This paper addresses the questions concerningthe relationship between scientific andcognitive processes. The fact that both,science and cognition, aim at acquiring somekind of knowledge or representationabout the world is the key for establishing alink between these two domains. It turns outthat the constructivist frameworkrepresents an adequate epistemologicalfoundation for this undertaking, as its focusof interest is on the (constructive)relationship between the world and itsrepresentation. More specifically, it will beshown how cognitive processes and their primaryconcern to construct a representation of theenvironment and to (...) generate functionallyfitting behavior can act as the basis forembedding the activities and dynamics of theprocess of science in them by making use ofconstructivist concepts, such as functionalfitness, structure determinedness, etc.Cognitive science and artificiallife provide the conceptual framework of representational spaces and their interactionbetween each other and with the environmentenabling us to establish this link betweencognitive processes and thedevelopment/dynamics of scientific theories.The concepts of activation, synaptic weight,and genetic (representational) spaces arepowerful tools which can be used asexplanatory vehiclesfor a cognitivefoundation of science, more specifically forthe context of discovery (i.e., thedevelopment, construction, and dynamics ofscientific theories and paradigms).Representational spaces do not only offer us abetter understanding of embedding science incognition, but also show, how theconstructivist framework, both, can act as anadequate epistemological foundation for theseprocesses and can be instantiated by theserepresentational concepts from cognitivescience. The final part of this paper addresses somemore fundamental questions concerning thepositivistic and constructivist understandingof science and human cognition. Among otherthings it is asked, whether a purelyfunctionalist and quantitative view of theworld aiming almost exclusively at itsprediction and control is really satisfying forour intellect (having the goal of achieving aprofound understanding of reality). (shrink)

This paper introduces an alternative approach to innovation: Emergent Innovation. As opposed to radical innovation Emergent Innovation finds a balance and integrates the demand both for radically new knowledge and at the same time for an organic development from within the organization. From a knowledge management perspective one can boil down this problem to the question of how to cope with the new and with profound change in knowledge. This question will be dealt with in the first part of the (...) paper. As an implication the alternative approach of Emergent Innovation will be presented in the second part: this approach looks at innovation as a socio-epistemological process of “learning from the future”. Keywords: Innovation, radical innovation, emergent innovation, knowledge creation, change. (shrink)

Purpose: Ernst von Glasersfeld’s question concerning the relationship between scientific/ rational knowledge and the domain of wisdom and how these forms of knowledge come about is the starting point. This article aims at developing an epistemological as well as methodological framework that is capable of explaining how profound change can be brought about in various contexts, such as in individual cultivation, in organizations, in processes of radical innovation, etc. This framework is based on the triple-loop learning strategy and the U-theory (...) approach, which opens up a perspective on how the domains of scientific/rational knowledge, constructivism, and wisdom could grow together more closely. Design/Structure: This article develops a strategy which is referred to as “tripleloop learning,” which is not only the basis for processes of profound change, but also brings about a new dimension in the field of learning and knowledge dynamics: the existential realm and the domain of wisdom. A concrete approach that puts into practice the tripleloop learning strategy is presented. The final section shows, how these concepts can be interpreted in the context of the constructivist approach and how they might offer some extensions to this paradigm. Findings: The process of learning and change has to be extended to a domain that concerns existential issues as well as questions of wisdom. Profound change can only happen if these domains are taken into consideration. The tripleloop learning strategy offers a model that fulfills this criterion. It is an “epistemo-existential strategy” for profound change on various levels. Conclusions: The (cognitive) processes and attitudes of receptivity, suspension, redirecting, openness, deep knowing, as well as “profound change/innovation from the interior” turn out to be core concepts in this process. They are compatible with constructivist concepts. Von Glasersfeld’s concept of functional fitness is carried to an extreme in the suggested approach of profound change and finds an extension in the existential domain. Key words: Double-loop learning, individual cultivation, (radical) innovation, knowledge creation, knowledge society, personality development, presencing, profound change, triple-loop learning, U-theory, wisdom. (shrink)

In this paper we review some problems with traditional approaches for acquiring and representing knowledge in the context of developing user interfaces. Methodological implications for knowledge engineering and for human-computer interaction are studied. It turns out that in order to achieve the goal of developing human-oriented (in contrast to technology-oriented) human-computer interfaces developers have to develop sound knowledge of the structure and the representational dynamics of the cognitive system which is interacting with the computer.We show that in a first step (...) it is necessary to study and investigate the different levels and forms of representation that are involved in the interaction processes between computers and human cognitive systems. Only if designers have achieved some understanding about these representational mechanisms, user interfaces enabling individual experiences and skill development can be designed. In this paper we review mechanisms and processes for knowledge representation on a conceptual, epistemological, and methodologieal level, and sketch some ways out of the identified dilemmas for cognitive modeling in the domain of human-computer interaction. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the article “Learning How to Innovate as a Socio-epistemological Process of Co-creation: Towards a Constructivist Teaching Strategy for Innovation” by Markus F. Peschl, Gloria Bottaro, Martina Hartner-Tiefenthaler & Katharina Rötzer. Upshot: I introduce and discuss an advancement of the idea of “learning from the future,” called “interacting with the envisioned future.” Further, this approach is put into the context of the target article and the perspective of radical constructivism.

Context: Cognitive science, as an interdisciplinary research endeavour, poses challenges for teaching and learning insofar as the integration of various participating disciplines requires a reflective approach, considering and making explicit different epistemological attitudes and hidden assumptions and premises. Only few curricula in cognitive science face this integrative challenge. Problem: The lack of integrative activities might result from different challenges for people involved in truly interdisciplinary efforts, such as discussing issues on a conceptual level, negotiating colliding frameworks or sets of premises, (...) asking profound questions challenging one’s own paradigm, and differences in terminologies, as well as from the “personal” challenge of realising one’s own limits of knowledge and, hence, the need to trust in another person’s expertise. This implies that the proposed curriculum structure provides an “epistemic laboratory”: a space for experiencing and negotiating, as well as constructing different viewpoints in a trustful setting. Approach: A newly-designed interdisciplinary cognitive science curriculum is presented that is based on a constructivist epistemology. We suggest that a careful construction of the learning space is a necessary requirement. The MEi:CogSci curriculum is designed and structured in such a way that enables didactical measures that allow for collaborative construction of meaning by discussing concepts, methods and terminologies and also hidden assumptions. Findings: The experience with four cohorts of students has shown that a truly interdisciplinary approach to cognitive science demands a different attitude towards knowledge as well as towards teaching and learning on both sides: the teacher and the student. The research orientation promotes an understanding of knowledge as something that is actively constructed, rendering the role of the teacher that of a co-learner rather than a transmitter of knowledge, thereby also changing the responsibility of students. (shrink)

Purpose: In the educational field a lack of focus on the process of arriving at a level of profound understanding of a phenomenon can be observed. While classical approaches in education focus on "downloading," repeating, or sometimes optimizing relatively stable chunks of knowledge (both facts and procedural knowledge), this paper proposes to shift the center of attention towards a more dynamic and constructivist perspective: learning as a process of individual and collective knowledge creation and knowledge construction. The goal of this (...) process is to profoundly understand a phenomenon in its multi-dimensionality and complexity and to reflect on the processes that have lead to this understanding. The issue we want to tackle in this paper is how this profound understanding can be brought about in a technology-enhanced learning environment. Method: Part 1 of this paper explores strategies of technology-enhanced knowledge sharing/creation in the field of higher education. Part 2 presents a successful blended learning scenario that illustrates the implementation of these learning strategies in a concrete course design. In this case study students are involved in active theory construction processes by conducting virtual experiments with a virtual organism. Part 3 elaborates on the epistemological implications of this case study. Findings: A constructivist framework for modes of knowing and modes of coming to know is developed. It is shown that -- in order to reach a profound understanding of a phenomenon -- it is essential to take into account the multi-facetted character of knowledge and to use the strategy of double-loop learning. Conclusion: This leads to an understanding of learning/teaching as a process of socio-epistemological engineering. Furthermore, the role of the teacher changes in such a constructivist setting of learning/teaching: Their primary task is to provide a "pedagogically (and technologically) augmented environment." They are responsible for creating an atmosphere of collective knowledge construction and reflection. Beyond the role of a coach and moderator the teacher has to act as a facilitator or "enabler" for the (individual and collective) processes of double-loop learning. (shrink)

Context: Radical constructivism (RC) is seen as a fruitful way to teach innovation, as Ernst von Glasersfeld’s concepts of knowing, learning, and teaching provide an epistemological framework fostering processes of generating an autonomous conceptual understanding. Problem: Classical educational approaches do not meet the requirements for teaching and learning innovation because they mostly aim at students’ competent performance, not at students’ understanding and developing their creative capabilities. Method: Analysis of theoretical principles from the constructivist framework and how they can be used (...) as a foundation for designing a course in the field of innovation. The empirical results are based on qualitative journal entries that were coded and categorized according to Charmaz’s grounded theory approach. Results: It is shown that there is a close relationship between learning and innovation processes. The proposed investigated course design based on RC incorporates the following concepts: the course setting is understood as a framework to guide understanding; students work in teams and are subjective constructors of their own knowledge; instructors take on the role of coaches, guiding students through an innovation process as co-creators. Such a framework facilitates dynamic processes of assimilation and accommodation, as well as perturbation through the “other,” which potentially lead to novel, and viable, conceptual structures crucial for sustainable innovation. Constructivist Content: The paper argues in favor of RC principles in the context of teaching and learning. The proposed course setting is oriented at von Glasersfeld’s understanding of knowing, learning, and teaching (vs. training. It outlines theoretical and practical aspects of these principles in the context of a course design for innovation. Furthermore, it shows the importance of von Glasersfeld’s concept of intersubjectivity for processes of accommodation and the generation of (novel) autonomous conceptual structures. The interplay between creating coherence, perturbation, and irritation through interacting with the “other” (in the form of co-students and instructors) is assumed to be vital for such processes, as it leads to the creation of not only novel but also viable conceptual structures, therefore re-establishing a relative equilibrium critical for sustainable innovation. (shrink)

Upshot: This response focuses on the following issues, which summarize the points made by the commentaries: (i) further reflection on and details of the methodological framework that was applied to studying the proposed design of our innovation course, (ii) the issue of generalizability of the findings for teaching innovation (in this context the question of generic or transferable skills will become central), and (iii) finally, more precise explanation of what we mean by “learning from the future as it emerges.”.

Borsboom, Cramer, and Kalis propose that the network approach blocks reductionism in psychopathology. We argue that the two main arguments, intentionality and multiple realizability of mental disorders, are not sufficient to establish that mental disorders are not brain disorders, and that the specific role of networks in these arguments is unclear.

The network approach to psychopathology is becoming increasingly popular. The motivation for this approach is to provide a replacement for the problematic common cause perspective and the associated latent variable model, where symptoms are taken to be mere effects of a common cause (the disorder itself). The idea is that the latent variable model is plausible for medical diseases, but unrealistic for mental disorders, which should rather be conceptualized as networks of directly interacting symptoms. We argue that this rationale for (...) the network approach is misguided. Latent variable (or common cause) models are not inherently problematic, and there is not even a clear boundary where network models end and latent variable (or common cause) models begin. We also argue that focusing on this contrast has led to an unrealistic view of testing and finding support for the network approach, as well as an oversimplified picture of the relationship between medical diseases and mental disorders. As an alternative, we point out more essential contrasts, such as the contrast between dynamic and static modeling approaches, that can provide a better framework for conceptualizing mental disorders. Finally, we discuss several topics and open problems that need to be addressed in order to make the network approach more concrete and to move the field of psychological network research forward. (shrink)

In this paper, we explore the architecture of downward causation on the basis of three central cases. We set out by answering the question of how top-down causation is possible in the universe. The universe is not causally closed, because of irreducible randomness at the quantum level. What is more, contextual effects can already be observed at the level of quantum physics, where higher levels can modify the nature of lower-level elements by changing their context, or even creating them. As (...) one moves up through higher levels, contextual effects on lower levels occur on various scales within nature, which is crucial in biology in general and the brain in particular. We then argue that there are important logical downward causes.objects have causal effects on material-energetic systems. It can be shown that abstract objects have measurable effects on lower levels, which needs to be accounted for by successful explanations of real phenomena such as intentional action. Intentional action has the form of deductive causation from logical structures to human agency. Without this assumption, we would not be warranted in believing that our physical theories latch onto a universe that is essentially the way we discover it to be. Denying top-down causation on account of the idea that the universe permits only bottom-up constitution of wholes from lower-level elements leads to undermining the very possibility of knowledge and science. Thus, it can be rejected as a global form of explanation. We sketch a model for mind-body interaction according to which the various levels of a human organism together enable the emergence of mental top-down effects. They are necessary conditions for the emergence of human mindedness. Once it is clear that downward causation is a widespread natural phenomenon, the apparent mystery of mental causation is, in principle, solved. (shrink)

Metaphysics, traditionally conceived, has often been defined as the inquiry into what lies beyond or is independent of experience, but which nonetheless pertains to the fundamental structure of reality. Thus understood, metaphysics produces claims that are not empirically testable. The 20th century logical empiricists famously—and ferociously—criticised metaphysics on these grounds as being devoid of cognitive content. Despite logical empiricism’s seminal role in the genesis and propagation of the analytic tradition in academic philosophy, metaphysics has made a remarkable comeback during the (...) second half of the 20th century. Contemporary analytic metaphysicians unabashedly refer to intuitions, conceptual analysis, and other genuinely philosophical, speculative methods in their search for insights into the fundamental nature of reality. Or so it seems. (shrink)

Preface to Journal of General Philosophy of Science, issue 2: Meta2physics. New Perspectives on Analytic and Naturalised Metaphysics of Science.

Despite pervasive variation in the content of laws, legal theorists and anthropologists have argued that laws share certain abstract features and even speculated that law may be a human universal. In the present report, we evaluate this thesis through an experiment administered in 11 different countries. Are there cross‐cultural principles of law? In a between‐subjects design, participants (N = 3,054) were asked whether there could be laws that violate certain procedural principles (e.g., laws applied retrospectively or unintelligible laws), and also (...) whether there are any such laws. Confirming our preregistered prediction, people reported that such laws cannot exist, but also (paradoxically) that there are such laws. These results document cross‐culturally and –linguistically robust beliefs about the concept of law which defy people's grasp of how legal systems function in practice. (shrink)

Peer review is a widely accepted instrument for raising the quality of science. Peer review limits the enormous unstructured influx of information and the sheer amount of dubious data, which in its absence would plunge science into chaos. In particular, peer review offers the benefit of eliminating papers that suffer from poor craftsmanship or methodological shortcomings, especially in the experimental sciences. However, we believe that peer review is not always appropriate for the evaluation of controversial hypothetical science. We argue that (...) the process of peer review can be prone to bias towards ideas that affirm the prior convictions of reviewers and against innovation and radical new ideas. Innovative hypotheses are thus highly vulnerable to being “filtered out” or made to accord with conventional wisdom by the peer review process. Consequently, having introduced peer review, the Elsevier journal Medical Hypotheses may be unable to continue its tradition as a radical journal allowing discussion of improbable or unconventional ideas. Hence we conclude by asking the publisher to consider re-introducing the system of editorial review to Medical Hypotheses. (shrink)

A cross-cultural survey experiment revealed a dominant tendency to rely on a rule’s letter over its spirit when deciding which behaviors violate the rule. This tendency varied markedly across (k = 15) countries, owing to variation in the impact of moral appraisals on judgments of rule violation. Compared with laypeople, legal experts were more inclined to disregard their moral evaluations of the acts altogether and consequently exhibited stronger textualist tendencies. Finally, we evaluated a plausible mechanism for the emergence of textualism: (...) in a two-player coordination game, incentives to coordinate in the absence of communication reinforced participants’ adherence to rules’ literal meaning. Together, these studies (total n = 5,794) help clarify the origins and allure of textualism, especially in the law. Within heterogeneous communities in which members diverge in their moral appraisals involving a rule’s purpose, the rule’s literal meaning provides a clear focal point—an identifiable point of agreement enabling coordinated interpretation among citizens, lawmakers, and judges. (shrink)

Marsilius of Inghen’s Commentary on the Sentences evinces the history of Scholasticism between Ockham and Luther. The part edited here discusses the Trinity revealing new evidence on the debates among Realists and Nominalists at the Universities of Paris and Heidelberg.

The principles of biomedical ethics – autonomy, non-maleficence, beneficence, and justice – are of paradigmatic importance for framing ethical problems in medicine and for teaching ethics to medical students and professionals. In order to underline this significance, Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress base the principles in the common morality, i.e. they claim that the principles represent basic moral values shared by all persons committed to morality and are thus grounded in human moral psychology. We empirically investigated the relationship (...) of the principles to other moral and non-moral values that provide orientations in medicine. By way of comparison, we performed a similar analysis for the business & finance domain. (shrink)