pt. 1. lecture 1. Meet the beast ; lecture 2. Medieval formulations ; lecture 3. The Reformation, the apocalypse revived ; lecture 4. Prophecy and science I, Francis Bacon ; lecture 5. John Milton and freedom of the press ; lecture 6. New Heaven, new earth, modern democracy ; lecture 7. Andrew Marvell, poet of the Republic ; lecture 9. The universe as matter, the universe as spirit -- pt. 2. lecture 10. The hope of Israel, the origins of toleration (...) ; lecture 11. Anti-Antichrist, the limits of prophecy ; lecture 12. Prophecy and Science II, prophecy and progress ; lecture 13. The apocalypse and the American Revolution ; lecture 14. Antichrist and the post-apocalyptic age, cold war ideology ; lecture 15. Antichrist and the post-apocalyptic age, Martin Luther King, Jr. ; lecture 16. Antichrist and the post-apocalyptic age, belief against politics. (shrink)

Munro adopts the emendations veris for Veneris and Zephyrus for Zephyri , making Zephyrus the ‘winged harbinger of Spring.’ As to the order of the procession, Munro takes one view in his translation and another in his notes: according to the latter it is ‘Zephyrus, Spring, Venus, Flora,’ the flowers springing up where Spring, Venus, and Zephyrus have trodden: according to the translation it is ‘Flora, Zephyrus, Spring, Venus.’ Duff, in his edition, adheres to the MSS. reading as printed above: (...) Veneris praenuntius pennatus is Cupid, and the order of the procession is ‘Zephyrus, Flora , Cupid, Spring and Venus .’ With this reading and interpretation, which are probably right, quibus goes in construction with praespargens: Munro, reading Zephyrus, takes quibus with uestigia propter, ‘in whose tracks’ , so that with his reading his note is right and his translation—‘along the path they tread mother Flora straws all the way before them’—is wrong, or at least not so probable, as quibus propter uestigia would be more naturally said of one following behind. (shrink)

This volume succeeds the same authors' well-known An Introduction to Modal Logic and A Companion to Modal Logic. We designate the three books and their authors NIML, IML, CML and H&C respectively. Sadly, George Hughes died partway through the writing of NIML.

BOOK REVIEWS 297 to and 21o), Receuil ~ l'usage des prkdicateurs in an Auxerre manuscript , and a Latin-Arabic Glossary preserved in a single Leiden manuscript . The estimate to be made of this Work must be all but totally positive. The complex organization of the volume can make difficulties, despite a useful index; Tolan's refer- ence to "five" authentic works perhaps includes the De Machometo since only four, Dialogi, Zij al-Sindhind, Epistola ad peripateticos and Disciplina clericalis have survived his (...) scrutiny. Tolan has conveyed deftly the fluid quality of a mediaeval book. Copied and recopied for readers whose varied interests might inspire additions and omissions, a mediaeval treatise might be reworked by the author himself and no longer be the book that it was. Alfonsian studies have been advanced by Tolan's urbane estimate of these works and of their reception by Latin Europe in the twelfth-century struggle to share the scientific and cultural achievements of Judaism and Islam. EDWARD A. SYNAN Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies and University of Toronto Raymond B. Waddington and Arthur H. Williamson, editors. The Expulsion of the Jews: r492 andAfler. Garland Studies in the Renaissance, Volume 2. New York: Garland Publishing, t994. Pp. x + ~96. Cloth, $48.oo. In t992 there were many conferences commemorating the expulsion of the Jews from Spain five.. (shrink)

The picture of information acquisition as the elimination of possibilities has proven fruitful in many domains, serving as a foundation for formal models in philosophy, linguistics, computer science, and economics. While the picture appears simple, its formalization in dynamic epistemic logic reveals subtleties: given a valid principle of information dynamics in the language of dynamic epistemic logic, substituting complex epistemic sentences for its atomic sentences may result in an invalid principle. In this article, we explore such failures of uniform substitution. (...) First, we give epistemic examples inspired by Moore, Fitch, and Williamson. Second, we answer affirmatively a question posed by van Benthem: can we effectively decide when every substitution instance of a given dynamic epistemic principle is valid? In technical terms, we prove the decidability of this schematic validity problem for public announcement logic (PAL and PAL-RC) over models for finitely many fully introspective agents, as well as models for infinitely many arbitrary agents. The proof of this result illuminates the reasons for the failure of uniform substitution. (shrink)

This is the second volume in the new monograph series sponsored by the American Philosophical Quarterly and judging by the high quality of most of the essays in this collection the idea for such a series seems to be a good one. A wide variety of topics in contemporary philosophical logic are discussed in seven essays, as suggested by the following brief account of their contents: Montgomery Furth's "Two Types of Denotation" is a careful study of Frege's views of denotation, (...) function, and object which manages to make some original suggestions as well as to clear up some confusing features of Frege's discussion. Jaako Hintikka's "Language Games for Quantifiers" develops interesting connections between the uses of quantifiers and various verbs related to seeking and finding and with these connections in mind offers a game theoretic interpretation of quantifiers. J. W. Cornman's admirably clear essay "Types, Categories and Nonsense" discusses the views of Ryle, Russell, Black, Pap, and Sommers on categories and types, formulating criteria of type difference close to that of Sommers. In "A Theory of Conditionals," R. C. Stalnaker takes some clues from the semantical analysis of modal logics in order to present an analysis of 'if... then...' statements and to deal with some epistemological problems about counterfactuals. In "Goodman's Nominalism," A. Hausman and C. Echelberger discuss certain facts which, in their view, no nominalist ontology, including Goodman's can deal with. Ted Honderlich's "Truth: Austin, Strawson, Warnock" is a discussion of Austin's views on truth and some of the confusions surrounding commentary on and criticism of it. Honderlich suggests his own definition of truth in the article. Finally, Colwyn Williamson in "Propositions andPropositions" discusses the various arguments which have been put forward to show that propositions are entities of a sort distinct from sentences. He rejects all such arguments as well as their conclusion.--R. H. K. (shrink)

Knowledge and its Limits presents a systematic new conception of knowledge as a kind of mental stage sensitive to the knower's environment. It makes a major contribution to the debate between externalist and internalist philosophies of mind, and breaks radically with the epistemological tradition of analyzing knowledge in terms of true belief. The theory casts new light on such philosophical problems as scepticism, evidence, probability and assertion, realism and anti-realism, and the limits of what can be known. The arguments are (...) illustrated by rigorous models based on epistemic logic and probability theory. The result is a new way of doing epistemology and a notable contribution to the philosophy of mind. (shrink)

This paper deals with higher-order vagueness in Williamson's 'logic of clarity'. Its aim is to prove that for 'fixed margin models' (W,d,α ,[ ]) the notion of higher-order vagueness collapses to second-order vagueness. First, it is shown that fixed margin models can be reformulated in terms of similarity structures (W,~). The relation ~ is assumed to be reflexive and symmetric, but not necessarily transitive. Then, it is shown that the structures (W,~) come along with naturally defined maps h and (...) s that define a Galois connection on the power set PW of W. These maps can be used to define two distinct boundary operators bd and BD on W. The main theorem of the paper states that higher-order vagueness with respect to bd collapses to second-order vagueness. This does not hold for BD, the iterations of which behave in quite an erratic way. In contrast, the operator bd defines a variety of tolerance principles that do not fall prey to the sorites paradox and, moreover, do not always satisfy the principles of positive and negative introspection. (shrink)

Second-order logic and modal logic are both, separately, major topics of philosophical discussion. Although both have been criticized by Quine and others, increasingly many philosophers find their strictures uncompelling, and regard both branches of logic as valuable resources for the articulation and investigation of significant issues in logical metaphysics and elsewhere. One might therefore expect some combination of the two sorts of logic to constitute a natural and more comprehensive background logic for metaphysics. So it is somewhat surprising to find (...) that philosophical discussion of secondorder modal logic is almost totally absent, despite the pioneering contribution of Barcan. (shrink)

I. An argument is presented for the conclusion that the hypothesis that no one will ever decide a given proposition is intuitionistically inconsistent. II. A distinction between sentences and statements blocks a similar argument for the stronger conclusion that the hypothesis that I have not yet decided a given proposition is intuitionistically inconsistent, but does not block the original argument. III. A distinction between empirical and mathematical negation might block the original argument, and empirical negation might be modelled on Nelson''s (...) strong negation, but only on intuitionistically unacceptable assumptions. IV. Intuitionists may have to accept the original argument, and therefore be committed to a dubious view of time on which there cannot be merely inductive evidence for statements about the infinite future. (shrink)

The chapter argues that a model‐building methodology like that widespread in contemporary natural and social science already plays a significant role in philosophy. One neglected form of progress in philosophy over the past fifty years has been the development of better and better formal models of significant phenomena. Examples are given from both philosophy of language and epistemology. Philosophy can do still better in the future by applying model‐building methods more systematically and self‐consciously, with consequent readjustments to its methodology. Although (...) it is neither likely nor desirable for model‐building to become the sole or even main philosophical method, its use enhances the power and reliability of philosophical thinking. (shrink)