Kierkegaard: the Holy and the true.--Paul: the truth in Christ.--Dostoevsky: the Holy and the good.--Luther: the goodness of God.--Nietzsche: the Holy and the beautiful.--Bach: the beauty of holiness.

The problem of change has assumed great prominence in much of the current ferment in theology, and many of the issues in question can best be interpreted as relating to the validity and limits of doctrinal development. The questions cannot be faced constructively, however, until the development of doctrine has been clearly charted, a historical as well as a theological assignment. In this unique introductory survey—more modest in scope but more scholarly in method than Cardinal Newman’s great programmatic essay of (...) 1845—Mr. Pelikan presents three case histories of the particular doctrines that have crucial points of division among Christians. His cogent analyses of Cyprian on Original Sin, Athanasius on the Virgin Mary, and Hilary on the Holy Spirit demonstrate the interaction between the sacramental life of the Church and the intellectual work of the theologian that consistently marked the development of doctrine by the early Fathers. Thus they clarify some central aspects of the continuing theological and ecumenical debates. Mr. Pelikan, Titus Street Professor of Ecclesiastical History at Yale University, is the author of many books and articles, including a forthcoming full-scale history of the development of doctrine. (shrink)

A review of deVries' and O'Shea's books, both titled "Wilfrid Sellars". By Jaroslav Peregrin.

Tomáš Marvan Otázka významu: Cesty analytické filosofie jazyka. 1. vyd. Praha: Togga, 2010, ISBN 978-80-87258-33-0, 150 stran.

We investigate several ideal versions of the pseudointersection number \(\mathfrak {p}\), ideal slalom numbers, and associated topological spaces with the focus on selection principles. However, it turns out that well-known pseudointersection invariant \(\mathtt {cov}^*({\mathcal I})\) has a crucial influence on the studied notions. For an invariant \(\mathfrak {p}_\mathrm {K}({\mathcal J})\) introduced by Borodulin-Nadzieja and Farkas (Arch. Math. Logic 51:187–202, 2012), and an invariant \(\mathfrak {p}_\mathrm {K}({\mathcal I},{\mathcal J})\) introduced by Repický (Real Anal. Exchange 46:367–394, 2021), we have $$\begin{aligned} \min \{\mathfrak (...) {p}_\mathrm {K}({\mathcal I}),\mathtt {cov}^*({\mathcal I})\}=\mathfrak {p},\qquad \min \{\mathfrak {p}_\mathrm {K}({\mathcal I},{\mathcal J}),\mathtt {cov}^*({\mathcal J})\}\le \mathtt {cov}^*({\mathcal I}), \end{aligned}$$ respectively. In addition to the first inequality, for a slalom invariant \(\mathfrak {sl_e}({\mathcal I},{\mathcal J})\) introduced in Šupina (J. Math. Anal. Appl. 434:477–491, 2016), we show that $$\begin{aligned} \min \{\mathfrak {p}_\mathrm {K}({\mathcal I}),\mathfrak {sl_e}({\mathcal I},{\mathcal J}),\mathtt {cov}^*({\mathcal J})\}=\mathfrak {p}. \end{aligned}$$ Finally, we obtain a consistency that ideal versions of the Fréchet–Urysohn property and the strictly Fréchet–Urysohn property are distinguished. (shrink)

In his proof of the first incompleteness theorem, Kurt Gödel provided a method of showing the truth of specific arithmetical statements on the condition that all the axioms of a certain formal theory of arithmetic are true. Furthermore, the statement whose truth is shown in this way cannot be proved in the theory in question. Thus it may seem that the relation of logical consequence is wider than the relation of derivability by a pre-defined set of rules. The aim of (...) this paper is to explore under which assumptions the Gödelian statement can rightly be considered a logical consequence of the axioms of the theory in question. It is argued that this is the case only when the all the theorems of the theory in question are understood as statements of the same kind as statements of arithmetic and statements about provability in the theory, and only if the language of the theory contains logical expressions allowing to include certain predicates of meta-language in the language of the theory. (shrink)