hervaeus Natalis distinguishes two types of items that can have esse obiective in the intellect: objects of acts of intellection (man, this cat, etc.) and properties unapprehended by these acts, or background properties (being a species, being a particular, etc.), that are beings of reason. Yet, his conception of the esse obiective of objects evolved. First, he had a neutral conception of esse obiective: items presenting themselves to the intellect are cognized, transparently, without being altered in the process. Later, he (...) developed an ontologically committing conception of the objective being of objects: items presenting themselves to the intellect take on rational being (esse rationis) as such. This evolution transpires because Hervaeus introduces intentional relations as what makes the cognized item be objectively in the intellect and includes them within the class of background properties (being of reason). Both these conceptions manage to account for our access to extra-mental things. -/- . (shrink)

Many contemporary philosophies of democracy agree that public deliberation plays an essential role in the making of legitimate political decisions. However, this consensus masks significant disagreement concerning the exact source of its value, as it is alternatively located in its impact on participants, in its expressive value, in its fairness, or in the quality of the decisions it produces. These rival justifications of democratic deliberation have different, and sometimes contradictory, consequences for political practices and institutions. This article analyses these justifications (...) to decide between them and to clarify how they relate to each other. It develops an original justification of democratic deliberation by showing that it treats citizens fairly as listeners if not speakers. While it is not certain that democratic deliberation makes it in general more likely to reach a good decision, it makes the conditions for political judgement less unequal. (shrink)

Mill’s claim that representative government can be democratic, and as such “the ideally best form of government”, rests on the virtues of public deliberation, which he sees both as a means for pursuing just political decisions and as a means of participation for the widest citizenry. His view has been criticized, by Schmitt in particular, for assuming that free discussion can dissolve the conflict of social forces and that it leads to the discovery of the truth. But does it really (...) depend on such premises? The focus of the paper is the tension between the search for truth and the need for inclusion in Mill’s theory of representative government. An examination of the role played by freedom of discussion suggests that far from sublimating social conflict or guaranteeing the correctness of political decisions, the deliberative process regulates the conflict of opinions, understood as a violent struggle over truth, on an egalitarian basis. (shrink)

Les nouveaux médias représentent-ils une menace ou un progrès pour la presse en régime démocratique ? À partir d’une analyse du rôle politique de la presse, qui contribue au droit de chacun à gouverner, Charles Girard s’interroge sur le renouvellement du métier de journaliste et sur les modes de délibération démocratique.

Abstact : This article provides a critical examination of David Estlund’s epistemic proceduralism. Epistemic proceduralism suggests a promising way to justify democracy without renouncing the pursuit of truth. By making the legitimacy and authority of democratic institutions dependent on their general tendency to produce good decisions, rather than on the correctness of their results or on their mere procedural fairness, it shows that they can to be connected to substantial standards, such as justice, without ignoring the persistence of moral disagreements. (...) By subjecting political procedures to a dual requirement, both epistemic and egalitarian, it suggests that a mixed conception of the value of democracy can be articulated. But by refusing to take sides on the nature of truth, on the choice of the relevant substantial standard, or on the moral theory defining the constraints that equal respect imposes on the choice of political procedures, epistemic proceduralism fails in my view to offer a convincing defence of democracy. In order to explain what makes democracy valuable, a philosophical conception must take a position on the nature of truth, justice and equality. -/- Résumé : Cet article propose une relecture critique du procéduralisme épistémique élaboré par David Estlund. Cette théorie suggère une voie prometteuse pour justifier démocratie sans renoncer à la poursuite de de la vérité. En proposant de faire dépendre la légitimité et l’autorité des procédures démocratiques de leur tendance générale à produire de bonnes décisions, plutôt que de la justesse constante de leurs résultats ou à l’inverse de leur seule équité procédurale, il montre qu’elles peuvent être reliées à une visée substantielle, telle la justice, sans ignorer pour autant la persistance des désaccords à son endroit. En soumettant ces procédures à une double exigence, à la fois épistémique et égalitaire, il montre qu’une conception mixte de la valeur de la démocratie est concevable. Mais en refusant de prendre parti sur la nature de la vérité, sur le choix du critère objectif devant guider l’évaluation des décisions politiques ou sur la théorie morale permettant d’expliciter les contraintes que l’égal égard dû aux personnes impose au choix des procédures, le procéduralisme épistémique s’interdit de construire une justification convaincante de la démocratie. Une justification philosophique de la démocratie doit, pour rendre compte de ce qui fait sa valeur, prendre position sur la nature de la vérité, de la justice et de l’égalité. (shrink)

Le droit d’offenser est partie intégrante de la liberté d’expression. Sa justification repose sur la distinction entre les dogmes, qui peuvent faire l’objet de critiques ou de moqueries, et les individus qui peuvent y adhérer. Sans elle, les désaccords moraux et religieux ne pourraient plus s’exprimer dans l’espace public.

In the Physics, Aristotle says that there is no change associated with the category of relatives. In this paper, I examine a widespread but neglected strategy that medieval thinkers use to understand Aristotle’s claim. According to this strategy, which I label initial presence, if there is no change in the category of relatives, it is because the relation-properties are already present in their subject as soon as the properties on which relation-properties are founded exist. Appreciating the importance of this strategy (...) is crucial not only for understanding medieval theories of relation but also for assessing the credibility of arguments used in the secondary literature to interpret medieval texts, in particular a well-known passage from Thomas Aquinas’s commentary on the Physics. (shrink)

In “The Meaning of Rights,” Norman Wilde offers an original account of rights, still of interest. Rights, he contends, are possessed by an individual by virtue of the social function she fulfills. It is because individuals belong to a common social order, in which each has her part to play, that they are “entitled to the conditions necessary for playing it” [288]. This approach allows for a nuanced view, according to which rights are neither absolutely inherent to the individual nor (...) entirely dependent on social conventions. But is such a function-based justification of rights plausible? (shrink)

Les sciences humaines se distinguent les unes des autres par leurs méthodes et leurs objets privilégiés. En élaborant des procédures d’enquête spécifiques, elles s’efforcent de comprendre la vie psychique ou les pratiques collectives, la distribution des populations ou les rapports entre groupes, les idéaux sociaux ou les échanges matériels. Leur fin commune est toutefois d’éclairer de leurs lumières croisées une même réalité humaine et sociale. Leurs objets ont donc vocation à se rejoindre, leurs méthodes à se compléter. En interrogeant leur (...) pluralité sans la reconduire à une illusoire unité, la philosophie peut éclairer l’espace conceptuel et problématique qu’elles ont en commun. Elle ne ressort toutefois pas indemne d’une telle étude : ses propres questionnements, épistémologiques et politiques, se trouvent radicalement altérés par leur confrontation à ces disciplines. Les contributions réunies dans le second tome de cet ouvrage analysent, dans cette perspective neuf concepts essentiels : la population, le psychisme, la pratique, les classes, le genre, la comparaison, les statistiques, le public et la critique. -/- Ont contribué à ce volume : Ét. Bimbenet, J. Christ, I. Drouet, R. Fanciullacci, S. Ferrando, Ch. Girard, F. Hulak, A. Le Goff, L. Paltrinieri, L. Perreau. (shrink)

La liberté d’expression est reconnue par les régimes démocratiques et les conventions internationales des droits de l’homme comme un droit fondamental. Est-elle pour autant absolue, comme l’affirment certains philosophes qui refusent qu’elle soit mise en balance avec d’autres droits ou principes? Cet article considère la signification de la thèse absolutiste et examine deux de ses principales défenses philosophiques, proposées par Alexander Meiklejohn et Thomas Scanlon. Il montre que ces théories échouent à établir la liberté d’expression comme un droit absolu : (...) elles ne parviennent ni à justifier la priorité stricte qu’elles lui accordent par rapport à tout autre droit ou principe, ni à le spécifier et à le délimiter de manière à rendre une telle priorité praticable. (shrink)

According to Franz Brentano, every mental act includes a representation of itself. Hence, Brentano can be described as maintaining that: reflexivity, when it occurs, is included as a part in mental acts; and reflexivity always occurs. Brentano’s way of understanding the inclusion of reflexivity in mental acts entails double intentionality in mental acts. The aim of this paper is to show that the conjunction of and is not uncommon in the history of philosophy. To that end, the theories of two (...) medieval thinkers, namely, Walter Chatton and Durand of Saint-Pourçain, are presented. The repeated conjunction of and paves the way for a more general distinction than that between subjectivist and objectivist theories of reflexivity, namely, one between automatic theories of reflexivity and apperceptive theories of reflexivity. (shrink)

If democracy is to be understood as government by and for the people, popular judgment has to be competent : decision-making procedures need to be both inclusive and effective. In this paper I consider a condition for the competence of the people : the existence of a public sphere propitious to the public contestation of political decisions. By comparing the contestatory (Pettit) and epistemic (Cohen, Estlund) models of democracy, I first show that contestability can only ground democratic legitimacy if popular (...) contestation operates partly via the public sphere. I then claim that that it is unrealistic to expect that the actions of media agents will spontaneously produce an appropriate deliberative context provided that freedom of expression and media pluralism are legally protected, as some suggest (Page). Finally, I conclude that the space for public contestation must be instituted, which implies that the regulatory resources offered by journalistic ethics, social criticism and media law should be exploited. (shrink)

The categories of acting and undergoing are not really examined in the Aristotelian treatise. This article aims at showing how the anonymous author of the Book of six principles analyses them in trying to fill this void. By doing so, the article underlines how this analysis philosophically relates to some technical problems discussed in the neo-platonician exegetic tradition of Aristotle’s Categories. It makes reference to some thir-teenth- and fourteenth- century commentaries on the Book of six principles both to present how (...) this text was interpretated and to give a glance at how the conceptions of these two categories came to evolve. (shrink)

La délibération publique entre citoyens doit-elle être le fondement de la légitimité proprement démocratique des décisions politiques? Cet article analyse les arguments avancés en ce sens par les premiers écrits sur la démocratie délibérative. Si la délibération individuelle est requise par la recherche de l’autonomie personnelle et de la satisfaction de l’intérêt particulier, la délibération collective n’est quant à elle une condition ni nécessaire ni suffisante pour atteindre l’autonomie politique et le bien commun. Elle seule permet toutefois de poursuivre ces (...) fins en égaux. (shrink)

Cet article propose une relecture critique du procéduralisme épistémique élaboré par David Estlund. Cette théorie suggère une voie prometteuse pour justifier démocratie sans renoncer à la poursuite de la vérité. En proposant de faire dépendre la légitimité et l’autorité des procédures démocratiques de leur tendance générale à produire de bonnes décisions, plutôt que de la justesse constante de leurs résultats ou à l’inverse de leur seule équité procédurale, il montre qu’elles peuvent être reliées à une visée substantielle, telle la justice, (...) sans ignorer pour autant la persistance des désaccords à son endroit. En soumettant ces procédures à une double exigence, à la fois épistémique et égalitaire, il montre qu’une conception mixte de la valeur de la démocratie est concevable. Mais en refusant de prendre parti sur la nature de la vérité, sur le choix du critère objectif devant guider l’évaluation des décisions politiques ou sur la théorie morale permettant d’expliciter les contraintes que l’égal égard dû aux personnes impose au choix des procédures, le procéduralisme épistémique s’interdit de construire une justification convaincante de la démocratie. Une justification philosophique de la démocratie doit, pour rendre compte de ce qui fait sa valeur, prendre position sur la nature de la vérité, de la justice et de l’égalité. (shrink)

The article deals with four questions that are, in general, present at the beginning of commentaries to the Book of six principles : 1. To what discipline does the treatise belong ? 2. What is the subject of the treatise and under what mode is it considered ? 3. Why is this treatise set apart from Aristotle’s Categories ? 4. Why speak of “principles” there ? Commentaries of the second half of the thirteenth century and of the beginning of the (...) fourteenth century are taken under consideration (unedited for the most part). (shrink)

Les théories récentes de la démocratie délibérative se désintéressent largement de la politique de masse : supposant que seul le contexte du face à face rend possible la délibération, elles rejettent d’emblée l’idée que celle-ci puisse passer par la communication de masse. La pertinence de l’idéal délibératif pour les régimes démocratiques contemporains dépend pourtant de la possibilité d’une telle délibération médiatisée. Elle est certes difficile à concevoir : dans la mesure où la communication de masse est difficile à réguler, propice (...) à la passivité, fragmentée et asymétrique, elle paraît peu apte à accueillir une délibération normée, engagée, publique et égalitaire. Il est toutefois possible de concevoir un concept satisfaisant de délibération médiatisée, en révisant notre compréhension de la délibération et en tenant compte des ressources spécifiques que les médias offrent pour l’échange public des raisons entre citoyens égaux. Cet article considère les conditions de possibilité d’une telle délibération. (shrink)

Si pour Trendelenburg les catégories aristotéliciennes sont rattachées au discours, et ensuite par le biais des notions aux choses, il en va différemment pour une part non négligeable du commentarisme médiéval du treizième et du début du quatorzième siècle. Pour cette part, un présupposé réaliste est à l’œuvre : les catégories semblent d’abord ramener aux choses, puisque ce sont des choses. Dans cette optique, l’antique question de la détermination du skopos des Catégories, ou de leur enjeu, se réduit à une (...) question de délimitation de champs disciplinaires : si les catégories sont des choses, de quelle discipline relève la science catégoriale ? Cet article se propose d’étudier la réponse-type apportée à cette question par cette tradition réaliste en prenant principalement appui sur les textes de Raoul le Breton. (shrink)

The chapter aims at reconstructing Gregory of Rimini's view on universals in absence of the full-bodied treatment Gregory himself promised in his work. According to Gregory, there is nothing universal outside the mind, and universal concepts are made-up on the basis of prior cognitions. In absence of Gregory's explicit statements of the matter, I argue that these concepts must most probably be qualities in the mind that are really distinct from acts of cognition and remain in the mind even if (...) they are not targeted by an actual act of cognition. (shrink)

Les sciences humaines ont en partage des concepts. L’histoire et la géographie, la sociologie et l’anthropologie, l’économie et la linguistique, la psychologie et la psychanalyse trouvent leur unité dans l’usage divers qu’elles en font, plutôt que dans un objet commun aux contours incertains. Pour s’établir comme sciences, elles ont dû affronter les problèmes épistémologiques, ontologiques et pratiques qu’ils suscitent ou révèlent. En s’efforçant d’éclairer le sens et l’efficace de ces concepts, en rendant compte de l’articulation et de l’évolution de ces (...) problèmes, la philosophie peut contribuer au développement des sciences humaines. Elle ouvre aussi pour elle-même un accès plus sûr à leurs savoirs et questionnements, sans lesquels elle ne saurait désormais avancer. Les contributions réunies dans ce recueil explorent, dans cette perspective, neufs concepts essentiels : la causalité, les normes, l’interaction, l’événement, la nature, la société, l’inconscient, l’expérimentation et la neutralité. -/- Ont contribué à ce volume : C. Bonicco-Donato, F. Callegaro, P. Charbonnier, E. Debray, P. Demeulenaere, S. Dupouy, C. Girard, F. Hulak, C. Pagès, R. Ogien. (shrink)

Abstract : This introduction to a special issue on "Normes and normativity" emphasizes the difficulties and challenges of distinguishing between a positive approach and a normative approach to norms in economics. Collective life is organized by norms, however the mere fact that they regularly influence behaviours does not imply their desirability. A strict description of norms may require consideration of ethical issues, which may be reported by different methods; choosing among norms however is an activity of a fundamentally normative nature, (...) which questions the legitimacy of decisions and evaluations. The very possibility of a demarcation between is and ought is not straightforward. In welfare economics in particular, the standard approaches that aim to avoid value judgements (welfarism) or to isolate them (axiomatics) can be problematic. To conclude, we present the four articles in the special issue meant to illustrate these issues regarding the nature, knowledge, value of norms and the positive-normative distinction. -/- Résumé : Cette introduction à un dossier thématique sur le thème "Normes et normativité" insiste sur les difficultés et les enjeux de la distinction entre les approches positives et normatives des normes en économie. La vie collective est organisée par des normes, mais qu’elles ordonnent les comportements dans les faits n’impliquent pas qu’elles soient désirables. Une stricte description des normes peut nécessiter de prendre en compte les questions éthiques, lesquelles peuvent être traduites par différentes méthodes ; choisir les normes en revanche est une activité de nature fondamentalement normative, qui interroge la légitimité des décisions et des évaluations. La possibilité même de démarcation entre positif et normatif ne va pas de soi : en particulier en économie du bien-être, les approches standards qui visent à éviter les jugements de valeur (le welfarisme) ou à les isoler (l’axiomatique) peuvent s’avérer problématiques. Pour conclure, nous présentons les quatre articles du numéro qui illustrent ces questionnements relatifs à la nature, la connaissance, la valeur des normes et la distinction entre normatif et positif. (shrink)

In an age of sharply increasing cultural polarization that has led many people to consider retreat into enclaves of the like-minded, this book seeks to persuade its readers that we need better quality conversations across ideological camps, and that the writings of Søren Kierkegaard and René Girard provide very effective tools for facilitating such conversations. The writings of Kenneth Burke are also drawn on, as an important bridge figure who influenced Girard. All three thinkers can lead us to (...) careful reflections on the psychological and social roots of violent behavior, which is a crucially important topic in need of deeper and broader understanding."-- Back cover. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:"The Crowd Is Untruth": A Comparison of Kierkegaard and Girard Charles K. Bellinger University of Virginia The purpose ofthis essay is to provide an introductory comparison of the writings of Soren Kierkegaard and René Girard. To my knowledge, a substantial secondary article or book has not been written on this subject.1 Girard's writings themselves contain only a handful of references to Kierkegaard.2 This deficiency is (...) unfortunate, since, as I hope to show in the following pages, these two authors do share common insights into the psychology ofviolence. Girard's writings usually take the form of a scientific analysis of historical data. He is attempting to frame a theory of culture which takes into account all of the data which he has encountered. It would seem that Kierkegaard's mode of thought is very different, since he is primarily concerned with the meaning of personal existence before God. But 1 Eugene Webb's Philosophers of Consciousness and The Self Between contain discussions ofKierkegaard and Girard, but they are basically parallel sections which do not include a focused comparison of the two authors. David McCracken's The Scandal ofthe Gospels makes reference to Girard and contains a chapter on Kierkegaard, but it also lacks an extended comparison. 2 See Girard 1984, 58; 1986, 173; 1988, 26-7. In his Foreword to Robert HamertonKelly (xi), Girard says, "Mimetic theory is too realistic and commonsensical to be confused with one more nihilistic stepchild ofGerman idealism. And yet, unlike the positivistic social sciences, it is not blind to paradox; it can articulate the intricacies of human relations just as effectively as a Kierkegaard or a Dostoievsky." 104Charles K Bellinger Kierkegaard was in his own way and in his own time a kind of social scientist. He engaged in an extended "anthropological contemplation" (1967-1978, 1:37), in which he attempted to map out the territory of the human spirit. Girard's thought, for its part, occasionally steps outside ofthe methodological atheism of the scientific guild to speak in theological terms. Thus in both realms, the scientific and the theological, there is the possibility of fruitful dialogue between these two authors. I am assuming that the readers ofthis essay are more familiar with the writings of Girard than with the writings of Kierkegaard. My procedure will therefore involve listing certain key concepts in Girard's thought, such as mimetic desire, envy, the social crisis, etc., followed by a search for parallel ideas in Kierkegaard. IfGirard were claiming complete originality for his interpretation of culture, my findings would show that he was in many respects foreshadowed by Kierkegaard. But, of course, he is not claiming this. He claims only to be restating and organizing insights which have already been achieved by great novelists and the Bible. I would argue that Kierkegaard is rightly seen as one of the great "novelists" who sees human culture clearly and penetratingly. It is not a coincidence that Kierkegaard's thought, like Girard's, is rooted in an interpretation ofthe Bible. After this initial survey ofsimilarities between Kierkegaard and Girard, I will outline a few possible differences between their approaches. This will lead to comments on the way in which Kierkegaard's thought can be used as a basis for understanding the motives which underlie political violence. Consequently Kierkegaard's thought can be coordinated with Girard's in such a way that the thought ofeach author is strengthened by the contribution of the other. Mimetic desire Mimetic desire is the main starting point for Girard's theory of personality and culture. Human beings have a basic feeling ofexistential lack that leads them to look to a model who seems to possess a greater fullness of being. The desires of the model are imitated in the hope of acquiring a similar fullness ofbeing. In Girard's words: When modem theorists envisage man as a being who knows what he wants, or who at least possesses an "unconscious" that knows for him, they may simply have failed to perceive the domain in which human uncertainty is most extreme. Once his Kierkegaard and Girard105 basic needs are satisfied (indeed, sometimes even before), man is subject to intense desires, though he may not... (shrink)

Early nineteenth century systematists sought to describe what they called the Natural System or the Natural Classification. In the nineteenth century, there was no agreement about the basis of observed patterns of similarity between organisms. What did these systematists think they were doing, when they named taxa, proposed relationships between taxa, and arranged taxa into representational schemes? In this paper I explicate Charles Frederic Girard’s (1822–1895) theory and method of systematics. A student of Louis Agassiz, and subsequently (1850–1858) (...) a collaborator with Spencer Baird, Girard claimed that natural classificatory methods do not presuppose either a special creationist or an evolutionary theory of the natural world. The natural system, in Girard’s view, comprises three distinct ways in which organisms can be related to each other. Girard analyzed these relationships, and justified his classificatory methodology, by appeal to his embryological and physiological work. Girard offers an explicit theoretical answer to the question, what characters are evidence for natural classificatory hypotheses? I show that the challenge of simultaneously depicting the three distinct types of relationship led Girard to add a third dimension to his classificatory diagrams. (shrink)

The reputations of scientists among their contemporaries depend not only on accomplishment, but also on interactions affected by influence and personality. The historical lore of most fields of scientific endeavor preserve these reputations, often through the identification of founders, innovators, and prolific workers whose contributions are considered fundamental to progress in the field. Historians frequently rely on the historical lore of scientists to guide their studies of the development of ideas, exhibiting justifiable caution in reassessing reputations in the light of (...) current knowledge. However, the transmission of historical lore can obscure the relative importance of accomplishment, influence and personality in shaping contemporary reputations, leaving the historian to either accept reputations at face value or attempt to reconstruct the context in which they were created. The science of taxonomy, because of its rules of priority, leaves a relatively accurate record of historical accomplishment through the persistence of taxa in catalogues and faunal guides. These records allow the modern historian an unbiased means to assess the relative accomplishments of historical figures and therefore a means to critically reassess reputations independent of personality and influence. In the historical lore of North American ichthyology, Louis Agassiz at Harvard and Spencer Baird at the Smithsonian emerge as central figures in the early development of the field during the mid-1800s, contributing not only through the quality and quantity of their science, but also through their roles as institutional leaders and mentors to workers who followed. Charles Girard, originally a student of Agassiz's and later a coworker with Baird, receives little notice in the history of ichthyology, and his reputation is that of a minor player in the initial description of the North American fish fauna, and one whose work appears to have been flawed or even careless when compared to his contemporaries. However, a review of both contemporary and modern taxonomic works reveals that Girard's productivity far exceeded that of either Agassiz or Baird. Furthermore, an examination of the tendency of Girard and his contemporaries to introduce synonymous names into the literature, which might reflect careless or uncritical work, suggests that Girard was among the more accomplished workers of his era, including Agassiz and Baird. Girard's low ranking in the folklore of North American ichthyology, therefore, can not be attributed to discernible shortcomings in his scientific work, but rather to a public and private campaign of criticism waged by Agassiz after Girard's departure from Harvard. While Agassiz's dispute with Girard stemmed from their personal interactions, he expressed them as criticisms of Girard's work, and thus helped shape Girard's scientific reputation as it has been transmitted through the lore of ichthyology. This case study reveals how scientific reputation may not always rest on accomplishment, but can be influenced by personal interactions obscured by time but nonetheless important to history. (shrink)

Selfhood and Sacrifice is an original exploration of the ideas of two major contemporary thinkers.

In _René Girard and Secular Modernity: Christ, Culture, and Crisis_, Scott Cowdell provides the first systematic interpretation of René Girard’s controversial approach to secular modernity. Cowdell identifies the scope, development, and implications of Girard’s thought, the centrality of Christ in Girard's thinking, and, in particular, Girard's distinctive take on the uniqueness and finality of Christ in terms of his impact on Western culture. In Girard’s singular vision, according to Cowdell, secular modernity has emerged thanks (...) to the Bible’s exposure of the cathartic violence that is at the root of religious prohibitions, myths, and rituals. In the literature, the psychology, and most recently the military history of modernity, Girard discerns a consistent slide into an apocalypse that challenges modern ideas of romanticism, individualism, and progressivism._ In the first three chapters, Cowdell examines the three elements of Girard’s basic intellectual vision and brings this vision to a constructive interpretation of “secularization” and “modernity,” as these terms are understood in the broadest sense today. Chapter 4 focuses on modern institutions, chiefly the nation state and the market, that function to restrain the outbreak of violence. And finally, Cowdell discusses the apocalyptic dimension of Girard's theory in relation to modern warfare and terrorism. Here, Cowdell engages with the most recent writings of Girard and applies them to further conversations in cultural theology, political science, and philosophy. Cowdell takes up and extends Girard’s own warning concerning an alternative to a future apocalypse: “What sort of conversion must humans undergo, before it is too late?” "Scott Cowdell's book is the first comprehensive study of modernity and secularity in René Girard's thought. Cowdell brings Girard's theory into a fruitful dialogue with leading approaches on secularization like those of Max Weber, Hans Blumenberg, Peter Berger, and Charles Taylor. Scholars and students of theology, philosophy, and sociology will benefit from this wide-ranging overview of the relationship between religion, modernity, and secularization." — Wolfgang Palaver, Institute of Systematic Theology, University of Innsbruck __ "In a stunning analysis, Cowdell shows that Girard’s sustained intellectual pursuit, which began in the 1960s with his mimetic analysis of modern realist fiction, has always been about the religiosity of the modern and postmodern social condition, even when it has dealt explicitly with the religious origins of antique culture. Cowdell demonstrates the 'highly explanatory and predictive' quality of Girard’s cultural anthropology, within which the 'secular' does not escape the 'religious.' This is a powerful book." — Ann W. Astell, University of Notre Dame __ "Scott Cowdell is one of the most interesting theological voices of his generation. The themes in Cowdell's work are always cosmic and vast in scope. This is a remarkable reading of our contemporary situation through the lens of René Girard. Accurate, informed, and illuminating, Cowdell has written a fabulous book. For the person needing a way into Girard and for the person who is already using Girard's work, Cowdell brings out the implications of Girard for the moment in which we live. An absolutely essential addition to your personal library." — The Very Rev Dr. Ian Markham, Virginia Theological Seminary_. (shrink)

A theory of human origins that is one-half Charles Darwin and one-half Cain and Abel is bound to entail a lot of rethinking of traditional themes. Rene Girard's thesis of original human violence and the Bible's power to reveal it has been around for more than a generation, but its consequences for Christian theology are still only slowly being unpacked. Anthony Bartlett's book makes a signal contribution, representing an astonishing leap forward in understanding what a biblical disclosure of (...) founding violence means for Christian thought and life. If human language arose directly out of the primal experience of murder, then semiotics becomes a core area for theological examination. Tracing the discipline of semiotics through postmodern thinkers, then back through its birth in the Latin era, Bartlett shows how Girard's thought is itself a semiotic emergence, beyond standard Christian metaphysics. Above all, Girardian theory of human signs demands we see the generative impact of violence in our language and thought, and then, conversely, that the Word of God, crucified without retaliation and risen in the same identity, brings a totally new sign and relation into history, offering a thoroughgoing transformation of human life and meaning. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to describe the evolution of the fundamental guidelines according to René Girard’s interpretation of the Oedipus myth. After close examination, it appears Girard’s methodology is based on four complementary levels: (1) the common-sense tracking of sacrificial substitutions; (2) the careful analysis of symmetries and dissymmetries in mythical texts; (3) the identification of cross-cultural and historical persecution stereotypes; (4) the application of the common standard of evidence (i.e. guilty beyond a reasonable doubt) for (...) criminal conviction. Throughout the paper, we will show that Girard’s approach bears strong resemblance with William Whewell’s method of consilience as well as Charles Sanders Peirce’s views of the historical sciences. (shrink)

In 1988, Nadine Dormoy conducted a series of interviews with Rene Girard after a number of books and conferences had situated his work in a new context of research on self-organizing systems. In these interviews, Girard discusses the intellectual activity that followed the 1982 Stanford University conference, Disorder and Order. Girard also discusses Theater of Envy, his book on Shakespeare, as well as corrects several misunderstandings of his mimetic hypothesis.

René Girard afirma que a sua teoria sobre a origem da origem cultura è um longo argumento, em palavras de Charles Darwin, com quem o autor francês encontra uma afinidade notável: tanto Darwin como ele próprio, diz Girard, concebem o sacrìfício como o fundamento da ordem natural e da cultura humana. Foi dito que, como o evolucionismo darwiniano, a teoria mimètica de Girard "propõe uma dinâmica, mostra uma evolução e tenta apresentar uma explicação universal" (Michel Serres). (...) O propósito desta comunicação è examinar a tese da analogia de ambas as teorias à luz de uma dupla interrogação: A teoria da origem da cultura de René Girard pode ser considerada um desenvolvimento possível do evolucionismo de Darwin? Ou, pelo contrário, a afinidade entre as duas doutrinas consiste meramente na inclusão de fenómenos de violência e de sacrificio no processo etològico e antropológico de hominização e evolução cultural? Defendo que a teorìa mimètica de Girard segue a via científica da doutrina evolucionista de Darwin e que a presença em ambas da violência e do sacrificio não è meramente circunstancial. René Girard has stated that his theory of the origin of culture is one long argument, in words borrowed from Charles Darwin, with whom the French author finds a remarkable affinity: both Darwin and himself, says Girard, conceive of sacrifice as being the foundation of natural order and of human culture. It has been said that, like Darwins, Girards mimetic theory "proposes a dynamic, shows an evolution and intends to give a universal explanation' (Michel Serres). The purpose of this paper is to examine the thesis of the analogy of both theories in the light of a main double question: Is Girard's theory of the orìgin of culture a possible development of Darwin's evolutionism? or, on the contrary: Does the affinity between both doctrines consist merely of the inclusion of violence and sacrifice in the ethological and anthropological process conducing to hominization and cultural development? I argue that Girard's mimetic theory follows the scientific path of Darwin's doctrine of evolution and that the presence in both works of violence and sacrifice is not merely circumstantial. (shrink)

Des droits fondamentaux au fondement du droit, le lien semble non seulement direct, mais évident. Or l'examen des différents discours théoriques sur le droit montre qu'il n'en est rien. Le livre de Charlotte Girard analyse précisément les différences de traitement du rapport entre ces deux termes dans les discours théoriques juridiques, en particulier ceux qui posent la question du fondement du droit. Soit l'étude des droits fondamentaux se distingue de celle du fondement du droit - les droits fondamentaux ne (...) mènent pas naturellement au fondement du droit -, soit on associe les deux notions - les droits fondamentaux sont au fondement même du droit. Or cette distinction renvoie à ce que la théorie du droit différencie traditionnellement : les approches juspositiviste d'une part et jusnaturaliste d'autre part. La confrontation de ces discours théoriques à la question du fondement du droit, qu'elle se traduise ou non par les droits fondamentaux, révèle une certaine fragilité des présupposés respectifs de ces discours. En réalité, le fondement du droit n'est pas seulement un élément de débat juridique et normatif, mais il relève aussi et surtout d'un débat politique et institutionnel. C'est en effet en raison de son caractère normatif que le fondement du droit - quel que soit le discours qui le porte, y compris le discours juridique théorique - appartient pleinement au champ politique. (shrink)

C’est le grand apport du livre d’Eudes Girard et de Thomas Daum, deux jeunes géographes fous de cette discipline, que de nous offrir une nouvelle perspective sur la géographie, sur cette « graphie » de la « Terre » ...

In the process of completing his critical edition of Marcus of Orvieto's Liber de Moralitatibus, Girard J. Etzkorn happened upon a set of questions attributed to Henry of Ghent at the end of Rome's Bibliotheca Angelica codex 750. These questions are edited in this volume under the proviso "attributed to" so that scholars may compare the texts with other works of the Ghentian master known to be authentic. Etzkorn concludes that the ten questions appear to be of two literary (...) genres. Moreover, the ten questions seem to be "selected" questions and were not likely disputed at the same time. Future investigations are essential to find out if the questions may indeed be attributed to Henry himself or whether they were written by one of Henry's disciples who was copying the thoughts and words of the master. (shrink)

One of science's greatest intellects examines how people and animals display fear, anger, and pleasure. Darwin based this 1872 study on his personal observations, which anticipated later findings in neuroscience. Abounding in anecdotes and literary quotations, the book is illustrated with 21 figures and seven photographic plates. Its direct approach, accessible to professionals and amateurs alike, continues to inspire and inform modern research in psychology.